



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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**July 5, 2024, 7:20pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.** Putin met with Orban in Moscow and reportedly discussed Ukraine and the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire agreement.[1] Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement on July 4 in a departure from his usual feigned interest in negotiations, and Putin notably outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire in a press conference with Orban on July 5.[2] Putin stated that an agreement between Russia and Ukraine should not result in a temporary ceasefire since this would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm and that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to the conflict.[3] Putin is currently unwilling to accept anything short of the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and identity, however, as his remarks and demands have consistently illustrated.[4]

**Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war.** Putin called for the complete Ukrainian withdrawal from "Donbas and Novorossiia" as a prerequisite for ending the war during his press conference with Orban — a reference to Putin's June 14 demand for Ukraine to recognize the Russian occupation of occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts and for Ukraine to surrender all territory that Russia does not currently hold in the four oblasts.[5] The imagined borders of "Novorossiia" are disputed among Russian ultranationalists, however, and Putin and the Kremlin have routinely indicated that they hold aims of territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.[6] Putin also invoked concerns on July 4 about Ukrainian

military reconstitution and expansion during a potential ceasefire to call for Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a prerequisite to negotiations.[7] Putin has long called for Ukraine's "demilitarization" — a demand that Ukraine abandon its ability to resist Russian aggression so that Putin can freely impose his will upon Ukraine.[8] Putin would almost certainly use Ukraine's capitulation to achieve his other goal of deposing Ukraine's democratically elected government and replacing it with a pro-Russian government and a political system to his liking.

**Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine.** Putin's rejection of any ceasefire indicates that he is increasingly confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[9] Putin's demands, achieved through either Ukraine's capitulation or the protracted war he assesses Russian forces can successfully wage, are not consistent with the survival of an independent Ukrainian state or the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests. Putin's confidence in Russia's ability to encourage capitulation or win a protracted war of attrition is based on the assessment that Ukraine will not be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations.[10] The West must hasten to provide Ukraine the support it needs to conduct counteroffensive operations to invalidate Putin's calculus and avoid protracting the war more than necessary to secure a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its partners.[11]

**Putin's rejection of any ceasefire agreement contradicts the Kremlin's previous effort to place the onus for negotiations on the West and Ukraine.** Putin blamed the West and Ukraine for the lack of negotiations while explicitly rejecting future Russian participation in any meaningful ceasefire negotiations during his July 4 press conference at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a stark contradiction in his rhetoric.[12] Putin also dismissed the possibility that any international body or head of state could mediate a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, despite previously presenting China and various Western leaders as possible actors that Russia could negotiate with. Russian opposition outlet *Meduza* reported on July 5 that it obtained a Kremlin manual ordering pro-Kremlin and Russian state media to highlight Putin's July 4 statements blaming the West and Ukraine for impeding peace negotiations with "ultimatums" and framing Russia as a willing, good-faith negotiator.[13] The manual recommends that Russian state media should present Putin's demands for Ukrainian capitulation as logical and realistic and Ukraine and the West as untrustworthy and deceptive. Putin's statements during his July 4 press conference and July 5 meetings will likely complicate the apparent ongoing Kremlin effort to convince select audiences that Russia remains interested in negotiations.[14]

**Putin attempted to portray Orban as an EU representative who can speak on the EU's behalf — a claim that EU officials explicitly denied.** Putin stated before his talks with Orban that he understands that Orban visited Russia "not only as [Russia's] long-standing partner, but also as the presiding officer of the EU Council." [15] Putin stated that he hoped Orban would speak to the position of Orban's "European partners" during their discussion. Orban stated that he would like to discuss Russia's position on issues that are "important to Europe" and claimed that Hungary will likely soon become the only state in Europe that can speak to all parties of the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that Orban visited Russia without agreeing or coordinating with Ukraine and emphasized that there can be no agreements on Ukraine without Ukraine.[16] EU

High Commissioner Josep Borrell and European Council President Charles Michel both explicitly stated that the EU Council presidency does not give Orban a mandate to visit Russia and that Orban is not acting on behalf of the EU.[17] Borrell stated that Orban's visit to Russia is "exclusively" within the framework of Hungarian-Russian bilateral relations and noted that the EU excludes official contacts between the EU and Putin.[18] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also stated that Orban is representing Hungary, not NATO.[19] Putin has repeatedly portrayed the West as his envisioned negotiating partner in a ceasefire agreement but notably dismissed all intermediary parties as possible mediators for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia on July 4.[20] Putin's attempts to portray Orban as a legitimate representative of the EU who possesses the authority to speak about possible negotiations on July 5 directly contradicts Putin's July 4 claims that intermediaries lack the competency and authority to mediate an end to the war.[21]

**Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Kremlin information operations are influencing domestic Russian support of the war in Ukraine.** Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published the results of a June 2024 poll on July 4 indicating that 58 percent of respondents believe that Russia should either definitely start peace negotiations with Ukraine in the near term or should start negotiations sooner rather than later, an all-time high since the start of the war but only a marginal increase since Levada's most recent polling in May 2024.[22] Levada Center noted that Russian support for negotiations previously peaked at 57 percent each in October 2022 and November 2023 and that support for negotiations had hovered between 48 and 53 percent since January 2024. Senior Kremlin officials have largely perpetuated information operations aimed at portraying Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine but only on Russian terms that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation and destruction.[23] Levada noted that 41 percent of Russians believe that Russia is more interested in negotiations than Ukraine; that this number has been relatively consistent since 2023; and that these respondents largely believe that Russia is "going in the right direction," approve of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and trust information about the war from television media (as opposed to information from the internet).

Prominent Kremlin information operations justifying the war in Ukraine have impacted domestic support for the war. Levada reported that two-thirds of respondents blame the US and NATO for the war in Ukraine and the resulting casualties, that this number has increased from around 53 percent since June 2023, and that half of these respondents believe that the war in Ukraine could escalate into a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.[24] Levada noted that Russians remain concerned about the war; 95 percent of respondents expressed at least some concern about Ukrainian shelling of border areas and strikes against rear areas and about 86 percent of respondents are concerned about the "use of nuclear weapons" (actor unspecified) and the Western supply of weapons to Ukraine. Levada noted that 34 percent of Russians believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine "could be justified" but that over half of respondents remain directly opposed.

**These Russian polls indicate that Russians who criticize the conduct of the war in Ukraine still support the war due to patriotism and disenfranchisement.** Russian sociological organization Public Sociological Laboratory (PS Lab) told opposition outlet *Verstka* in an article published on July 5 that "non-opponents" to the war are increasingly criticizing the war in Ukraine but still believe that Russia should continue the war and will not say that the war is a mistake.[25] PS Lab defines "non-opponents" as those supporting, justifying, or distancing themselves from the war and that most justify the war but are not "convinced supporters." PS Lab stated that most "non-opponents" share three attributes: they are apolitical and have a "detachment" from power, they

possess serious and specific complaints about the government, and they cite patriotism for both their war justifications and their war criticisms. PS Lab noted that these "non-opponents" believe that they cannot influence the Russian government yet also feel more connected to the Russian government and identity than before the war, indicating that Kremlin propaganda is successfully establishing a degree of domestic unity that "non-opponents" value more than protesting against the Kremlin over their discontent about the war's conduct. Levada reported that the percentage of Russians who are proud of Russia's military actions in Ukraine rose to 48 percent, up from 45 percent in November 2023 and 38 percent from September 2023 – but still below the 51 percent peak following the onset of the war in February and March 2022.[26] Russian propaganda has created a layer of patriotism that likely acts as a buffer between complaints about the conduct of the war and the government that the Kremlin can endure and meaningful opposition that the Kremlin is unwilling or unable to tolerate.

PL Lab told *Verstka* that the percentage of actual "non-opponents" within Russia is difficult to estimate, but *Verstka* suggested several indicators that this percentage could range between 30 and 50 percent. *Verstka* noted that about 49 percent of respondents in a March 2024 Levada poll named human casualties as a possible reason for stopping the war in Ukraine and an increase in the number of respondents who avoid assessing the war.[27] Levada's June 2024 poll reported that 31 percent of respondents follow the war but do not pay close attention whereas 19 percent closely follow the war.[28]

**Many of Russia's "non-opponents" of the war have criticisms that parallel those of Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, yet they lack the ultranationalists' close attention to the war and desire for political change in support of Russian war aims.** PS Labs told *Verstka* that surveyed "non-opponents" spoke about conversations with family members fighting in Ukraine who complained that Russian television lies about the real situation on the frontlines – echoing a longstanding Russian milblogger criticism that Russian state media frequently portrays the situation on the front as better than it is.[29] The "non-opponent" belief that they cannot influence the government and their inattention to the details of the war is a stark departure from the Russian ultranationalist voices, many of whom believe they can influence policy and have advocated for the better treatment of Russian military personnel, better conduct of the war in Ukraine, and even attempted political campaigns aimed at prompting change to these ends.[30]

**Ukrainian forces conducted successful drone and missile strikes against targets in Tambov and Rostov oblasts and Krasnodar Krai on July 4 and 5.** Ukrainian media reported that sources within Ukrainian intelligence stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a successful drone strike against a gunpowder plant in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast on July 4 and that the GUR is clarifying the consequences of the strike.[31] Russian opposition media outlet *SOTA* posted footage claiming to show the Ukrainian drone strike against the Tambov gunpowder plant.[32] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov declined to comment on the reported strike on July 5 but stated that this gunpowder plant is a key Russian military enterprise and suggested that Russia will struggle to restart operations at the plant.[33]

Footage published on July 4 and 5 shows that a Ukrainian drone struck the Novoshakhtinsky oil refinery's (NZNP) "Rostovskiy" oil depot in Rostov-on-Don and caused a subsequent explosion and fire at the depot on the night of July 4 to 5.[34] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev stated that Russian air defenses destroyed 10 drones over Rostov Oblast and that debris from Ukrainian drones caused fires in Rostov Oblast.[35] NZNP is reportedly the largest supplier of petroleum products in southern Russia,


and it is highly likely that the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) (which is based in Rostov-on-Don) uses products from the Rostovskyi oil depot.[36]

Sources within Krasnodar Krai emergency services told Russian opposition outlet *Astra* that several Ukrainian drones and at least two unspecified missiles struck Russia's Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 4 to 5 and damaged a nearby substation, disrupting power to nearby residential areas.[37] *Astra* stated that the strike wounded a Russian servicemember and noted that the Russian 960th Guards Attack Aviation Regiment (1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division, 4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army) is stationed at the airbase and is typically armed with Su-25, Su-25UB, and Su-25SM3 attack aircraft. Ukrainian officials have not commented on the Krasnodar Krai strike as of this report, and the damage to the airfield is currently unclear. The Russian Investigative Committee has reportedly opened a criminal investigation into the Krasnodar Krai strike on charges of terrorism.[38]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.**
- **Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war.**
- **Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine.**
- **Putin's rejection of any ceasefire agreement contradicts the Kremlin's previous effort to place the onus for negotiations on the West and Ukraine.**
- **Putin attempted to portray Orbán as an EU representative who can speak on the EU's behalf – a claim that EU officials explicitly denied.**
- **Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Kremlin information operations are influencing domestic Russian support of the war in Ukraine.**
- **These Russian polls indicate that Russians who criticize the conduct of the war in Ukraine still support the war due to patriotism and disenfranchisement.**
- **Many of Russia's "non-opponents" to the war have criticisms that parallel those of Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, yet they lack the ultranationalists' close attention to the war and desire for political change in support of Russian war aims.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted successful drone and missile strikes against targets in Tambov and Rostov oblasts and Krasnodar Krai on July 4 and 5.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.**
- **Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care and other support for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine amid ongoing criticisms that the Russian military command sends injured soldiers to fight on the frontline.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh stated on July 5 that Ukrainian forces are continuing to identify and destroy elements of a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group in Sotnytskyi Kozachok (directly on the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border and around 45km northwest of Kharkiv City).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that there continue to be reports of Russian forces seizing the settlement, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of an enduring Russian presence within Sotnytskyi Kozachok.[40]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- |                                                           |                                                  |                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours                 | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*            | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Field Fortifications        |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory           | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              |                                     |

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Russian sources claimed on July 2 that Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets River near Buhruvatka.



Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to contest the terrain within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 4 and 5. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian infantry and Ukrainian forces withdrawing wounded servicemembers on the northeastern outskirts of Vovchansk, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions in the area.[41] Geolocated footage published on July 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk.[42] Povkh stated that fighting has intensified in the Kharkiv direction and that Russian forces are regularly introducing additional units into combat in order to conduct rotations for degraded units.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsy and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe.[44] Elements of the Russian "Severyan" assault detachment are reportedly operating within Vovchansk.[45]




## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Stepova Novoselivka (northwest of Svatove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Stepova Novoselivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, Makiivka, and Hrekiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near the Serebrianske forest area on July 4 and 5.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Lyman direction were most active near Terny on July 5.[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces conduct constant small infantry assaults in the direction of Borova (west of Svatove) and periodically use armored

vehicles and non-lethal chemical weapons (likely referring to various Riot Control Agents [RCAs] that Russian forces are using widely throughout the front).[49]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Tom Thacker, Benjamin Gondola, and Harrison Hurwitz  
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- - - Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- - - Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▨ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▨ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters west of the railway line west of Lyman Pershyi as well as 500 meters in forest areas south of Vilshana in the Petropavlivka direction. A Russian source claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers in the Makiivka direction as well as 1.6 kilometers east of Stelmakhivka.

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Siversk on July 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka on July 4 and 5.[50] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[51]


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division seized the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the microraion to positions west of the Siverskyi Donetsk-Donbas Canal – in line with statements by Ukrainian military officials and military observers on July 4.[52] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces have intensified infantry assaults near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) but are not using armored vehicles.[53] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka and Hryhorivka; within Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on July 4 and 5.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Klishchiivka.[55]

# Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk amid continued fighting in the area on July 5. Geolocated footage published on July 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk) and in southern Niu York (south of Toretsk).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces completely seized Yurivka (south of Niu York) and advanced near Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk) and Pivdenne (southeast of Toretsk), within northern Pivnichne, and further within southern Niu York.[57] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; east of Toretsk near Pivnichne; and southeast of Toretsk near Niu York, Yurivka, and Zalizne

on July 4 and 5.[58] Elements of the Russian "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[59]



Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on July 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), north of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka), within Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka), between Sokil and Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka), north of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), and near Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka).[60] A Russian source claimed that there are conflicting reports about Russian advances along the railway line north of Sokil.[61] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Voskhod, disputing widespread Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement on July 4.[62] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Lozuvatske, Yevhenivka, Prohres, Voskhod, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove, Karlivka, and Nevelske on July 4 and 5.[63] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Karlivka.[64]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 5. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Kostyantynivka and near Heorhiivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[66] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces have paused assaults and increased the number of drone strikes in this direction after suffering heavy



losses.[67] ISW has not observed a tempo of Russian offensive operations in the area that would suggest a tactical pause, however. Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, Vodyane, and Volodymyrivka on July 4 and 5.[68] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[69]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- +— Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced 2.92 kilometers deep in the southern part of Niu York. A Russian source claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced almost two kilometers east of Vuhledar.

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske, Urozhaine, and Makarivka (all south of Velyka Novosilka) on July 4 and 5.[70] Elements of the Russian

11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Urozhaine.[71]




### **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

Limited positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 4 and 5.[72] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction stated on July 5 that Russian forces are increasingly using assault groups with two to three personnel and rarely field even squad-sized assault groups.[73] The Ukrainian spokesperson suggested that Russian forces are fielding these small assault groups due to Ukraine's effective

reconnaissance fire complex (RFC) in the area.[74] The Ukrainian spokesperson added that Russian assault groups are attempting to find weak spots in Ukraine's defensive line in the Zaporizhia direction and are essentially conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations instead of assaults.[75] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the area of responsibility of the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces (from east [left] bank Kherson Oblast through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[76] Chechen Republic Head Ramazan Kadyrov claimed on July 5 that elements of the Chechen "Yug-Akhmat" Battalion are participating in assaults near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne).[77] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[78]

Positional fighting continued in east bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on July 5.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting also continued on islands in the Dnipro River and that Ukrainian forces have superior drone capabilities in the area.[80] Social media sources claimed on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a base of the Russian 66th Command Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) near Nova Kakhovka with six drones.[81]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of July 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 4 to 5. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched 32 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that

Ukrainian forces shot down all 32 Shaheds over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy oblasts.[82] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian missile and drone strikes between June 29 and July 5 targeted Ukrainian airfields, defense industrial base (DIB) facilities, and missile storage facilities in Ukraine.[83]

Russian forces continue efforts to evade and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses during missile and drone strikes. Ukrainian 96th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade Commander Colonel Serhii Yaremenko stated on July 5 that Russian forces continue to learn lessons from strikes and are regularly changing tactics in an effort to bypass and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[84] Yaremenko stated that Russian forces are increasingly equipping missiles with air defense countermeasures, including radar jammers.[85]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care and other support for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine amid ongoing criticisms that the Russian military command sends injured soldiers to fight on the frontline. Russian deputy defense ministers Viktor Goremykin and Anna Tsivileva visited a Russian military hospital on July 5 and presented awards to injured servicemembers, inspected physical rehabilitation services, and examined the production and fitting of prostheses.[86] Tsivileva stated that the Russian MoD is working to improve its medical conditions so Russian soldiers can receive full medical treatment and clearer determinations on whether the soldier can return to military service or should be discharged.[87] Tsivileva likely aimed to assuage recent Russian ultranationalist complaints that the Russian MoD is providing inadequate military care to injured soldiers and improperly returns injured personnel to service, including fighting on the frontline.[88] Russian milbloggers have specifically been complaining about a recent appeal from injured soldiers of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) who claimed that Russian commanders sent them to the frontline to fight without receiving medical care and that the soldiers only received medical care after public outcry from Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military authorities sent Artem Sharipov, the Russian soldier who recorded and published the appeal from the injured soldiers of the 26th Tank Regiment, to the military commander's office in occupied Zaitseve, Luhansk Oblast on July 3.[90] The milblogger noted that Zaitseve is the location of a well-known military prison basement, and the Russian command has sent soldiers accused of disobedience to this prison and tortured them.[91]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

### **Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.*

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian authorities continue anti-migrant crackdowns in occupied Ukraine. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on July 3 that the DNR Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and Rosgvardia conducted a joint operation to detain 33 migrants in occupied Mariupol for violating Russian migration laws.[92] Pushilin stated that Russian authorities deported 24 of these migrants.

Russian occupation authorities continue forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia under various schemes. The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) stated on July 4 that Russian occupation authorities deported nearly 100 Ukrainian children from occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast to Vologda as part of a cultural and education program, likely intended to Russify these Ukrainian youth and as part of efforts to eradicate an independent Ukrainian national identity and culture.[93]

### **Russian Information Operations and Narratives**

The BBC published an investigation on July 2 detailing how a network of Russia-based news organizations is using artificial intelligence (AI) to amplify false information intended to disrupt the US presidential election and undermine US support for Ukraine.[94] The BBC reported that Russia-based news organizations presenting themselves as local US newspapers are using AI to "spin" articles from legitimate news organizations and then publishing the more conspiratorial version of the article on their websites. The Russia-based news organizations are reportedly publishing thousands of English-language articles each week and even creating fake documents and YouTube videos to support the articles, some of which receive high rates of engagement on social media. The BBC reported that Newsguard, a company that tracks misinformation websites, stated that at least 170 websites are connected to the operation.

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

Belarusian officials continue narratives portraying Ukraine as a threat, possibly in an effort to revive information operations that aim to draw Ukrainian forces to an inactive sector of the frontline along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Vladimir Kuprianyuk stated on July 5 that Ukrainian forces have accumulated 15,000 personnel near Belarus' border with Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct provocative actions in the area.[95] Kuprianyuk stated that Belarusian forces will strengthen their positions near the Belarusian-Ukrainian border but will not escalate the situation.[96] Belarus has previously supported Kremlin informational efforts to raise Ukrainian concerns about escalation along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border after Russia used Belarus as a staging ground for the full-scale invasion in 2022, aiming for these concerns to encourage Ukraine to draw forces from elsewhere along the frontline.[97]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other**

**geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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