

Iran Update



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November 27, 2024 Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Note: ISW will not be releasing an assessment tomorrow, November 28, in celebration of Thanksgiving

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has claimed no attacks into northern Israel nor any against Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to falsely claim that it defeated the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that its forces will continue to ensure that the IDF adheres to the ceasefire.[1] The IDF similarly stated on November 27 that it will remain in its positions in Lebanon for multiple weeks to ensure that Hezbollah complies with the agreement.[2] The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.

The IDF fired artillery and small arms at unidentified individuals who approached IDF positions around the Israel-Lebanon border after the ceasefire went into effect.[3] The IDF also detained four Hezbollah fighters, including a local commander, who entered a restricted area along the border.[4] Neither Hezbollah or Israeli officials have claimed that these incidents constitute violations of the ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on November 12 that Hezbollah would likely experience command-and-control challenges and struggle to immediately enforce widespread compliance with a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament among its rank-and-file members.[5] These isolated incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border may reflect those command-and-control challenges rather than Hezbollah leaders' intent to violate the ceasefire.

The IDF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) warned Lebanese civilians against returning to villages where the IDF is deployed on November 27.[6] Western and Lebanese media reported a large-scale movement of displaced Lebanese civilians to villages in southern Lebanon.[7] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the IDF would inform Lebanese civilians when it was safe to return.[8] The LAF similarly told Lebanese residents of towns near the Israel-Lebanon

border to delay returning to their homes until after the IDF withdraws.[9] Senior Israeli officials said that the IDF has yet to have a policy regarding how to address civilians returning to these areas.[10]

The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.[11]

The LAF announced on November 27 that it had begun to “strengthen its deployment” south of the Litani River in cooperation with UNIFIL. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon.[12]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

An unspecified source in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee told Iraqi media that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will continue to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.[13] The source claimed that Ansar Allah al Awfiya, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada will continue to attack Israel until the IDF ends its operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] Kataib Hezbollah similarly released a statement on November 26 claiming that “new parties” will enter the conflict with Israel following Hezbollah’s “break. . . from the Axis of Resistance.”[15] Kataib Hezbollah emphasized that it will not “abandon [its] people in Gaza.”[16]

Syria opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), seized at least 19 villages and military sites in western Aleppo from the Syrian regime in a surprise offensive on November 27.[17]

Thousands of opposition fighters and armored elements have advanced within five kilometers of Aleppo City, seizing territory from the Syrian regime.[18] The frontlines southwest of Aleppo have remained largely stagnant since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire, which ended an offensive by pro-regime forces, including Iranian-backed militias.[19] Fateh Mubin, an opposition group based in Idlib, stated that its forces seized the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 46th Regiment front line base and called it one of the “largest positions” of the Syrian regime west of Aleppo.[20] Local reports indicated that the opposition forces have advanced to the M-5 highway south of Aleppo, seizing a crucial ground line of communication to the city.[21] It remains unclear whether HTS and its partner groups can retain control of the territory seized in the past several hours. Syrian regime and Russian forces have attacked HTS command-and-control sites in Idlib and along the lines of advance in response to the offensive.[22] Fateh Mubin stated that its offensive was preemptive and meant to “deter the enemy, defeat its gathered forces, and keep its fire away from our people.”[23]

Israeli forces interdicted a significant shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in Jenin in the West Bank.[24]

The IDF announced on November 27 that it seized the shipment, which included explosive devices, remote detonators, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[25] Israeli media reported that the shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets as well.[26] This shipment is especially noteworthy given that it included weapons, such as mortars and rockets, that are more advanced than what Palestinian militias in the West Bank typically use.[27] CTP-ISW has observed no previous instances of Palestinian militias in the West Bank using rockets since the October 7 War began, though this shipment of only three rockets is relatively minor. The interdiction of this shipment comes as Israel has observed renewed Iranian efforts to smuggle materiel into the West Bank in recent months.[28] Israeli forces thwarted two other weapons smuggling attempts into the West Bank in recent days.[29] Iran

may be intensifying its efforts to arm proxy and partner militias in the West Bank to compensate for the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

- **Lebanon:** The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.
- **Iraq:** Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.
- **Syria:** Syrian opposition forces launched a surprise offensive into regime-held territory in northeastern Syria, seizing several military sites and villages around Aleppo.
- **West Bank:** Israeli forces interdicted a shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in the West Bank. The shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets.

Key Takeaways in the October 7 War

As of November 27, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in Jabalia and Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 27.[30] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade directed airstrikes targeting Hamas militia infrastructure, including weapons depots and buildings, in the northern Gaza Strip.[31] The IDF conducted the strikes using intelligence that it obtained from Palestinian fighters detained in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The IDF killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in an airstrike

and close combat at a former school complex in Beit Lahia.[33] The IDF facilitated the evacuation of civilians from combat areas to the south.[34] The IDF detained an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters during the evacuation process.

Palestinian militias have claimed at least seven attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 26.[35] Hamas detonated a building rigged with explosives in eastern Jabalia refugee camp and claimed that the explosion injured several Israeli soldiers.[36] Palestinian militias also fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), detonated improvised explosive devices (IED), and mortared Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[37] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement mortared Israeli forces in Beit Lahia.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on November 26 that killed a Hamas sniper in al Tabaeen School in al Daraj, Gaza City.[39] The IDF stated that the sniper used the school to store weapons.[40] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian casualties, including using precise munitions.[41] The airstrike killed 15 Gazans, according to local medics.[42] Al Tabaeen School previously served as a Hamas command-and-control site.[43] The IDF struck al Tabaeen School in August 2024, killing 31 Hamas and PIJ fighters.[44]


The IDF reported on November 27 that the 143rd Division directed an airstrike that killed Hamas member Murad al Rajoub in Gaza City.[45] Rajoub was responsible for a bombing attack that injured ten Israeli civilians in Beersheva in 2002.[46] Israel released Rajoub from Israeli prison as part of a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas in 2011.

Hamas fired rockets targeting an IDF command-and-control site along the Netzarim Corridor on November 26.[47]

The IDF 143rd Division likely conducted clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip on November 27. A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli vehicles operated in areas northwest of Rafah City and demolished civilian infrastructure there.[48]

Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip


As of November 27, 2024, 12:30 PM ET



* ISW-CTP's "Reported Israeli Clearing Operations" layer uses the US military's doctrinal definition of clearing which is an operation that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area." Clearing operations frequently take weeks and sometimes months to complete

Israeli-Announced Evacuation Zones in the Gaza Strip

As of November 27, 2024 at 12:30 PM ET



Palestinian militias praised Lebanese Hezbollah for concluding a ceasefire agreement with Israel, describing the ceasefire as a significant victory for the Axis of Resistance.[49]

The militias highlighted Hezbollah's "steadfastness" in confronting the IDF in southern Lebanon. The militias also called for continued mobilization against Israel.[50] Hamas reiterated its maximalist ceasefire demands in its statement praising the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[51]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

A Palestinian individual stabbed two Palestinian Authority (PA) security officers in Hebron on November 27.[52] PA security forces arrested the assailant.


Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:


- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces operating near Khiam in southeastern Lebanon before the ceasefire began on November 26. Hezbollah claimed that it attacked Israeli armor and infantry “withdrawing” from Ibl al Saqi, north of Khiam, with two improvised explosive devices (IED) and an anti-tank guided missile on November 26.[50] Hezbollah also attacked Israeli forces south of Khiam with rockets.[51] Arab media published videos of civilians walking around Khiam near Israeli armor after the ceasefire took effect.[53]

Reported Israeli Operations in the Eastern Sector As of November 27, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Reported Israeli Operations in the Western Sector As of November 27, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah infrastructure before the ceasefire began on November 26. The IDF Air Force struck nine Hezbollah financial warehouses and branches of Hezbollah's financial arm, al Qard al Hassan, in southern Lebanon on November 26.[54] The IDF stated that Hezbollah used these facilities to store and manage its funds in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, and the Bekaa Valley.[55] The IDF also struck a branch of the al Ansaf Exchange Office, which transfers money to Hezbollah to fund its operations.[56] These strikes are part of the IDF campaign targeting Hezbollah's financial network and infrastructure.[57] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation warnings to residents in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, and the Bekaa Valley before conducting the strikes.[58]

The IDF Air Force struck dozens of Hezbollah headquarters, launchers, weapons depots, buildings, and other infrastructure in Lebanon before the ceasefire began on November


26.[59] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah military facility in Beirut.[60] The IDF stated that Hezbollah’s naval missile unit used the facility as a weapons production site and a command post.[61] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation warnings to residents of several neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs before the IDF conducted the strikes .[62] The IDF Air Force also struck Hezbollah command posts, weapons depots, and buildings in the Tyre and Nabatieh governorates in southwestern Lebanon.[63] The IDF stated that Radwan special operations forces (SPF) in the Aziz and Badr units used several of these sites.[64]

The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah’s largest precision missile production facility in the Bekaa Valley on November 26.[65] Hezbollah manufactured surface-to-surface missiles and weapons components, and stored precision missiles at the underground facility in Janta near the Lebanon-Syria border. The IDF said that the facility was 1.4 km long.[66] The IDF said that Hezbollah used the facility to smuggle fighters and thousands of weapons components from Syria into Lebanon. The IDF said that Hezbollah built the facility with Iranian assistance and that IRGC operatives worked at the site alongside Hezbollah members. The IDF also conducted strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure near the production facility, including a training camp for Radwan Force fighters.[67] The IDF began expanding the range of its air campaign into northern and eastern Lebanon, which is where Hezbollah reportedly stores its long-range precision missiles, in late September 2024.[68] The IDF also conducted airstrikes on several Hezbollah weapons transportation routes along the Syria-Lebanon border.[69] The IDF stated that these strikes are part of its efforts to prevent Hezbollah from arming itself.[70]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah Air Unit 127, which is responsible for drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.[71] The IDF Air Force conducted a precision strike targeting Unit 127 Operations Officer Jaafar Ali Samaha in Beirut on November 26.[72] The IDF said that Samaha had held several senior positions in the unit for over a decade directing attacks against Israel and coordinating operations with other Hezbollah air units.[73] The IDF said that its Air Force has struck 200 Unit 127 targets since the start of IDF operations in Lebanon, including drone launch pads, weapons warehouses, command posts, and production workshops.[74] The IDF reported that these strikes eliminated 70 percent of Hezbollah’s drone inventory and destroyed at least 30 cruise missiles.[75]

Reported Israeli Operations in Lebanon


As of November 27, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



Hezbollah claimed at least 12 drone and rocket attacks into northern Israel before the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire began on November 26.^[76] Hezbollah fired rockets at Even Menachem approximately two hours before the ceasefire began.^[77] Hezbollah targeted an IDF base near Acre three times.^[78] Hezbollah continued targeting IDF positions near the Israel-Lebanon border.^[79] Hezbollah claimed that it launched several one-way attack drones at unspecified military targets in Tel Aviv.^[80] The IDF detected a drone that exploded near Afula, north of the West Bank.^[81]

Syrian media reported that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting at least four locations in Homs and Tartous governorates along the Syria-Lebanon border on November 26.^[82] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the airstrikes killed two Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers

and destroyed the al Arida Bridge in Tartous Governorate.[83] The airstrikes also damaged the al Dabousiya Bridge in Tartous Governorate and Qamar and al Jubaniya bridges in Homs Governorate.[84] The IDF has previously targeted Hezbollah supply routes along the Syria-Lebanon border as part of its interdiction campaign against Iranian arms shipments into Lebanon.[85]



Iran and the Axis of Resistance

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted a strike on November 26 targeting an Iranian-backed militia weapons storage facility in an unspecified location

in Syria.^[86] CENTCOM stated that it conducted the strike in response to an attack by an unspecified Iranian-backed militia on US forces in Syria on November 25.^[87] No Iranian-backed militia has claimed an attack targeting US forces at the time of this writing.

The Group of 7 (G7) called on the Houthis to resume nationwide peace negotiations in a “responsible and constructive manner” during a G7 summit in Italy on November 26.^[88] The G7 demanded that the Houthis immediately release UN, NGO, civil society, and diplomatic personnel detained in Yemen. The G7 condemned Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea and urged the Houthis to release the *MV Galaxy Leader* and its crew, which the Houthis seized in November 2023.

Iran is pursuing closer diplomatic and economic ties with North African countries. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi led an Iranian delegation to Algeria and Tunisia starting on November 24.^[89] The delegation met with Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Attaf and the chairmen of Algeria’s parliamentary foreign affairs committees, Mohamed Amroun and Mohamed Khawan.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with several foreign counterparts on the sidelines of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Forum in Cascais, Portugal on November 26 and 27.^[90] Araghchi met with his counterparts from Tunisia, Algeria, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Spain.^[91] Araghchi also discussed the October 7 War and emphasized the need for dialogue to resolve international issues during a meeting with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.^[92]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised the Artesh Navy during a meeting with senior Artesh Navy officials, including Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, on November 27.^[93] Khamenei called on the Artesh Navy to increase its combat readiness in order to deter Iran’s enemies from attacking Iran.^[94]

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami announced on November 27 that Iran has begun injecting gas into “thousands of advanced centrifuges” in response to the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors censure resolution against Iran.^[95] The IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran on November 21 for failing to fully comply with the IAEA.^[96] A hardline Iranian newspaper reported on November 23 that Iran would activate around 5,000 centrifuges, including IR-6, IR-4, and IR-2m centrifuges, by injecting uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into them.^[97] Activating these centrifuges will significantly increase Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.^[98]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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