

**Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, George Barros,
and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

March 14, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on March 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated" Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast.[1] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in order to influence the political and informational scene.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.

Russian milbloggers have also not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[4] At least one Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs into rear Ukrainian areas.[5]

Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim.[6] Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.

Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands" of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives.[7] Putin responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if Ukrainian forces surrender.[8] Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.[9]

Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Putin received Witkoff in Moscow on the evening of March 13 and reiterated that Putin "supports Trump's position on the settlement in Ukraine" but that there are "questions that need to be answered together." [10] Peskov said that Putin gave Witkoff information to pass to Trump and that Russia and the United States understand that Putin and Trump need to have a conversation and will determine the details of a Putin-Trump phone call in the future.[11] Neither the Kremlin nor the US government have provided further details about this meeting as of this report.

Peskov's emphasis on a direct Putin-Trump call and Putin's continued refusal to accept the US-Ukrainian proposed ceasefire suggests that Putin likely intends to distract from and prolong any negotiations for a future ceasefire in Ukraine. Putin's recent calls for a direct phone call with Trump are only the latest development in Putin's efforts to posture Russia and the United States as equal on the global stage.[12] Russian insider sources recently claimed that Putin aims to protract negotiations about a possible temporary ceasefire, and Putin's recent public statements are consistent with these insider claims.[13] Leaked documents from a think tank close to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s Fifth Service reportedly state that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept a ceasefire in Ukraine before 2026.[14] ISW assessed on March 12 that these Russian insider source leaks may have been intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.[15]

US intelligence reportedly continues to assess that Putin is unwilling to end the war in Ukraine and remains committed to conquering Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW's long-term assessment of Putin's objectives in Ukraine and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. The *Washington Post*, citing unspecified people familiar with the matter, reported that classified US intelligence reports assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of dominating Ukraine.[16] The *Washington Post* reported that a US intelligence assessment dated March 6, 2025, concluded that Putin remains determined to "hold sway" over Ukraine. Current and former US officials told the *Washington Post* that if Putin did agree to a temporary ceasefire, Russia would use the ceasefire to rest and refit Russian forces and that Putin


would likely break the agreement and falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire. Four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials told NBC on February 18 that intelligence from the United States and US allies shows that Putin still aims to control all of Ukraine and that there is no intelligence suggesting that Putin is ready for a peace deal.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, and the Kremlin has maintained its expansionist rhetoric despite recent talks with the Trump administration about peace in Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced within Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha).[19] Russian forces likely also seized Goncharovka (west of Sudzha), given that NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data from March 14 indicates heavy fighting in the area and that Russian sources recently claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[20] Other Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka, Goncharovka, and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), and that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and up to the southern outskirts of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha along the international border).[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not yet entered Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha along the international border), and another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions within Oleshnya, Guyevo, and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo along the international border).[22] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha), and a milblogger claimed that Russian forces are regrouping for further advances within Kursk Oblast.[23] Elements of the Russian "Kurskiye Vityaz" Assault Battalion, reportedly of the "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), are reportedly operating near Sudzha, and elements of the 1st Battalion of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[24]

Russian forces also reportedly continued to advance in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 14 that small Russian assault groups are continuing to attack into northern Sumy Oblast and are trying to advance towards Novenke and Zhuravka (both northeast of Sumy City).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novenke and into northern Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26] A Russian milblogger reiterated claims on March 14 that Russian forces may attempt to create a "sanitary zone" in Sumy Oblast in the future.[27] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk responded to recent speculation about the possibility of a Russian cross border attack into Chernihiv Oblast and stated that Ukrainian forces have the situation along the international border in Chernihiv Oblast under control and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have operated in the area "for a long time." [28]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas, including in Moscow Oblast. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that Ukrainian drone strikes hit the Tuapse Oil Refinery overnight and caused a fire at one of the oil tanks that burned an area of over 1,000 square meters.[29] Geolocated footage published on March 14 shows a burning oil depot in Tuapse.[30] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Tuapse Oil Refinery is one of Russia's largest refineries and can process up to 12 million tons of oil per year, supporting Russian military needs in southern Russia and in the Black Sea.[31] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian drone strikes also damaged multiple unspecified facilities in Moscow Oblast on the morning of March 14. Russian authorities and sources claimed that downed Ukrainian drones damaged residential areas in Moscow Oblast while en route to Moscow City

and did not report damage to other facilities, however.[32] Footage published on March 14 shows a drone striking a building near the 333rd Combat Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[33] Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also based in Mulino.[34] Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian state-news outlet Ukrinform on March 14 that SBU drones recently struck gas compressor stations in Saratov and Tambov oblasts and a storage facility for S-300/S-400 air defense missiles near Radkovka, Belgorod Oblast.[35]

Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian drones were able to successfully infiltrate Moscow City's airspace and strike infrastructure in the area despite Russia's efforts to concentrate air defenses around Moscow Oblast.[36] Kovalenko suggested that Russian authorities have concentrated air defense systems around Moscow City at the expense of other areas in Russia due to a significant shortage of radars and air defense systems. Kovalenko noted that Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed a significant number of air defense systems and radars both along the front line and within rear areas in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, highlighting that tactical Ukrainian drone strikes have likely significantly degraded Russia's ability to effectively defend strategic-level military and industrial assets in deep rear areas.

The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a corps structure. Ukraine's 3rd Separate Assault Brigade announced on March 14 that the Ukrainian military command restructured the unit as the 3rd Army Corps.[37] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskiy stated on February 3 that Ukraine started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian military into a "corps structure." [38] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between Ukraine's brigades and operational groups of forces and create a command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon will likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and facilitate more effective operations.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation. Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson announced on March 13 an artillery package for Ukraine worth three billion Swedish Kroner (roughly \$300 million), including 18 additional Archer artillery systems, five ARTHUR counter-battery radar systems, and financial support for the Ukrainian shell initiative and domestic artillery production.[39] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov signed a bilateral agreement with Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles on March 14 to strengthen defense cooperation and support Ukrainian military training.[40] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Dutch Representative Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius to discuss the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal and possible future supply of F-16 jets, drones, and ammunition and Dutch support in further developing Ukrainian weapons production.[41]


Key Takeaways:

- **ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine.**

- **Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.**
- **Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.**
- **Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas, including in Moscow Oblast.**
- **The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a corps structure.**
- **Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Siversk and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
 © 2025 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Advances in Russia
- Claimed Russian Advances in Russia
- Ukrainian Advances in Russia

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports of Russian activity in Kursk Oblast and northern Sumy Oblast and Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 13 and 14.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Doroshivka, and Holubivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 13 and 14.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near the Dvorichna-Kupyansk P-79 road.[44]

The Ukrainian Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported on March 14 that Russian forces are attempting to transfer additional units and resources across the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[45]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Russian forces are approaching Borova and cleared Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and east of Borova near Nadiya on March 13 and 14.[47] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Bohuslavka.[48]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction


March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Russian forces advanced up to 2.5 kilometers near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced into the center of the settlement.[49] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force but failed to gain a foothold in Novolyubivka and retreated to previous positions.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampolivka and elements of the 73rd Artillery Brigade (likely part of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Torske.[50] ISW has not previously observed elements of the 73rd Artillery Brigade operating in Ukraine, and the Russian military command likely formed the brigade as part of Russia's force restructuring and expansion efforts.[51]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces seized the entirety of Vasyukivka.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Russian forces of an unspecified echelon recently activated northwest of Soledar and advanced north of Sako i Vantseti (both south of Siversk) on March 13.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on March 13 and 14.[55]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 14 that Russian forces are increasing their activity in the northern part of the Siversk direction near Bilohorivka, rather than in the southern Siversk direction, and that Russian forces are conducting assault operations and using more first-person view (FPV) drones to prepare for frontal assaults against Bilohorivka.[56]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar on March 13 and 14.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of Russia’s 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Ozaryanivka (northeast of Toretsk).[59] Geolocated footage published on March 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward in a forested area south of Onezhska Street in southwestern Toretsk.[60]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced northward in northern Toretsk to Krasnodarska Street, westward in southwestern Toretsk to Hlinky Street, northwestward in Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), and northward in Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[61]

ISW recessed assessed Russian advances near the Tsentralna Mine from its map in western Toretsk, as ISW has not observed evidence of an enduring Russian presence in this area, and because ISW has observed Ukrainian counterattacks in central Toretsk. These changes likely did not occur in the past 24 hours. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 claiming Ukrainian forces have counterattacked and seized positions in this area.[62]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Krymske, and Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on March 13 and 14.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Toretsk.[64]

Zaporozhets reported on March 14 that Russian forces increased attacks in the Toretsk direction following Russian redeployments to the area.[65] Zaporozhets also reported that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction are using physically unfit disabled soldiers, and that Russian forces that hastily advance into central Toretsk using motorcycles sometimes advance into the incorrect areas.

Order of Battle: Elements of Russia’s 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk’s Fomiha and Zabalka microraiions.[66] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[67]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[68]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are contesting Ukrainian positions in Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced in southern Shevchenko and western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[69] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) advanced in central Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Svyrydonivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Pishchane, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Oleksandropil, Tarasivka, Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Novooleksandropil, Novoserhiivka, Troitske, and Uspenivka on March 13 and 14.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in southern Shevchenko.[72]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on March 14 that Russian forces are reintensifying offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction and are attempting to advance southwest of Pokrovsk.[73] Trehubov stated that Russian forces have yet to make significant advances in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have retaken the tactical initiative in the Pokrovsk direction and are intensifying efforts to widen the Russian salient southwest of Pokrovsk.[74]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



ISW
 INSTITUTE FOR THE
 STUDY OF WAR
 AND
CT CRITICAL
 THREATS
 THE DR. JACK LONDON
 GEOSPATIAL FUND

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
 © 2025 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- | | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | | |

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area 500 meters in depth and two kilometers wide southeast of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil on March 13 and 14.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Kostyantynopil.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 14 that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters in depth along a 3-kilometer-wide front near Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced in an area one kilometer in depth and 300 meters wide along the Mokri Yaly River in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[78] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Skudne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) in an area up to one kilometer deep and 1.5 kilometers wide.[79]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Novosilka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Rivnopil on March 13 and 14.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Burlatske.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Skudne and elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Dniproenerhiya (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[82] Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[83]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on March 14.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[84]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zherybyanky (northwest of Robotyne) in the direction of Kamyanske (northwest of Zherybyanky), near Mali Shcherbaky (northeast of Zherybyanky), and advanced eight kilometers near Shcherbaky (just east of Maly Shcherbaky).[85]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka and northeast of Robotyne toward Mala Tokmachka on March 13 and 14.[86]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction

March 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 14.



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 27 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 16 Shahed and decoy drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kharkiv oblasts and that nine decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Russian drone strikes damaged objects in Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[89] Official Ukrainian sources reported on March 14 that Russian forces conducted two drone strikes involving three drones against a hospital in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[90] Russian forces conducted the second strike roughly 40 minutes after the first strike, likely in an effort to injure Ukrainian first responders.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to advance Russia's nuclear posturing. Lukashenko claimed that the Russian Oreshnik ballistic missile will “soon” enter service with Belarusian forces and that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed possible Oreshnik deployment locations during their March 13 meeting in Moscow.[91]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Chairperson Dmitry Pantus in Minsk on March 12 and agreed to expand defense cooperation.[92] Zadeh met with Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin earlier on March 12.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

[1] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76450>

[2] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76459>

[3] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21994>

[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157806 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62844> ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/21837> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66732 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31126 ;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20815 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20811 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62808> ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20822 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/25292> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157826 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87868>
; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87885> ; <https://t.me/rybar/68807> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/25274> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/33459> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33479> ;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/31114 ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21828> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21829> ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/21805> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31108 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66604 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/66607

[5] https://t.me/Army_Russia/47847 <https://t.me/milinfo/143862>

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024>

[7] <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114161039436456514>

[8] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76459>

[9] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>

[10] https://t.me/rian_ru/285166; https://t.me/tass_agency/305682; <https://ria dot ru/20250314/peskov-2004985595.html>

[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/305684; https://t.me/tass_agency/305683;
https://t.me/tass_agency/305686

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825>

[13] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325>

[14] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225>

[15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025>

- [16] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/13/putin-trump-ukraine-russia-ceasefire/> ; <https://archive.ph/Pw9d2>
- [17] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825>
- [18] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar120624>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125>
- [19] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8643; <https://t.me/zovshkipera46/15419>;
- [20] <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.29,51.22,13.02z>
- [21] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62844>; https://t.me/dva_majors/66720 ;
<https://t.me/rybar/68827>; https://t.me/tass_agency/305710; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31126;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20841; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157826;
- [22] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33500>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21837>
- [23] https://t.me/dva_majors/66720 ; <https://t.me/rybar/68827>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21837>;
https://t.me/rusich_army/21668; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157826
- [24] <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18189>; <https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/zsu-likviduvaly-kombata-rosijskoyi-brygady-pyatnashka/>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157770
- [25] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/14/peretynayut-kordon-i-hovayutsya-na-sumshhyni-polyuyut-za-malymy-grupamy-rosijskyh-pihotyncziv/>
- [26] https://t.me/dva_majors/66732; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62844>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25345>
- [27] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62868>
- [28] <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/970599-v-otu-siversk-rozpovili-ci-fiksuvali-rosijski-drg-na-prikordonni-cernigivsini-pisla-podij-na-kursini/>
- [29] https://t.me/tass_agency/305615 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/305618;
<https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8584>; <https://t.me/astrapress/76481>
- [30] <https://t.me/sssternenko/41189>; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1900439142988673171
- [31] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8974> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/14/u-tuapse-atakovano-odyn-z-najbilshyh-npz-rosiyan/>
- [32] <https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23395397> ; <https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23397731> ;
https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/14554 ; https://t.me/vorobiev_live/8489 ; <https://t.me/vrogov/19559> ;
<https://t.me/bazabazon/35759> ; <https://t.me/bazabazon/35760> <https://t.me/vchkogpu/55300> ;
<https://t.me/vchkogpu/55301> ; <https://t.me/vchkogpu/55304> ; <https://t.me/vchkogpu/55308> ;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20845

- [33] <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18199>
- [34] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-regular-ground-forces-order-battle-russian-military-101>
- [35] <https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3970451-droni-sbu-urazili-v-rosii-dvi-gazokompresorni-stancii-ta-sklad-raket-dzerelo.html>
- [36] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8976>
- [37] <https://t.me/ab3army/5333>
- [38] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025>
- [39] <https://x.com/PlJonson/status/1900197629021040974> ; <https://government dot se/press-releases/2025/03/new-swedish-support-strengthens-ukraines-artillery-capacity/>
- [40] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12177
- [41] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/13/volodymyr-zelenskyj-zustrivsyia-z-liderkoyu-providnoyi-partiyi-niderlandiv-govoryly-pro-spravedlyvyj-myr-f-16-ta-zbroyu/>
- [42] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A9Jhu4erCcgo5g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhyzGrl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0R3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>
- [43] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A9Jhu4erCcgo5g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhyzGrl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0R3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>
- [44] <https://t.me/alehingennadiy/4982>
- [45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6327
- [46] <https://t.me/alehingennadiy/4982>
- [47] https://t.me/tass_agency/305637 ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A9Jhu4erCcgo5g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhyzGrl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0R3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM720aS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l> ; <https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/29736>

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/305637

[49] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25338>

[50] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25338>

[51] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war>

[52] <https://t.me/kozakgyluntv/21216>; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1900551080288702512

[53] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21841>

[54] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62850>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/25292>

[55] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoA9Jhu4erCcgo5g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhyzGrl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM720aS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=js9e-xJUUpKY>;
<https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/03/13/artyleriya-drony-i-pihota-ukrayinski-syly-zupynyly-vorozhu-ataku-na-verhnokamyanske/>

[56] https://suspilne.media/970183-zelenskij-ta-tramp-vidreaguvali-na-vimogi-putina-sodo-peremira-svecia-nadast-zsu-artsistemi-archer-1115-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1741948996&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[57] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM720aS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>

[58] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25325>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87903>

[59] https://t.me/rozvidka_noem/16247; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1900566611842551842>

[60] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1900441973078556966>;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1900442190721036484>; <https://t.me/c/1886009492/2428>

[61] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31123; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62849>;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/33512>

[62] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62849>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33512>;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/31123

[63] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoA9Jhu4erCcg05g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhzyGrl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoA9Jhu4erCcg05g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhzyGrl>

[64] <https://t.me/wargonzo/25292>

[65] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/14/zajmayutsya-utyilizacziyeyu-hromyh-i-kosyh-rosijski-komandyry-nyshhat-svoyih-lyudej-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/>

[66] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33512>

[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13550

[68] https://t.me/UMBRELLA_32_OMBR/49 ;
https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1900522492810158268 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8645 ;
https://t.me/disarm_for_ruzzia/38

[69] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33486> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25339> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/33491>

[70] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33492>

[71] [mLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhzyGrl](https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl) ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62856> ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/66720 ; <https://t.me/rybar/68827> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21839>

[72] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33491> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13891 ;
https://t.me/rusich_army/21667

[73] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/14/ponovylasya-shtovhanyna-yaka-bula-ranishe-napokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-rizko-aktyvizuvav-zusylyya/>

[74] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21839>

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/13891

[76] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoA9Jhu4erCcg05g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhzyGrl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>

[77] <https://t.me/wargonzo/25292>

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/13891

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/13887

[80]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/13891

[82] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33519> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13887

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/13885 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13884

[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/13886

[85] <https://t.me/wargonzo/25292>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62843>;

https://t.me/tass_agency/305644; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33495>;

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157842

[86]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoA9Jhu4erCcg05g4W2HwJaNmPUhSEj9CAQ4UVVe9oPmLPztVHE4zfPWqwHydhyzGrl>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR3bRyjz9UcUftGknKRgfV2VVPNJ2z2dzF6DXLrAi8hheJeSXKAoyGZHVynNFZeTzl>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidonNcnSbWSxgbdM892s7WmheM72oaS28D27MmXRL2ebnCkSHjJKpwy9bgJdLebWfq2l>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62843>;

<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25352>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157842;

<https://t.me/motopatriot78/33516>

[87] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/39938

[88] <https://t.me/kpszsus/30598>

[89] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39546 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/03/14/vorog-atakuvav-harkiv-udarnymy-bpla/> ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2222 ;

https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2225 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2227 ;

https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2228 ; <https://t.me/astrapress/76469>

[90] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/03/14/na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-zavdaly-podvijnogo-udaru-po-likarni/> ; <https://t.me/synegubov/13457> ; <https://t.me/synegubov/13459> ;

[91] https://t.me/tass_agency/305691 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/305696 ;
https://t.me/pul_1/16111; https://t.me/tass_agency/305692

[92] <https://belta.by/society/view/belarus-i-iran-obsudili-proekty-voenno-tehnicheskogo-sotrudnichestva-701967-2025/>; <https://ru.irna.ir/news/85777338/%D0%98%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD-%D0%B8-%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%8C-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%8C-%D0%BE-%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9>

[93] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025>