

Iran Update



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February 10, 2025, Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


Hamas said on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[1] Hamas likely aims to retain its hostages as leverage in negotiations. Hamas' military wing spokesperson claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire agreement by delaying the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, targeting them with gunfire, and restricting the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip.[2] These claims are misleading. Israel delayed the movement of Gazans to the northern strip in January 2025 because Hamas did not release a female civilian hostage before releasing female soldier hostages, as required under the ceasefire agreement.[3] Israeli forces have fired warning shots at Palestinians, but warning shots are a normal part of most escalation-of-force procedures in professional militaries.[4] Israel has also provided at least an average of 555 aid trucks per day to Gazans, which is an increase from 70 trucks per day in early January 2025, before the ceasefire.[5] Israel has responded to Hamas' threat to violate the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare for any "possible scenario" in the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas' ceasefire violations.[6]

Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously indicated that Israel is willing to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip and added that Israel will "continue the war until Hamas no longer holds sway in Gaza." [7] Hamas may calculate that by retaining the hostages, it can increase domestic Israeli pressure on the Israeli government to continue negotiations and reach a permanent ceasefire. Hamas would be able to use these remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again in the future.

This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly presented itself as the defender of the Palestinian people and as the government of Gaza. Hamas, were it negotiating as a government or as a defender of its people, would seek to exchange the hostages in return for a stop to the fighting and the release of humanitarian aid in order to help Palestinians. Hamas is using the hostages as leverage to secure its own survival, however. The UN reported that Israel has allowed “over” 10,000 aid trucks into the strip since January 19.[8] This means that Israel provided an average of more than 555 aid trucks to enter the strip daily between January 19 and February 6, according to the United Nations.[9] The ceasefire requires Israel to allow 600 trucks into the Strip a day, which would require Israel to send 10,800 trucks into the Strip between January 19 and February 6.[10] The daily average of 555 aid trucks is 55 trucks more than Israel allowed to enter the strip prior to October 7, 2023, and an increase of nearly 500 trucks daily compared to November 2024, however.[11]

US President Donald Trump said on February 10 that the United States will “build a permanent place” for Gazans outside the Gaza Strip.[12] Trump added that he will negotiate with Jordan and Egypt to accept Gazan refugees even though both countries have rejected the proposal.[13] The Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced on February 9 that Egypt will host an emergency Arab League summit on February 27 in Cairo to discuss “new and dangerous developments” following Trump’s statement on Gaza.[14] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also called for an emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in separate phone calls with OIC Secretary General Hussein Ibrahim Taha, and the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Malaysian foreign ministers on February 9 and 10.[15]

Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Lines As of February 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.[16] The restructured legislation will provide social welfare funding to Palestinians based on socio-economic status rather than allowances based on “prisoner or martyr” status.[17] This legislation formerly provided payment to Palestinian fighters arrested by Israeli security forces based on the length of their prison sentence.[18] Various Israeli and American administrations referred to this system as “pay-to-slay.”[19] A Palestinian official told Axios that the decree transfers the cash assistance program, database, and allocations from the PA Ministry of Social Development to the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment, an “independent institution” focused on reducing poverty and addressing unemployment.[20] Abbas founded the organization in 2019.

Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10.[21] These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.[22] President Masoud Pezeshkian, who similarly signaled his openness to negotiations with the West, also indicated his alignment with Khamenei's stance.[23] Senior political officials and Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders also condemned US President Donald Trump's "maximum pressure" policy towards Iran and dismissed any potential US and Israeli "threats" to Iran.[24] The coalescence of top regime officials on the nuclear issue, including those previously supportive of negotiations, follows The *Telegraph's* report on February 8, which stated that senior Iranian military leaders have been urging Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon.[25]

Key Takeaways:


- **Gaza Strip Ceasefire:** Hamas said that it will postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 10, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations. This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza.
- **West Bank:** Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.
- **Iran:** Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10. These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.

Syria

Turkish or Turkish-backed forces continued to shell US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions near Tishreen Dam after CTP-ISW's data cut off on February 9.[26] Turkish or Turkish-backed forces fired artillery, tank guns, and rockets targeting SDF positions near the dam.[27] Turkey separately shelled at least nine villages and SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in Aleppo Province on February 9 and 10.[28]

Turkey continued to engage the SDF near the Turkish-controlled enclave in northern Syria. SDF fighters targeted a Turkish base north of Tal Tamr on February 9, killing two Turkish fighters and destroying a military vehicle.[29] Turkish forces targeted an SDF position near Tal Tamr in return on February 10.[30] Turkish forces also targeted SDF positions west of Tal Abyad with drone strikes and heavy artillery.[31] The Turkish Defense Ministry stated that it killed three SDF fighters in the Peace Spring and Euphrates Shield region on February 10.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Northern Syria February 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



The IDF continued to operate along the Golan Heights in southern Syria. Local media reported that the IDF searched a town near Tal Ahmar in southern Quneitra Province on February 10.[33]


Armed factions in Suwayda have continued to negotiate with the Syrian interim government over their absorption into the Syrian military. Suwayda-based Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering leader Suleiman Abdul Baqi said on February 10 that the Syrian Defense Ministry and Suwayda factions will meet to discuss reorganization and merging into the national military structure.[34] Baqi added that his groups had coordinated with Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on the operation to overthrow Bashar al Assad before the HTS-led operations room began its offensive in November 2024.[35] This legacy of military coordination likely created relationships that assisted the Suwayda faction's assimilation into the HTS-led Defense Ministry.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to operate near the Lebanon-Syria border following recent fighting between smugglers and HTS-led forces.[36] The LAF previously deployed to positions along the northern and eastern Lebanon border on February 8.[37] The LAF confiscated a “large quantity” of weapons including rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, military weapons, and ammunition, from the homes of unspecified wanted individuals in Qasr, Hermel Province, Lebanon, on February 10.[38] A Syrian journalist reported on February 10 that members of the Jaafar clan, which is a familial group affiliated with Hezbollah that maintains smuggling networks in the area, withdrew from the Syrian border area into Lebanese territory.[39] The Jaafar clan is reportedly a predominantly Shia clan of approximately 4,000 people with ties to Hezbollah who operate primarily in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate.[40] This clan has historically been involved in drug smuggling in Lebanon.[41]


HTS-led Syrian interim government forces continued to deploy to the Syria-Lebanon border in coordination with the LAF.[42] A Syrian journalist reported that HTS-led interim government forces completed operations and cut the ground line of communications that pro-Hezbollah smugglers used to cross the Syria-Lebanon border.[43] The Syrian journalist reported that Syrian interim government forces now control two areas in the western al Qusayr countryside, Homs Province.[44] The Syrian Border Security Administration’s Western Region Commander told Syrian media that Syrian forces seized a large number of drug manufacturing facilities and a counterfeit currency printing press in Hawik, Homs Province.[45] The commander stated that the operations also targeted smuggling networks on the border, many of whom are associated with Hezbollah.[46] The Syrian journalist noted that the HTS-led forces have yet to clear areas between Zeita and Hawash that the journalist claimed to contain Hezbollah weapons depots and have historically been considered a Hezbollah stronghold.[47] A Syrian journalist and Lebanese media reported on February 10 that other clans within Lebanon, including the al Alwah clan, continued operating in Baalbek and moving toward the Lebanon-Syria border.[48]

Assessed Control of Terrain around Homs

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Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria February 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
- Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji discussed regional security with Combined Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Major General Kevin Leahy on February 10.[49]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
- Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The _____ *Gaza* _____ *Strip*

See topline section.

Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

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
Two IDF divisions are in the Gaza Strip buffer zone

Lebanon

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on February 9 that targeted a Hezbollah weapons smuggling tunnel in the Bekaa Valley that ran from Syria into Lebanon.[50] A Syrian journalist reported that the IDF targeted a tunnel near al Qusayr.[51] The IDF reportedly previously targeted this tunnel in October 2024.[52] An Israeli research center reported on February 10 that Hezbollah Unit 4400 controlled the tunnel, which was three kilometers long.[53] Hezbollah's Unit 4400 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[54] The Israeli research center estimated the tunnel entrances could facilitate the movement of small trucks to transport weapons from Syria to Lebanon.[55]

Hezbollah likely attempted to rebuild this tunnel, which prompted the Israeli strike. It is possible the IDF failed to destroy the tunnel in October 2024, though it is unclear why the IDF would have risked a strike during the ceasefire or waited four months if the tunnel was functional after the October 2024 strike. The IDF can strike targets in Lebanon under the ceasefire if the LAF fails to stop Hezbollah ceasefire violations.

The IDF separately conducted airstrikes on February 9 that targeted Hezbollah sites in Lebanon that contained weapons and rocket launchers that the IDF deemed posed an "immediate threat." [56] Lebanese media reported IDF airstrikes in Jezzine and Baalbek Governorates. [57]



Saudi media reported on February 10 that Lebanese authorities are continuing to “closely inspect” planes from Iran and Iraq to Beirut to prevent Iranian cash transfers to

Hezbollah.[58] Western media reported in December 2024 that Iran may seek to establish a new "logistics hub" in the Beirut airport for military shipments to Hezbollah.[59] Lebanese airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah in early January.[60] The *Wall Street Journal* reported on January 31 that Israel accused unnamed Turkish citizens of moving money for Hezbollah from Istanbul to Beirut by air since the start of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[61]

West Bank

Israeli forces arrested Alaa al Bitawi, who Israel Army Radio called “one of the heads of Hamas” in the Jenin refugee camp, and several other wanted Hamas fighters, in Jenin Governorate on February 10.[62] Israeli forces previously attempted to arrest Bitawi during other operations in the northern West Bank.[63] An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported that Bitawi planned to carry out attacks with other fighters.[64] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Jenin Governorate on February 9.[65]

Israel Army Radio reported on February 10 that approximately fifty percent of residents have left the Nour Shams refugee camp, Tulkarm Governorate, due to ongoing IDF operations there.[66] The PIJ, Hamas, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades joint operations room claimed that it conducted a coordinated small arms attack targeting IDF infantry in Nour Shams on February 10.[67] PIJ announced the formation of a joint operations room in the West Bank with Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades on January 22.[68]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

IRGC-affiliated media reported that Iranian security forces arrested four people in Tehran on February 8, including a woman, after the woman removed her clothing while in the back seat of a car and walked out “half-naked” on the street in a “pre-planned act.”[69] CTP-ISW cannot verify that this incident occurred.

Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin met with Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately in Tehran on February 8 and 9.[70] The officials reportedly discussed the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), ISIS in Syria, and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed bilateral cooperation in transportation, energy, and environmental sectors in a telephone conversation with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow on February 10.[71] Berdimuhamedow also invited Pezeshkian to attend an upcoming “Peace and Trust” conference in Turkmenabat.[72]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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