

Iran Update, January 3, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our [interactive map of Iran and the Middle East](#).

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran's Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on December 3. Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City.
2. Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
3. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel's "surgical strike" killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.
4. Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel's killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
5. Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani's burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani's death. Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.
6. The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19.

7. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on December 3. Israeli forces in the neighborhoods coordinated with artillery and ground forces to direct a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters surveilling them with drones.¹ Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces and vehicles in Daraj and Tuffah.² The group claimed that it detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and anti-tank rocket at an Israeli bulldozer and tank east of Tuffah.³

Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City. The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters conducted an “elaborate ambush” targeting Israeli ground forces on the outskirts of al Shati refugee camp.⁴ The National Resistance Brigades said that its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli ground forces. The National Resistance Brigades fighters then fired unspecified munitions at the Israeli force.⁵ The group also claimed to have shot down an Israeli tactical reconnaissance drone in a separate incident and published pictures of drone pieces.⁶ CTP-ISW cannot verify the militia’s claim and the IDF has not commented on the incident. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it seized an Israeli drone south of Zaytoun neighborhood in the southern Gaza Strip on January 3.⁷ The militia fired anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood, where Israeli forces have not reported on clearing operations since mid-November.⁸

The al Qassem Brigades claimed three combined attacks targeting the IDF in the Gaza Strip with other Palestinian militias on January 3. The al Qassem Brigades have coordinated several attacks in the Gaza Strip with other militias throughout the war.⁹

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement—claimed that it fired a surface-to-air missile at an Israeli helicopter in Khan Younis.¹⁰ Neither group provided evidence to corroborate the claim. The Mujahideen Brigades have cooperated with the al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—prior to the Israel-Hamas War.¹¹

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades claimed to shoot down an Israeli Hermes drone with a surface-to-air missile east of Gaza City.¹² Neither group provided evidence to corroborate

the

claim.

The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades published footage of their fighters firing mortars together at Israeli vehicles and soldiers in Khan Younis.¹³ Hamas and PIJ have coordinated their operations against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip throughout the Israel-Hamas war.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 3. The IDF said that Israeli forces continued “intense fighting” in Khan Younis on January 3.¹⁴ The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting a PIJ weapons manufacturing facility in Khan Younis.¹⁵ Israeli ground forces directed another airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to an Israeli tank.¹⁶ The al Qassem Brigades targeted Israeli tanks and bulldozers with anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortared Israeli soldiers operating in Khan Younis.¹⁷ The al Quds Brigades detonated an EFP targeting an Israeli tank as Israeli forces advanced northeast of Khan Younis.¹⁸

Other Palestinian militias are also attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—fired an RPG at Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.¹⁹ The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—mortared a group of Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis City.²⁰

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khuzaa southeast of Khan Younis on January 3. An IDF brigade combat team uncovered a tunnel shaft in a school and clashed with Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to Israeli vehicles in Khuzaa.²¹ Israeli infantry, armor, and engineers raided Palestinian militia infrastructure in the area. The al Qassem Brigades detonated two anti-personnel devices targeting seven Israeli infantrymen operating east of Khuzaa.²²

Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.²³ Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh delivered a speech on January 3 condemning Arouri’s death as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and an “expansion” of Israeli attacks on the group.²⁴ The al Qassem Brigades published a statement on January 3 that honored Arouri and the other militia leaders who died in the explosion.²⁵ PIJ Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah mourned Arouri, calling him a leader who contributed to the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.²⁶ The Palestinian National and Islamic Forces—a coalition of major factions in Palestine—commemorated Arouri’s death and called for “revolutionary action” in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel.²⁷

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 3.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in nine locations across the West Bank.²⁸ The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades conducted nine attacks against military and civilian targets in the West Bank.²⁹ The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades Tulkarm Battalion detonated improvised explosive devices targeting Israeli forces conducting counterterrorism operations in the Nour Shams refugee camp.³⁰ The IDF ordered an airstrike targeting the fighters who detonated the explosives.³¹

Palestinian shopkeepers closed storefronts in protest of Saleh al Arouri's death in seven locations across the West Bank on January 3.³² Palestinian media posted flyers on January 2 calling for supporters to strike and hold demonstrations.³³

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel's "surgical strike" killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.³⁴ Nasrallah blamed Israel for Arouri's death, describing it as a "dangerous crime that will see response and punishment." Nasrallah's speech was in commemoration of the anniversary of the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.³⁵ Nasrallah said that Israel has not deterred LH and that LH is ready to act against Israel "without limits" if the country wages war on Lebanon.³⁶ He added that war with LH would be "very costly" and a "regret" for Israel with "no ceiling" and "no rules".³⁷ Nasrallah's choice to not immediately signal an escalation is notable, given that LH and Hamas threatened in August 2023 that Israeli strikes targeting Palestinian leadership in Lebanon would spur a regional war.³⁸ Nasrallah said that he will give another speech detailing LH operations in southern Lebanon on January 5.³⁹

LH doubled the number of its cross-border attacks into Israel on January 3. This is notable in the context of Nasrallah's speech and the Israeli strike that targeted Arouri. LH claimed 13 attacks on Israeli forces and military positions on January 3, compared to an average of six attacks per day during the previous week.⁴⁰ LH's attack claims highlighted their use of anti-tank missiles and heavy-payload Burkan rockets.⁴¹ This is notable given that recent LH attack claims have rarely specifically described the types of weapon systems used in LH attacks.⁴²

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel's military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3. Halevi met with the IDF commander of Northern Command and unit commanders along the Lebanese border. Halevi said the IDF is at the "peak" of its readiness in northern Israel but that his focus is currently fighting Hamas.⁴³ He also said October 7 was an "opportunity" for Israel to change the situation in a "very significant way" in the south, north, and in the region. He added that Israel needs to give a very strong response to the October

7 attack.⁴⁴ Halevi also discussed plans for Israel to deploy more forces along the Israel-Gaza Strip and Lebanese borders over at least the next year.⁴⁵

Iran and Axis of Resistance—

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death on January 3.⁴⁶ The unspecified fighters remotely detonated two improvised explosive devices within twenty minutes of each other. Iranian media has not confirmed the size or type of explosive device. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated that the first explosion occurred at 1500 local time and the second more deadly explosion occurred at 1520.⁴⁷ The first explosion occurred within 700 meters of Soleimani’s burial site, and the second explosion occurred within one kilometer of Soleimani’s burial site. Iranian media reported that the two explosions killed 103 people and injured an additional 188.⁴⁸ Iranian media emphasized that no IRGC officials were in attendance or injured.⁴⁹ The attack killed three Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers.⁵⁰

Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.⁵¹ The State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not believe Israel was to blame. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State likely conducted two separate smaller-scale terror attacks in Shiraz, 591 kilometers from Kerman, in October 2022 and August 2023.⁵² CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) maintained ground lines of communication between Iran and Afghanistan.⁵³

Iranian officials, including the Security Deputy of Kerman, called the explosion a terrorist attack.⁵⁴ The Iranian Interior Minister said that the terrorist attack was a “continuation of conspiracies” carried out by Iran’s enemies.⁵⁵ Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed his condolences to the victims of the terror attack.⁵⁶ Khamenei stated that the attack was carried out by the “evil and criminal enemies” of Iran. Khamenei promised a hard response to the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and politicians expressed their condolences over the terrorist attack in Kerman on January 3. Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai condemned the attack in separate statements.⁵⁷ Khazali claimed that Israel seeks to drag the region into a “comprehensive and open war” to conceal its “defeats” in the Israel-Hamas war.

Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 3. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Omar oil field.⁵⁸ The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a separate one-way drone attack targeting US forces at the al Tanf garrison.⁵⁹

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised Palestinians in the Gaza Strip for resisting Israel during a speech to religious eulogists on January 3.⁶⁰ Khamenei further condemned the United States for its support of Israel’s “malice and dirty goals.”

Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.⁶¹ Iranian political officials—including President Ebrahim Raisi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—said that the assassination was a sign of Israel’s weakness and a violation of Lebanese territory.⁶²

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that the decision would “backfire.”⁶³ The IRGC published a statement warning that Arouri’s death will inspire further Palestinian resistance against Israel.⁶⁴

The Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada General Secretariat compared Israel’s killing of Arouri to the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, in January 2020.⁶⁵ It claimed on January 2 that the Arouri strike violated Lebanese sovereignty just as the US strike targeting Soleimani in January 2020 violated Iraqi sovereignty.⁶⁶ Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias frequently cite alleged US “violations of Iraqi sovereignty” to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces. The United States has a legitimate right to self-defense as it operates in Iraq to fight ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government.⁶⁷

Kataib Hezbollah emphasized the US role in Israel’s “dangerous escalations” in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria and renewed its pledge to “defeat” the United States and Israel in a statement honoring Arouri on January 2.⁶⁸ Kataib Hezbollah and its partners, not the United States, escalated in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq initiated attacks on US forces after the start of the Israel-Hamas War with attacks in Iraq on October 18 and in Syria on October 19.⁶⁹ The United States did not respond with force in Syria until October 26, after an Iranian-backed drone landed in a US barracks in Erbil, and in Iraq until November 21.⁷⁰ Lebanese Hezbollah began attacking Israel from southern Lebanon immediately after the October 7 attacks.

Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh warned on January 2 that the “murderous criminals” who killed Arouri will pay for their actions.⁷¹

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized on January 3 his organization’s solidarity with Palestinian and Lebanese “jihadist movements.”⁷²

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.⁷³ Kaabi made this statement on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis. Iranian military leaders have previously vowed to expel US forces from the Middle East as part of their revenge for Soleimani’s death.⁷⁴ Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have been trying to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, particularly in recent weeks. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on December 28, 2023, that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq.⁷⁵ CTP-ISW assessed that Sudani likely made this announcement due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.⁷⁶

Iraqi Design Alliance member Amer al Fayeز stated that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—agreed to replace all current provincial governors in a meeting on January 2.⁷⁷ The Design Alliance won 12 out of 23 seats in Basra Province in the recent provincial council elections. Current Basra Governor Asaad al Eidani leads the Design Alliance.⁷⁸ Eidani became governor of Basra in 2017.⁷⁹ Iraqi media reported on December 27 that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are trying to deprive Eidani’s party of their majority in the Basra provincial council.⁸⁰ Fayeز criticized the framework’s agreement to remove current provincial governors, describing it as “undemocratic” and a “political decision.”⁸¹ Fayeز added that there is “no justification for replacing the successful governors [who were] elected by the people of the governorate.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani has demonstrated in recent months that provincial councils do not retain the exclusive authority to appoint and remove provincial governors. Sudani appointed Abdul Qadir al Dakhil as the acting governor of Ninewa following former Ninewa Governor Najm al Jabouri’s resignation in November 2023.⁸² Sudani additionally tried to remove the provincial governors of Anbar, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Ninewa in April 2023.⁸³ CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sudani was attempting to sideline political opposition, especially Sunnis.⁸⁴ Some of the governors he sought to remove supported former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi.⁸⁵

The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE while it transited the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19.⁸⁶ CMA CGM stated that the vessel was headed to Egypt. The Houthi movement claimed that the vessel was bound for Israel.⁸⁷ The Houthi movement continues to claim that it only targets vessels in the Red Sea that are owned by Israelis or vessels bound for Israel.⁸⁸ The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships with no connection to Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.⁸⁹

The United States and 11 partner countries warned the Houthi movement against further attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea in a joint statement on January 3.⁹⁰ The statement warned that the Houthis would face unspecified consequences if the Houthi movement does not cease its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.⁹¹ The Houthi military spokesperson threatened on January 3 that the Houthis would retaliate against any attack by the United States.⁹² The US statement also called for the Houthis to release unlawfully detained vessels and crews. The Houthis continue to hold the commercial vessel *Galaxy Leader*, which the Houthis seized on November 19.⁹³

¹ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742463421168123951>
² <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1196>; <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1198>;
<https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1201>
³ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1201>
⁴ https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4041
⁵ https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4041
⁶ https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4042
⁷ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1197>
⁸ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1199>; <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1726171162672267537>
⁹ <https://t.me/QudsN/323716>; <https://t.me/sarayaps/16724>; <https://t.me/almanarnews/137409>
¹⁰ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1207>
¹¹ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/mujahideen-brigades/
¹² <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1195>
¹³ <https://t.me/sarayaps/17143>; <https://t.me/sarayaps/17145>; <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1211>
¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742463417712087078>
¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742463419444265106>
¹⁶ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742463417712087078>
¹⁷ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1204>; <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1206>;
<https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1194>
¹⁸ <https://t.me/sarayaps/17142>
¹⁹ <https://t.me/abualiajel/95>
²⁰ https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5428
²¹ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742463400825716950>
²² <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1205>
²³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67866346>
²⁴ <https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49533>
²⁵ <https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1202>
²⁶ <https://t.me/jeninqassamm/3365>
²⁷ <https://t.me/hamasps/18818>
²⁸ <https://t.me/QudsN/352747>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352784>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352785>;
<https://t.me/QudsN/353226>
²⁹ <https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2663>; <https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2664>;
<https://t.me/QudsN/352741>; <https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2665>;
<https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2666>; <https://t.me/alredalsrey/24>; <https://t.me/alredalsrey/527>;
<https://t.me/alredalsrey/528>; <https://t.me/alredalsrey/531>; <https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2669>;
<https://t.me/QudsN/352800>
³⁰ <https://t.me/AymanGouda/5907>; <https://t.me/alredalsrey/524>; <https://t.me/alredalsrey/528>;
<https://t.me/jeninqassamm/3377>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352769>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352848>
³¹ <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742470515338441024>
³² <https://t.me/QudsN/352899>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352905>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352921>;
<https://t.me/HebronNewss/33560>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352952>; <https://t.me/QudsN/352965>;
<https://t.me/QudsN/352989>; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/44145
³³ <https://t.me/QudsN/352839>
³⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67866346>
³⁵ <https://www.almanar.com.lb/11479800>; <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=63865&cid=113>;
<https://www.youtube.com/live/ZFFSoDhYMnM?si=MrlPfXV7iUolgIUX>
³⁶ <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=63865&cid=113>
³⁷ <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=63865&cid=113>;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-head-vows-group-will-not-be-silent-after-israeli-killing-amas-deputy-2024-01-03/>
³⁸ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-hamas-official-threatens-regional-war-if-israel-resumes-targeted-killings/>; <https://www.timesofisrael.com/nasrallah-says-it-israel-will- cease-to-exist-if-war-erupts-as-rhetoric-escalates/>

67 <https://media.defense.gov/2023/Aug/03/2003274284/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20INHERENT%20RESOLVE%20Q3.PDF>

68 <https://www.kataibhezbollah dot me/news/3342>

69 <https://t.me/elamharbi/7>; <https://t.me/elamharbi/3>

70 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-iran-linked-sites-for-continuing-attacks-on-u-s-forces-iraq-and-syria/>;

<https://www.voanews.com/a/us-officials-american-forces-attacked-at-iraq-air-base-respond-in-self-defense-/7364267.html>

71 <http://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=183353>

72 <http://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=183371>

73 https://t.me/Kofia_News/45696

74 <https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14000630000898/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85>

75 <https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/iraqi-govt-moving-towards-ending-us-led-coalition-presence-i>

76 <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-28-2023>

77 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%B1>

78 <https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq-News/Tasmeem-alliance-to-attend-the-first-parliamentary-session-as-an-independent-Bloc>

79 <https://www.newarab dot com/Blog/2017/9/4/Everything-you-need-to-know-about-Basras-new-governor>

80 <https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=303684>

81 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%B1>

82 <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%81%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9>

83 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

84 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

85 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

86 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

87 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

88 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

89 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

90 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

91 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

92 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

93 <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-4->

%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF

⁸⁴ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-24-2023>

⁸⁵ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-24-2023>

⁸⁶ <https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1742389041725886957>

⁸⁷ <https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1742534607478641006> ;

<https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1742516855925772542>

⁸⁸ <https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1742516855925772542> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-december-31-2023>

⁸⁹ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-december-31-2023>

⁹⁰ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/>

⁹¹ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/>

⁹² <https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1742516855925772542>

⁹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/20/yemen-houthi-rebels-seize-cargo-ship-galaxy-leader-red-sea-israel> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-november-19-2023>