Iran Update, April 27, 2023

Iran Update, April 27, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Zachary Coles, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

April 27, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.    

The domestic Iranian information space is currently shaped such that violence against religious figures is being viewed as part of escalating tensions between the public and Iranian regime. Iranian social media users circulated a video of an unidentified car driver seemingly trying to run over a cleric in Tehran City, Tehran Province on April 27.[1] This incident follows a bank security guard killing Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26.[2] Many social media users have connected these incidents, arguing that the relationship between regime dissidents and loyalists has become more tense and sensitive in recent months.[3] The driver’s motive for attempting to run over the cleric on April 27 remains unclear. It is possible that the driver deliberately attempted to harm the cleric out of frustration toward the regime. The driver’s decision to attack the cleric is noteworthy regardless of the motive given the extent to which the killing of Ali Soleimani captured the national attention the day prior.

The recent violence against members of the clerical establishment corroborates CTP’s previous assessment that the regime’s encouragement of pro-regime loyalists to enforce mandatory veiling could exacerbate tensions between regime dissidents and supporters.[4] Khorasan Razavi Provincial Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Kazem Taghavi separately announced on April 27 the arrest of two females who assaulted an individual enforcing regime morality standards in this province.[5] This incident underscores that the regime’s refusal to grant sociocultural concessions to the population is fueling physical altercations between regime dissidents and loyalists. Such incidents could continue as citizens remain devoid of any other outlet to release their frustrations and grievances toward the regime.

Iranian state media published slightly differing reports on Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s call for privatizing the economy on April 27. Ghalibaf made these comments while visiting local companies in East Azerbaijan Province. Iranian Students’ News Agency framed Ghalibaf’s remarks as an urgent call for privatizing Iran’s economy to “save the country.”[6] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency similarly reported Ghalibaf’s call for economic privatization but did not report “save the country,” assigning less urgency to the issue.[7] Ghalibaf called for the government and parastatal organizations to decrease their involvement in the Iranian economy on February 22, as CTP previously reported.[8]

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari announced plans to “restore the security situation” in Tarmiyah, Salah al Din Province, Iraq on April 27, which could lead to Iranian-backed Shia militias conducting sectarian cleansing against the local Sunni community under the guise of counter-ISIS operations. Shammari unveiled his plan after visiting Tarmiyah on April 17.[9] ISIS attacks Iraqi Security Forces in Tarmiyah regularly.[10] Shammari did not specify the measures included in his plan, but Al Araby Al Jadeed reported on April 27 that local residents are concerned he will deploy elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[11] The 6th Iraqi Army Division and the Tarmiyah Regiment—a PMF unit comprised of locals— are already stationed in Tarmiyah, suggesting locals are concerned specifically about the possible deployment of non-local, Iranian-backed PMF forces.[12] Iranian-backed militias previously advocated for the sectarian cleansing of Tarmiyah after an ISIS attack in the town in February 2023.[13]  Iranian-backed PMF militants have previously massacred Sunni civilians in response to ISIS attacks targeting PMF units. Asaib Ahl al Haq killed eight Sunni civilians in Farhatiya—35 kilometers north of Tarmiyah—in October 2021, for instance.[14] The Badr Organization has similarly exploited its control over Diyala Province, which borders Tarmiyah, to force out Sunni inhabitants in sectarian cleansing efforts under the guise of counter-ISIS operations.[15] Iranian-backed militia and US-designated terrorist organization Kataib Hezbollah has separately cleansed Jurf al Sakhr of its Sunni population and turned the town into a military bastion inaccessible to federal Iraqi officials.[16]

ISIS is setting conditions to take advantage of Iranian-backed militia efforts to cleanse Tarmiyah of the Sunni population. ISIS responded to Iranian-backed militia calls to cleanse Tarmiyah of its Sunni population in February 2023, stating that the militias aim to “extend [Iranian-backed militia] influence over [Tarmiyah], steal [Tarmiyah’s] wealth, and displace [Tarmiyah’s] people.”[17] ISIS has historic support zones in Tarmiyah, which is one of the primary towns in the northern Baghdad Belts. The Baghdad Belts are a series of rural and semi-urban towns surrounding Baghdad that ISIS and its predecessors use to stage attacks into the capital.[18] ISIS’s predecessor—al Qaeda in Iraq—similarly leveraged Shia militia abuses to present itself as a security guarantor for Sunni communities in the early 2010s, allowing it to reconstitute its support structures and rapidly reconstitute its insurgency after the withdrawal of US forces.[19]

Key Takeaways

• The domestic Iranian information space is currently shaped such that violence against religious figures is being viewed as part of escalating tensions between the public and Iranian regime.
• Iranian state media published slightly differing reports on Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s call for privatizing the economy.
• Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari announced plans to “restore the security situation” in Tarmiyah, Salah al Din Province, Iraq on April 27, which could lead to Iranian-backed Shia militias conducting sectarian cleansing against the local Sunni community under the guise of counter-ISIS operations.
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with senior Lebanese politicians during an official visit to Beirut.
• The Artesh Navy seized the Chinese-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Advantage Sweet in the Gulf of Oman.
• The Iran-aligned Shia Coordination Framework is trying to further manipulate Iraqi elections processes to consolidate its political power.
• IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander for Abu Kamal Hajj Sajjad met with an unidentified Russian general in Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred on April 27. CTP assesses with low confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[20]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Nurses

CTP recorded one strike in Kerman City, Kerman Province on April 27.[21]

Former reformist President Mohammad Khatami criticized the regime’s social and political policies but rejected overthrowing the Islamic Republic during a meeting with Iranian politicians and journalists on April 25.[22] Khatami argued that the regime’s attitude towards mandatory veiling is absurd considering its toleration of partial veiling and further argued for flexibility in the political implementation of Islamic principles, consistent with his previous rhetoric. Khatami expressed his respect for the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement but argued that overthrowing the regime would not serve Iran’s interests. Khatami called for major reforms to governmental institutions on February 6, as CTP previously reported.[23]

President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Mahmoud Askari Azad as his assistant on April 26.[24] Azad previously held senior positions in the Welfare and Social Security Ministry (dissolved in 2011), Management and Planning Organization, and Administration and Recruitment Affairs Organization. Azad additionally served as the Barakat Foundation board of directors chairman.[25] The Barakat Foundation is a prominent Iranian bonyad, which is a parastatal foundation that the regime uses to control sections of the economy and hoard wealth.[26] Raisi headed the Astan Quds Razavi bonyad between 2016 and 2019 and has appointed many previous bonyad officials to positions in his administration.[27]

The IRGC Ground Forces 12th Ghaem ol Mohammad Independent Brigade and intelligence forces arrested unidentified actors planning to attack a military facility in Semnan City, Semnan Province on April 27.[28] The IRGC Ground Forces coordinated the arrest with both the IRGC Intelligence Organization and Intelligence and Security Ministry.

The Law Enforcement Command (LEC) closed two restaurants in Tehran on April 27 for serving unveiled women.[29] The LEC also closed at least eight “celebrity-affiliated” restaurants and commercial complexes in Tehran since the Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan announced the implementation of his veiling enforcement plan on April 15, as CTP previously reported.[30]

The bank security guard who assassinated Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26 claimed on April 27 that he mistakenly thought that Soleimani was someone else, according to Iranian state media.[31] The security guard stated that he intended to kill the bank deputy’s brother as “revenge” for an argument he previously had with the deputy. The guard added that he “lost control” due to his anger and mistook Soleimani for the bank deputy’s brother.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with senior Lebanese politicians during an official visit to Beirut on April 27. Abdollahian spoke with his Lebanese counterpart Abdallah Bouhabib about bilateral cooperation, expediting the Lebanese presidential selection process, and Iranian support for Lebanon’s ongoing economic and energy crises.[32] Abdollahian also met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati. CTP previously reported that Abdollahian met with Yemeni National Salvation Government Chief Negotiator Mohammad Abdol Salam in Muscat, Oman on April 26.[33]

External Security and Military Affairs

The Artesh Navy seized the Chinese-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Advantage Sweet in the Gulf of Oman on April 27.[34] Iranian news outlets claimed that the Artesh Navy seized the tanker, which was transporting oil from Kuwait to the US, after it collided with an Iranian vessel and tried to flee the accident scene.[35] The US 5^th Fleet described the seizure as “contrary to international law and disruptive to regional security and stability.”[36] Iranian leaders ordering the seizure of a Chinese-owned tanker would be surprising given that China is the largest importer of Iranian oil.[37]

The Iran-aligned Shia Coordination Framework is trying to further manipulate Iraqi elections processes to consolidate its political power. An anonymous Coordination Framework official told Nas News that the coalition will not support new provincial elections until Parliament agrees to restructure Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).[38] The IHEC is an independent body comprised of nine council members chosen via lottery to oversee Iraq’s elections.[39] The anonymous official falsely accused IHEC of rigging Iraq’s October 2021 parliamentary elections to cost the Coordination Framework 50 seats. Independent Iraqi parliamentarian Amir Abdul Jabbar accused the Coordination Framework of pressuring IHEC Commissioner Jalil Khalaf to resign on April 24.[40] CTP previously assessed that the State of Law Coalition—one of the Coordination Framework’s more powerful political blocs—pushed election law reforms through Parliament on March 26 likely to advantage itself in future elections and thereby consolidate power.[41] Iranian-backed efforts to undermine IHEC’s autonomy and intimidate its commissioner provide further evidence in support of this assessment.

Shafaq News reported on April 27 that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani intends to replace his defense and water resource ministers in the first phase of his planned cabinet reshuffle.[42] Azm Alliance member Thabet al Abbasi and Tasmim Movement member Aoun Diab Abdullah respectively serve as Iraq’s current defense and water resource ministers.[43] The Sunni-dominated Azm Alliance previously attempted to exclude the Coordination Framework from a coalition government it tried to form with other Sunni blocs, both major Kurdish parties, and the Sadrist bloc in September 2022.[44] The Tasmim movement similarly aligned itself against the Coordination Framework in October 2021 when it accepted the election results that significantly reduced the Coordination Framework’s seats.[45] CTP previously reported that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—via Sudani—are consolidating government resources through budget allocation and reshuffling other cabinet appointments.[46] Sudani may similarly replace Abbasi and Abdullah with allies or members of his Coordination Framework-aligned State of Law Coalition to further consolidate government resources and power.

IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander for Abu Kamal Hajj Sajjad met with an unidentified Russian general in Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province on April 27. Eye of Euphrates reported that the Russian general traveled from Deir ez Zor City to discuss unspecified topics with a delegation of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militia leaders led by Sajjad. The Russian general may be the same general who arrived to lead the Russian Reconciliation Center in Hatla, Deir ez Zor Province on April 27.[47] The Russian Reconciliation Center has conducted operations, including humanitarian activities, in areas held by both the Assad regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez Zor Province since November 2022.[48] Russian forces deployed to Qamishli, Hasakah Province after transferring control of a military position along the western bank Euphrates River near a known smuggling route into SDF territory to Syrian Arab Army 17th Division forces on April 25.[49] The Russian general’s potential connection to the Russian Reconciliation Center, which operates on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, suggests that he may have discussed control over crossing and smuggling routes with Sajjad.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on April 27 that IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) military trainers resolved a dispute that delayed a training course for new recruits several sites across Deir ez Zor Province.[50] New Syrian recruits for an unspecified Iranian-backed militia were scheduled to begin the training course on a recent but unspecified date in Deir ez Zor Province.[51] LH trainers delayed the start date for training due to allegations of IRGC personnel “treating trainees very badly.”[52]