

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2023

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August 27, 2023, 6:35pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine. Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the directions of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv), Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv), and Ocheretuvate (25km southeast of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Shtupun also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and achieved unspecified successes near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and in an unspecified location in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[2] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction.[3]

A Ukrainian soldier, likely operating in the Robotyne area, offered further tactical details on the prepared Russian defensive positions that Ukrainian forces have penetrated and on those that are currently ahead of them. The Ukrainian soldier stated that, in the Robotyne area, there is a system of interconnected Russian trenches, dugouts, and limited underground tunnels that allow Russian forces to facilitate the movement of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition from different tactical positions along the front.[4] The Ukrainian soldier stated that anti-tank ditches and minefields stretch across fields in front of and in between these interconnected layers of defensive positions.[5] The soldier added that all "unexcavated" areas around these prepared defensive positions are heavily mined and that Russian forces have narrowly designated unmined paths in their defensive layers to allow Russian forces to reach firing positions.[6] The Ukrainian soldier did not indicate whether the Ukrainian forces had passed through the densest minefields but suggested that Ukrainian forces still had to demine areas at a gradual pace before advancing further.[7] ISW previously assessed that areas near the next series of prepared Russian defensive positions may be less heavily mined to give Russian forces operating north of these positions the ability to retreat, although the Ukrainian soldier's reporting suggests that this may not be the case in the areas where Ukrainian forces are currently approaching the next Russian defensive layer.[8] Ukrainian forces are now within striking distance of the next series of Russian defensive

positions, which appears to be comprised of a relatively more contiguous array of anti-tank ditches and dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles with Russian fighting positions behind these obstacles similar to the previous layer of Russian defenses.[9] The highly interconnected systems of trenches and dugouts that the Ukrainian soldier described is the result of months of Russian preparation and it is unclear if Russian forces extended that system throughout subsequent series of defensive positions further south.

The composition of Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine and the ambiguities about how Russian forces are manning and equipping them continues to obscure how the next phase of fighting will transpire. ISW recently assessed that a lack of observed uncommitted Russian forces in the area may suggest that a subsequent series of Russian defensive positions may be less heavily defended than the positions that Ukrainian forces already penetrated to the north, although this remains unclear.[10] Russian forces have reportedly conducted additional lateral transfers to the Robotyne area with elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division from the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast and are also reportedly redeploying unspecified elements from the Kherson direction to the area.[11] Russian forces committed elements of the 7th VDV Division immediately to combat after laterally transferring them to the Robotyne area in early August, although the Russian command could decide to commit these new reinforcements to strengthen the next series of defensive positions south of the current Ukrainian advance.[12] Russian forces committed a considerable amount of materiel, effort, and manpower to hold the series of defensive positions that Ukrainian forces are currently penetrating, and it is unclear if Russian forces will retain the advantages they have held if they cannot commit the same level of resources and personnel to these next layers of defense.[13] The next Russian defensive layer will, nevertheless, very likely pose significant challenges for the Ukrainian advance.

Russian forces conducted missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of August 26 to 27 and reportedly targeted a Ukrainian airfield in Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted four Russian Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles out of eight unspecified Russian projectiles launched at Ukraine.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian missiles struck a Ukrainian military airfield near Pinchuky, Kyiv Oblast.[15]

The Russian MoD appears to have unsuccessfully attempted to silence Russian milbloggers' concerns over the alleged mistreatment of a Russian brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast — sparking further criticism from the ultranationalist community. A Russian state-affiliated war correspondent released a video on August 26 claiming to show five Russian servicemen of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) currently operating on the Dnipro River delta islands in a trench.[16] The servicemen asked that Russian milbloggers stop spreading complaints on social media concerning the brigade's alleged lack of artillery support and accused Russian milbloggers of harming the brigade's operations in the delta area. The servicemen also called on milbloggers to fight on the frontlines if they wanted to help the Russian war effort. ISW reported on August 25 and August 26 that Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade were suffering significant casualties under Ukrainian artillery fire on an island in the Kherson direction and that commanders were ignoring the personnel's calls for artillery fire.[17] Several Russian milbloggers responded to the appeal and claimed that the video was clearly staged to deflect criticism from the brigade's leadership and the Russian MoD.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that the servicemen

appeared to be wearing new uniforms, which the milbloggers noted is inconsistent with claims that these servicemen are fighting in trenches. The Russian MoD had consistently tried throughout the full-scale invasion to silence criticisms in the Russian information space by accusing Russian milbloggers of violating Russian operational security.[19]

The Russian Investigative Committee announced on August 27 that genetic tests confirm that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was among 10 people killed in a plane crash on August 23.[20] Wagner commanders and representatives have refrained from commenting on the announcement and called on Russians to stop spreading rumors and fake news.[21] Wagner’s official Telegram channels were likely referring to Telegram channels that claim to be affiliated with Wagner and are baselessly speculating that Prigozhin is still alive.[22]

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD had been actively setting conditions to halt Wagner Group’s operations in the Middle East and Africa prior to Prigozhin’s death on August 23. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified reports that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited Syria and Libya to coerce local officials into severing their cooperation with Wagner forces.[23] Yevkurov reportedly told Syrian officials to block Wagner’s logistics to the Central African Republic (CAR) that originated in Syria and prompted Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas to deliver Wagner an ultimatum demanding that Wagner hand over weapons and leave Syria by September 20.[24] The reports noted that Yevkurov will likely be meeting with African officials to set similar ultimatums for Wagner personnel in other countries. Yevkurov also reportedly told Wagner representatives in Syria that there have been no decisions regarding who will oversee the Wagner contingent after Prigozhin’s assassination and urged them to enlist in the Russian MoD-affiliated “Redut” private military company (PMC) as well as preparing to disarm soon. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD is trying to fully reassign Wagner personnel to either a “volunteer corps” based out of “Patriot” Park in Moscow Oblast or to the “Redut” PMC.[25] The milblogger added that the Russian MoD negotiators are afraid of directly pressuring Wagner personnel and are instead pressuring Middle Eastern and African officials to sever their ties with Wagner – leaving the Wagner personnel without a choice. The milblogger observed that Wagner cannot independently exist following the Russian MoD’s June 1 announcement that volunteer formations cannot be independent of the Russian MoD.


The Russian MoD may be more intensely focused on disbanding the Wagner Group than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Former *BBC Russian Service* investigative journalist Andrey Zakharov, citing unnamed sources, reported that Putin allowed Prigozhin to continue Wagner operations in the Middle East and Africa but instructed him to not intervene in Ukraine or Russia during one of their two meetings after Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.[26] Zakharov added that the Russian MoD, on the other hand, intensified efforts to “strangle” Wagner in Syria and Africa, and Prigozhin together with Wagner’s leadership flew to Moscow to attempt to resolve this issue before his assassination. Zakharov added that currently, the fate of “Prigozhin’s empire” – inclusive of his military contracts and contracts for the extraction of oil, gas, and gold – in the Middle East and Africa is unclear. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that a third party, possibly another Russian force structure, should adopt Wagner’s foreign assets rather than having the Russian MoD do so to prevent tension and the destruction of these assets. A Russian source also claimed that the Russian MoD may have been rushing to disband Wagner because the Kremlin had yet to decide on Wagner’s fate and because the MoD wanted to be the first organization to assume control over Wagner’s leftovers.[27]

ISW cannot independently confirm the validity of these reports, but if these accounts are true, they may indicate that Putin is not micromanaging the dissolution of the Wagner PMC but rather has passed this responsibility to the Russian MoD. The surge of these accounts across Russian milblogger and opposition communities, however, may also be an attempt to separate Putin from Prigozhin's assassination and the prospective dissolution of Wagner.

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine.**
- **A Ukrainian soldier likely operating in the Robotyne area offered further tactical details on the prepared Russian defensive positions that Ukrainian forces have penetrated and on those that are currently ahead of them.**
- **The composition of Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine and the ambiguities about how Russian forces are manning and equipping them continues to obscure how the next phase of fighting will transpire.**
- **Russian forces conducted missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of August 26 to 27 and reportedly targeted a Ukrainian airfield in Kyiv Oblast.**
- **The Russian Investigative Committee announced on August 27 that genetic tests confirm that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was among 10 people killed in a plane crash on August 23.**
- **Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had been actively setting conditions to halt Wagner Group's operations in the Middle East and Africa prior to Prigozhin's death on August 23.**
- **The Russian MoD may be more intensely focused on disbanding the Wagner Group than Russian President Vladimir Putin.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.**
- **Russian authorities continue efforts to coerce migrants and foreigners living in Russia to fight in the war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of August 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line but did not make territorial gains on August 27. Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers claimed that Russian forces concentrated their efforts on attacking remaining Ukrainian positions in southern Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[28] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces successfully advanced in the Kupyansk direction on August 26, but did not provide evidence or specify the location of the claimed advance.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured three Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction and are advancing around Synkivka.[30]

Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 27. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are shifting their focus from the Kupyansk direction to attacking in the direction of Novoyehorivka (15km southeast of Svatove) and that Ukrainian forces repelled 10 Russian assaults near Novoyehorivka.[31] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked near Novoyehorivka and Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna).[32] Yevlash observed that elements of the Russian 4th Guards Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) are conducting offensive operations on the Luhansk Oblast frontline and that this division has one tank regiment. The 4th Guards Tank Division previously suffered significant personnel and equipment losses during Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast in fall 2022[33] A Russian war correspondent claimed that elements of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, Central Military District) are continuing to operate on the Svatove-Kreminna direction.[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian “Moskva” volunteer battalion operate near the Serebryanske forest area.[35] The “Moskva” volunteer battalion is reportedly composed of fans of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and soccer as well as athletes, and its commander previously served in the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (VDV).[36]

Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack Russian positions on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 27. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Synkivka, Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), the Torske salient (13km west of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[37]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of August 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- - - Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction but did not make any confirmed gains on August 27. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction, where there were 14 combat engagements during the past day.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[39] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to attack Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz elements holding positions near Klishchiivka.[40]

Russian forces continued counterattacks near Bakhmut on August 27 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured up to half of their recently lost positions near Klishchiivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Russian gains near the settlement.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (7km northwest of Bakhmut).[43] Yevlash stated that Russian forces in the Bakhmut area typically conduct assaults with designated assault detachments, sometimes without artillery support, that are then followed by regular Russian personnel.[44]

A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting rotations in the Bakhmut area and deploying reinforcements to the area.[45] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Bakhmut area stated on August 24 that Russian forces transferred "fresh" elements of unspecified newly created units and elements of units from unspecified Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine to the Bakhmut direction.[46] ISW has previously observed Russian milbloggers describe likely tactical rotations in place as rotations.[47] The milblogger is likely not describing rotations wherein Russian forces would replace a committed unit with a previously uncommitted unit or formation so that the initial unit could rest and reconstitute, as Russian forces likely lack the required operational reserves to do so.[48] ISW has not observed evidence of additional Russian units or formations recently arriving in the Bakhmut direction. Ukrainian forces have recently conducted rotations in other sectors of the front and likely possess operational reserves to conduct further rotations.[49]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of August 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka) along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on August 27.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on August 27 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[51] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian assault operations in Marinka were

unsuccessful.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of August 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces counterattacked on the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) but did not specify an outcome.[53]


Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 27 and reportedly advanced. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Urozhaine area (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and were successful near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have continued to attack the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area throughout the past week.[55]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around the Vremivka Salient as of August 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on August 27 and reportedly advanced. Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the directions of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv), Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv), and Ocheretuvate (25km southeast of Orikhiv).[56] Shtupun also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and were successful in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhzhia Oblast).[57] Russian sources claimed on August 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kopani (12km southwest of Orikhiv) and advanced near Robotyne and toward Verbove (18km

southwest of Orikhiv).[58] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne and near Balka Uspenivka (11km southeast of Orikhiv).[59]



Russian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on August 27 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in Robotyne on August 26 and 27.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back to the center of Robotyne, while Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov and other Russian sources claimed that Robotyne is contested.[61] Shtupun reported that Russian forces have increased the number of airstrikes in the Zaporizhzhia direction and stated that this indicates that Russian forces cannot stop Ukrainian offensive operations with other forces or means.[62] Footage published on August 26 purportedly shows elements of the 70th

Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Orikhiv direction.[63] The reported commitment of elements of the 76th Airborne Division and the reports of increased Russian air activity on the Melitopol axis are indications that Russian forces already defending the area are not sufficient to stop the Ukrainian advance themselves. It is unclear whether the reported reinforcements and increased air attacks will be sufficient.



Russian milbloggers continue to claim that Ukrainian forces are operating on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 26 and 27 that

fighting is ongoing and that Ukrainian reconnaissance groups continue efforts to secure positions on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[64]



Russian and Ukrainian air and naval forces have reportedly skirmished around gas and oil platforms in the Black Sea recently. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 27 that a Russian aircraft fired on a Ukrainian vessel operating near a platform in the northwest part of

the Black Sea last week.[65] The UK MoD also noted that Ukrainian forces have struck several Russian-controlled platforms and that Russian and Ukrainian forces have periodically stationed troops on them.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated on August 25 that the Kerch Strait Bridge should open completely by November 1. Khusnullin said in an interview with Kremlin newswire *TASS* that Russian authorities will finish the first stage of repairs to the Kerch Strait Bridge on September 15 and then will close the currently open section of the bridge for repairs.[66] Khusnullin said that Russian authorities plan to finish the final restorations by November 1.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue efforts to coerce migrants and foreigners living in Russia to fight in the war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship. Russian independent media outlet *Horizontal Russia* 7x7 reported on August 27 that Russian authorities refuse to consider citizenship applications from Tajik and Uzbek migrants in Kaluga Oblast until the migrants sign military service contracts.[68] Several migrants stated that Russian authorities continue to deny their citizenship applications despite the military enlistment office declaring them ineligible for military service.[69] Russian sources reported on August 26 that the Russian State Duma will consider a bill proposing that Russian authorities revoke the acquired citizenship of foreigners who fail to register for military service within two weeks of receiving their Russian passport or otherwise attempt to evade military duty.[70] The bill also proposes that Russian authorities deport foreigners after revoking their citizenship.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation authorities continue to bring Russian citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter its demographic composition. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that occupation authorities are seizing the apartments and houses of locals who have left occupied territories or been arrested.[72] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian citizens are then moving their families from Russia into the seized residences in occupied Ukraine.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on August 27 that Tajik and Kyrgyz military contingents arrived at the airfield in Baranavichy, Brest Oblast, to participate in the “Combat Brotherhood-2023” joint operational-strategic exercises.[74] The exercises are a part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s annual command staff exercises and will have five centerpiece component exercises including combined arms combat exercises, special reconnaissance exercises,

and logistics exercises.[75] Belarus plans to hold the “Combat Brotherhood-2023” exercises from September 1 to 6.[76]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://suspilne dot media/559823-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-zsu-prosuvautsa-u-napramku-novoprokopivki-maloi-tokmacki-ta-oceretuvatogo-stupun/>

[2] <https://suspilne dot media/559823-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-zsu-prosuvautsa-u-napramku-novoprokopivki-maloi-tokmacki-ta-oceretuvatogo-stupun/>

[3] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/08/27/na-bahmutskomu-ta-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-aktyvni-bojovi-diyi/>

[4] <https://twitter.com/solonko1648/status/1695525388670095804> ;
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695563964158025974

[5] <https://twitter.com/solonko1648/status/1695525388670095804> ;
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695563964158025974

[6] <https://twitter.com/solonko1648/status/1695525388670095804> ;
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695563964158025974

[7] <https://twitter.com/solonko1648/status/1695525388670095804> ;
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695563964158025974

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2023>

[9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2023>

[10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2023>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2023> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082423>

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082223>

[13] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082623>

[14] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/08/27/povitryani-syly-znyshhyly-chotyry-krylati-rakety-voroga/>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219com8XKeaVw9CrW9LfJ3zou43SvbL8v8Mot3iXT5GsC4R325W9y4xKzaDcTFsVvl> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/08/27/mynuloyi-nochi-vorog-zavdav-udaru-krylatymy-raketamy-povitryanogo-bazuvannya-h-101-h-55-h-555-yurij-ignat/>

[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/29853

[16] <https://t.me/guselandreii/2895>

[17] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2023>

[18] <https://t.me/moscowcalling/30029>; <https://t.me/moscowcalling/30034>; <https://t.me/moscowcalling/30037>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/24403; <https://t.me/yurasumy/10351>; https://t.me/romanov_92/41510; https://t.me/dva_majors/24367; https://t.me/dva_majors/24366

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