

Iran Update



Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

November 13, 2024, Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The damage caused by Israel's October 25 strike targeting Iran's ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran's decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel's October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran's ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2] These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has "several hundred long-range missiles" and that Iran is "unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.

US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages" of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[5] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[6] An unspecified US official said that Dermer's meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were "productive" and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a "side letter" that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[7] Hochstein told *Axios* on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[8] Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter's language.[9]

Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel's terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah's ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel's insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the "full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction" in negotiations.^[10] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL's current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.^[11]

Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel's ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire's terms.^[12] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah's disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF's deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.^[13] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.

Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.^[14] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.^[15] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev's comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer's recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.^[16] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.^[17] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.^[18]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander "Sasha" Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.^[19] The video is almost

certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant's support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[20] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant's firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu's move to fire Gallant.[21] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[22] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu's dismissal of Gallant.[23]

An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[24] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF's Chief Mission Support Bernard told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[25] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF's characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[27]

Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[28] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks. The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[29] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[30]


Key Takeaways:

- **Iranian Retaliation Against Israel:** The damage caused by Israel's October 25 strike targeting Iran's ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran's decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.

- **Lebanon Ceasefire Talks:** US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages" of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.
- **Hezbollah's Ceasefire Considerations:** Hezbollah may outright reject Israel's terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah's ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel's insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel's ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.
- **Russia in the Middle East:** Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.
- **Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip:** Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant's support of a ceasefire with Hamas.
- **Syria:** An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.

Key Takeaways in the October 7 War

As of November 13, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:


- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 13. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[31]

Israeli forces conducted clearing operations in Gaza City on November 13. The IDF Air Force struck and killed several Palestinian fighters, including a fighter who participated in the October 7 attacks, near Gaza City on November 13.[32] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have conducted four attacks targeting Israeli forces near Gaza City since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12.[33] Elements of the 252nd Division have operated in Zaytoun at least since November 2.[34]


Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired rockets targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor on November 13.[35]

The PFLP fired rockets targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis on November 13.[36]



Israeli-Announced Evacuation Zones in the Gaza Strip


As of November 13, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Palestinian militias have conducted multiple indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12. PIJ fired rockets targeting unspecified southern Israeli towns on November 12.[37] The IDF intercepted one rocket that crossed into southern Israel from the northern Gaza Strip on November 12.[38] The IDF said that another rocket launched from the Gaza Strip fell in an open area near Erez in southern Israel on November 13, causing no casualties.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades separately fired rockets targeting Nir Am in southern Israel.[40] The IDF said that one rocket fell inside the Gaza Strip after sirens went off in Nir Am.[41]

Attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip

As of November 13, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



US Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized on November 13 that Israel needs to continue improving the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[42] Blinken acknowledged that Israel has fulfilled 12 of the 15 steps that he and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin urged Israel to take in a letter to senior Israeli officials on October 13.[43] Blinken stated on November 12 that the United States will not alter its assistance to Israel because Israel has taken enough “important steps” to address the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[44] Blinken told reporters on November 13 that Israel still needs to implement “extended pauses” of fighting to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries, allow commercial trucks into the Gaza Strip, and rescind evacuation orders for areas where the IDF has finished operating to enable Palestinian civilians to return to their homes.[45]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

An unspecified individual fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint in Deir Qaddis in the central West Bank on November 13.^[46] The IDF reported that the attacker conducted the shooting attack from inside a vehicle and that the attacker fled the scene of the shooting. The IDF is searching for the attacker.


Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Elements of the IDF 91st Division continued operating in southeastern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 12.^[47] The IDF 282nd Artillery Brigade and the IDF 769th Territorial Brigade raided several areas in southern Lebanon.^[48] Lebanese media claimed that the IDF conducted artillery shelling near Wadi al Saluki, which is located approximately 2.5 kilometers west of Houla in Marjeyoun District, southern Lebanon.^[49] Israeli forces have been advancing westward through Houla as early as November 2.^[50] Artillery fire support is meant to "destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy" to ensure freedom of maneuver for ground forces.^[51]


Reported Israeli Operations in the Eastern Sector As of November 13, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF 36th Division expanded its clearing operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 13.[52] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade located a Hezbollah tunnel with living quarters and equipment storage areas.[53] The 188th Brigade (36th Division) has advanced toward the outskirts of the "second line" of Lebanese towns in southern Lebanon in recent days. Hezbollah fighters ambushed the 51st Battalion (1st Golani Brigade, 36th Division) as troops cleared a building.[54] Hezbollah fighters in nearby buildings also fired anti-tank munitions at the Israeli forces inside the building. Six Israeli soldiers died during the firefight. An initial IDF investigation found that Hezbollah fighters likely sheltered in a tunnel entrance in the building while Israeli forces fired at the building and emerged to ambush Israeli infantry. Lebanese media claimed that the 51st Battalion was attempting to advance toward Aainata when Hezbollah fighters ambushed it.[55]


Hezbollah has continued indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance into "second line" Lebanese border towns.[56] Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces east of

Maroun al Ras.[57] Hezbollah claimed a separate rocket attack targeting Israeli forces advancing northeast from Yaroun.[58]



Reported Israeli Operations in Lebanon

As of November 13, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities and infrastructure in Beirut on November 13. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force struck at least 16 buildings throughout the southern suburbs of Beirut.[59] The IDF struck Hezbollah weapons warehouses, headquarters, command posts, and a missile battery in Beirut's southern suburbs.[60] Western media reported that the Israeli strike on Baalchmay killed at least eight people.[61] The IDF stated that these strikes are part of its efforts to target Hezbollah's operational capabilities by destroying its weapons production and storage sites in Beirut.[62] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Laylaki, Haret Hreik, and Ghobeiry before attacking these areas.[63]


The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in Aramoun, south of Beirut, on November 12.[64] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that the strike killed at least six people and wounded at least 15.[65]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on November 13 targeting bridges in al Qusayr, Syria, that Hezbollah uses to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[66] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the bridges are currently out of service.[67] Al Qusayr is a stronghold for Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran frequently transfers weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via al Qusayr.[68] The IDF has conducted multiple attacks in recent months to reduce the transfer of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah via Syria.[69] The IDF stated that attacking the bridges in al Qusayr would degrade the ability of Hezbollah unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, to operate.[70]

The IDF Navy has struck Hezbollah and Hamas targets in Lebanon over the past few weeks in support of the IDF's campaign in Lebanon.[71] The IDF Navy killed Said Alaa Naif Ali, a senior member of Hamas in Lebanon. The IDF reported that Ali recruited fighters in Lebanon to join Hamas. The IDF Navy conducted a separate strike targeting Ali Barkhat, a key member of Hezbollah's air unit, Unit 127. IDF Navy fighter jets also struck a Hezbollah naval unit base in Beirut. Hezbollah used the base to store naval vessels and conduct training exercises simulating attacks into Israel.

Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon and Syria


As of November 13, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 12 to 2:00pm ET on November 13. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah claimed a missile and drone attack targeting the IDF's headquarters at the Kirya in Tel Aviv for the first time on November 13.[72] There is no evidence that the attack occurred. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted the drone attack at 1530 local time.[73] Israeli media did not report any sirens near Tel Aviv around that time.[74] The IDF said that it intercepted two drones over the Western Galilee and Upper Galilee.[75] It is unclear if these drones were part of Hezbollah's attack on the Kirya. Hezbollah also claimed that it launched several Qader-2 surface-to-surface missiles at the Kirya several hours later.[76]

Hezbollah conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12.^[77] Hezbollah claimed several attacks targeting weapons manufacturing sites in Israel, including a factory south of Haifa and an Israel Weapon Industries site in Ramat Hasharon near Tel Aviv.^[78] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting the IDF military headquarters in Gilot, north of Tel Aviv.^[79] The IDF said that it intercepted five rockets following sirens in northern and central Israel.^[80] Hezbollah said that it fired drones targeting Amos base, south of Haifa, for the first time.^[81] Hezbollah said that several of its attacks were part of its “Khaybar” campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel's killing Hassan Nasrallah.^[82] Khaybar attacks often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel.



Iran and the Axis of Resistance

A US delegation arrived in Baghdad on November 13 to hold indirect talks with Iran, according to an unspecified informed source speaking to Iraqi media.^[83] The talks aim to “calm the situation [in the Middle East],” according to the source. A US delegation recently traveled to Iraq in late October 2024 to hold indirect talks with Iran, but the talks were postponed after the IDF killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip.^[84] The arrival of the US delegation in Iraq is noteworthy given recent reports that Iran might launch an attack against Israel from Iraqi territory.^[85]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12. The claims include the following:

- A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in central Israel.^[86]
- A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel.^[87]

The IDF intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Mitzpe Ramon in southern Israel on November 12.^[88] The IDF also intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Ramat Magshimim in the southern Golan Heights on November 12.^[89] The IDF separately reported on November 13 that it intercepted four drones that were heading toward Israel “from Lebanon and the east.”^[90] It is unclear whether this report included the drones that the IDF intercepted on November 12.

Iranian-sponsored Attacks in the Middle East

As of November 13, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



Iraqi Fatah Alliance member Ali al Fatlawi claimed on November 13 that the United States is “procrastinating” the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.^[91] The Fatah Alliance is headed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.^[92] Fatlawi added that the United States seeks to “impose complete control” over Iraqi airspace. Fatlawi may have made this statement in response to the IDF using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.

The IRGC Ground Forces have killed four likely Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested seven others in Sistan and Baluchistan Province over the past 48 hours.^[93] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran near the border with Pakistan. The IRGC Ground Forces killed and arrested the fighters as part of the "Martyrs of Security" exercise, which began on October 31 in response to the killing of ten Law Enforcement Command officers in Taftan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26. Jaish al Adl claimed responsibility for the October 26 attack.^[94]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted airstrikes targeting an unspecified Iranian-backed militia's weapons storage and logistics headquarters facility in an unspecified location in Syria on November 12.^[95] CENTCOM conducted the strikes in response to a recent rocket attack targeting US personnel at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province, Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that unspecified fighters conducted two rocket attacks targeting US forces at al Shaddadi and at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor, Syria, on November 12.^[96] Syrian media reported that the US airstrikes killed five Iranian-backed fighters in Albu Kamal on the Syria-Iraq border.^[97] CENTCOM recently conducted strikes targeting nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria on November 11.^[98]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on November 13 it conducted airstrikes targeting several Houthi weapons storage facilities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on November 9 and 10.^[99] Houthi media reported three US-UK airstrikes in al Faza neighborhood, al Tuhayta district, southern al Hudaydah Governorate, on November 11.^[100] Houthi media also reported a US-UK airstrike targeting a “civilian car” in al Sawmah District, western al Bayda Governorate, on November 12.^[101] Local anti-Houthi media reported on November 12 that the strike targeted a car carrying members of the Houthi’s “missile force.”^[102] CENTCOM has not confirmed this strike at the time of this writing.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024>

[2] <https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/11/13/israeli-assessment-operation-days-of-repentance-devastated-iranian-missile-production/>

[3] <https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production> ;

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/>

[4] <https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/11/13/israeli-assessment-operation-days-of-repentance-devastated-iranian-missile-production>

[5] www.ynet.co.il/news/article/h1cqegmfyl

[6] <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/12/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-biden>

[7] <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/12/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-biden>

[8] <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/12/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-biden>

[9] www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/823927/

[10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024>;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854202026458325272>

[12] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2024>

[13] www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/823927/

[14] <https://ria.ru/20241113/lavrentev-1983430610.html>

[15] <https://ria.ru/20241113/lavrentev-1983430610.html>

[16] <https://x.com/yanircozin/status/1855497546933620773>

[17] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16457>

[18] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-read-lebanons-acceptance-russian-military-aid>; <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/hizbullah-and-russias-nascent-alliance>

[19] <https://t.me/sarayaps/18802> ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Israeli Held by PIJ Expresses Fear of IDF in Video, Calls to Ramp Up Protests ,” October 13, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[20] <https://t.me/sarayaps/18802> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-5-2024>

[21] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/thousands-in-jerusalem-protest-gallant-ouster-for-second-night/>

[22] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-5-2024>

[23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-5-2024>

[24] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwrvw7x8j90>

[25] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwrvw7x8j90>

[26] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwrvw7x8j90>

[27] <https://t.me/damascusv011/24465>

[28] <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-09-24/ty-article/.premium/while-idf-attacks-degraded-hezbollah-it-remains-a-major-threat-to-israeli-home-front/00000192-25a9-dff0-a5f7-3fbf15ado000>

[29] [www dot idf.il/244999](http://www.idf.il/244999) ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-3-2024>

[30] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-3-2024>

[31] <https://t.me/sarayaps/18804>

[32] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856581144747077732>

[33] <https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8266/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9> ;
<https://t.me/darebmojahden/5345> ; <https://t.me/sarayaps/18803> ;
https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14982

[34] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852748146964603320>

[35] <https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8267/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA->

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D8%A9-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-
%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-
%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-107

[36] <https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14840>

[37] <https://t.me/sarayaps/18800>

[38] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856414240044921203>

[39] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856662453922189810>

[40] <https://t.me/nedalps/4503>

[41] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856734879163036127>

[42] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/blinken-calls-on-israel-for-extended-pauses-in-gaza-war/

[43] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/blinken-calls-on-israel-for-extended-pauses-in-gaza-war/ ; <https://www.nbcnews.com/video/israel-met-12-of-15-steps-demanded-by-u-s-to-ease-gaza-suffering-blinken-says-224311365929>

[44] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024>

[45] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/blinken-calls-on-israel-for-extended-pauses-in-gaza-war/

[46] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856757609375961518>

[47] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856581139495784501>

[48] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856581139495784501>

[49] <https://t.me/channelnabatieh/101888>

[50] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024>

[51] https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/9B9879F3-F213-4CD7-9D20-8D4520E8D38E-1397219978180/fm3_09.pdf

[52] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856588328897818727>

[53] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856581141773299825>

[54] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16467>

[55] <https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1856706683843842413>

[56] <https://t.me/mmirleb/8990>

[57] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9002> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9016>

[58] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9027>

- [59] https://x.com/IsraelRadar_com/status/1856614254163394900
- [60] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856597101209063735> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856691745834033605>;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856599096867348850>;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856692159732203763>
- [61] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c86q5qeqldo> ; <https://t.me/channelnabatieh/101908> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrikes-hit-beirut-suburbs-2024-11-12>
- [62] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856691745834033605>;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856597108368855146>
- [63] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856451825685102959>;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856465390047768917>;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856474140393558423>;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856603760979534241>;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856604028655784385>
- [64] <https://t.me/channelnabatieh/101953>
; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/13/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine>
- [65] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/13/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine> ; <https://x.com/mophleb/status/1856606517669077244>
- [66] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793273420968420>
- [67] <https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid02P7NFdDuXxiKzzUbbPxxwodPJatL1LaoSDUtzvq5Wtq2y5zpP8r7suMcbeyeVd5zDsl>
- [68] <https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria> ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-5-2024#_ednb17f68bd5697f4998787c6a9764de21a81
- [69] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793273420968420>
- [70] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793276525023670>
- [71] www.idf.il/248261
- [72] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9012>
- [73] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9012>
- [74] www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-829029; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-says-it-launched-attack-military-base-tel-aviv-no-sirens-heard-city-2024-11-13/>
- [75] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856688650857119853>
- [76] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9028>

[77] <https://t.me/mmirleb/8992>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/8993>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/8995>;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/8996>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9005>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9006>;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/9009>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9010>;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/9012>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9017>; ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9018>;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/9019>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9020>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9021>;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/9028>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9029>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9030>

[78] <https://t.me/mmirleb/8994>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9029>

[79] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9021>

[80] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856732551928574360>

[81] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9015>

[82] <https://t.me/mmirleb/8994>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/9015> ;

[83] <https://baghdadtoday dot news/261958-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86.html>

[84] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-18-2024>

[85] <https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq>

[86] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1516>

[87] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1518>

[88] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856424639217422527>

[89] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856490085492969808>

[90] <https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1856645299797639594>

[91] <https://baghdadtoday dot news/261966-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%Bo%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%84.html>

[92] <https://ina dot iq/eng/34695-al-hakim-and-al-ameri-renew-the-call-to-stop-the-war-on-gaza.html>

[93] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/23/3199144>

[94] <https://www.iranintl dot com/202410269980>

[95] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856506687890276620>

[96] <https://english.almayadeen dot net/latestnews/2024/11/12/al-mayadeen-s-correspondent--a-rocket-attack-targeted-the-tw>

[97] <https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1856608357546692919> ; <https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/11/13/12251>

[98] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856088134028558467>

[99] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856780067231469739> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-november-10-2024>

[100] <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1856119112306409778> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-november-12-2024>

[101] <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1856253340436386190>

[102] <https://x.com/almasdaronline/status/1856338310190244055> ;

<https://x.com/saeedalBatati/status/1856341216679375043>