

## Iran Update, November 11, 2024

Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

**Hezbollah officials continue to claim that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon are failing to achieve Israeli objectives.** The head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, claimed in a November 11 press conference in Beirut that Israel has been unable to hold terrain in any Lebanese villages.[1] Afif denied recent Israeli claims that Israeli operations have destroyed 80 percent of its rocket stockpiles, claiming that Hezbollah could “outlast” Israel in a long war.[2] Afif’s statements are similar to Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s statement, which grossly exaggerated the number of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[3] Both Afif and Qassem’s statements obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon.[4]

**The head of Hezbollah’s media office also emphasized Hezbollah’s friendly relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[5] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s disarmament during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[6]** Afif said during the conference that Hezbollah’s relationship with LAF is “strong and solid” and will always remain so.[7] Afif named Lebanese soldiers who had recently been killed in Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon as “heroes” and “martyrs.”[8] He also condemned unspecified actors who have attempted to sow divisions between Hezbollah and the LAF.[9] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently implicitly threatened the LAF against collaboration with the IDF on November 6 and implied that the LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid targeting Batroun, northern Lebanon.[10] Afif’s comments are likely an attempt to strengthen Hezbollah’s relationship with the LAF, particularly after Qassem’s implicit threats. Afif’s comments are particularly notable given that the LAF would be the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a ceasefire proposal in late October.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF.[12]

**Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government.** Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf confirmed Iran’s political support regarding the ceasefire talks in Lebanon in a phone call with his Lebanese counterpart Nabih Berri on November 11.[13] Ghalibaf held separate meetings with Berri and Lebanese Prime Minister

Najib Mikati during his visit to Beirut on October 11, where Ghalibaf discussed Iranian efforts to secure a ceasefire that would end Israeli operations in both Lebanon and the Gaza strip.[14] Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf only spoke with Berri on November 11 about a ceasefire in Lebanon.[15] Berri has also previously stated that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri's assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon.[16] CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake the tasks that the United Nations has set for it, which includes preventing Hezbollah's presence in southern Lebanon.[17]

**Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar stated on November 11 that there has been “certain progress” in ceasefire talks to end the fighting in Lebanon.[18]** Saar stated that Israel will agree to a ceasefire if the ceasefire pushes Hezbollah an unspecified distance back from the border and prevent Hezbollah's rearmament.[19] These comments are consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's public demands that a ceasefire agreement include measures to prevent Hezbollah's reorganization and rearmament.[20] Israeli media reported that the Israeli security cabinet convened on November 10 to discuss the latest ceasefire proposal after US special envoy Amos Hochstein exchanged ceasefire drafts with Lebanese officials.[21]

**Hamas reaffirmed its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage exchange deal on November 10 in response to the emergency Organization of Islamic States and Arab League summit.** Hamas said that it would “deal positively” with proposals that achieve a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the return of all displaced Gazans to their homes, an increase in humanitarian aid, and full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[22] Hamas also called upon the Arab leaders at the summit to form an international Arab-Islamic alliance to pressure Israel and its allies to end the war in the Gaza Strip.[23] Newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said in a press conference on November 11 that he does not think that a Palestinian state is a “realistic” goal to come out of the October 7 War.[24] Saar added that a Palestinian state would be a “ Hamas state.”[25] Ceasefire mediator Qatar confirmed on November 9 that it had “stall[ed]” its mediation efforts due to frustration with both side's lack of willingness and seriousness to end the conflict.[26]

**Top Saudi officials are continuing to criticize Israel in order to placate Iran without promising concrete action against Israel.** Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman called on the international community to “compel Israel to respect Iran's sovereignty and not to attack its territory” during the opening remarks for the emergency Organization of Islamic States (OIC) and Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 11.[27] Mohammad bin Salman did not comment on Iranian attacks into Israeli territory, however.[28] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who did not attend the summit due to “executive matters,” expressed hope that Iran and Saudi Arabia will increase cooperation in a phone call with Mohammad bin Salman on November 11.[29] Saudi Armed Forces General Staff Chief General Fayyad al Ruwaili separately discussed increasing “defense diplomacy” and military cooperation with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General

Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran on November 10.[30] Bagheri invited Saudi Arabia to participate in joint naval exercises in the future.


**US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted strikes against nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 10.[31]** A local Syrian journalist reported that US forces conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militias in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[32] A Syrian regime-aligned National Defense Forces fighter died in the airstrikes.[33] CENTCOM said that the strikes targeted two unspecified locations in response to attacks on US personnel in Syria in the last day.[34] Pro-Iran sources reported that Iranian-backed militias fired rockets targeting US forces at al Omar oil field base on November 10.[35] CENTCOM said that the strikes will degrade Iranian-backed militias ability to attack US and Coalition forces.[36]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Hezbollah:** Hezbollah officials continue to claim that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon are failing to achieve Israeli objectives. The head of Hezbollah's media office also emphasized Hezbollah's friendly relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF would be responsible for enforcing Hezbollah's disarmament during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.
- **Lebanon Ceasefire Talks:** Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar stated on November 11 that there has been "certain progress" in ceasefire talks to end the fighting in Lebanon. Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Top Saudi officials are continuing to criticize Israel in order to placate Iran without promising concrete action against Israel.
- **Syria:** US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted strikes against nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 10.

# Key Takeaways in the October 7 War

As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Hamas reaffirmed its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage exchange deal

The head of Hezbollah's media office attempted to affirm Hezbollah's relationship with the Lebanese army in a press conference

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji met with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani in Tehran

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack on Nahal Sorek military base in central Israel

0 50 100 200 Kilometers

□ Gaza Strip and West Bank    ▨ Golan Heights

Map by George Barros, Daniel Mealie, Mitchell Belcher, Noel Mikkelsen, Tom Thacker, Cameron Hayes, Brian Carter, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Ben Rezaei  
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## **Gaza Strip:**

### **Axis of Resistance objectives:**

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

**The IDF 162nd Division likely continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 11.** The IDF Air Force struck and killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operations officer in a school in the northern Gaza Strip.[37] The officer compiled situational assessments and coordinated operations with Hamas to attack the IDF and Israel.[38] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades attacked Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in central Jabalia refugee camp.[39] Hamas targeted an Israeli command position in the northwestern Gaza Strip with rocket and mortar fire.[40] Hamas also fired an RPG targeted Israeli armor west of Jabalia camp.[41] A Palestinian journalist said that Palestinian fighters ambushed Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp but did not provide specifics about the attack.[42]

**The IDF has expanded the Netzarim Corridor to a width of seven to eight kilometers and has built semi-permanent infrastructure there.**[43] An Israeli journalist who visited the military area described recent infrastructure additions that include a cell tower and a main water line from Israel.[44] IDF engineering units are conducting “extensive drilling operations“ to minimize the threat of Hamas attacks from tunnels passing under IDF outposts on the Corridor. The journalist claimed that some IDF posts along the Corridor are not subjected to indirect fire attacks for weeks at a time.[45] This report about the rate of indirect fire is notable, given that militia groups claim that they shell Israeli positions along the Corridor almost daily. It is possible some of these attacks are inaccurate or otherwise fail. Skilled mortar operators or rocket artillerists should be able to shell these positions with reasonable accuracy and rates of success. The fact that this fire may be inaccurate further supports CTP-ISW's assessment that some elements of Hamas and other militias are badly degraded or defeated. Two Fatah-associated militias fired rockets and mortars targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on November 11.[46]


**Local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armor advanced into western Nuseirat refugee camp on November 11.** A Palestinian journalist reported Israeli armored bulldozers and tanks moved earth amid artillery shelling and small arms fire in the camp.[47] The IDF has not commented on the operation or issued evacuation orders for western Nuseirat at the time of this writing. The IDF maintains a semi-permeant presence just north of Nuseirat on the Netzarim Corridor.[48]

**The IDF 143rd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on November 11.**[49] The IDF 933rd Infantry Brigade (143rd Division) destroyed an ammunition warehouse that Hamas had “left behind” in Shaboura refugee camp in Rafah.[50] The warehouse contained drones, weapons production components, mortars, and explosive charges.[51] 933rd Infantry Brigade troops also directed strikes

on militia infrastructure, armed militia cells, anti-tank guided missile firing positions, rocket warehouses, and underground infrastructure.[52]

# Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

## As of November 11, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



\* ISW-CTP's "Reported Israeli Clearing Operations" layer uses the US military's doctrinal definition of clearing which is an operation that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area." Clearing operations frequently take weeks and sometimes months to complete

# Israeli-Announced Evacuation Zones in the Gaza Strip

## As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



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CTP-ISW's "Israeli Announced Evacuation Zones" layer shows Israeli evacuation zones announced by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). CTP-ISW used IDF maps and statements to create this layer. Where IDF maps cover part of a zone this layer covers the whole zone to avoid understating the evacuation order. The IDF began announcing these evacuation zones on December 2, 2023, at 0222 ET on X (Twitter)



- Reported Israeli Clearing Operations\*
- Israeli Announced Evacuation Zones
- Claimed Furthest Israeli Advances
- IDF-Declared Humanitarian Corridors in Gaza
- Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Zone
- Netzarim Corridor
- Philadelphi Corridor

0 2.5 5 10 Kilometers

Map by George Barros, Daniel Mealie, Mitchell Belcher, Noel Mikkelsen, Tom Thacker, Cameron Hayes, Brian Carter, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Ben Rezaei - © 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

\* ISW-CTP's "Reported Israeli Clearing Operations" layer uses the US military's doctrinal definition of clearing which is an operation that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area." Clearing operations frequently take weeks and sometimes months to complete



**The IDF seized a sack of small arms ammunition from an aid convoy travelling from the northern to southern Gaza Strip.** The convoy moved goods internally through the Gaza Strip and did not pass through Israeli inspections outside of the Gaza Strip.[53] The IDF is currently heavily engaged with Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip, making the movement of the ammunition unlikely to be related to immediate tactical needs of Palestinian fighters in the south. CTP-ISW assessed in September that Israel had likely defeated Hamas in Khan Younis and was in the process of doing so in Rafah.[54]

**IDF reservist turn-out rate has declined to between 75 and 85 percent in recent weeks, according to Israeli media.**[55] Israeli reservists had been turning out at a rate of up to 150% immediately after the October 7, 2023, attack.[56] Senior Israeli officers have attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war. The war and the intense deployment cycles that go along with it are causing familial, academic and employment problems. Israeli media also reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduction in reservist turn-out.[57]

## **West Bank**

### **Axis of Resistance objectives:**

- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

## **Northern Israel and Lebanon**

### **Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:**

- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

**The IDF is paving a road in the demilitarized zone along Syria's border with the Golan Heights, according to the Associated Press.**[58] The news agency said that the construction began "in earnest" in late September 2024.[59] The United Nations confirmed that Israeli troops entering the demilitarized zone violates the ceasefire agreement.[60] A local Syrian source reported in October 2024 that two Israeli tanks crossed the Golan Heights-Syria border to protect bulldozers completing the road project.[61] Syrian media claimed that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October.[62]

**The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 21 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on November 11.**[63] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[64] Most of the towns from which the IDF asked Lebanese civilians to evacuate are located along the front or second lines of the Israel-Lebanon


border. The spokesperson said that the IDF will act “forcefully” against Hezbollah activities in the areas of these specified towns.[65]

**The IDF Air Force and IDF 282nd Artillery Brigade (36th Division) struck a launcher in southern Lebanon that Hezbollah used to fire rockets at several areas in northern Israel on November 11.[66]**

**Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted artillery shelling near Kfarchouba and Shebaa in Hasbaya District, southeastern Lebanon, on November 11.[67]** The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade has operated around the Hermon and Mount Dov areas since early October 2024 to locate and destroy militia infrastructure.[68]

**Hezbollah claimed it fired an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli forces positioned in a house on the northwestern outskirts of Kfar Kila on November 11.[69]**

# Reported Israeli Operations in the Eastern Sector As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET




**Hezbollah claimed it fired drones, mortars, and rockets at Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Maroun al Ras on November 11.[70]**

**Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces fired small arms near the forests of the Naqoura, Labbounh, Alma al Shaab, Tir Harfa, al Dahyra, and Aita al Shaab areas in**

**southwestern Lebanon on November 11.[71]** The IDF 146th Division has operated in and near many of these towns in recent weeks.[72] The IDF last acknowledged the 146th Division’s operations in southwestern Lebanon on November 5.[73]

## Reported Israeli Operations in the Western Sector As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET





# Reported Israeli Operations in Lebanon

As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 21 towns and villages in southern Lebanon



Lebanon Roads	Israeli Evacuation Warnings
Assessed Israeli Advances*	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
Israeli Evacuation Zone	Artillery Shelling
Israeli Closed Military Zone	

0 5 10 20 Kilometers

Map by George Barros, Daniel Mealie, Mitchell Belcher, Noel Mikkelsen, Tom Thacker, Cameron Hayes, Brian Carter, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Ben Rezaei - © 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project


\* Assessed advances are areas where ISW-CTP assess forces have operated in or launched attacks but do not control.

**The IDF Air Force likely struck a site along Hezbollah’s ground line of communication across Syria on November 11.**<sup>[74]</sup> Syrian regime media reported that the airstrike struck an aid collection point along the Homs-Damascus road in Shamsin, Homs Province.<sup>[75]</sup> Shamsin is roughly 20 kilometers from the Lebanon-Syria border.<sup>[76]</sup>

**The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure on November 11.** Lebanese sources reported that the IDF conducted airstrikes in at least 61 locations across Lebanon since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on November 11.<sup>[77]</sup> Lebanese media reported that an Israeli airstrike on a building in Ain Yaaqoub, northern Lebanon, killed 30 people.<sup>[78]</sup>

# Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon and Syria

As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



*This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 10 to 2:00pm ET on November 11. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.*


**Hezbollah has conducted at least 23 drone, mortar, and rocket attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 10.**[79] Hezbollah fired 90 rockets in two barrages towards the Haifa area.[80] Hezbollah claimed it was targeting the Krayot area and Zevulon Military Industries, north of Haifa.[81] The attack injured three civilians and caused material damage to homes and vehicles in the Krayot area.[82] Hezbollah also fired multiple barrages of rockets targeting Israeli soldiers along the Israel-Lebanon border.[83]

**Hezbollah claimed that it fired several drones targeting Regavim base, south of Haifa, on November 11.** Hezbollah said this attack fell within the framework of its “Khaybar” campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel killing Hassan Nasrallah. Khaybar attacks often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel.[84] Hezbollah previously conducted a drone attack on October 13 targeting Regavim base that killed four IDF 1st Infantry Brigade soldiers and injured 61 others.[85] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hezbollah’s first attack on Regavim base and subsequent attacks targeting IDF rear positions are support lines are likely part of a broader Hezbollah campaign as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[86] This effort has proved unsuccessful so far.



# Attacks into Northern Israel from Lebanon

As of November 11, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



## Iran and the Axis of Resistance

**Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji met with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani in Tehran on November 10.**[87] Araji is a senior member of the Badr Organization and previously served as Iraq's interior minister. The Badr Organization is an Iranian proxy group in Iraq formed by the IRGC in 1982.[88] Iranian media published a photo of Ghaani and Araji in Tehran but did not provide a readout of the meeting.[89] Araji's meeting with Ghaani is noteworthy given recent reports that Iran may launch a retaliatory attack on Israel from Iraqi territory.[90] Araji would not be responsible for operational

coordination as part of the retaliation, but he would have a role in determining the Iraqi state's position on an Iranian-backed attack launched against Israel from Iraqi territory. Araji separately discussed increasing border security between Iran and Iraq in a meeting with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[91]

**The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed eight drone attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 10.** The claims include the following:

- Four drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in northern Israel.[92]
- One drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in northern Israel.[93]
- Two drone attacks targeting a vital target or vital targets in southern Israel.[94]
- One drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in southern Israel.[95]

The IDF intercepted at least four drones launched “from the east” overnight between November 10 and 11.[96]

**The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley on November 10.**[97] This attack marks the fourth time that the Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques has claimed an attack targeting Israel since October 25.[98] Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack claim at the time of this writing.


**The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Force reported that unspecified attackers killed five Iranian Basij security officers in Sirkan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on November 10.**[99] Iranian media has not reported who is responsible for the attack and no group has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks targeting security forces in southeastern Iran, however. The attack is part of a larger uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[100]

**Israeli media reported that Iran-linked hacker group *Anonymous for Justice* claimed a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS) on Israeli company Hyp's payment processing service Credit Guard on November 10.**[101] Israeli media stated that the attack targeted communications between card terminals and wider payment infrastructure that interfered with the ability to make payments on platforms that use Hyp's services. Israeli media reported that services affected by this hack included the Maccabi health fund, taxi service Gett, food ordering app Wolt, and certain public transportation payment systems.[102] Hyp Credit Guard has returned to normal operations as of November 11.[103] *Anonymous for Justice* also took responsibility for a cyber-attack against Israeli credit services company Automated Bank Services on October 29 and caused disruptions to computing services in the banking sector.[104]

**The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack on Nahal Sorek military base in central Israel on November 11.[105]** Nahal Sorek base is located about halfway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and hosts the IDF's Qazaza Special Weapons Depot, which stores munitions ranging from small arms ammunition to advanced missiles.[106] Israeli air defense systems detected a projectile from Yemen targeting an area west of Jerusalem and intercepted the projectile before it reached Israeli airspace.[107]

# Houthi Attacks into Israel

As of November 11, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



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- [1] <https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=76232&cid=113>
- [2] <https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=76232&cid=113>
- [3] [www dot almanar.com.lb/12732315](http://www dot almanar.com.lb/12732315); <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024>
- [4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/hezbollah%E2%80%99s-military-forces-are-failing-lebanon>
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- [9] <https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=76232&cid=113>
- [10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024>
- [11] <https://isw.pub/IranUpdate103124>
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