Iran Crisis Update, November 26

Nov 26, 2022 - ISW Press


Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Dana Alexander Gray, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 26, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly rejected the possibility of compromise or reform to placate the ongoing protests on November 26. Khamenei reiterated his hard line on the protests and his accusation that foreign actors incited the unrest. He ended his speech with a Quranic verse that social media users interpreted as further affirmation that he will not make concessions.[1] Khamenei made these remarks in a meeting with Basij members and lauded their role in protest suppression. 

Khamenei may have meant to use his speech to signal to other senior regime officials his disapproval of cooperating with reformists to quell the protests. Some regime power centers have signaled their willingness to cooperate with reformists and possibly implement limited reform in recent weeks. President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani discussed implementing unspecified “liberalizing measures” with reformist leaders, including members of the Khomeini and Rafsanjani families, in exchange for help quelling protests in late October and possibly early November, according to the Wall Street Journal.[2] Other senior regime officials, including Mojtaba Khamenei, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi have met with reformist politicians in recent days as well.[3] If true, it is noteworthy that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has seemingly not yet agreed to meet with reformists given that many of his counterparts across the Islamic Republic have. A prominent journal published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) furthermore responded positively on November 21 to former reformist President Mohammad Khatami’s calls for dialogue to address protester grievances.[4] 

Khamenei has conversely rejected reformist outreach. Mohammad Ali Abtahi—who is a close political associate of Khatami—stated on November 26 that Khatami wrote a letter to Khamenei about the protests.[5] Abtahi added that “there is no sign that [Khamenei] has considered” the letter. Khamenei’s apparent rejection of Khatami may indicate a divide between the supreme leader and some of his subordinates over how to engage the reformists. One should not overstate any such potential disagreement, however. It is highly unlikely that any senior regime officials considering cooperation with reformists would disobey or ignore Khamenei’s orders.

Many regime officials support Khamenei’s uncompromising stance toward the protests, on the other hand. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi expressed implicit support for the regime using more brutality in the protest crackdown on November 21.[6] Some hardline media outlets have similarly called for security forces to use less restraint against protesters.[7] This rhetoric indicates that at least some regime circles prefer more repression rather than limited reform.

President Ebrahim Raisi visited members of the Basij special forces on November 25, confirming their involvement in the protest crackdown.[8] Raisi met with members of the Basij Fatehin battalions and lauded their role in protest suppression.[9] The Fatehin battalions are Basij special forces that have suppressed previous protest waves and deployed to Syria to fight for despot Bashar al Assad.[10] These forces operate sniper elements.[11] The Basij has established Fatehin units in every province, according to IRGC-affiliated media.[12]

Protests centered primarily around universities on November 25, highlighting once again the different demographics that comprise the protest movement. This movement includes university and high school students, minority communities in the border regions, urban elite, and many more. Each of these demographics has led the protests at a different point in this movement, granting it an impressive degree of resilience.

Protest coordinators and organizations have called for protests throughout Iran from December 5 to 7.[13]

Key Takeaways

  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly rejected the possibility of compromise or reform to placate the ongoing protests. Khamenei may have meant to use his speech to signal to other senior regime officials his disapproval of cooperating with reformists to quell the protests.
  • President Ebrahim Raisi visited members of the Basij special forces on November 25, confirming their involvement in the protest crackdown.
  • Protest coordinators and organizations have called for protests throughout Iran from December 5 to 7.
  • Protests centered primarily around universities, highlighting once again the different demographics that comprise the protest movement
  • At least 15 protests took place in four cities across four provinces.
  • Dozens of local leaders from Baneh, Kurdistan Province issued a video statement condemning the regime crackdown and expressing support for the protesters.
  • Iranian-backed militants fired two rockets at US patrol base in Hasaka Province, Syria.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least 15 protests took place in four cities across four provinces. CTP assesses with high to moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on November 26:

Note: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and protests as over one thousand.

Karaj, Alborz Province[14]

  • Crowd Size: Small

Karaj, Alborz Province[15]

  • Crowd Size: Undetermined
  • Demographic: Kharazami University of Karaj students
  • Regime Repression: Security personnel filmed protesters

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[16]

  • Crowd Size: Small

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[17]

  • Crowd Size: Medium
  • Demographic: Esfahan University of Technology students

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[18]

  • Crowd Size: Medium
  • Protest Type: Strike and protest
  • Demographic: Steel workers

Alvand, Ghazvin Province[19]

  • Crowd Size: Undetermined
  • Protest Type: Strike and protest
  • Demographic: Industrial workers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[20]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Protest Type: Strike and protest
  • Protester Activity: Fire lit in street
  • Demographic: Automobile workers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[21]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Amir Kabir University of Technology students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[22]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: University of Science and Culture students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[23]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Allameh Tabataba'i University students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[24]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: University of Tehran students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[25]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Kharazami University of Tehran students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[26]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Protest Activity: Fires lit in street

Tehran City, Tehran Province[27]

  • Crowd Size: Small

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on November 26:

Tehran City, Tehran Province[28]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Protest Activity: Sit in
  • Demographic: Sharif University of Technology students
 
 

Dozens of local leaders from Baneh, Kurdistan Province issued a video statement condemning the regime crackdown and expressing support for the protesters on November 26.[29] These individuals showed their faces allowing their easy identification and risking regime punishment for their actions. This statement is similar to previous video statement from several dozen Sunni clerics and religious leaders in Kurdistan Province expressing support for the protesters on November 21.[30]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Iranian-backed militants fired two rockets at US patrol base in Hasaka Province, Syria on November 25.[31] The attack caused no casualties or damage.[32] CTP previously reported that likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack on US forces in northeastern Syria on November 17.[33] The IRGC likely directed these attacks to expel US forces from the region and also to respond to Washington’s perceived role in stoking protests.

 

[1] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1596494118934511622

[2] https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-protests-government-mahsa-amini-11669137860

[3] https://www.iranintl.com/202211241814

[4] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/irgc-media-hint-at-dialogue-facilitated-by-reformist-ex-president

[5] https://eslahatnews dot com/%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%AD%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-22

[7] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/iranian-conservatives-demand-harsher-crackdown-as-protest-death-toll-rises

[8] www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/09/05/2811995

[9] www.president dot ir/fa/140988

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf

[11] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/10/irgc-to-expand-basij-special-forces.php

[12] www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1399/01/31/2240536

[13] https://twitter.com/OutFarsi/status/1596515145114607616?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ

[14] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1596568134403690498?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1596579365235486722?s=20&t=FzbzURxqsuES6A1EqgsoBQ ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1596575990410784769?s=20&t=FzbzURxqsuES6A1EqgsoBQ

[15] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596536215918067714?s=20&t=vezDyfkIW8qK0cGP9YoIEw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596535690396946436?s=20&t=7-SQQ1a3ituszWApFXjTAg ; https://twitter.com/vaasnaaa/status/1596576191531700227?s=20&t=7-SQQ1a3ituszWApFXjTAg ; https://twitter.com/Sahand_Ava/status/1596542232013987840?s=20&t=7-SQQ1a3ituszWApFXjTAg ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1596531234737364993?s=20&t=pLceLPFpPFk9ps5CWBt12w

[16] https://twitter.com/VIsfehan/status/1596549802598322176?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ

[17]  https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1596595898875641857?s=20&t=qHRrIekkBDG15ywemlmOmQ ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596454978499010562?s=20&t=qHRrIekkBDG15ywemlmOmQ

[18] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1596464333696819200?s=20&t=XoJ5uRym-DJvImhpBSQVvQ  ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596575891550871552?s=20&t=XoJ5uRym-DJvImhpBSQVvQ ; https://twitter.com/Lajbaz57/status/1596594539073970176?s=20&t=XoJ5uRym-DJvImhpBSQVvQ ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1596460936793305089?s=20&t=XoJ5uRym-DJvImhpBSQVvQ  ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596437215315480576?s=20&t=XoJ5uRym-DJvImhpBSQVvQ

[19] https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1596434826197966849?s=20&t=oP4XtAB9-kgiQmLTwlS8dw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596435023905067015?s=20&t=THwBzum2LyychH3PAM_WZA ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1596430803407339522?s=20&t=THwBzum2LyychH3PAM_WZA ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1596448393932390401?s=20&t=THwBzum2LyychH3PAM_WZA

[20] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1596434789854240768?s=20&t=-lNwjhgFmm9YNTxIKcWVhw

[21] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1596432928405606400?s=20&t=PA8h05YKp0lXyxWGTTg9xA ; https://twitter.com/nikimahjoub/status/1596491486191030276?s=20&t=PA8h05YKp0lXyxWGTTg9xA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596411580362952705?s=20&t=noWe62yp_rf47q8q4VDxRw

[22] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1596443658903076865?s=20&t=CET0NNX8WGLOuqEB548J_g ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596454346811662336?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1596456399135207425?s=20&t=CET0NNX8WGLOuqEB548J_g ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1596464649641332741?s=20&t=CET0NNX8WGLOuqEB548J_g

[23] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596537100932874240?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1596524497623924736?s=20&t=A5PivXCbLtx4sny8-tAbnw

[24] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596538208250126336?s=20&t=C5zhanB1GHJ2_I-2XQ9S1w ; https://twitter.com/indypersian/status/1596527693213978627?s=20&t=C5zhanB1GHJ2_I-2XQ9S1w ; https://twitter.com/SedayeShahrivar/status/1596541262571659264?s=20&t=C5zhanB1GHJ2_I-2XQ9S1w

[25] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596534433233920001?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1596602191107616768?s=20&t=pLceLPFpPFk9ps5CWBt12w ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1596509170076995584?s=20&t=pLceLPFpPFk9ps5CWBt12w

[26] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1596584413072089088?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1596581290333331456?s=20&t=twJQwoPLAru6CH9k2GsVOQ ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1596581121608716289?s=20&t=H9H0IOtp-quNSzySS__fRw

[27] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596582204783697921?s=20&t=U4yatR4dx-IFeU3tMRr7Zg ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596582505288695810?s=20&t=qHRrIekkBDG15ywemlmOmQ ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1596589724197654528?s=20&t=U4yatR4dx-IFeU3tMRr7Zg

[28] https://twitter.com/pouriazeraati/status/1596473265475981312?s=20&t=dfIuCqpbSiH2SnFaqqrstw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1596430591511375872?s=20&t=4mcITkXXKWx8UeMVbUhbCQ

[29] https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1596574986055356416

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-21

[31] https://www.syriahr dot com/en/277597/

[32] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1596277600036470784

[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-17

 

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