

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward,
Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 19, 2023, 7pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight. Russian forces struck Taras Shevchenko Theater in Chernihiv City, killing seven people and injuring 117.[1] Chernihiv Oblast Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian forces “probably” launched a “ballistic missile” at the theater, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces used an Iskander-M ballistic missile during the strike.[2] The theater reportedly hosted a drone exposition called “Lyuti Ptashky” (Angry Birds), which had previously occurred in other Ukrainian cities.[3] The event organizer, Maria Berlinska, stated that organizers only shared the location of the event with individuals who registered and were screened before attending the event.[4] The event reportedly ended shortly after an air raid warning, and organizers advised people to hide in a shelter.[5] Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are targeting public events to emotionally affect Ukrainians and noted that Russian forces have previously struck public events even without prior public announcements of such events.[6] Many Russian milbloggers originally claimed that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) building, before most indicated that Russian forces struck the drone exhibition.[7]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces also carried out 17 Shahed drone strikes overnight on August 19 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff later reported that Russian forces also carried out five missile strikes.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and Ukrainian regional officials reported that Russian attacks overnight on unspecified targets wounded eight people.[10] The Zhytomyr Oblast Administration reported that a Russian loitering munition targeted unspecified infrastructure in the oblast and that debris from the shot down drone sparked a localized fire.[11]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.[12] Geolocated images published on August 19 show smoke rising from the Soltsy airbase.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone using small arms and that a fire damaged one aircraft.[14] A

Russian insider source claimed that the fire damaged at least two aircraft and that the Soltsy airbase housed an unspecified number of Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name Backfire-C) long-range supersonic bombers.[15] The source also claimed that Russian forces moved the undamaged aircraft to Olenya air base, Murmask Oblast.[16]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[17] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the initiative in the Bakhmut direction.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances east of Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City).[19] Additional geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] *CBS News* reported on August 18 that anonymous US officials stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the direction of Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia Oblast) and have cleared a Russian minefield north of Tokmak.[21] US officials are likely referring to recent Ukrainian advances north and east of Robotyne (about 23km northeast of Tokmak). ISW previously assessed that recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines.[22] These advances may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating in less heavily mined areas of the Russian line of defense that are likely more conducive to more rapid Ukrainian gains.[23]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.[24] This was reportedly Putin's first visit to Rostov-on-Don since the Wagner Group took control of the SMD headquarters on June 23-24.[25] Putin rarely visits areas associated with the war in Ukraine; in April he visited Kherson and Luhansk oblasts and in March he visited Mariupol.[26] Putin's visit to the SMD headquarters is likely a public gesture that he continues to side with Gerasimov and his group of commanders despite these commanders' failure to stop Wagner's rebellion or achieve the war aims Putin set for them. Putin's visit occurred about two months after the rebellion, and he is likely attempting to portray himself as in control of his regime and military.


The Russian MoD is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs). A Wagner-affiliated source that there is an ongoing effort to recruit Wagner personnel to deploy to missions abroad as part of PMCs. The source claimed that unspecified Russian authorities – likely referring to Russian MoD – are forming the new “Rossiyskiy Ekspeditsionniy Korpus” (Russian Expeditionary Corps) PMC at the base of one of the advanced Spetsnaz brigades.[27] The source also claimed that the Russian MoD controls “Redut” PMC (also known as “Zvezda” PMC), which is currently recruiting personnel for missions in Africa instead of in Ukraine.[28] The source suggested that Redut PMC may have been attempting to recruit Wagner fighters to Redut's operations in Africa, referring to a statement that Wagner commanders issued on August 9 warning fighters about calls from “second-rate” PMCs advertising jobs in Africa.[29] The Russian MoD may be attempting to lure Wagner personnel away

from Wagner with new work opportunities at MoD-controlled PMCs as part of a wider effort to break up Wagner.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.**
- **Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.**
- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced in certain areas on August 19.**
- **Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.**
- **Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push western into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[30] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to push Ukrainian forces from Synkivka.[31] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russian forces continued probing attacks in the Kupyansk area but have not achieved any significant advances.[32] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Representative Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) continued offensive operations in the direction of Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 19, but did not advance. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks and counterattacks near Synkivka, Vilshana, and the Mankivka tract (about 15km east of Kupyansk).[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 19 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing at a rate of one to 1.5km per day in the direction of Oskil (57km northeast of Kreminna).[35] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka (12km southwest of Kreminna) on August 18.[36]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 19, but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and south of Kuzmyne (4km southwest of Kreminna).[37] Russian sources, including Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk, claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian armored assaults near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[38] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces skirmished along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka line (up to 13km southwest of Svatove).[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on August 19 but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an armored assault near Klishchiivka and that fighting is ongoing.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the “Alexander Nevsky” Brigade and “Volki” (Wolves) Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade volunteer formations have recently repelled several Ukrainian attacks west of Soledar (11km northeast of Bakhmut).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations around Bakhmut on August 19 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), north and south of Klishchiivka, east of Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Toretsk (20km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue to control Klishchiivka.[45] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz, 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate or GRU), and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) are operating together near Klishchiivka.[46] Footage published on August 18 purportedly shows elements of the 137th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut direction and elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) operating south of Bakhmut.[47] ISW observed elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Marinka in June.[48]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line as of August 19 and recently made limited advances. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances east of Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City).[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka and Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 19 and did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novokalynove (11km northeast of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions near Urozhaine and unsuccessfully counterattacked near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine.[54] A Russian source claimed that elements of the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[55] ISW has previously observed that the 247th VDV Regiment reportedly moved from the Orikhiv area to the Staromayorske area in late July and that units of the 7th VDV Division are currently split across at least two, possibly three, sectors of the front – supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces lack operational reserves and are conducting lateral redeployments across the front.[56]


Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on August 19. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasingly attacking in the direction of Zavitne Bazhannya (12km south of Velyka Novosilka), east of Urozhaine, and near Pryyutne.[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around the Vremivka Salient as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on August 19. Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced north of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[58] Ukrainian forces may have been operating in this area before August 19, but Russian sources claimed this area was under Russian control. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[59] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the northern and northeastern outskirts of Robotyne on August 18 and 19.[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that an explosion occurred during a meeting at the office of the Enerhodar occupation police chief on August 18.[61] GUR reported that the explosion injured the head of the Enerhodar occupation police department head Colonel Pavel Chesanov and other occupation police officials and that Russian authorities planned to evacuate the wounded to Russia via military helicopter.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




-  Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
-  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
-  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
-  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
-  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
-  Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
-  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
-  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on August 18 that Russian forces "temporarily withdrew" from Robotyne and that there is active fighting south of the settlement. A Russian source claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian forces captured half of Robotyne.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of August 19, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces are using counterbattery actions to set conditions for future maneuvers on the left (east) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Operational Command South Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces' current main task in Kherson Oblast is to set conditions for the security of future operations and maneuvers on the left bank of the Dniester

River.[63] Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting counterbattery measures to clear Russian maneuver boats that can hinder Ukrainian operations.[64]

Russian sources claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces control the area of the left bank of Kherson Oblast near Kozachi Laheri. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to gain a foothold on the left bank of Kherson Oblast near Kozachi Laheri, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces control the area on the left bank near the settlement.[65]

The Russian navy is reportedly incapable of enforcing control over Black Sea maritime traffic. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 18 that at least six civilian ships are leaving Ukraine towards the Mediterranean Sea through Ukrainian-created temporary corridors in the Black Sea.[66] The milblogger claimed that the Russian navy's ability to prevent these movements is limited due to “gross mistakes in the construction of the fleet in the pre-war period, the irrational use of forces and means,” and unresolved organizational issues.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian MoD, likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[68] The Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School will have 3,436 military personnel and staff. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Russia is establishing the Donetsk command school to professionally train Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) personnel for command roles and observed that there are two similar command schools in Russia.[69] The establishment of the command school follows numerous complaints from Russian milbloggers who stated that DNR commanders could not retain their positions as part of the Russian Armed Forces without receiving additional command training and may indicate that Russia is attempting to improve issues with some of its command staff.[70] The establishment of a command school, however, may reveal that the Russian MoD wants to keep proxy forces separate from regular Russian forces and that DNR forces are not entirely integrated into the regular forces. The Russian military command could have sent DNR commanders and servicemen to train in existing Russian command schools, rather than spending additional federal funds to create an entirely new school. ISW previously observed that Russia maintains border checkpoints between occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts despite illegally annexing these territories, and it is likely that the Russian MoD is extending similar separation policies between Russian regular and irregular forces.[71] The Russian MoD alternatively may be attempting to avoid giving DNR servicemen who are engaged in combat in Donetsk Oblast a reason to go to Russia amidst the full-scale invasion.

Russian Cossacks are forming a new volunteer battalion in Rostov Oblast to defend against external and internal threats.[72] The Russian “Oplot” veterans movement announced on August 19 that Cossacks began recruiting volunteers for the “Oplot-1” volunteer battalion to fight against Ukrainian sabotage groups and “undermining of confidence in authorities.” The “Oplot” volunteer battalion is recruiting men ages 21 to 50 without a criminal record.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated that occupation authorities sent a third group of 18 children from Skadovsk Raion, occupied Kherson Oblast to a recreation center in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic.[73] The Skadovsk Raion occupation administration reportedly stated that occupation authorities will send a fourth group of local children between the ages of seven and 16 to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic in September.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

Spokesperson of the United Press Center of the Northern Direction Ukrainian Defense Forces, Colonel Yurii Povh, reported that Wagner Group forces in Belarus do not pose a strategic threat to Ukraine. Povh reported on August 19 that the situation on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is under control and that Russia is conducting information operations to incite speculations about Wagner's presence in Belarus in order to exert psychological influence on Ukrainian, Polish, and Western audiences.[75] Povh stated that Wagner instructors currently travel to various Belarusian training grounds to train military personnel.[76] Povh's statements are consistent with ISW's assessment that Wagner forces currently do not pose a significant military threat to Ukraine or NATO.[77]

Some Wagner personnel may have left Belarus because of a decrease in their incomes. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 19 that the number of Wagner personnel decreased from 5,800 at an unspecified date to 4,400 at a later unspecified date.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that some Wagner personnel joined operations in Africa, went on vacation, joined a different PMC, or resigned from Wagner due to a lack of funding from the Russian government.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Wagner instructors who train Belarusian forces are dissatisfied with their salaries from the Belarusian government and therefore do not plan to stay in Belarus permanently.[80] A Belarus-focused milblogger likened the Wagner camp in Belarus – likely referring to the main Wagner base in Tsel, Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast – to a “mini-city” with traffic, a car repair shop, a medical unit, mobile shops, and sports ground.[81]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarussian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/lomako_oleksandr/1891; <https://twitter.com/ZelenskyUa/status/1692830218338107595?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1692835087090622494?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1692837541635043774?s=20>; https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1692870602695061552?s=20; <https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1692877262582939832?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/TreyYingst/status/1692871709223751809?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1692844713005420965?s=20>; https://t.me/istories_media/3392; <https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1692845068049424805?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/kava2402/status/1692837290563825982?s=20>

[2] <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-drone-strikes-ukraine-crimea-attack/32555000.html>; <https://t.me/rybar/50907>; <https://t.me/kommunist/18220> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/95312

[3] https://t.me/borys_filatovv/1197; <https://www.facebook.com/100083503787891/posts/pfbid02f1cNr2LWuh2KCHgzKjneRiVcugC8Ze8Acu58VsW3tWCEifKX8pGzisJPVW9YBLvkl/?mibextid=cr9u03>; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/19/russia-ukraine-war-news/> ; <https://apostrophe.ua/ua/news/society/accidents/2023-08-19/pochemu-proizoshel-udar-podramteatru-v-chernigove-organizator-lyutih-ptashok-sdelala-zayavlenie/303087>

[4] <https://apostrophe.ua/ua/news/society/accidents/2023-08-19/pochemu-proizoshel-udar-podramteatru-v-chernigove-organizator-lyutih-ptashok-sdelala-zayavlenie/303087>

[5] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/19/russia-ukraine-war-news/>

[6] <https://t.me/annamaliar/1028>

[7] <https://t.me/milinfoolive/105261> ; <https://t.me/rybar/50909> ; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/28636>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12546>; https://t.me/dva_majors/23870 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/95326; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64487>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64482>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64475>; <https://t.me/sotaproject/64700>; https://t.me/dva_majors/23888 ; <https://t.me/rybar/50910> ; <https://t.me/milinfoolive/105262> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/35594>; <https://t.me/rybar/50907>; <https://t.me/rybar/50908>

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