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and George Barros with William Runkel

March 23, 2025, 4:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on March 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. An unnamed US official told the *Financial Times* (FT) on March 23 that the talks will cover the technical aspects of the temporary strikes moratorium, including monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that the talks will define the scope of this ceasefire.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian delegation, which also includes Ukrainian Presidential Office deputy heads Pavlo Palisa and Ihor Zhovka, Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk, MFA State Secretary Oleksandr Karasevich, and several unspecified military officers.[2] FT reported that the US delegation includes US National Security Council member Andrew Peek and State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton.[3] A Ukrainian official told the *New York Times* (NYT) that the US and Ukrainian delegations may hold additional talks on March 24 depending on the progress of negotiations.[4] The US-Ukrainian meeting is ongoing as of this publication and ISW will report on the details of the talks in-depth on March 24.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies. A Russian insider source claimed on March 23 that the Russian Federation Council Accounts Chamber (the Russian Federation's highest audit body) recently initiated

an audit of the Russian Central Bank to investigate its monetary policy from 2022 to 2024 and the impact of the interest rate on inflation, budget expenditures, and investment.[5] The source claimed that the investigation is "effectively" an attack on Nabiullina. The insider source claimed that a group of lobbyists from large Russian businesses seek interest rate reductions. ISW cannot independently verify this insider source's claim and has not observed other reporting about the alleged audit.

Russian inflation has been rising due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the Russian Central Bank decided in December 2024 to maintain the key interest rate at 21 percent – the highest Russian interest rate since 2003 – as part of efforts to curb growing inflation rates.[6] The Russian Central Bank's interest rate through 2025 has remained relatively conservative despite significant and growing inflationary pressures.[7] The Kremlin has claimed in recent months that the inflation rate is about nine to 10 percent, but these figures are likely far below the actual inflation rate, which is likely closer to 20 to 25 percent.[8] Russia's current interest rate should likely be higher, and the Kremlin likely pressured the Central Bank to keep the rate at 21 percent when the Central Bank should have increased it to curb inflation.[9]


Russian President Vladimir Putin has also attempted to shift blame for the rising inflation rate on the Central Bank, and on Nabiullina in particular. This was likely in an effort to draw the ire of the Russian business community away from the Kremlin and onto her, although Nabiullina likely has not been able to exercise fully independent monetary policy. The audit on the Central Bank may be part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to apply political pressure on the bank to prevent further interest rate hikes beyond the current rate of 21 percent, manage the expectations and frustrations of the Russian business community, and further the Kremlin's narrative about Russia's economic stability. The Kremlin's continued manipulation of the Central Bank's decisions is likely hampering the Russian government's ability to enact sound wartime monetary policies.

Key Takeaways:

- **US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.**
- **Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Russian forces conducted offensive operations to push Ukrainian forces out of their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha along the international border).[10]

A Russian milblogger claimed that it would take Russian forces at least one month to push Ukrainian forces out of their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[11]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[12]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) have seized almost all of Basivka (northeast of Sumy City near the international border).[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Volodymyrivka (west of Basivka near the international border).[14]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[15]

Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in Belgorod Oblast on March 23.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked with engineering equipment near Grafovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[16] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into southern Demidovka after Russian forces had problems with communications among units but that Russian forces then pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[17]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 23 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian command and control post in Glotovo, Belgorod Oblast (west of Belgorod City near the international border) on March 21, destroying communications devices and technical equipment.[18]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment, "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), "Grom-Kaskad" drone brigade, and "Irlandtsy" detachment are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[19]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 22 and 23.[20]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that Russian forces have been attempting to cross the Vovcha River in Vovchansk but cannot transport armored vehicles across the river without pontoon crossings, which Shamshyn noted Russian forces cannot establish due to Ukrainian drone surveillance.[21] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces last attempted to cross the Vovcha River with a small infantry group a "few weeks" ago.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[22]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 22 and 23.[23]

A Russian milblogger claimed that southern Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) is a contested "gray zone." [24]

Ukrainian forces recently liberated the village of Nadiya, Luhansk Oblast, in the Borova direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northeastern Nadiya (east of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently seized the settlement.[25] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces' loss of Nadiya on March 22 shows that issues in the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), including those involving commanders submitting false reports about Russian advances, remain unresolved.[26]

Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[27]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nadiya on March 22 and 23.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) and 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Nadiya.[29]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novolyubivka and up to four kilometers wide and up to 2.7 kilometers deep west of Ivanivka (both northeast of Lyman).[30]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman toward Nove and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on March 22 and 23.[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne on March 22 and 23.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on March 22 and 23.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed attacks in Chasiv Yar with equipment and that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[34]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on March 23 that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Chasiv Yar and Toretsk but effective Ukrainian defensive operations have prevented Russian forces from seizing the settlements.[35] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 23 that Russian forces recently attempted to attack in the Chasiv Yar direction with armored vehicles but were unsuccessful.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Chaikovskoho Street in northern Toretsk.[38]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka. [39]

Zaporozhets reported on March 23 that Russian forces will soon begin to use armored vehicles in the Toretsk direction as part of renewed attempts to seize Toretsk.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian position near Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[41] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division, including elements of its 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment; 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA); 428th Tank Battalion (possibly of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA); and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA)are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions northeast of Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement).[43] Additional geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Vesela Street in northwestern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and south of Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Sribne, though ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 5.[46]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Novoukrainka, Novoandriivka, Kotlyne, Udachne, Uepsnivka, Kotlyarivka, and Bohdanivka on March 22 and 23.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Shevchenko.[48]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction and some Russian milbloggers stated that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from conducting rotations.[49] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian strikes are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Selydove (south of Pokrovsk) to Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and near Karlivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[50]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 22 and 23.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynopil and that Ukrainian forces retain positions within the settlement and on its western outskirts.[52]


Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced-company-sized Russian mechanized assault consisting of 13 armored vehicles in the Novopavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) direction on an unspecified recent date.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novosilka on March 22 and 23.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vesele and Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Shartarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Vesele.[57] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction (west of Velyka Novosilka).[58]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 23.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[59] Artillery elements of the Russian 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[60]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[61]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on March 22 and 23.[62]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance platoon operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on March 23 that Russian forces only use vehicles for logistics purposes during the day and far from the frontline and that Russian logistics usually try to bypass large settlements and use large armored vehicles as little as possible.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction; and artillery elements of the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[64]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 23.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 23 that the Ukrainian Air Forces struck a crossing support company of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) in occupied Dnipriany (east of Kherson City on the east [left] bank Kherson Oblast) on March 21, destroying naval assets and technical equipment.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction March 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 22 and 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 97 drones over southern, northern, western, and central Ukraine and that 25 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces used a large number of strike drones (at least 122) and a relatively small number of decoy drones (25) in the overnight strikes. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[67]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed over 1,115 air targets between March 17 and 23, including 625 Shahed drones and 250 reconnaissance drones.[68] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched over 1,580 guided glide bombs, almost 1,100 strike drones, and 15 missiles of various types against Ukraine in the past week (March 17 to 23).[69]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia continues efforts to innovate long-range strike drones, including with foreign-produced components. A Russian source claimed that Russia began using Chinese-produced controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA), which are resistant to jamming, in long-range Shahed drones in order to better counter Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.[70]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe>;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-us-teams-hold-talks-saudi-arabia-end-war-with-russia-2025-03-23/>

[2] <https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe>; <https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-politics/3973981-u-sauidivskij-aravii-vidbuvsja-persij-raund-peregovoriv-storoni-pisli-na-perervu.html>

- [3] <https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe>
- [4] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/europe/russia-ukraine-truce-talks.html>
- [5] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17247
- [6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>
- [7] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>
- [8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725>; <https://chelny-izvest dot ru/news/ugolok-potrebitelya/ceny-vyrastut-na-20-25-cto-zdet-rynok-bytovoi-texniki>; <https://www.dw dot com/ru/cto-podorozaet-v-rossii-v-2025-godu/a-70955627>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>
- [9] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>
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- [21] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/v-otu-harkiv-poyasnyly-chomu-okupanty-nenamagayutsya-forsuvaty-richku-vovcha/>
- [22] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5586 https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5586
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[24] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25799>

[25] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11169; <https://t.me/DniproOfficial/5909>;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/33667> ; <https://www.objectiv dot tv/objectively/2025/03/23/vsu-osvobodili-selo-na-borovskom-napraavlennii-video/>

[26] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22002>

[27] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25799>

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