



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 28, 2024, 8pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin directed on June 28 the production and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and intermediate-range missiles following the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision making in Russia's favor.[1] Putin attended a Russian Security Council meeting in which he claimed that Russia had vowed to uphold the INF's provisions against producing or deploying intermediate-range ground-based missiles until the United States violated these provisions and that Russia must now also produce and deploy such systems.[2] The United States suspended participation in the INF on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles, and Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019.[3] Putin specifically cited two 2024 US bilateral military exercises; one with the Philippines in Northern Luzon, Philippines on April 11 and a second with Denmark near Bornholm Island, Denmark on May 3-5. Both of these bilateral US exercises involved a Typhon Medium Range Capability (MRC) launcher, which US readouts specified can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles.[4] The SM-6 missiles have a maximum range of 370 kilometers, while the Tomahawks have a maximum range of about 2,500 kilometers.[5] US officials did not specify which missiles, if any, may have been involved in either exercise.

Putin is more likely using these exercises as a scapegoat for his broader reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western military assistance to Ukraine. These US and partner exercises involved launchers capable of launching missiles that could pose variable threats to Russia from the exercise

locations. Bornholm Island is roughly 300 kilometers from the westernmost shore of Kaliningrad Oblast and roughly 1,400 kilometers from Moscow. The US Sixth Fleet specified that the Bornholm Island exercise involved transporting the Typhon launcher from land to shore as part of convoy protection rehearsals, suggesting that these exercises likely involved shorter-range weapons.[6] The Russian border area closest to the Philippines – the area southwest of Vladivostok – is roughly 2,800 kilometers from Northern Luzon, out of range of the Tomahawk missiles. Putin's June 27 condemnation follows the People's Republic of China (PRC) delayed condemnation of the US exercise in Northern Luzon on May 30. Putin likely invoked the Philippines exercise in part to posture favorably to the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam as he attempts to create a coalition of states in support of a new "Eurasian security architecture." [7] The Kremlin has invoked the fear of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West throughout its full-scale invasion to push the West to self-deter from providing Ukraine the weapons it needs to sustain its defense against Russian forces, and the Kremlin notably employs this effort during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.[8]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Russia on June 28 and reportedly struck a microelectronics plant and a military unit on the night of June 27 to 28. Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Yegorov claimed that a drone struck an oil depot in Michurinsky Raion and started a fire on the morning of June 28.[9] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* stated that the drone hit the Transnefteprodukt "Nikolskoe" linear production and dispatch station in Novonikolskoe.[10] *Astra* also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified military unit in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast and the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City - one of the largest microelectronics manufacturers in Russia that makes components for military equipment - on the night of June 27 to 28.[11] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed that Russian forces suppressed a Ukrainian drone with electronic warfare (EW) over Bryansk City and that drone debris damaged an administrative building.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 12 drones over Bryansk Oblast but did not mention any drone strikes against Tambov Oblast.[13]

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces have damaged or destroyed more than 30 Russian military aircraft in the first six months of 2024, although ISW cannot confirm this report fully. Ukrainian StratCom stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged nine Su-25 aircraft, one Su-57 aircraft, two MiG-31 aircraft, roughly 13 Su-34 aircraft, two Su-35 aircraft, two A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, one Il-22M11 airborne command post aircraft, and one Tu-22M3 strategic bomber in the first six months of 2024.[14] Ukrainian StratCom stated that most of the strikes against the Russian aircraft occurred in occupied Ukraine except for a handful of strikes over the Sea of Azov and within Russia.[15] Ukrainian StratCom did not specify what portion of these Ukrainian strikes were air defense interceptions of Russian aircraft in flight and what percentage were strikes against Russian aircraft at airfields. Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian forces downed an A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft in February 2024 after Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down another A-50 aircraft and Il-22M11 airborne command post aircraft in January 2024.[16] Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian strikes damaged at least one Russian Su-57 in June 2024, and footage indicates that Ukrainian forces downed a Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bomber in mid-April.[17] Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed two MiG-31 aircraft in occupied Crimea in an ATACMS strike in May 2024.[18] Ukrainian officials reported the downing of numerous Su-34 aircraft in February and March 2024, although ISW cannot verify these reports or Ukrainian StratCom's figures concerning Su-

34, Su-35, and Su-25 aircraft.[19] The downing of Russian aircraft, especially critical aircraft like the A-50 and Il-22, has previously temporarily constrained Russian aviation activities over occupied Ukraine, but Ukrainian forces have yet to be able to significantly attempt to contest the air domain.[20] Ukrainian officials have routinely highlighted a need for additional air defense assets and advanced fighter aircraft in order to significantly contest the air domain and pursue air parity with Russian forces.[21] Russian forces have exploited continued constraints on Ukraine's air defense umbrella to field Russian tactical aircraft regularly along the frontline that conduct widespread glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations.[22]

Many Russian elites have reportedly shifted from criticizing Russia's war effort in Ukraine to supporting it because they assess that Russia is prevailing. Russian opposition journalist and founder of Russian opposition television channel *TV Rain* Mikhail Zygar reported in a June 28 *Foreign Affairs* article that many Russian elites who were opposed to the war in 2022 started to support the war in 2023 because they "believe Russia is prevailing [in the war]" given Russia's slow but steady battlefield gains, a persisting Ukrainian munitions disadvantage, and perceived "waning" Western security assistance to Ukraine.[23] One unspecified Russian oligarch who previously criticized the war reportedly told Zygar that Russia must win the war otherwise "they won't allow us to live... and Russia would collapse." Zygar reported that Russian elites have even started speculating about war outcomes that would constitute a Russian victory. ISW cannot independently verify any of Zygar's reports. Zygar's statements are consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian elites came to heel behind Russian President Vladimir Putin in support of the war following intensified crackdowns against the Russian elite after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zygar's report that Russian elites are now assessing that Russia can prevail on the battlefield and are even discussing a Russian victory indicates that elites may also be supporting Putin's stated theory of victory, which posits that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent operationally significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and eventually win a war of attrition.[24]


Russian officials called for harsher punishments in Russia's criminal system, likely in response to the recent terrorist attacks in Dagestan. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin stated at the International Youth Legal Forum in St. Petersburg on June 28 that Russia should consider lifting the moratorium on the death penalty for certain, unspecified cases.[25] Head of the Russian Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin stated on June 26 that the Constitutional Court considers the return of the death penalty to be inadmissible within the framework of the current constitution, but Bastrykin suggested on June 28 that a presidential decree may be able to lift the moratorium without changing the constitution.[26] Bastrykin claimed that the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack demonstrates the need for the return to the death penalty and complained that a defendant could receive the death penalty for the murder of at least two to three people during the Soviet Union, but the terrorists that conducted the Crocus City Hall attack that killed over 100 people will receive a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.[27] Russian Justice Minister Konstantin Chuychenko stated on June 28 that the Ministry of Justice recently prepared a bill that would designate forced labor as the main punishment for more than 65 crimes.[28] Chuychenko claimed that forced labor is a "more humane" form of punishment than imprisonment and reduces recidivism.[29] Bastrykin claimed on June 27 that migrant crime is spreading in Russia and called for stricter migration policies, prompting widescale xenophobic support for Bastrykin's statements from Russia's ultranationalist milbloggers.[30] Other Russian officials called for the return of the death penalty in the days following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, and Bastrykin is likely renewing these appeals in response to the June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan.

Russia may be creating a shadow fleet to transport Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) and circumvent Western sanctions. *Bloomberg* reported on June 27 that there is evidence that Russia is creating a shadow fleet to transport Russian LNG in similar ways to how Russia created a shadow fleet to avoid the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil.[31] *Bloomberg* reported that a little-known company in Dubai has acquired at least eight vessels in the past three months and that Russia has reportedly already granted four of these vessels permission to traverse Russian Arctic waters in Summer 2024. At least three of the eight vessels reportedly list their insurers as "unknown," a common tactic tankers carrying Russian crude oil have used to skirt the G7 price cap. *Bloomberg* noted that it cannot independently connect these vessels to major Russian entities directly. The latest EU sanctions package from June 24 forbids EU entities from providing reloading services of Russian LNG in EU territory for transshipment operations to third countries.[32]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin directed on June 28 the production and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and intermediate-range missiles following the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision making in Russia's favor.**
- **Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Russia on June 28 and reportedly struck a microelectronics plant and a military unit on the night of June 27 to 28.**
- **The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces have damaged or destroyed more than 30 Russian military aircraft in the first six months of 2024, although ISW cannot confirm this report fully.**
- **Many Russian elites have reportedly shifted from criticizing Russia's war effort in Ukraine to supporting it because they assess that Russia is prevailing.**
- **Russian officials called for harsher punishments in Russia's criminal system, likely in response to the recent terrorist attacks in Dagestan.**
- **Russia may be creating a shadow fleet to transport Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) and circumvent Western sanctions.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Vovchansk and Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.**
- **Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* used Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data to estimate that over 71,000 Russian men died in the war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on June 28. Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) along Heoriv Chornobylya Street.[33] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on June 28 that the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has stabilized and that Russian forces have not made any significant progress since roughly June 12.[34] The drone battalion commander stated that Russian forces are using both "Storm" assault units staffed with poorly trained personnel and regular Russian units in the Kharkiv direction. The drone battalion commander also reported that Russian forces are quickly replenishing their losses in the area despite suffering heavy losses. Fighting continued near and within Vovchansk on June 28.[35] Elements of the Russian engineering "Phoenix" Battalion are reportedly attempting to remotely mine areas in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[36]

A Ukrainian source claimed on June 26 that Russian forces may have lost almost the entire 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade in the Kharkiv direction due to significant losses and personnel refusing to fight, although ISW has not observed any evidence of this claim and assesses it to be exaggerated.[37] Ukrainian officials recently reported on June 16 and 23 that Russian forces attempted to withdraw elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade that became combat-ineffective after suffering high losses in the Kharkiv direction.[38] ISW observed reports on June 11 that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade were operating near Chasiv Yar.[39] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade in the Kharkiv direction likely suffered significant losses that rendered them combat-ineffective, but the brigade is unlikely to have been completely destroyed, particularly since it remains unclear how large a portion of the 83rd VDV Brigade the Russians transferred from the Chasiv Yar area to the Vovchansk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▭ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Kreminna and east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[40] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced about 1.5 kilometers near Terny and Yampolivka (both west of Kreminna) while Russian forces were focused on offensive operations in the direction of Borova (west of Svatove).[41] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 31st and 37th motorized rifle regiments, 19th Tank Regiment, and the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all of 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 488th and 238th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) were likely regrouping in preparation for resumed offensive operations near Terny and Yampolivka when Ukrainian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions.

Russian forces reportedly advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 28, but there were no confirmed Russian advances in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and in the Serebryanske forest area (southwest of Kreminna), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Stelmakhivka, and Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Nevske, Makiivka, and Kopanky; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 27 and 28.[43] Elements of the Chechen "Shrama" detachment of the 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Kreminna.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- - - Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Ukrainian source claimed on June 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced at least 1.5 kilometers deep north of the Siverskyi Donets River. A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Russian forces have advanced one and a half kilometers towards Petropavlivka.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) as of June 28, following Russian milblogger claims on June 27 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 28 that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division seized Rozdolivka on June 26, although other milbloggers claimed that fighting continued within the settlement on June 27 and 28.[46] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russian forces seized Rozdolivka, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted notably intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 28.[47] Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne, Ivano-Darivka, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 27 and 28.[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in easternmost Chasiv Yar, indicating that Russian forces continue to operate within the town. Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward to the concrete plant in Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[49] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn made multiple statements on June 27 that Ukrainian forces either pushed all Russian forces from Kanal Microraion or pushed most Russian forces from Kanal Microraion but that limited, isolated Russian groups remain in the microraion.[50] Voloshyn's statements and continued geolocated footage of Russian forces operating further within Kanal Microraion suggest that small Russian infantry groups can enter and advance within the microraion but likely struggle to establish enduring positions. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces regaining positions in eastern Kanal Microraion or other indicators that Ukrainian forces have managed to push Russian forces completely out of easternmost Chasiv Yar. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established a foothold within central Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) as of June 27.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Novyi and Kanal microraions (eastern Chasiv Yar), Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar), and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on June 27 and 28.[52] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division's 217th and 331st VDV regiments, the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and the "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near eastern Chasiv Yar.[53]


Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 28 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces established a foothold on the outskirts of Niu York (south of Toretsk) and made gains near Zalizne and Pivdenne (both southeast of Toretsk) on June 28.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are 1.5 kilometers from Toretsk, although ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are over three kilometers from the town.[55] Russian forces also continued assaults near Toretsk and east of Toretsk near Druzhba and Pivnichne on June 27 and 28.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Avdiivka on June 28 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the pond on the northwestern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and are pushing Ukrainian forces towards Vozdvyzhenka (northwest of Avdiivka).[57] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains within and near Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and near Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka).[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Yevhenivka, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 27 and 28.[59] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Yasnobrodivka, that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Novoselivka Persha, and that Russian forces are reinforcing elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) in the direction of Vozdvyzhenka and Prohres.[60]


Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces advanced up to 550 meters deep and 150 meters wide within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 700 meters deep south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and are within three kilometers of the O0532 (Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway.[62] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of

Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 27 and 28.[63] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City).[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 28 that Russian forces advanced 700 meters south of Kostyantynivka. A Russian source claimed on June 27 that Russian forces advanced up to 550 meters wide and 150 meters deep in Krasnohorivka. A Russian source claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced almost two kilometers towards Druzhba as well 500 meters deep in Pivnichne. A Russian source claimed on June 24 that Russian forces advanced 6.03 kilometers wide and 2.08 kilometers deep north of Volodymyrivka.

Russian forces did not conduct ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 28.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced at least one kilometer near Zahirne (northeast of Robotyne and southwest of Hulyaipole), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[66]



International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on June 27 that strikes from unspecified actors destroyed an external radiation monitoring station roughly 16 kilometers from the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[67] Grossi noted that this particular monitoring station is not essential to the ZNPP's function and therefore does not directly impact safety at the ZNPP but that the strike is part of the continued erosion of safety measures of the ZNPP.

Fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky), on June 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[68] A Russian milblogger amplified a claim that Russian forces effectively control Krynky but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in basements that Russian forces cannot clear.[69] Elements of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]; reportedly integrated into the 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue fighting on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[70]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 28, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian and occupation authorities are intensifying civilian warning and protection systems in occupied Sevastopol following an incident in which a partially-intercepted Ukrainian missile injured more than 150 beachgoers, which prompted widespread criticism of Russian occupation authorities. Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhayev announced that the Sevastopol occupation government decided to adopt a new "Ballistika" warning system indicating that civilians need to shelter

within two to three minutes and establish at least 600 new temporary shelters on beaches in which civilians can take refuge during strikes.[71] Russian state news outlet TASS reported that Russian authorities are also increasing fines to 300,000 rubles (about \$3,500) for preventing civilians from entering private property during an air raid.[72] Russian ultranationalist milblogger and Kremlin Human Rights Committee member Alexander "Sasha" Kots praised the new measures.[73] Russian authorities continue to irresponsibly promote occupied Crimea as a tourist destination during wartime, and these new measures enable the Kremlin's contradictory objectives of attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in occupied Crimea while also continuing its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea. Razvozhayev discouraged civilians from visiting Sevastopol's northern beaches until Russian authorities can construct shelters but explicitly stated that authorities are not closing Sevastopol's beaches - an irresponsible decision in wartime in an area being actively used to support military operations.[74]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine during the day on June 28. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck Odesa City with a ballistic missile, likely an Iskander-M armed with cluster munitions.[75] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported that Russian forces conducted an unspecified missile strike against Dnipro City.[76]

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Military Administration Head Svitlana Onyshchuk reported on June 28 that previous Russian missile strikes have damaged the Burshtyn Thermal Power Plant (BTPP) so severely that Ukraine cannot repair it.[77] Onyshchuk reported that Russian forces have launched over 12 missiles against the BTPP, and Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne Ivano-Frankivsk* reported that Russian forces have conducted strikes against the energy infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast at least five times between March 22 and June 1.[78]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* used Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data to estimate that over 71,000 Russian men died in the war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023.[79] *Vazhnye Istorii* used Rosstat data to compare the pre-war ratio of male and female mortality rates to calculate what the male mortality rate would likely have been in 2022 and 2023 had there been no war in Ukraine. *Vazhnye Istorii* calculated the difference between Rosstat's mortality data and the estimate for a normal expected mortality rate to estimate the minimum possible war deaths. Russian opposition outlet *Meduza* similarly used Rosstat data to compare the pre-war ratio of male and female mortality rates to calculate an estimate for male mortality in 2022 and 2023 had there been no war in Ukraine.[80] *Meduza* then compared the difference in male mortality rates to estimate that a minimum of 64,000 Russian men died in the war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023.

Satellite imagery reportedly indicates that Russian forces have lost a significant number of tanks and armored vehicles in the war in Ukraine. German news outlet *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) used artificial intelligence (AI) to examine satellite imagery taken between 2021 and 2024 of 87 Russian military sites, including 16 that store tanks and armored vehicles, and found that several tank and armored vehicle

storage sites are empty.[81] SZ's AI analysis found that one base housed 857 tanks in April 2021, housed 431 in October 2022, and is nearly empty as of June 2024. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) research analyst Michael Gjerstad told SZ that Russia has roughly 3,200 tanks in stock but that the majority of them are in bad condition. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report on June 26 stating that Russia plans to produce 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armored fighting vehicles in 2024, but RUSI noted that 85 percent of these vehicles are refurbished from storage instead of new production.[82]

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Tharaka Balasuriya met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin on June 27 to resolve problems regarding the Russian military's recruitment of Sri Lankan nationals.[83] The Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported the officials discussed compensation to Sri Lankan nationals killed and wounded while serving in the Russian military, the possibility of Sri Lankan citizens terminating Russian military contracts early, and the establishment of a joint working committee to address concerns of Sri Lankans who are currently serving in the Russian military. Balasuriya stated that Russia and Sri Lanka agreed that Russia would stop recruiting Sri Lankan citizens into the Russian military after a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on June 11.[84]

Select Russian milbloggers credited themselves with influencing Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's decision to provide Russian military personnel with social benefits. Two Russian milbloggers who attended the June 10 meeting between Belousov and a select group of Russian milbloggers claimed that following the meeting Belousov ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to resolve problems with providing social support to veterans of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republic (DNR/LNR) formations who served prior to Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in 2022.[85] ISW assessed that Belousov likely met with select Russian milbloggers who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time to ensure their loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov.[86] These milbloggers' claims may also be an attempt to portray Belousov as a receptive leader.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian officials continue to posture themselves as rallying the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) to innovate weapons and equipment for Russian forces in Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov led a discussion at the "ERA" military innovation forum on June 28 in which he heavily emphasized the importance of developing innovative man-portable weapons, close combat arms, and airfield-based drones.[87] Manturov emphasized that the battlefield situation is dynamic and that Russian DIB enterprises must finalize new products "not even in months but in days." Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and heads of military command-and-control bodies and DIB enterprises also attended Manturov's discussion.[88] Yevkurov emphasized that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Russian government, the DIB, and the state-led "Popular Front" social movement are all collaborating to ensure Russia's technological lead in weapons production, especially in drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to integrate occupied areas of Ukraine into Russian legal, social, and informational structures. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 28 that Russia must elevate the standard of living in occupied areas of Ukraine to meet Russian federal standards and solve social issues.[89] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo met with Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Eldar Gaifutdinov on June 27 to discuss further developing communications, television, and radio broadcasting infrastructure within occupied Kherson Oblast to help the "informational front" in the "hybrid war with the West." [90]

Russian authorities continue to Russify and militarize Ukrainian children in occupied areas in a broader effort to eradicate Ukrainian national identity and culture. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on June 27 that occupation authorities sent 70 Ukrainian schoolchildren to participate in the Russian state "Movement of the First's" "Zarnitsa 2.0" military-patriotic game that teaches basic military and sports skills and aims to instill a "love for the [Russian] Fatherland" in these Ukrainian children.[91] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on June 26 that Russian authorities have forced more than 16,500 Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to join military-ideological organizations including Yunarmiya and "Movement of the First." [92] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated that occupation authorities send Ukrainian children to Moscow through vacation schemes to give speeches supporting Russia's war in Ukraine and visit Russian military facilities.[93]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to baselessly blame the United States for a recent Ukrainian strike on occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and issue threats that aim to push the United States to self-deter against continued support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD suggested that the United States continues to aid strikes against occupied Crimea and framed this as risking direct confrontation between NATO and Russia.[94] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov instructed the Russian General Staff to propose measures to promptly respond to Western "provocations." The Russian MoD claimed on June 23 that the United States was responsible for a Ukrainian strike on occupied Sevastopol since the United States allegedly helped Ukrainian forces with target designation.[95] The Russian MoD, however, notably acknowledged that a Russian air defense interceptor caused the missile to deviate from its flight path and detonate over civilians.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian forces reportedly deployed a multiple rocket launch system (MLRS) battalion to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 28 that Belarusian forces deployed a Polonez MLRS battalion to the border in response to the "difficult situation" near the border and as part of a surprise readiness check.[97] The Belarusian State Border Committee claimed on June 28 that Belarusian forces shot down an alleged drone from the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border in Gomel Oblast on June 26.[98]

Russian and Belarusian officials and enterprises discussed bilateral economic cooperation at the Forum of Regions of Belarus and Russia in Belarus on June 28. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the forum that Russia and Belarus are trying to introduce new technologies into economic activities and are developing "knowledge-intensive industries" and agriculture.[99] Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov claimed that Russian and Belarusian enterprises and representatives will sign over 100 contracts during the forum and that over 80 Russian federal subjects are involved in trade and economic cooperation with Belarus.[100] The Russian Federation Council claimed that Belarusian and Russian parliamentarians discussed bilateral cooperation in the fields of agro-industrial and light industry.[101]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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