

# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2023

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December 11, 2023, 5:50pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on December 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 11 that Russia will conduct voting for the 2024 presidential election in occupied Ukraine, likely in an attempt to legitimize the Russian occupation and Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule.**[1] The CEC reported that it made the decision to hold the election in occupied territories – all of which except Crimea are under martial law – in consultations with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and occupation authorities.[2] Russian law notably requires the CEC to consult with these agencies when considering holding elections in areas under martial law, including occupied Ukraine.[3] Russia will likely use the March 2024 presidential election to further establish a veneer of legitimacy for its occupation of Ukraine as it has done during the illegal 2022 annexation referenda and the 2023 regional elections.[4] Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated on December 7 that elections in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts “will differ somewhat” in procedure from elections in Russia and occupied Crimea.[5] The CEC will likely use these differing procedures to falsify votes in Putin's favor and claim a high voter turnout while falsely portraying occupied Ukraine's participation in the election as legitimate to the international community.

**Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 10 to 11.** Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-131/136 drones from occupied Cape Chauda and Belbek, Crimea and eight ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast targeting Kyiv Oblast.[6] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces downed all 18 Shaheds and all eight ballistic missiles.[7] Ukrainian Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Kh-59 cruise missile over Kryvyi Rih Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 11.[8]

**The United Kingdom (UK) and Norway will lead a coalition aimed at providing short-term and long-term assistance to the Ukrainian Navy as the UK announced additional maritime aid provisions to Ukraine.** The UK announced on December 11 that the UK and

Norway would lead the Maritime Capability Coalition to provide short-term assistance to Ukraine and help in long-term efforts aimed at making the Ukrainian navy more interoperable with NATO.[9] The Norwegian Defense Ministry reported that the Maritime Capability Coalition is one of several “Capability Coalitions” discussed during the most recent meeting of the 50-nation strong Ukraine Contact Group on November 22.[10] Ukrainian Navy Commander Oleksiy Neizhpapa stated that the coalition is designed to last until at least 2035.[11] UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 20 Viking amphibious armored vehicles and 23 raiding boats.[12] Shapps also announced that the UK transferred two Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine as part of a plan that predated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[13] Neizhpapa stated that the two minehunters are currently in the UK and cannot yet be brought to Ukraine due to the Montreux Convention.[14] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention since February 28, 2022, to deny access to the Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits per Article 19 which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.”[15] Russia has reportedly relied on civilian ships to bypass the Turkish use of the Montreux Convention to transport war materiel through the straits.[16]

**Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to expand Russian naval capabilities in areas well beyond Ukraine and Eastern Europe, likely in an effort to strengthen and expand Russia’s ability to threaten the West.** Putin attended the flag-raising ceremony for two nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine carriers, the cruise missile carrier *Krasnoyarsk* (Yasen-M class submarine) and the intercontinental ballistic missile carrier *Emperor Alexander III* (Borei-A Class submarine), at the Sevmash shipbuilding plant in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast, on December 11.[17] Putin stated that the two new submarines would join the Russian Pacific Fleet (Eastern Military District) to defend Russia’s far eastern borders.[18] Putin stated that Russia plans to quantitatively strengthen the Russian navy and strengthen Russian naval power in the Arctic and Far East and in the Black, Baltic, and Caspian seas.[19] Putin claimed that the Sevmash plant intends to transfer three more Borei-A class submarines and five more Yasen-M class submarines to the Russian navy in the coming years.[20] The construction and launch of new naval craft are expensive and time-consuming undertakings, and Putin’s interest in expanding Russian naval capabilities in all areas where Russia has naval basing suggests that the Russian leadership may intend to include naval expansion as part of its long-term force expansion effort.[21]

The Russian military’s long-term restructuring and expansion effort aims to prepare Russia for a future-large scale conventional war against NATO, and the commitment of expensive naval resources to areas beyond Ukraine and Eastern Europe likely aims to threaten NATO and its allies across multiple regions.[22] The Kremlin has routinely stressed that Russia is a Pacific naval power in its pursuit of an equal defense partnership with China, and Russia engaged in naval posturing in the Sea of Okhotsk in May 2023 aimed at deterring further Japanese support for Ukraine.[23] Putin further emphasized Russian strategic interest in the Arctic later on December 11 at a meeting on the economic development of Russia’s Arctic zone, a region in which Russia may intend to strengthen naval capabilities given Finland’s recent NATO accession and Sweden’s pending NATO accession.[24] It is unclear whether Russian naval manufacturers will be able to produce strategic naval craft at the Kremlin’s desired scale and quality in the coming years, although Russia continues efforts to gradually mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) and may decide to focus these efforts on Russian naval manufacturers.

**The Russian State Duma approved amendments allowing Russian courts to fine or assign compulsory work to foreigners who are convicted of crimes in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.** The Russian State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation approved amendments that would allow Russian judges to issue 40,000 to 50,000 rubles (about \$440 to \$550) in fines or 150 to 200 hours of compulsory work to migrants convicted of a crime in place of deportation.[25] The amendment will allow Russian judges to determine if deportation is an “excessive” or “disproportionate” punishment based on the criminal record of the foreigner convicted.[26] The amendment likely aims to reduce the number of deportations so that Russia can continue to benefit from migrant labor amid labor shortages and continue wider efforts to coerce migrants, both with and without Russian citizenship, into Russian military service. Russian authorities have increasingly conducted mass detentions of migrants, during which Russian authorities have served those with Russian citizenship military summonses and have threatened to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized migrants if they refuse to serve in the Russian military.[27] Russian authorities have also targeted migrants without Russian citizenship in crypto-mobilization efforts by proposing restrictions on the actions and job opportunities of foreign citizens in Russia, advertising Russian military contract service in Central Asian languages, and coercing migrants into contract service in exchange for Russian citizenship.[28] ISW assesses that the Russian government continues to struggle to reconcile the incoherent and competing objectives of exploiting migrant labor to alleviate Russian labor shortages and prioritizing crypto-mobilization efforts to send migrants to the frontline.[29] Russian authorities are also likely using these measures to appease Russian ultranationalists who generally oppose the inclusion of migrants into the Russian economy and society.

**Russian National Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev announced on December 11 that the Russian government will make “targeted changes” to the Russian constitution.** Medvedev emphasized that the Russian government must make amendments to the constitution very carefully and that there is currently no reason to discuss a new constitution altogether.[30] Medvedev did not specify what these “targeted changes” will be, and the nature and degree of these changes are currently unclear.[31] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin called on November 22 for Russia to codify an unspecified state ideology, which would legally require an amendment to the Russian constitution, as Article 13 of the Russian constitution forbids Russia from proclaiming a state ideology and commits the Russian state to recognize ideological diversity.[32] Russian state TV channel *Rossiya 1* reported on December 10 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with Russian Constitutional Court judges in the coming week. Putin may use this meeting to articulate to the judges or publicly announce the specific constitutional changes Medvedev was referencing.[33]

**Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US government officials in Washington, D.C. on December 12.** Zelensky will meet with US President Joe Biden and members of Congress, including House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson.[34] ISW will cover these events on December 12.

**Imprisoned Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s team reported that Navalny has gone missing as of December 11, just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s**

**2024 presidential election campaign announcement.** Navalny's Press Secretary Kira Yarmysh reported on December 11 that authorities at Russian penal colony no.6 in Vladimir Oblast stated that Navalny is no longer registered to the penal colony after preventing Navalny's lawyers from visiting him on December 8 and 11.[35] Yarmysh reported that authorities at penal colony no.7, also in Vladimir Oblast, told Navalny's lawyers that Navalny is also not at penal colony no 7, and Yarmysh stated that Navalny's current location is unknown.[36] Yarmysh reported that Navalny was in ill health when his lawyers last visited him.[37] ISW has no independent confirmation of Yarmysh's statements. Navalny's reported disappearance comes just days after Putin's December 8 presidential campaign announcement and the Navalny team's December 9 announcement of a presidential campaign strategy, which several other Russian opposition figures endorsed.[38]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 11 that Russia will conduct voting for the 2024 presidential election in occupied Ukraine, likely in an attempt to legitimize the Russian occupation and Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule.**
- **Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 10 to 11.**
- **The United Kingdom (UK) and Norway will lead a coalition aimed at providing short-term and long-term assistance to the Ukrainian Navy as the UK announced additional maritime aid provisions to Ukraine.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to expand Russian naval capabilities in areas well beyond Ukraine and Eastern Europe, likely in an effort to strengthen and expand Russia's ability to threaten the West.**
- **The Russian State Duma approved amendments allowing Russian courts to fine or assign compulsory work to foreigners who are convicted of crimes in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.**
- **Russian National Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev announced on December 11 that the Russian government will make "targeted changes" to the Russian constitution.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 11 and advanced in some areas.**
- **Ukrainian military officials indicated that Russian forces recently intensified mechanized offensive operations near Avdiivka.**
- **A Russian law went into effect on December 11 likely aimed at preventing Russian conscripts from fleeing military service.**
- **Russia continued to illegally deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation and medical programs as Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to dispute this practice.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives


### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 11 and marginally advanced. Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least four Russian attacks in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (9km east of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and repelled at least five Russian attacks in the Lyman direction near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna) and Terny (17km west of Kreminna).[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction near Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and in the Lyman direction near Zhytlivka (2km northwest of Kreminna).[41] Syrskyi also reported that the Russian military is committing assault units previously in reserve to assaults near Synkivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made minor gains near Shyroka Balka (roughly 11km west of Kreminna) and attacked toward Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[43] An image published on December 10 purportedly shows personnel of the Russian “Phantom” Detachment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) operating in the Lyman direction.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and advanced on December 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Petropavlivka, Synkivka, Lake Lyman (northwest of Synkivka), Terny, and Dibrova.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and gained a foothold west of Shyroka Balka.[46]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on December 10 that Russian forces advanced one and a half kilometers near Kreminna. A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers near Terny and Yampolivka. A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced three and a half kilometers near Vesele since the beginning of the Russian offensive. A Russian source claimed on December 7 that Russian forces advanced more than a half kilometer in the dacha area southwest of Bakmut.

## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**


Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut on December 11 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least eight Russian assaults near Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut) and Vesele (16km northeast of Bakhmut).[47] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the direction of Siversk (27km north of Bakhmut).[48]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Bakhmut direction near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) on December 11.[49]

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations near Bakhmut on December 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 13 Russian assaults near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka, Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivnichne (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are concentrating considerable efforts north and west of Bakhmut and that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]), and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) are conducting assault operations in these areas.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian stronghold north of Khromove along the O0506 (Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar) highway and pushed Ukrainian forces out of several positions near Klishchiivka.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within 100 meters of the outskirts of Bohdanivka and advanced towards Ivanivske and Klishchiivka between December 8 and 10.[53]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Megan Wilson, and Shaylei Dauphinais  
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- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced over an area one and a half kilometers wide and 580 meters deep on the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka. A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced three and a half kilometers near Vesele since the beginning of the Russian offensive. A Russian source claimed on December 7 that Russian forces advanced more than a half kilometer in the dacha area southwest of Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on December 11 and recently marginally advanced. Geolocated footage posted on December 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 11 that Russian forces made tactical advances in the railway area near Stepove and in northern Stepove.[55] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the administrative borders of Avdiivka itself, but ISW has observed no visual confirmation of any of these Russian claims.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka itself;

east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka); south of Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka); and near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka) and Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[57]

Ukrainian military officials indicated that Russian forces recently intensified mechanized offensive operations near Avdiivka. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces launched significant offensive operations with armored vehicle support near Avdiivka and Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City) on December 10 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 11 Russian tanks and 15 armored combat vehicles.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 49 Russian attacks near Avdiivka on December 11, a significant increase relative to the past few weeks.[59] ISW has not yet observed significant Russian gains near Avdiivka as a result of these attacks, however.


# Assessed Control of Terrain near Donetsk City as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on December 11 and reportedly advanced. Russian milbloggers claimed on December 10 and 11 that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City) but that Ukrainian forces still maintained positions in the settlement.[60] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still control three percent of Marinka.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), Marinka, and

Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[62] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Heorhiivka (directly southwest of Donetsk City).[63]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on December 10 that Russian forces control 97% of Marinka. A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced over an area one and a half kilometers wide and 580 meters deep on the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka. A Russian source claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced three and a half kilometers near Vesele since the beginning of the Russian offensive. A Russian source claimed on December 8 that Russian forces advanced up to 430 meters along two forest belts in the direction of Ocheretyne and Novokalynove. A Russian source claimed on December 8 that Russian forces advanced 150 meters near the Avdiivka Coke Plant wastewater treatment facility.

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**


Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 11 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion operating in the area claimed that subzero temperatures and ice are inhibiting communications.[65]



Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 11 but did not advance. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the area.[67] Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces have not dedicated enough electronic warfare (EW) complexes to the Zaporizhia Oblast front line to defend against Ukrainian drones.[68] One milblogger claimed that the Russian military command has currently dedicated fewer EW and artillery units to western Zaporizhia Oblast than to other areas of the front.[69]

Russian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 11 and reportedly advanced. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured positions near Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) and an unspecified forest area in western Zaporizhia Oblast, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Robotyne and Novopokrovka (12km northeast of Robotyne).[71]


# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground operations near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on December 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces consolidated positions in an area south of Krynky and that Ukrainian forces took advantage of poor weather to transport 30-50 personnel to the east bank.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in Krynky after conducting airstrikes against Ukrainian positions.[73] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro River) but that the area is calm.[74]



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on December 11 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer along the N-08 highway near Novofedorivka between December 8 and 10. Russian sources claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer towards Robotyne.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of December 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

A Russian law went into effect on December 11 likely aimed at preventing Russian conscripts from fleeing military service.[75] The law obliges Russian conscripts, in addition to current and former

members of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and those with access to state secrets who previously fell under this condition, to hand over their Russian passports to the Russian government and will invalidate passports for those who fail to do so. The law stipulates that conscripts will need to show a military identification card that indicates that they completed their conscription military service or alternative civil service in order to retrieve their passport.

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Rostec subsidiary High-Precision Complexes announced on December 11 that it completed deliveries of modernized BMP-2M infantry fighting vehicles to Russian forces ahead of schedule.[76] The vehicles reportedly include the “Berezhok” combat module, which includes a 30mm 2A42 autocannon, 30mm AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher, 7.62mm PKT machine gun, and Kornet anti-tank guided missile installation.[77]

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russia continued to illegally deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation and medical programs as Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continues to deny her participation in these efforts. Lvova-Belova claimed on December 10 that six Ukrainian children returned to Ukraine from Russia as part of a Qatari-negotiated deal.[78] Lvova-Belova praised the Russian government’s work in the process and reiterated claims that the children were not deported.[79] Lvova-Belova stated on December 11 that the Russian government and Russian “charity” institutions that work with children from occupied Ukraine in Russia deported ten children aged 10 to 16 from occupied Mariupol to Taganrog for “rehabilitation” programs and four disabled children from occupied Kherson Oblast to assisted living homes in Penza Oblast associated with Lvova-Belova’s “Kvartal Louis” organization.[80]

Russian federal subjects (regions) continued to develop patronage systems with territories in occupied Ukraine as part of efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia. Kherson occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on December 11 that Adygea Republic Head Murat Kumpilov agreed to renovate three schools and two medical stations in occupied Kherson Oblast by 2024.[81] Saldo claimed that the Adygea Republic has already renovated two schools, two sports and recreation complexes, a multifunction center, and a city museum.[82]

### **Russian Information Operations and Narratives**

Russian government officials continue attempts to exacerbate alleged tensions between Ukrainian political and military leaders. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin baselessly claimed on December 11 that high-ranking Western officials are discussing replacing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with another senior Ukrainian military or political official.[83] Russian sources are increasingly promoting reports about internal Ukrainian political tensions in an effort to discredit Ukrainian leadership and weaken Western support for Ukraine.[84]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian parroted a Russian information operation claiming that Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas can acquire weapons “in Ukraine via illicit purchases” at the international Doha Forum on December 11.[85] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and several Russian state-controlled media outlets made similar claims shortly after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023.[86] US Department of Defense Inspector General Robert Storch stated in February 2023 that his office has not found evidence that “any of the billions of dollars in weapons and aid to Ukraine has been lost to corruption or diverted into the wrong hands,” indicating that Iranian officials are likely amplifying a longstanding Russian information operation.[87]

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] [https://t.me/istories\\_media/4410](https://t.me/istories_media/4410); <https://t.me/bbcrussian/57694>

[2] [https://t.me/istories\\_media/4410](https://t.me/istories_media/4410); <https://t.me/bbcrussian/57694>

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