

# MARJAH'S LESSONS FOR KANDAHAR

Operation Moshtarak was the largest joint offensive in Afghanistan to date. The objective of Moshtarak was to retake the Taliban stronghold of Marjah, a town in the Nad Ali district in southern Afghanistan's Helmand province. Thousands of U.S. Marines, partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) landed in the town on February 13, 2010 with the short-term objectives of killing, capturing, and driving out Taliban militants; and securing the town's district center, two main bazaars, and key crossing routes.<sup>1</sup>

Longer-term objectives included securing the town's population and building credible local governance as part of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. In the months since the air assault phase, coalition and Afghan forces in Marjah have encountered a number of challenges in effectively clearing the area of insurgents, integrating the Afghan police into counterinsurgency efforts, and coordinating and delivering competent and timely district governance in Marjah. Understanding the nature of these challenges and possible mitigation strategies is critical, not only for future efforts in Marjah, but also to inform the operational planning and execution of the coalition's *Hamkari Baraye Kandahar* or Cooperation for Kandahar campaign and to improve the overall effectiveness of the coalition's ongoing partnership with the Afghan government.

## CLEARING TERRAIN IN MARJAH

Given the size of the terrain and the extent of the Taliban's control prior to the launch of Moshtarak, recent experiences in Iraq and elsewhere suggests that a comprehensive clearing mission in a counterinsurgency should be expected to last for months, especially given the permanent presence of only two Marine battalions.

The American military's *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*

defines "clearing" in counterinsurgency as removing enemy forces and eliminating organized resistance in an assigned area by "destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants."<sup>2</sup> Marjah is approximately one hundred square miles of agricultural land dotted with small compounds and bazaars, and crisscrossed by a series of canals that irrigate the farmland. The area was littered with thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) prior to the arrival of coalition forces. Comprehensively clearing terrain like Marjah is extremely difficult and requires significant time and resources.

The main assault force operating inside Marjah included 1/6 and 3/6 Marine battalions, several hundred Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, and a contingent of Special Forces as well as a U.S. Army battalion, which established a cordon to the northeast. Only a portion of this total force, however, conducted operations within the town itself.

After air assaulting into the outskirts of Marjah in the early hours of February 13, 2010, the assault force advanced towards the center of the town to seize and secure several key objectives, including two main bazaars (Loy Chareh and Koru Chareh) and the town center.<sup>3</sup> Once these areas were secured, the force would then extend anti-Taliban clearing



MAP 1 | HELMAND PROVINCE, SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

operations to outlying areas.<sup>4</sup> By February 20, 2010, the town center and bazaars were reportedly secure, according to Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Second Expeditionary Brigade.<sup>5</sup>


Nicholson, however, cautioned that U.S. and Afghan forces still had to clear “huge swaths” of the target area but would first concentrate on protecting streets and markets, anticipating building a bubble of security.<sup>6</sup> Brigadier General Nicholson expected the town to be cleared in thirty days, setting a target completion date of mid-March.<sup>7</sup>

Yet just days later, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell stated that operations in Marjah were transitioning from the clearing to the holding phase.<sup>8</sup> Marines and Afghan forces reported that

they had cleared the last major pockets of Taliban resistance in the town on February 27, 2010, just fourteen days after the initial invasion and only one week into the projected thirty day clearing timeframe set by NATO commanders in mid-February.<sup>9</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III reaffirmed Morrell’s earlier statements in early March and noted that the clearing phase was nearly complete.<sup>10</sup> Days later, Brigadier General Nicholson had stated that the hold, stabilize, and build phases were the next main challenges.<sup>11</sup>

There was a lull in enemy-initiated engagements in late February after initial Taliban resistance; however, reports of renewed enemy activity were beginning to surface by mid to late March.<sup>12</sup> Outside the three bazaars and administrative center of Marjah, Afghan government officials had little to

MAP 2 | POPULATION CONCENTRATION IN MARJAH



SOURCE: ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN AND JASON LEMIEUX, "THE AFGHAN WAR: A CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW," CSIS, PG. 43. JUNE 23, 2010.

no freedom of movement due to the threat of IEDs and small-scale ambushes.<sup>13</sup>

In northern Marjah, the security situation was becoming increasingly unstable as the Taliban waged an intimidation campaign against the population. This included the assassinations of an uncooperative senior elder and a local working on a bridge reconstruction project, the kidnapping of family members connected with individuals believed to be cooperating with government officials, and the circulation of night letters warning the population not to cooperate with foreign forces.<sup>14</sup> There were reports that the Taliban's governor for Marjah returned to the area to hold a meeting with local elders in April 2010. He offered stern warnings that they should not cooperate or take money from U.S. Marines or Afghan government officials.<sup>15</sup>

Unarmed Taliban fighters on motorcycles reinforced these threats by visiting individual compounds. They reiterated the governor's warnings in person and urged families not to send their children to school.<sup>16</sup> The Taliban increased both their presence and activity throughout April, with some fighters present to harvest poppy.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout May, additional fighters attempted to re-infiltrate Marjah, aided by the complex and hard-to-secure terrain.<sup>18</sup> The Taliban continued their subversive intimidation campaign during this time. The end of the poppy harvest in mid to late May undoubtedly freed up manpower for increased Taliban activity, and many groups operated in small maneuver teams of two and three men that were harder to detect.<sup>19</sup> By the end of May, Marines reported an increase in firefights while conducting regular patrols.<sup>20</sup>



According to media reporting, the presence of insurgents in Marjah steadily increased from mid-March to mid-May, as did the insurgents' effectiveness in convincing the population that they, not the U.S. Marines or Afghan government will be on the winning side.<sup>21</sup> The ability of overstretched U.S. Marines and overmatched Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) to degrade the capacity of a shadowy and subversive enemy was limited. From mid-May to mid-June, there were more U.S. Marine fatalities than in the first month of the operation.<sup>22</sup>

Yet, recent counterinsurgency operations in southern and northern Helmand suggest that kinetic activity is not the best way to gauge the enemy's presence.<sup>23</sup> It is not simply the enemy's fighting forces that must be eliminated; it is also their "politico-administrative apparatus" and intelligence network that must also be removed.<sup>24</sup> The population's willingness to cooperate and communicate with U.S. and Afghan forces and share information about insurgent locations and activities is a more effective measurement tool.<sup>25</sup>

Typically, during the clearing phase of a COIN operation, human intelligence about enemy fighters in the area is gradually obtained from locals after friendly forces have demonstrated the ability to protect and secure the population, thus earning their trust. As long as the population is open to insurgent threats and intimidation, they will be reluctant to share critical information that often translates into necessary, actionable intelligence.

Despite progress securing their main military objectives, Marjah's residents remain hesitant to engage with U.S. and Afghan forces for fear of retribution. Afghans in the town also view efforts to rejuvenate the town's bazaars, build clinics, and restore schools as insufficient to fully sway them to the Coalition's side.<sup>26</sup> These actions, or 'demonstration efforts,' are designed to show the population that the local Afghan government can provide for their wellbeing. Yet, the British experience in Helmand since 2006 demonstrates that reconstruction and development in the absence of security for the population have little enduring value.<sup>27</sup> In Marjah, as long as the population is exposed to the threats and retaliatory actions by insurgents, they will not

entertain the possibility of actively opposing them. According to locals, "villagers do not dare give them away to the Americans because they are local men and can exact revenge."<sup>28</sup>

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Comprehensively clearing terrain such as Marjah is a slow, methodical process. Removing the Taliban's extensive Marjah network requires months of clearing and close interaction with the town's population, much of which is located miles away from the district center and bazaars. Frequent and sustained interaction with the population has the proven ability to prevent insurgent reinfiltration. This is a prerequisite in order to begin the transition to the hold phase.<sup>29</sup> This transition takes weeks, not days.<sup>30</sup> There is a significant period of overlap between these stages in terms of the tasks and time it takes to successfully execute the transition. Continuously securing the population is one of the central tenets of a successful transition.

On the basis of experience, an example of successful execution and realistic timelines for clearing and holding can be seen in the southern Helmand River valley. During the summer of 2009, U.S. Marines and a small contingent of ANA launched an operation to secure three contiguous districts where the enemy maintained a significant presence.<sup>31</sup> Two of these districts, Garmser and Nawa are most similar to Marjah. The Coalition forces in this region faced a significantly easier objective vis-à-vis Marjah: the force encountered a less intense enemy counteroffensive, a more receptive population, and significantly less complex terrain. Nevertheless, it still took months to comprehensively clear the area. Major progress in the hold and build phases did not materialize until late winter and early spring 2010, more than six months after the initial assault, according to 2/2 and 1/3 Marines.<sup>32</sup>

A successful clearing effort is ultimately measured by the elimination of insurgents, their infrastructure and networks and the cooperation of the population with the clearing force.<sup>33</sup> Ultimately, security is the necessary precondition for the population's trust and support. Security includes actual protection from insurgent threats and intimidation and more importantly, the belief that the population will not

be punished for openly siding with friendly forces. These are prerequisites for the provisioning of basic services and the introduction of local governance.

Although it remains to be seen if coalition and Afghan forces will engage in large-scale clearing operations in the districts surrounding Kandahar City, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must have realistic expectations regarding the time and resources required to clear difficult, enemy-infested terrain and fully ensure the establishment of proper and necessary security conditions for improving local government.

## USING POLICE IN COIN OPERATIONS

ANCOP are considered to be the most professional and highly trained elements of the Afghan National Police. ANCOP was designed to serve as a temporary replacement police force for local Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) who leave the battlefield for an intensive eight-week training course, known as the Focused District Development program (FDD) and to maintain law and public order during the “hold” phase of COIN operations.<sup>34</sup> Though ANCOP is a paramilitary police force, it cannot be in the lead during the “clear” phase of COIN.<sup>35</sup> In fact, no police force can sufficiently function in a COIN environment until the hold phase. Police are trained to enforce order, not establish security.<sup>36</sup> The decision to employ ANCOP in this role during the “clear” phase of Operation Moshtarak exceeded the capability of this force.

Just days after the invasion, more than 300 ANCOP arrived in Marjah. Immediately there were problems. Some refused to work at night, send out patrols, and stand post more than three hours at a time.<sup>37</sup> Others refused to stand guard or clean their living areas. Some units abandoned their checkpoints during the midday heat and took lunch breaks that lasted for hours.<sup>38</sup> Many were caught smoking hashish. In the early days after the invasion, an entire ANCOP battalion of 179 policemen was temporarily taken off-line after approximately one-quarter of the force tested positive for drug use.<sup>39</sup> It was clear from the outset that the capacity of this force would be severely limited.

The most troubling development was reports of corruption. Marjah’s previous police force was so corrupt and abusive that residents warned the Marines prior to the invasion that “if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death.”<sup>40</sup> Although the majority of ANCOP is more professional and disciplined than the AUP, their conduct in certain instances during Moshtarak was comparable to previous abuses by the AUP. Reports from Marjah stated that ANCOP members set up checkpoints to shake down residents while others charged locals for head-of-the-line privileges.<sup>41</sup> Reports of reckless behavior, ignorant of the strict rules of engagement that were designed to minimize civilian casualties were also reported.

Despite these issues, the fundamental problem with the ANCOP in Marjah was assigning them to perform functions for which they were not trained, equipped or prepared to do. On February 17, 2010, just four days after the invasion, Marines reported that the security situation in northern Marjah was such that ANCOP forces could be brought in to allow 3/6 Marine forces to clear more areas.<sup>42</sup> Brigadier General Larry Nicholson echoed those sentiments several days later, arguing that he needed ANCOP forces to free up his soldiers to fight the Taliban, “what I can’t afford is for all the [Coalition] forces to be pinned down holding areas we’ve already taken,” he said.<sup>43</sup>

The decision to send ANCOP to assist in the earliest stages of Operation Moshtarak was a mistake. ANCOP was neither equipped nor trained to maintain responsibility for a sizable piece of terrain like northern Marjah, especially only days into a clearing operation. This task would be far more appropriate for an Afghan National Army battalion, a light infantry force, with embedded U.S. Marine trainers. Many ANCOP assigned to northern Marjah were forced to undergo retraining as a result of their poor performance, after which reports suggested that their performance improved.<sup>44</sup>

The overreliance on ANCOP was likely the result of a paucity of American and Afghan National Army forces participating in Operation Moshtarak. According to General Stanley McChrystal, “had we put more force in [Marjah], we could have locked [it] down better,” stating that “I think we have let

too much move along without overwhelming-enough security.”<sup>45</sup> Although ANCOP is a necessary and useful force multiplier, coalition forces must be cognizant of their actual capabilities and provide them with the necessary embedded trainers and supervision they require to perform.

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Coalition and Afghan planners should not rely on the ANCOP or any police equivalent to successfully execute mission-critical tasks in the early stages of counterinsurgency, especially during the protracted clear phase.<sup>46</sup> Ill-equipped and insufficiently trained Afghan police forces are not an effective substitute for adequate numbers of ANA, U.S., and coalition troops.

As a result of ANCOP's poor performance in Moshtarak, senior U.S. military officials have recently ordered U.S. Special Forces to provide training to forty-percent of the ANCOP and establish long-term partnerships with half the battalions they train.<sup>47</sup> Six ANCOP kandaks (or battalions, consisting of slightly more than 300 policemen each) are scheduled to be deployed to Kandahar to support Operation Hamkari Baraye Kandahar that is currently underway. It is unlikely that this “seven to eight day program of instruction” for immediately deploying units and “longer and more comprehensive training” and partnering will be sufficient in addressing the shortfalls of this force.<sup>48</sup> ANCOP units deployed to Kandahar will require sufficient guidance and supervision in the field to ensure proper conduct and appropriate tasking.

### **LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN-PRACTICE VS. 'IN-THE-BOX'**

Prior to the launch of Operation Moshtarak, military and civilian leaders formulated a ready-made “government-in-a-box” concept for Marjah. This “government-in-a-box” was said to include all necessarily components of district-level governance that could be quickly inserted just days into the clearing phase. The hope was that this ready-made administration could provide basic services to the population that would demonstrate the Afghan government's ability to govern more effectively

than the Taliban system. Yet, four months after the start of Operation Moshtarak, local governance in Marjah is still a work in progress.

An unprecedented level of interaction and cooperation took place at the national and provincial level during the planning phase. NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, Mark Sedwill, said that Moshtarak was planned from the “end-game backwards,” which is to say that planners understood the importance of “civilian delivery of governance and development,” and used that ideal end state to determine the required inputs.<sup>49</sup> President Karzai and the various Afghan line ministries participated in the process to ensure that the stabilization and governance phase would be instituted quickly and smoothly following the establishment of sufficient security conditions. Despite positive early engagement with Kabul and the relevant Afghan ministries, the government's capacity to deliver critical resources in an efficient and timely manner revealed the challenges of creating effective district governance.<sup>50</sup>

The stabilization phase and the installation of the “government-in-a-box” was executed under the rubric of the District Delivery Plan (DDP), led by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Helmand Governor Gulab Mangal, and the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).<sup>51</sup> The DDP is an inter-ministerial initiative that was created in 2005, comprising the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education and the IDLG and it was designed to “establish or improve the presence of the Afghan government in recently secured districts.”<sup>52</sup> The DDP's “planning” and “partnership” efforts were confidence inspiring, according to statements from General McChrystal on February 4, 2010.<sup>53</sup>

Yet, in-practice, the “government-in-a-box” concept was underwhelming. Nearly ten days into the operation, Kabul had not set a date for dispatching dozens of bureaucrats from Afghan ministries, including health, education, justice, finance and agriculture.<sup>54</sup> In early May, several key ministers admitted that they had not done enough local-level outreach to ensure the delivery of manpower and

resources.<sup>55</sup> By late May, only eight of eighty-one certified teachers were on the job.<sup>56</sup> Only a handful of ministry representatives assigned to Marjah lived in the district while others resided within the relative sanctity of the provincial capital. In order to commute to work from the capital, these officials required a sizable security detachment.<sup>57</sup> It was and remains difficult for the Afghan government to earn the trust and confidence of the local population when many of the individuals sent to provide basic services are absent or at best ineffective.

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The extent of President Karzai's, the IDLG's, and various Afghan ministries' involvement in the planning and coordination of the stabilization phase of Operation Moshtarak is a positive development and should be commended. Yet, the capability of these Kabul-based ministries to project resources to the district level was limited in practice. ISAF planners must accurately assess what Afghan ministries can deliver and when. Planning is only one small part of the process. Marjah revealed a disparity between what the various ministerial heads promised and what they could adequately deliver. If demands on performance exceed capacity, ISAF planners must account and even make their own plans to address the governance and economic objectives in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Yet, it is worth noting that in Kandahar the challenge of governance is fundamentally different than that of Marjah. Whereas Marjah suffered from a total absence of state governance, Kandahar has functioning Afghan governance institutions. The problem in Kandahar is that the population views government institutions as predatory and illegitimate, representing the interests of key powerbrokers rather than the populous.<sup>58</sup> Effective and legitimate governance in Kandahar and its environs will depend on local engagements with the population through locally recognized and respected avenues to earn the populations buy-in and support and to produce results.

## CONCLUSION

The execution of Operation Moshtarak has presented coalition and Afghan forces with unique insight into the planning and execution of large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Rushed clearing operations, the premature overreliance on ANCOF, and a limited capacity to establish effective local governance have hindered success. As coalition and Afghan forces look towards Kandahar this summer, the lessons from Operation Moshtarak should be used to inform proper planning and execution in order to avoid the repetition of costly mistakes.

Most importantly, campaign objectives and timelines must be grounded in reality. A premature progression through the clear phase creates false expectations and sets the stage for misplaced criticism. The inability to meet unrealistic expectations gives the impression of failure, emboldening the enemy and increasing doubt amongst the population. Rather, objectives and timelines based on experience and lessons learned provide a realistic and accurate opportunity for enduring success. Although unforeseen challenges and obstacles to overcome will likely surface during the 'Cooperation for Kandahar' campaign, accurate planning and proper execution enable the greatest possibility of success. Much like in Marjah, success will require time.

*Special thanks to Peter Bacon for his contributions to this report.*



ENDNOTES

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 175-176

<sup>3</sup> Julius Cavendish, "Afghanistan war: Marjah battle as tough as Fallujah, say US troops," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 15, 2010

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<sup>5</sup> Jerome Starkey, "Police move in to hold areas liberated by US Marines," *The Times*, February 20, 2010

<sup>6</sup> Jerome Starkey, "Police move in to hold areas liberated by US Marines," *The Times*, February 20, 2010

<sup>7</sup> Munir Ahmad and Rohan Sullivan, "Taliban leader escapes US missile, brother killed," *Associated Press*, February 20, 2010; Alfred de Montesquiou, "NATO forces face Taliban mines, resistance," *Associated Press*, February 14, 2010

<sup>8</sup> Donna Miles, "Marja Operation move toward 'Holding' phase," *American Forces Press Service*, February 25, 2010

<sup>9</sup> Alfred de Montesquiou and Deb Reichmann, "Troops clear last pockets of resistance in Marjah," *Associated Press*, February 27, 2010

<sup>10</sup> John Kruzal, "Marja clearing phase nears completion," *American Forces Press Service*, March 2, 2010

<sup>11</sup> Michael J. Carden, "Troops in Marja focus on public support for government," *American Forces Press Service*, March 5, 2010

<sup>12</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; US Marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *New York Times*, May 17, 2010; Anand Gopal, "Marjah, Afghanistan: Guns quiet, the battle for power now begins," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 2010

<sup>13</sup> Anand Gopal, "Marjah, Afghanistan: Guns quiet, the battle for power now begins," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 2010

<sup>14</sup> Richard Oppel Jr., "Violence helps Taliban undo Afghan gains," *New York Times*, April 4, 2010; "US fight Taliban with heavy metal and rock music," *Agence France Presse*, April 6, 2010; Deb Reichmann, "Setting up new government in Marjah inches along," *Associated Press*, April 9, 2010

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<sup>17</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; US Marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *New York Times*, May 17, 2010

<sup>18</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; US Marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *New York Times*, May 17, 2010

<sup>19</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; US Marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *New York Times*, May 17, 2010

<sup>20</sup> Don Nissenbaum, "McChrystal calls Marjah a 'bleeding ulcer' in Afghan campaign," *McClatchy Newspapers*, May 24, 2010

<sup>21</sup> Kathy Gannon, "Taliban lose control of Marjah but remain strong," *Associated Press*, March 19, 2010; Anand Gopal, "Marjah, Afghanistan: Guns quiet, the battle for power now begins," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 2010; Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; U.S. marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *International Herald Tribune*, May 17, 2010

<sup>22</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "'Still a long way to go' for U.S. operation in Marja, Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, June 10, 2010

<sup>23</sup> Jeffrey Dressler, "Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah," Institute for the Study of War, March 2, 2010

<sup>24</sup> The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, 152

<sup>25</sup> The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, 174

<sup>26</sup> It should be noted that the Marines have had significant successes in Marjah, such as securing the Koru Chareh bazaar and the village of Daftani to the south. The village currently supplies their own security force and has participated in data collection and outreach with coalition and Afghan forces according to, Miguel Marquez, "In Afghanistan, no direct route to success," *ABC News*, July 1, 2010

<sup>27</sup> Jeffrey Dressler, "Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah," Institute for the Study of War, March 2, 2010

<sup>28</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Farmers flee Afghan zone as security deteriorates; US Marines are finding it difficult to keep Taliban from returning to Marja," *International Herald Tribune*, May 17, 2010

<sup>29</sup> The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, 176

<sup>30</sup> For example, the clear-hold transition during COIN operations in Baqubah, Iraq in late 2007, early 2008 lasted approximately five weeks.

<sup>31</sup> Jeffrey Dressler, "Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah," Institute for the Study of War, March 2, 2010

<sup>32</sup> "Afghanistan: Marines Gear Up For Biggest Fight Yet," USMC Press Release, February 4, 2010; Kenneth Katzman, "Security policy and force capacity building: Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy," Congressional Research Service Reports and Issue Briefs, March 1, 2010

<sup>33</sup> The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, 174-175

<sup>34</sup> "Elite Afghan Police Force Underway to Marjah," NTM-A-CSTC-A, May 27, 2010

<sup>35</sup> "Building and Developing Foreign Police Forces," Conference sponsored by The Institute for the Study of War and National Defense University, April 26-27, 2010

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<sup>37</sup> CJ Chivers, "Top Afghan police unit earns poor grade for mission in Marjah," *New York Times*, June 2, 2010

<sup>38</sup> CJ Chivers, "Top Afghan police unit earns poor grade for mission in Marjah," *New York Times*, June 2, 2010

<sup>39</sup> Dion Nissenbaum, "Corruption, incompetence charges plague new Afghan police force," *McClatchy Newspapers*, May 10, 2010

<sup>40</sup> CJ Chivers, "With Marja largely won, Marines try to win trust," *New York Times*, March 1, 2010

<sup>41</sup> Dion Nissenbaum, "Corruption, incompetence charges plague new Afghan police force," *McClatchy Newspapers*, May 10, 2010; CJ Chivers, "Top Afghan police unit earns poor grade for mission in Marjah," *New York Times*, June 2, 2010

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<sup>46</sup> "Building and Developing Foreign Police Forces," Conference sponsored by The Institute for the Study of War and National Defense University, April 26-27, 2010

<sup>47</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "Special partnership: Special Forces add training for Afghan police units," *Army Times*, June 14, 2010

<sup>48</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "Special partnership: Special Forces add training for Afghan police units," *Army Times*, June 14, 2010

<sup>49</sup> Jim Garamone, "Helmand will serve as a template, NATO official says," *American Forces Press Service*, March 8, 2010

<sup>50</sup> "Afghanistan's Marja District," Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, May 6, 2010

<sup>51</sup> "Press briefing on Operation Moshtarak," NATO-ISAF, February 17, 2010

<sup>52</sup> "U.S.-Afghanistan agreement to provide basic government services," State Department, Bureau of International Information Programs, April 10, 2010; "Background notes: Afghanistan," State Department Documents and Publications, March 10, 2010; "Sub-national Governance Policy," Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Spring 2010.

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