

Iran Update



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Information Cutoff: November 22, 2024, 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment.[1] Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21.[2] The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.[3] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.[4] Iran could activate some of the IR-6 or IR-2m centrifuges that it has installed at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, respectively, in recent months. The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed but not yet activated eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow.[5] The IAEA also confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed 10 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[6] Iran has installed six additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz since August 2024, bringing the total number of cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to 37.[7] Only 15 out of these 37 cascades had been activated as of November 2024.[8] Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[9]

Lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi threatened on November 22 that Iran would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if the E3 triggers the “snapback” mechanism in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows its signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[10] The E3 censure resolution requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would

almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose “snapback” sanctions.[12] UK media reported in early November 2024 that the United Kingdom is prepared to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran.[13] Iranian officials have long threatened to withdraw from the NPT, but Gharib Abadi’s warning is noteworthy given the current standoff between Iran and the E3. Gharib Abadi’s warning also comes amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[14]


Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division Commander Brigadier General Nadav Lotan as the IDF Ground Forces commander on November 22.[15] The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzl Halevi appointed Lotan after the former IDF Ground Forces commander resigned in September 2024, citing personal reasons.[16] Halevi also reassigned several high-ranking IDF positions, including appointing new commanders for the 162nd Division, currently operating in the northern Gaza Strip, and the 887th Division, which operates in the West Bank.[17]

Key Takeaways:

- **Iran:** Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution against Iran.
- **Iran:** A senior Iranian official threatened that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the JCPOA signatories trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution could set conditions for the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran.
- **Israel:** Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of a new IDF Ground Forces commander. The new commander, Brigadier General Nadav Lotan, previously commanded the IDF 162nd Division.

Key Takeaways in the October 7 War

As of November 22, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF killed several Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on November 22.

The IDF 162nd Division conducted airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure, such as ammunition warehouses, in Jabalia and Beit Lahia.[18] The IDF killed five Hamas Nukhba special operations forces fighters in the northern Gaza Strip who conducted attacks on Mefalsim on October 7,

2023.[19] The IDF has also destroyed around 300 buildings rigged with explosives in Jabalia in recent weeks.[20] The IDF gathered intelligence from several detained Palestinian fighters from Jabalia to locate additional fighters there.[21]

Palestinian militias claimed four attacks targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip on November 21 and 22.[22] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms and anti-tank munitions targeting Israeli forces in Beit Lahia.[23] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[24] The IDF reported on November 21 that a soldier from the 84th Infantry Brigade died in the northern Gaza Strip.[25]

The IDF reported on November 22 that the commanders of its 162nd Division and 900th Infantry Brigade traveled to Beit Lahia this week and conducted a situational assessment.[26] The IDF stated that the 900th Infantry Brigade has established "operational control" over Beit Lahia after killing several Palestinian fighters and destroying militia infrastructure there.[27] The IDF further stated that the 900th Infantry Brigade will now focus on destroying Palestinian militia infrastructure above and below the ground.[28] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade began clearing operations in Beit Lahia on November 6.[29]


Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on November 22.[30]

The IDF reported on November 22 that it conducted an airstrike that killed PIJ rocket unit commander Khaled Abu Daqa in Deir al Balah humanitarian zone in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF stated that Daqa was responsible for several indirect rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting Israeli forces and civilians in southern Israel.[31] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian harm from the strike, including by using precise intelligence and specific munitions.[32]

Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF in the southern Gaza Strip on November 22.[33] Hamas snipers shot at five IDF soldiers in a complex attack at the Salah al Din border crossing.[34] Hamas fighters then fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting an IDF Merkava tank and a bulldozer that had arrived in the area to tend to injured IDF soldiers. The IDF confirmed that the sniper attack injured one soldier from the 933rd Infantry Brigade.[35]


Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

As of November 22, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



Israeli-Announced Evacuation Zones in the Gaza Strip

As of November 22, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF likely advanced east along the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road toward Deir Mimas on November 22. The Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road connects the Marjaayoun District, which borders Israel, to the Nabatieh District, which includes territory north of the Litani River. Geolocated images and footage posted on November 22 showed IDF armor driving north of Deir Mimas along the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road in addition to an IDF position north of Deir Mimas along the road.[36] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 22 shows cleared areas south of Burj al Muluk, indicating that the IDF likely moved through the area prior to advancing northward to the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun road. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated outlet *al Akhbar* reported that IDF armor was seen advancing toward the western outskirts of Deir Mimas, while IDF drones reportedly warned residents of the town to stay in their homes.[37]

Lebanese media reported that certain sections of the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road are blocked near where the IDF is reportedly advancing. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that an IDF airstrike destroyed part of the road near Khardali on November 21, north of where the IDF is likely operating.[38] Lebanese media also reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) blocked a section of the road after observing the IDF advance nearby.[39]

Hezbollah claimed numerous attacks targeting Israeli forces likely advancing toward Deir Mimas. Hezbollah claimed three rocket attacks targeting the IDF near Tal al Nahhas, east of Deir Mimas.[40] Hezbollah claimed to fire rockets, mortars, and an anti-tank missile targeting the IDF north of Deir Mimas.[41]

Lebanese sources reported that the IDF shelled around a cluster of towns to the west of Deir Mimas, including Arnoun and Yohmor. [42]The IDF also issued evacuation warnings to residents of neighboring towns Taybeh, Adchit al Qusayr, and Deir Seryan on November 21 before conducting airstrikes in those areas.[43]


Lebanese sources reported that IDF artillery impacted around the towns of Nabatieh, Harouf, Zebdine, Kfar Tebnit, and Jabal al Ahmar for the first time since IDF ground operations began.[44] The IDF Artillery Corps crossed the border and began operating in southern Lebanon on November 17 with M-109 self-propelled guns to increase its artillery range and provide better support to ground forces in the area.[45] The IDF operates the M-109A5, which has a range of 22 kilometers.[46]

The IDF 98th Division continued to operate in Khiam.[47] Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 22 showed the IDF 7th Armored Brigade in southern Khiam.[48] The 7th Armored Brigade located several Hezbollah combat compounds, anti-tank positions, observation posts, and weapons depots, containing grenades, combat equipment, and other weapons in the area.[49] Israeli forces located a camouflaged anti-tank position and discovered a Kornet missile, a drone, and a killed

Hezbollah fighter.[50] Israeli forces located and destroyed several underground shafts and ammunition depots.[51] The IDF called Khiam a “significant. . . center” for Hezbollah activities.[52] Hezbollah claimed to have conducted eight rockets and drone attacks targeting Israeli forces on Khiam’s eastern outskirts.[53] Hezbollah also claimed to fire an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli armor south of Khiam prison.[54]

Israeli media reported that the IDF 91st Division engaged Hezbollah fighters in Aitaroun, south-central Lebanon, for 14 hours during operations in late October.[55] Six soldiers from the IDF 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) were killed in the encounter on October 26.[56] Ynet reported that the 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) launched a raid to enter Aitaroun’s city hall, which was suspected to serve as a Hezbollah headquarters.[57] Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces with small arms and grenades inside the building.[58] Ynet reported that the IDF 91st Division briefly suspected that Hezbollah had kidnapped an Israeli soldier and initiated kidnapping protocols until the soldier was found.[59]

Reported Israeli Operations in the Eastern Sector As of November 22, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



An Israeli military correspondent has visited Israeli forces in Jebbayn, southwestern Lebanon, in recent days.[60] The IDF has been operating in Jebbayn since at least November 15, and the presence of civilian journalists in Jebbayn suggests that the IDF has at least partially secured the village.[61] The correspondent reported that Israeli forces continue to locate Hezbollah staging grounds, including anti-tank positions, in Lebanese “second-line” villages.[62] A battalion commander in the IDF 188th Armored Brigade (146th Division) said that Israeli forces are tasked with removing all Hezbollah ammunition and infrastructure in these towns.[63]

Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF advanced west toward Naqoura from Chama, southwestern Lebanon, on November 22.[64] Israeli Army Radio reposted the reports.[65] UNIFIL reported on November 22 that it has observed heavy shelling and ground combat


near Chama and Naqoura in recent days.[66] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets and drones targeting Israeli forces in Chama and west of Chama.[67]

Two likely Hezbollah 122-mm rockets injured four UNIFIL peacekeepers in Chama, southwest Lebanon, on November 22.[68] UNIFIL stated that the rockets struck a bunker and a logistics site, causing significant damage to infrastructure.[69] UNIFIL added that the rockets were “likely launched by Hezbollah or affiliated groups.”[70] The only non-state armed groups in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate there. This incident marks the third time in a week that Hezbollah or IDF fire has struck the UNIFIL position in Chama.[71]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for four towns in southwestern Lebanon.[72] The IDF has previously ordered residents of all but one of these towns, Iskenderun, to evacuate north of the Awali River. The IDF stated that it would operate against Hezbollah in evacuated areas.[73]


Reported Israeli Operations in the Western Sector

As of November 22, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Reported Israeli Operations in Lebanon


As of November 22, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 21. The IDF issued evacuation orders on November 22 for residents in four neighborhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[74] The IDF has struck at least eight Hezbollah sites, including headquarters and weapons depots, in southern Beirut since issuing the evacuation orders.[75] The IDF stated that the attacks were meant to destroy ammunition depots and weapons production sites that Hezbollah has developed over years.[76]

The IDF destroyed Hezbollah Aziz regional command infrastructure in multiple waves of airstrikes on Tyre, southern Lebanon, on November 22.[77] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for residents of two neighborhoods in eastern Tyre and specific buildings in the city.[78] The IDF struck Hezbollah headquarters, intelligence infrastructure, weapons


depots, observation posts, and military buildings in Tyre.[79] The IDF noted that Hezbollah's Aziz unit, which is responsible for Hezbollah operations along the southwest Israel-Lebanon border, is headquartered in Tyre.[80] Local sources reported at least 19 distinct IDF strikes around Tyre on November 22.[81]



This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 21 to 2:00pm ET on November 22. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 21.[82] Hezbollah targeted an IDF Air Force site in Haifa with a "Nasr 2" precision surface-to-surface missile.[83] Hezbollah claims that the "Nasr 2" carries a 140-kilogram warhead and

can travel up to 150 kilometers.[84] Hezbollah first used the "Nasr 2" on October 20.[85] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Hezbollah is firing these missiles and rockets from deeper in southern Lebanon or around Baalbek in northeast Lebanon, where the IDF will "likely never operate." [86] Hezbollah also launched rockets targeting an IDF radar site on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights for the second consecutive day.[87] Hezbollah continued to launch rockets and one-way attack drones targeting the IDF on the Israel-Lebanon border on November 22.[88] Hezbollah also continued to target IDF sites, such as Shraga and Stella Maris base, near Acre.[89]



Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in southern Israel on November 21.[90]


The Iraqi federal government is highlighting its efforts to halt Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel in order to try to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18, in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[91] Iraqi federal government spokesperson Basim al Awadi stated that Baghdad has made “great efforts” to reign in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in an interview with Sky News Arabia on November 22.[92] Awadi added that the federal government is prepared to take “any necessary measures” to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani previously ordered Iraqi security forces on November 19 to confront any armed group that attempts to launch attacks from Iraq.[93]

A high-ranking Iranian delegation is expected to travel to Baghdad in the coming days to hold indirect talks with the United States, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on November 22.[94] The source claimed that Iran seeks to end the October 7 War “as soon as possible” and that the Iranian delegation will push the United States to pressure Israel to end the war. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran has an interest in ending the October 7 War to prevent Israel from further degrading Hezbollah and Hamas.[95] A US delegation reportedly arrived in Baghdad on November 13 to hold indirect talks with Iran aimed at “calming the situation [in the Middle East].”[96]

Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed on November 22 that the Houthis fired a Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile targeting the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev desert.[97] The IDF intercepted the missile on November 21.[98]

Houthi Attacks into Israel

As of November 22, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



Senior Iranian Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani emphasized Hezbollah’s resilience during an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on November 21.[99]

Larjani stated that the Israeli pager attack targeting Hezbollah in September 2024 was a “serious blow” for Hezbollah but argued that Hezbollah has recovered from the attack.[100] Larjani also reiterated the Iranian regime’s support for a ceasefire in Lebanon.[101] Larjani reportedly conveyed a message from Khamenei to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut that called on Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River.[102] Larjani separately called on the incoming US administration to form a “new” nuclear agreement with Iran.[103] Larjani stated that, under the proposed agreement, Iran would agree not to pursue a nuclear weapon but would retain its uranium enrichment capabilities.[104]

IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami vowed on November 22 that Iran will retaliate against Israel.^[105] Salami emphasized that Israel's instability and ongoing resistance movements will accelerate its collapse, calling on Islamic countries to impose an economic blockade to expedite this process.^[106] Salami stated on November 8 that disrupting Israel's maritime trade, which he claimed accounts for 98 percent of its economy, by targeting its ports and making the Mediterranean Sea unsafe for commercial transit, would critically threaten Israel's existence and potentially lead to its collapse.^[107] Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr separately reiterated Iran's firm commitment to retaliation against Israel, emphasizing that Iran's pledge for "Truthful Promise III" is precise and effective.^[108]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro concluded the 10th Iran-Venezuela Joint Economic Commission in Caracas, Venezuela on November 21.^[109] Iranian and Venezuelan officials signed cooperation agreements to enhance trade, industrial projects, and technology transfer.^[110] Both sides emphasized joint efforts to resist global hegemony and strengthen economic ties, building on a 20-year partnership agreement signed in June 2022 during Maduro's visit to Tehran.^[111]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the "Axis of Resistance" as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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<https://t.me/mmirleb/9363> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9371>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9372>;
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<https://t.me/mmirleb/9382>

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