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April 6, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.


Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on April 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 5 that Russian forces advanced 143 square kilometers in Ukraine in March 2025 as Ukrainian forces conducted successful tactical counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction.[1] The UK MoD reported that the rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased each month since November 2024, as Russian forces seized roughly 730 square kilometers in November 2024, 393 square kilometers in December 2024, 326 square kilometers in January 2025, and 195 square kilometers in February 2025.[2]

ISW has observed geolocated footage to concur in the assessment that the monthly rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased since November 2024.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces in Ukraine gained roughly 627 square kilometers in November 2024, 569 square kilometers in December 2024, 427 square kilometers in January 2025, 354 square kilometers in February 2025, and 203 square kilometers in March 2025. The UK MoD likely uses a different methodology or sources to assess Russian advances in Ukraine, but the UK MoD's report is consistent with evidence ISW has observed of decreasing monthly Russian advances between November 2024 and March 2025. Ukrainian forces have conducted localized counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions in recent weeks, regaining lost positions in these areas and contributing to slowing Russian advances in Ukraine.[4]

Monthly Russian Gains in Ukraine from November 2024 to March 2025



Graphic by Harrison Hurwitz
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Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that preliminary data states that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 109 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 40 Shahed drones and that 53 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that five Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Kyiv Oblast.[7]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are changing their strike tactics and constantly modernizing their Shahed drones and ballistic missiles, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability to shoot them down.[8] Ihnat noted that the US Patriot air defense system is effective against ballistic missiles. Russian forces have repeatedly experimented with different strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and ensure that Russian missiles – particularly the ballistic missiles that are more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to shoot down – are able to reach their intended targets.[9] Russian forces likely launched missiles and drones on the night of April 5 to 6 from various locations in the Black Sea, Russia, and occupied Crimea, as part of these experimentation efforts.

Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States have jointly

proposed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 6 that Russian forces launched missiles from the Black Sea during the April 5 to 6 overnight strike and that Ukraine's partners have identified the Russian vessels and launch sites involved.[10] Zelensky stated that Russia has not agreed to the Black Sea moratorium on military operations in order to maintain its ability to strike Ukraine from the Black Sea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russia launched a total of 10 Kalibr cruise missiles from an unspecified frigate and submarine, marking the fourth time in the past four months that Russia has used ships to launch missiles at Ukraine.[11]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25, after the United States and Ukraine first proposed the temporary Black Sea moratorium, that all Russian military vessels' movement "outside of [the] eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement.[12] It is unclear from where Russian forces launched the Kalibr missiles during the April 5 to 6 strike and where the boundary of the "eastern part of the Black Sea" lies. The United States, Ukraine, and Russia continue to negotiate the exact terms of a temporary moratorium in the Black Sea, as Russia continues to hold its moratorium talks with the United States hostage in an effort to extract sanctions relief from the West – a demand that European officials have refused and that is not necessary to implement the maritime truce.[13]

The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing evidence, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.

Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), have consistently made detailed claims about Ukraine's alleged violations of the temporary ceasefire since the start of discussions about the ceasefire.[14] Russian officials repeatedly downplayed successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the start of discussions about the energy infrastructure ceasefire. Russian local and regional officials would previously often claim that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian drone strikes or that "debris" from downed drones damaged infrastructure facilities, despite geolocated footage showing hits or subsequent fires at energy infrastructure facilities in Russia and would only occasionally admit to successful Ukrainian strikes when the resulting damage was high.[15]


ISW has neither observed local or regional Russian official reporting about Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure nor footage of such strikes that would corroborate the Russian MoD's or MFA's repeated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly denied Kremlin claims that Ukraine is striking Russian energy infrastructure. The Kremlin likely aims to undermine Ukraine's credibility and prolong ongoing negotiations about the energy infrastructure ceasefire, the Black Sea moratorium, and a frontline ceasefire.

Key Takeaways:

- **The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine.**

- **Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6.**
- **Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States have jointly proposed.**
- **The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing evidence, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War April 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted seven strikes against Russian energy infrastructure facilities in occupied Crimea and Bryansk, Rostov, and Voronezh oblasts without offering any evidence.[16]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts amid continued fighting in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area on April 6.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 and 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha) and southern Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[17]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 6 that Russian forces seized Basivka.[18] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Yunakivka, Sumy Oblast (south of Basivka).[19]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Guyevo.[20]

Ukraine's Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk reported on April 6 that Russian forces maintain the intensity of their attacks against border settlements in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[21] Mysnyk noted that Russian forces are moving personnel close to Ukraine's northern border with Russia but that there are no signs that Russian forces are creating a "powerful" force grouping in

the area. Mysnyk stated that the Russian military command is using special forces to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance missions and that the Russian military command can use Russian transport logistics to quickly transfer forces to the area.



Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Belgorod Oblast on April 6 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[23]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kharkiv direction on April 6.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 6 that Ukrainian forces repelled a "fairly massive" Russian infantry assault in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the past week (March 31 to April 6) "for the first time in a long time." [24] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces detected the Russian forces before they began to accumulate. The spokesperson stated that Russian casualties in the brigade's area of responsibility amounted to more than 120 soldiers over a period of five to six days and that Russian forces in the area consist of penal recruits and servicemembers who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 6, as Russian forces are regrouping. [25]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Udy (north of Kharkiv City). [26]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction April 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[27]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Novoyehorivka on April 5 and 6.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Podoly (immediately east of Kupyansk).[29]



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[30]


Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and east of Borova near Nadiya on April 5 and 6.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.72 kilometers deep west of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[32]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Lyman near Nove, Kolodyazi, Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna on April 5 and 6.[33]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian infantry in the Lyman direction are conducting assaults carrying anti-tank mines that the personnel then attempt – often unsuccessfully - to detonate at Ukrainian positions.[34]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on April 5 and 6.[35]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on April 6 that Russian forces are using artillery, aviation, and drone strikes as well as small infantry group attacks to try to find weak spots in Ukrainian defenses.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces occasionally use motorcycles or civilian vehicles and are using fewer armored vehicles because they are more difficult to replace than manpower losses.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv near Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on April 5 and 6.[37]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Enhelsa Street in northern Toretsk.[38]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka, Sukha Balka, and Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Romanivka on April 5 and 6.[39]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have shifted their efforts to the south of the Toretsk direction near Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[40]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk April 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Skhidna Street in northeastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[41]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and that Russian and Ukrainian forces each occupy one-third of the settlement.[42] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy roughly 22 percent of Lysivka. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also advanced west and northwest of Solone and 300 meters near Nadiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk) toward Kotlyarivka (west of Nadiivka).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy half of Kotlyne (southwest of

Pokrovsk).[44] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy roughly 94 percent of Kotlyne.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Zelene Pole; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Bohdanivka on April 5 and 6.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating[47] □ Elements of the 35th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Lysivka and Dachenske.[48] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Solone.[49]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction April 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) and 200 meters near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) in the direction of Bahatyr (northwest of Rozlyv).[51]


Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 5 and 6.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have a quantitative manpower and equipment advantage in the Kurakhove direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on April 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Burlatske, west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on April 5 and 6.[55]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, north of Robotyne near Novoandriivka, and northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 5 and 6.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske, Shcherbaky, and Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[57]



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 5 and 6 but did not advance.[58]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to struggle with boat shortages in the Dnipro River Delta island area.[59]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 5 to 6.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, 257 Shahed drones, 106 reconnaissance drones, and 103 other drones between March 31 and April 6.[60] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched more than 1,460 glide bombs, almost 670 strike drones, and more than 30 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (March 31 to April 6).[61]

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stated on April 6 that the April 4 Russian ballistic missile strike against a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killed nine children – the deadliest single, verified strike harming children since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[62]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems.

Click [here](#) to read the April 3 Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1908495281341034964>

[2] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1908497430774984811>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025>

[5] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/04/06/u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-chomu-skladno-zbyvaty-rosijski-balistychni-rakety/>

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