

**Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov,
and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate Trotter**

March 30, 2025 4:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45 am ET on March 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future. Trump stated during a phone call with NBC News on March 30 that he is "angry and pissed off" at Putin for disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as the leader of Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal" – possibly referring to a general ceasefire or long-term peace in Ukraine – then the United States will place secondary sanctions on all "oil coming out of Russia." Trump stated that the United States will put a "25 percent tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all [Russian] oil." Trump stated that the United States will not allow companies or countries that purchase Russian oil to "do business" in the United States and that the United States could begin imposing secondary sanctions within the next month if Russia, Ukraine, and the United States do not conclude a ceasefire agreement. Trump stated that he will speak with Putin at an unspecified time later this week. Putin reiterated long-standing Russian claims that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader of Ukraine on March 28.[2]

ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreement on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[3]

A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Kirill Logvinov presented a detailed plan to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 30 that supports Putin's recent demand for the UN, United States, and European countries to establish a temporary government in Ukraine in the near future.[4] Logvinov argued that the UN should reach an agreement between the parties to the conflict following the implementation of a ceasefire, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries, on the appropriate transfer of power to the UN. Logvinov suggested that one of the parties, mediators, or the UN Secretary General should submit an official appeal that the UN establish a temporary internal administration in Ukraine. Logvinov specified that the UN Security Council (UNSC), particularly its permanent members, must support the mandate and that any UNSC member can submit a draft proposal on the composition and funding of the temporary government. Logvinov stated that the UN Secretary General should then prepare a report on the temporary administration, particularly noting staffing and budgetary guidelines, after which the UNSC should consider any proposals and submit a final decision on the interim government. Logvinov noted that the final proposal must also "receive the support of the members of the [UNSC], namely the permanent ones." Logvinov's proposal would notably allow Russia (a permanent member of the UNSC) to submit a proposal on the interim Ukrainian government and to veto any proposal that Russia considers unfavorable and would bar Ukraine from any role in the final approval process.

Logvinov and TASS are supporting Putin's recent effort to inject a new demand into discussions about the resolution to the war that is consistent with the Kremlin's long-standing effort to ensure the installation of a government friendly to Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to dictate the sequencing and processes surrounding the demand while holding the ceasefire negotiation hostage to extract additional concessions from the West. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres rejected Putin's proposal to establish a temporary administration in Ukraine and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected on March 28.[5]

Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 111 Shahed and decoys from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones over northern, southern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian Shahed drones struck a military hospital and civilian buildings in Kharkiv City.[7] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed on March 29 with a recent report from German outlet *Bild* that Russian forces have altered their long-range drone strike tactic and now have drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[8] The milblogger further speculated that these tactics have facilitated recent Russian drone strikes on Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.[9] The Ukrainian MoD stated that the Space Policy Department will


serve as a single point of contact for domestic and foreign developers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and international partners. The Ukrainian MoD announced a ten-year roadmap to develop the space sector that includes conducting an audit of space infrastructure to identify Ukraine's critical needs and developing domestic satellite and space technology capabilities to integrate into and augment existing Ukrainian defense systems.

Key Takeaways:

- **US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future.**
- **A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).**
- **Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30.**
- **The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed without evidence on March 30 that Ukrainian drones struck a substation near Podvyote (along the international border south of Bryansk City), Bryansk Oblast.[10]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued assaults in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on March 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers reiterated claims on March 30 that Russian forces advanced to the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha and near Guyevo and Gogolevka (south and southwest of Sudzha).[11]

Russian sources claimed on March 30 that Russian forces attacked southwest of Sudzha near Oleshnya and south of Sudzha near Guyevo in Kursk Oblast and northeast of Sumy City near Basivka in northern Sumy Oblast.[12]

Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov stated on March 29 that Russian forces are advancing in several unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast and expanding their salient into northern Sumy Oblast in order to support further advancements.[13] A Ukrainian source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on March 29 that Russian forces are attempting to advance near Veselivka (north of Sumy City) and Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[14] A Russian

milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Yunakivka (south of Basivka).[15]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 137th Regiment, are reportedly operating in Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly advancing near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[16] Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Guyevo.[17]



Russian forces continued assaults in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 29 that Russian forces gained a foothold in eastern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[18]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 30 that fighting continues near Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[19]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Popovka and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[20]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City near Zolochiv and Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv City near Lypsti, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 29 and 30.[21]

An officer for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Lyptsi stated on March 29 that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from conducting mechanized assaults and operating within ten kilometers of the frontline.[22]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kupyansk near Mala Shapivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Kamyanka, and Topoli.[23]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 29 and 30.[24]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mechanized bridge over the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[25] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces noted that Russian forces are using older armored vehicles, including T-55 tanks, to move personnel to forward positions in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 30 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and west of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky on March 29 and 30.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[27]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Olhivka, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Nove, Katerynivka, and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on March 29 and 30.[28]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast
March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on March 29 and 30.[29]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 29 that Russian forces conducted an assault using up to 18 motorcycles in the Siversk direction.[30]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar towards Mayske; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shulytne; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on March 29 and 30.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently unsuccessfully counterattacked in southern Chasiv Yar.[32]

Zaporozhets stated on March 29 that Russian forces recently conducted an assault with armored vehicle and motorcycle support near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[33]

Russian forces recently advanced in and near Toretsk.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 and 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and in central Toretsk.[34]

Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyllivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 29 and 30.[35]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on March 30 that fighting is intensifying in the area and that Russian forces are attacking along Toretsk's flanks.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[37] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[38]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Shevchenko (southwest of Pokrovsk).[39] Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[40]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced in and near Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[41]


Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Kalynove and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi

Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Zvirove, Shevchenko, and Kotlyarivka on March 29 and 30.[42]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 30 that Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 28.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]), the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[44] ISW has most recently observed elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction, although a Russian milblogger recently claimed that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating in the Toretsk direction.[45] The 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade may be in the process of a redeployment, or different elements of the brigade may be deployed across several areas of operation in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has recently observed elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Velyka Novosilka, and has not observed further indications that this unit has deployed to the Pokrovsk direction.[46] Elements of the 75th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Kotlyne.[47] Elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[48] Elements of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarivka.[49] Drone elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Sribne.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced in central Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[51]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bohdanivka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove toward Rozlyv on March 29 and 30.[52]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault of five armored vehicles near Rozlyv and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one armored vehicle.[53]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Skudne and toward Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Novopil on March 29 and 30.[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian "Baikal" detachment of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Fedorivka (north of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Drone operators of the 43rd Separate Spetsnaz Company, 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (both of the GRU), 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced east of Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all northwest of Robotyne) toward Orikhiv (north of Robotyne).[58]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on March 29 and 30.[59]


A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russia is concentrating personnel near and on the outskirts of Kamyanske for a future assault against the settlement.[60] Russian forces conducted offensive actions in the Kamyanske direction – possibly reconnaissance in force tasks – in October 2024.[61]



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dniro (Kherson) direction on March 29 and 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the direction of Prydniprovsk and Sadove (both east of Kherson City on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast) on March 29 and 30.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction
March 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1906340755351675125> ;
<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-angry-putin-zelenskyy-iran-sanctions-rcna198729> ; <https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1906337060698399090>

[2] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825>

[3] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025>

[4] https://t.me/Logvinov_opinion/883 ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825>

[5] <https://x.com/michellenichols/status/1905645685187194980>

[6] <https://t.me/kpszsu/31628>

[7]

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https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2275 ; <https://x.com/ZelenskyUa/status/1906295546081661244>

[8] <https://t.me/rybar/69250> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025>

[9] <https://mod.gov.ua/news/ministerstvo-oboroni-stvorilo-upravlinnya-kosmichnoyi-politiki-katerina-chernogorenko>

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/308538

[11] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20954 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67940

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/308499 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159718 ;
<https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19285> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22149>

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/308464

[14] <https://suspilne.media/sumy/982561-armia-rf-namagaetsa-zajti-u-veselivku-na-sumsini-deepstate/>

[15] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22149>

[16] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26181> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19285>

[17] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89083>

[18] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26183>

[19] <https://t.me/wargonzo/25615> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67940

[20] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89036> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89065>

[21]
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<https://t.me/otukharkiv/5236>; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12780

[22] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/03/29/vidnaly-vazhku-tehniku-na-harkivshhyni-vorozhi-tanky-znahodyatsya-za-10-kilometriv-vid-liniyi-frontu/>

[23] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31180 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26198> ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/22148>

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