

# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward,  
Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 30, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on January 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Note: ISW added a new section on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign to track Russian efforts to target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.**

**The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.** Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 30 that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is currently ongoing and that Russian forces aim to reach the Zherebets River (in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area) and the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[1] Budanov forecasted that Russian forces would fail to achieve these objectives, however, and would likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of the spring.[2] Budanov's statements are consistent with ISW's observation that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations along this axis since the beginning of January 2024.[3] Russian forces have recently made tactical gains southeast of Kupyansk along the critical P07 Kupyansk-Svatove route near Krokmalne and appear to be increasing assaults northwest and west of Krokmalne towards the Oskil River.[4] Russian forces will likely be able to secure additional tactical-level gains in the Kupyansk area but are unlikely to be able to translate these tactical gains into wider mechanized maneuvers needed for operationally significant advances that could capture more territory in Kharkiv Oblast and push to the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast administrative borders.[5] ISW has observed that elements of the Western Military District's 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army are active in the Kupyansk area and have been able to pursue infantry-led frontal assaults but have not shown the capacity to conduct large-scale mechanized maneuver since they were deployed to this axis over a year ago. ISW will soon publish a more detailed operational analysis of the situation on this Kharkiv-Luhansk axis.[6]

**Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.** Ukrainian Presidential Press

Secretary Serhii Nykyforov stated on January 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not dismiss Zaluzhnyi.[7]

**Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.** Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported on January 30 that Russian forces are using chemical weapons against Ukrainian positions in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[8] Shtupun noted that Russian forces conducted at least five strikes using likely K-51 grenades carrying chloropicrin on January 29 alone. Chloropicrin is primarily used as a soil fumigant that can be fatal when inhaled, and it is sometimes classified as a riot control agent (RCA) due to its harmful and irritant effects.[9] The CWC prohibits the use of RCAs in warfare.[10]

**Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).[11]** Dvornikov had been the commander of the Southern Military District and the first overall theater commander in Ukraine from April to May 2022, and Russian President Vladimir Putin had sidelined Dvornikov without officially firing him following Dvornikov's failure to capture Donbas by May 2022.[12] Dvornikov was reportedly serving as an advisor to the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Concern as of October 2023.[13] Dvornikov's newest appointment demonstrates Putin's preference for rotating his failed generals through positions that are peripheral to combat duty as opposed to outright dismissing them.[14] DOSAAF is a Soviet-era youth movement that promotes military skills and has likely supported Russian youth education aimed at Russifying youth in occupied Ukraine.[15] Russian sources claimed that Dvornikov will need to "resuscitate" the "long-suffering" DOSAAF organization, and Dvornikov's appointment may indicate increased Kremlin attention to military-patriotic youth education.[16]

**Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia's rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia's support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.** Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated on January 30 that Japanese sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine will continue but that Japan is interested in resolving its territorial issues with Russia and signing a peace treaty.[17] Japan never signed a formal peace treaty with the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to Kishida's statement and claimed that the disputed Kuril Islands are Russian and that the "territorial question" between Russia and Japan about the islands is "closed" according to Russia's constitution – referring to amendments to Russia's constitution in 2020 that banned territorial concessions.[18] Medvedev claimed that Russia will "actively" develop the Kuril Islands and that their "strategic role" will grow as Russia stations new weapons there.[19] Russia has been installing military infrastructure on the Kuril Islands since at least 2015.[20] Medvedev used highly offensive language to imply that Russia would not negotiate with Japan about the islands and to criticize Japan's relations with the United States.[21] Medvedev posted these comments on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account as opposed to his Russian-language Telegram channel, suggesting that his objective was specifically to offend Japan in the English-speaking world and posture aggressively towards the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. The Russian Pacific Fleet also conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea on January 29.[22] Medvedev's claims and the Pacific Fleet exercises are likely aimed at

demonstrating that Russia is a strong Pacific power that supports China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, as the Kremlin has routinely stressed in the past.[23]

**Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the United States with the Nazis.** Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated at an international ambassadorial roundtable on “solving the situation in Ukraine” on January 30 that “Napoleon, Hitler, and now the US” have found a new way to attack Russia.[24] Lavrov quoted Nazi *Reichskommissar* (literally “imperial commissar”--the Nazi occupation governor) for Ukraine Erich Koch stating that “Ukraine is for [the Third Reich] only an object of exploitation... and that the population must be used as a second-class people in solving military problems” and claimed that the West today is fighting the war against Russia through Ukraine “with only the goal outlined by *Reichskommissar* Koch.”[25] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently started framing the war as an existential geopolitical conflict against an alleged modern Nazi movement in the West, though Lavrov’s claim that the West is pursuing the same goals and methods as a specified Nazi official is the most explicit framing yet.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin may have decided that the narrative that Russia and other countries are fighting a geopolitical Western “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin’s attempt to appeal to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in territories formerly colonized by the Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the “Russian World” (*Russkiy Mir*) ideology.[27] The *Russkiy Mir* framework is purposefully based on amorphous ethnic identities that are not universally agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition. Lavrov’s intensification of portrayals of the United States and West as alleged Nazi actors at an international event is also noteworthy and may suggest that the Kremlin views the Nazi narrative as potentially more successful as a posturing tool with international audiences, particularly those that are not aligned with the United States and the West.

**Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system.** Russian media reported that several major Russian entities experienced outages on January 30, including but not limited to Russian telecommunications giants Yandex, Megafon, MTS, Rostelecom, and Beeline; banks VTB, Sberbank, Alfabank; consumer goods companies Avito, Wildberries, Ozon, and Lamoda; and the social media site VK.[28] The Russian Ministry of Digital Transformation reported that a technical issue with the global Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) caused the outage with .ru domains and that authorities have since restored service to users on Russia’s National Domain Name System.[29] Russian anti-censorship organization Net Freedoms Project and other opposition outlets noted that Russia has been trying to establish its “sovereign internet” system and connected the DNSSEC failure with attempts to transfer all Russian internet users to a Russian national domain name system (DNS) server separate from the global internet.[30] The Russian “sovereign internet” law, which came into force in November 2019, aims to create an independent Russian internet system protected from external actors and obliges Russian internet service providers to possess the technological means to counter these threats, and the Russian government will likely coopt this technology to increase surveillance and censorship in the Russian information space.[31]

**The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system.** Russian state newswire *TASS* reported that social media site Telegram experienced an outage on January 18; telecom operator Beeline experienced an outage on January 19; and YouTube experienced outages in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Rostov-on-Don on January 23.[32] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor tested blocking all major messaging platforms in the Russian Far East on January 23, and Russian opposition outlet *SOTA* reported that Roskomnadzor blocked internet access in the Republic of Sakha on January 24 to stymie unrest following an ethnically motivated murder.[33] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on January 8 that it blocked over 200,000 internet resources for allegedly promoting “fakes” and for “discrediting” the Russian military and that it prepared a bill allowing Roskomnadzor to rapidly block information that fails to comply with Russian censorship laws.[34] The Kremlin is also replacing blocked sites with its own analogs; Russian Wikipedia replacement “Ruviki” left beta testing as of January 15 and internet giant Yandex took an additional step to separate its Russian entity from its international entity on January 23.[35]

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.**
- **Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.**
- **Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Russia is signatory.**
- **Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).**
- **Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.**
- **Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the US with the Nazis.**
- **Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system.**
- **The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system.**
- **Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Horlivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 30.**
- **The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month**

and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”

- Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024.

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of***

***these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk direction on January 30 amid continued positional fighting. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the capture of Tabaivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after initially claiming its capture on January 29, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced further west of the settlement and are now trying to take Pishchane (east of Kupyansk).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks west of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) forced Ukrainian forces to abandon their positions in part of Synkivka and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka (both northeast of Kupyansk).[37] ISW has observed no visual confirmation of any of the Russian claims, however. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured several positions during counterattacks near Tabaivka.[38] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting east of Pishchane and in the direction of Berestove (southeast of Kupyansk).[39] Elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) reportedly continue operating in the Svatove direction southeast of Kupyansk.[40]

Positional fighting continued west and south of Kreminna on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued positional engagements west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Dibrova.[41] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment continue to operate in the Kreminna direction.[42]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Shalei Dauphinais  
© 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

|   |  |                                     |
|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours                 | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*            | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Russian Ground Lines of Communication                     | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory  | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |                                     |

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on January 29 that Russian forces advanced along a front one and a half kilometers wide and 750 meters deep near Synkiivka.

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 29 shows elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) capturing and clearing positions southwest of Bakhmut in the dacha area along the T0504 Bakhmut-Ivanivske road.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and have moved closer to the Siversky-Donets Donbas canal west of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, and Klishchiivka.[45] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet), 331st and 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut area.[46]




# Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northwest of Horlivka. Geolocated footage posted on January 29 shows Ukrainian troops assaulting and capturing several positions about three kilometers northwest of Horlivka.[47]


Positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on January 30 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka for the past several days.[48] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have captured positions near the water filtration plant and industrial zone in southeastern Avdiivka.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka near

Pervomaiske.[50] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian advances southeast or southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; in northwestern Avdiivka in the Coke Plant area; in southern Avdiivka near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant; in southeastern Avdiivka in the industrial zone; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Opytne.[51] Elements of the 9th and 110th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) and the South Ossetian “Storm Ossetia and Alania” volunteer battalion are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka area.[52]



Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled an unsuccessful Russian attack towards the Solodke-Kostyantynivka line (about 17km southwest of Donetsk City and directly southwest of Novomykhailivka) and that Russian forces lost two tanks, six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles, and one BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle.[53] Geolocated footage shows damaged and abandoned Russian armored vehicles north and south of Novomykhailivka following the attempted assault.[54] Several Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces attacked south and southwest of Novomykhailivka.[55] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[56]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Shaylei Dauphinais  
© 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▨ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

## Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva.[57] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the southern Donetsk direction (an area that covers Novomykhailivka to the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area).[58] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District); 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]); and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating south of Velyka Novosilka.[59]



Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Novopropkivka (south of Robotyne).[60] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[61]




# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on January 30.[62] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[63]

Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on January 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system radar station near occupied Rozdolne, northwestern Crimea.[64] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down 11 Ukrainian drones over Crimea on the night of January 29 to 30 but did not specify how many total drones Ukrainian forces launched.[65]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of January 30, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

## Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed-136/131 drones and two S-300 missiles at Ukraine on the night of January 29 to 30 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 of the drones over Mykolaiv, Sumy, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Kyiv



oblasts.[66] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces specifically aimed Shahed drones at frontline areas and infrastructure objects near the line of contact, particularly fuel and energy facilities.[67] Ihnat stated that it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to shoot down drones near the frontline and that the use of electronic warfare (EW) against Russian drones is a priority for Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely experimenting with new strike packages that are forcing Ukraine to deploy air defense systems to certain locations, forcing Ukraine to leave other areas of the theater more exposed to Russian drone and air strikes.[68] Ihnat previously acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have concentrated a considerable amount of air defense near Kyiv City to defend against regular Russian strikes and that it will be difficult for Ukrainian forces to disperse these systems throughout Ukraine as Russia's strike campaign continues.[69] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 30 that Russian forces have launched over 330 missiles and 600 drones at Ukraine since the beginning of 2024.[70]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”[71] Russia's sole tank manufacturer UralVagonZavod reportedly produced 20 tanks per month as of March 2023.[72] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed in March 2023 that Russia's DIB could produce 1,500 main battle tanks in 2023, which suggests an average production of 125 tanks per month.[73]

The Russian MoD claimed on January 30 that Russian DIB enterprise Novator fulfilled its state defense order for Kalibr cruise missiles and Iskander ballistic missiles in 2023. Novator General Director Farid Abdrakhmanov reported to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that Novator fulfilled the state defense order for Kalibrs and Iskanders in 2023 by switching to round-the-clock production and creating a three-shift schedule at all of its factories.[74] Abdrakhmanov stated that Novator has already fulfilled 17 percent of the state defense order for 2024.[75] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 15 that Russian forces have not included Kalibr cruise missiles in strike series against Ukraine since mid-September 2023 likely as part of efforts to build up a missile reserve and that Russia likely has difficulties producing Kalibr cruise missiles because they require many foreign components blocked under international sanctions.[76]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade announced on January 30 that it created a new Department for Unmanned Aerial Systems and Robotics to oversee state and civil defense orders for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production.[77] The new Department for Unmanned Aerial Systems and Robotics will also be responsible for developing and supporting the robotics industry, except for industrial robotics, which the Department of Machine Tools and Heavy Engineering will continue to oversee.[78]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are testing a new design of the BTR-22 armored personnel carrier (APC) that is faster and more durable than the BTR-82A APC.[79] The milblogger claimed that the BTR-22 has more protective hull armor and can reach a maximum speed of 100 kilometers per hour (about 62 miles per hour) on paved roads - a 20 kilometers per hour (about 12 miles per hour) increase over the BTR-82A's maximum speed.[80]

### **Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)**

Dutch Defense Minister Kasja Ollongren announced that the Netherlands is allocating 122 million euros (about \$132 million) for strengthening Ukrainian cyber defenses and providing Ukraine with ammunition and equipment.[81] Ollongren reported that the Netherlands is allocating 87 million euros (about \$94 million) to purchasing artillery shells for Ukraine, 25 million euros (about \$27 million) to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) to purchase equipment, and 10 million euros (about \$11 million) to improve Ukrainian cyber defenses.[82]

Two unnamed US officials told *Politico* in a January 30 article that the United States may deliver the first batch of an unspecified number of new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs to Ukraine as soon as January 31.[83] One unnamed US official stated that new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs have a maximum range of 90 miles (about 145 kilometers).[84]

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Council Deputy Alla Barkhatnova stated on January 30 that occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast are working to increase the number of children who go on "trips" to "health and recreation" camps in Russia in 2024.[85] Barkhatnova noted that several such programs took place in 2023 and that Ukrainian children underwent "social and psychological adaptation" in various camps, including in Litvonovo, Moscow Oblast, and in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.[86] Ukrainian Regional Center for Human Rights (RCHR) lawyer Kateryna Rashevskaya noted on January 30 that the RCHR has confirmed that Russia has opened 55 such children's camps within Russia, nine in occupied Crimea, and 13 in Belarus.[87] Rashevskaya observed that Ukrainian children are exposed to Russian military-patriotic programming at such camps and are always guarded by Russian military personnel.[88] ISW has long assessed that Russia is deporting Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacation camps or medical rehabilitation, amongst other schemes, and that Russian authorities use such camps to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian ideologies.[89]

### **Russian Information Operations and Narratives**

Russian milbloggers continued to seize on rumors of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's dismissal or resignation to further Russian information operations about domestic Ukrainian affairs and the West's alleged control over the Ukrainian government.[90]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued to promote narratives about Russia’s influence in Armenia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. An Armenian citizen reportedly damaged the Children of the Siege of Leningrad monument in Yerevan on January 29, and the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the perpetrators must be punished and that they expect Armenian authorities to conduct an investigation.[91] Kremlin newswire *TASS* later stated that the Armenian Investigative Committee opened a criminal case and is conducting a preliminary investigation.[92] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Armenian government directed the damage to the monument.[93] The Russian Embassy in Armenia and the milblogger claimed that Armenian society largely agrees with Russia’s position about the incident despite claims that the Armenian government orchestrated it.[94]

### **Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin conducted an official state visit to Cuba on January 29 and 30 likely in support of Russian sanctions evasion efforts. Khrenin met with Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Minister Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera on January 30 to discuss prospects for Belarusian-Cuban military and security cooperation and signed unspecified agreements on military cooperation.[95] Khrenin emphasized that Cuba is a “strategic ally in the Western hemisphere.”[96]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/30/na-pochatku-vesny-nastup-rosijskyh-vijsk-vycherpayetsya-kyrylo-budanov/>

[2] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/30/na-pochatku-vesny-nastup-rosijskyh-vijsk-vycherpayetsya-kyrylo-budanov/>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024>

- [5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010524>;  
<https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1750947530974605650>
- [6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024>
- [7] <https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-polytics/3819991-v-op-zaavlaut-so-prezident-ne-zvilnav-zaluznogo.html>
- [8] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/30/okupanty-zastosuvaly-5-granat-iz-otrujnym-hlorpikrynom-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-oleksandr-shtupun/>
- [9] <https://iwaste.epa.gov/guidance/chemical-biological/agent-info?agent=chloropicrin>;  
[https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ershdb/emergencyresponsecard\\_29750034.html](https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ershdb/emergencyresponsecard_29750034.html)
- [10] <https://www.opcw.org/our-work/what-chemical-weapon#:~:text=A%20riot%20control%20agent%20is,is%20prohibited%20by%20the%20CWC>.
- [11] <https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/01/30/73177094/>; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/111241](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111241) ; [https://t.me/Sladkov\\_plus/9661](https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/9661) ; <https://kubnews dot ru/obshchestvo/2024/01/30/v-moskve-vybrali-novogo-predsedatelya-dosaaf-rossii/>
- [12] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023>
- [13] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-23>
- [14] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023>
- [15] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2023>
- [16] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/111241](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111241) ; [https://t.me/Sladkov\\_plus/9661](https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/9661) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56550>
- [17] <https://www.asahi dot com/articles/ASS1Z6FSPS1ZUHBI032.html>  
; <https://www.newsweek.com/ex-russian-president-suggests-japanese-officials-commit-suicide-1865342> ; <https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/01/30/russian-ex-president-medvedev-slams-japan-over-kuril-islands-claim-a83904> ; <https://www.japantimes dot co.jp/news/2024/01/30/japan/politics/kishida-policy-speech/>
- [18] <https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1752269272376590801> ; <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-revised-constitution-shows-putin-no-friend-japan>
- [19] <https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1752269272376590801>
- [20] <https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/russias-militarization-kuril-islands>

[21] <https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1752269272376590801>

[22] <https://ria dot ru/20240129/tof-1924049356.html> ; <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-navy-south-china-sea-1865210>

[23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2023>

[24] [https://t.me/MID\\_Russia/34531](https://t.me/MID_Russia/34531) ; [https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1928541/](https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1928541/)

[25] [https://t.me/MID\\_Russia/34531](https://t.me/MID_Russia/34531) ; [https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1928541/](https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1928541/)

[26] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724>

[27] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724>

[28] <https://meduza dot io/news/2024/01/30/polzovateli-v-rossii-pozhalovalis-na-sboi-v-rabote-interneta-profilnyy-telegram-kanal-pishet-o-masshtabnoy-polomke-v-domennoy-zone-ru> ; [https://t.me/d\\_code/18386](https://t.me/d_code/18386) ; <https://t.me/NetFreedomsProject/975> ; <https://t.me/fontankaspb/51442>; <https://t.me/severrealii/22667> ; <https://t.me/sotaproject/73262> ; <https://t.me/sotaproject/73263>; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229088](https://t.me/tass_agency/229088); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229083](https://t.me/tass_agency/229083); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229103](https://t.me/tass_agency/229103) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61256>; <https://t.me/severrealii/22667>; <https://www.severreal dot org/a/v-rossii-perestal-rabotat-domen-ru/32798417.html>

[29] [https://t.me/istories\\_media/4909](https://t.me/istories_media/4909); [https://t.me/istories\\_media/4909](https://t.me/istories_media/4909); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229093](https://t.me/tass_agency/229093); <https://t.me/mintsifry/2115>; <https://t.me/mintsifry/2114>

[30] <https://t.me/NetFreedomsProject/975>; <https://meduza dot io/en/news/2024/01/30/russian-internet-users-report-service-disruptions-amid-massive-outage-in-russia-specific-domain>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2024/01/30/polzovateli-v-rossii-pozhalovalis-na-sboi-v-rabote-interneta-profilnyy-telegram-kanal-pishet-o-masshtabnoy-polomke-v-domennoy-zone-ru> ; [https://t.me/d\\_code/18386](https://t.me/d_code/18386) ; <https://t.me/NetFreedomsProject/975> ; <https://t.me/fontankaspb/51442>; <https://t.me/severrealii/22667> ; <https://t.me/sotaproject/73262> ; <https://t.me/sotaproject/73263>;

[31] [https://www.vedomosti dot ru/imports substitution/state\\_regulation/articles/2023/04/25/972408-cuverennaya-set](https://www.vedomosti dot ru/imports substitution/state_regulation/articles/2023/04/25/972408-cuverennaya-set)

[32] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/227717](https://t.me/tass_agency/227717); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/227049](https://t.me/tass_agency/227049); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/226986](https://t.me/tass_agency/226986); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/226882](https://t.me/tass_agency/226882)

[33] <https://t.me/sotaproject/72969>; <https://t.me/sotaproject/72840>; <https://t.me/sotaproject/72873>

[34] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19686503> ; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/225550](https://t.me/tass_agency/225550) ; <https://t.me/severrealii/22214> ; <https://www.severreal.org/a/genprokuratura-otchitalas-o-200-tysyachah-blokirovok-za-feyki-i-diskreditatsiyu-/32765250.html> ; <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19686345>; <https://t.me/sotaproject/71995>; <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17124>;

[35] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/226473](https://t.me/tass_agency/226473); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/227582](https://t.me/tass_agency/227582); <https://www.interfax dot ru/business/941445>; <https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/01/23/tech-giant-yandex-gets-new-russian-owner-ahead-of-restructuring-a83817>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2024/01/23/kontrol-nad-yandeksom-peredan-rossiyskomu-yuridicheskemu-litsu>; <https://t.me/bbcrossian/59576> ; <https://t.me/radiosvoboda/54633>

[36] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35142](https://t.me/mod_russia/35142); [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/33608](https://t.me/dva_majors/33608) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56530>; <https://t.me/rybar/56523>

[37] [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279); [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1273](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1273);  
<https://twitter.com/militarysummary/status/1751335161642336289?s=46>

[38] <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>

[39] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGM epp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil> ; <https://t.me/rybar/56523>;  
[https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279)

[40] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61257>

[41] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGM epp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil>;  
[https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35147](https://t.me/mod_russia/35147) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35153](https://t.me/mod_russia/35153);  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efn34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl>

[42] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/111200](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111200)

[43] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61192>; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/4210](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4210)

[44] [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279)

[45] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efn34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGM epp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/30/vorog-ne-maye- uspihu-na-kupyanskomu-ta-bahmutskomu-napryamkah-volodymyr- fito/>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>; [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279); <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnik a/6863>

[46] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6863> (Bakhmut); [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35157](https://t.me/mod_russia/35157) (Klishchiivka); <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1752337187935334703>; <https://t.me/vdd98/2380>; <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1752337363278151808>; [https://t.me/anna\\_news/61778](https://t.me/anna_news/61778); <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1752100248208482719> (Bohdanivka); <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1752100420409823743>

[47] <https://t.me/osirskiy/561>; <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=342325211965118>; [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/10283](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/10283); <https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1752174862183932097>; <https://twitter.com/spatialgrounds/status/1752337513111249191>

[48] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/33608](https://t.me/dva_majors/33608) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56530>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>; [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279); <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53631>

[49] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/33608](https://t.me/dva_majors/33608) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56530>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6869>

[50] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53631>

[51] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efmt34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoQTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGMepp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/33608](https://t.me/dva_majors/33608) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56530>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>; [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1275](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1275); [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279); <https://t.me/batalyon15/3687>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6869>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53631>

[52] <https://t.me/batalyon15/3687>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61203>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61244>

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efmt34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl>

[54] <https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752334884511601064>; <https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752334887997051065>; <https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752359034563301480>; <https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752359314667319411>;

[55] <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>; [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1279](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1279)

[56] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efmt34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoQTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGMepp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil>; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/111221](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111221)

[57] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido201xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJVI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoQTWXDkAKbPihiqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGMepp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil>

[58] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35144](https://t.me/mod_russia/35144)

[59] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/6801](https://t.me/voin_dv/6801) (Vremivka area); <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61206> (Pryyutne); [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/6799](https://t.me/voin_dv/6799) (Pryyutne)

[60] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJV1>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QTWXdkAKbPihqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGMapp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/17877>

[61] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61198>

[62] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xcVMuUsTvpVo8gbchPEu98SUN9Pa8Efmt34sC4owH8BbP6HQNySfnJg8cE5KgPYjl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1xM8gjxxRqmgGXa81Cr5XGskzecerMLhaCpaXZDCu5ygKKGFK6rGbzQtVCaGQFJV1>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QTWXdkAKbPihqAzo26q7ohg3h6hGYGMapp8UVhBHXC8Ddia46hfBAvdzkGVeDTil> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/33608](https://t.me/dva_majors/33608) ; <https://t.me/rybar/56530>

[63] <https://t.me/milinfolive/115290>

[64] <https://t.me/AFUStratCom/22352>

[65] <https://t.me/rybar/56535> ; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/228952](https://t.me/tass_agency/228952) ; <https://t.me/bbcussian/59880>

[66] <https://t.me/kpszsu/10189>

[67] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/01/30/yurij-ignat-poyasnyv-chomu-cziyeyi-nochi-ne-vdalosya-znyshhyty-usi-shahedy/>

[68] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2024>

[69] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024>

[70] <https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1752282513676918813>

[71] <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1751898118436655191>

[72] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2023>

[73] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2023>

[74] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35148](https://t.me/mod_russia/35148)



- [75] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/35148](https://t.me/mod_russia/35148)
- [76] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524>
- [77] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229090](https://t.me/tass_agency/229090)
- [78] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229090](https://t.me/tass_agency/229090)
- [79] <https://t.me/milinfoolive/115275>
- [80] <https://t.me/milinfoolive/115275>
- [81] <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/01/29/nederland-trekt-%E2%82%AC-122-miljoen-uit-voor-munitie-materieel-en-cybersecurity-in-oekraïne> ; <https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/niderlandy-vydilyayut-122-mln-yevro-na-snaryady-ozbroyennya-ta-kiberbezpeku-dlya-ukrayiny/> ; <https://www.ukrinform.com.ua/rubric-ato/3820021-niderlandi-vidilaut-ukraini-122-miljoni-na-boepripasi-ozbroenna-ta-kiberbezpeku.html>
- [82] <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/01/29/nederland-trekt-%E2%82%AC-122-miljoen-uit-voor-munitie-materieel-en-cybersecurity-in-oekraïne> ; <https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/niderlandy-vydilyayut-122-mln-yevro-na-snaryady-ozbroyennya-ta-kiberbezpeku-dlya-ukrayiny/> ; <https://www.ukrinform.com.ua/rubric-ato/3820021-niderlandi-vidilaut-ukraini-122-miljoni-na-boepripasi-ozbroenna-ta-kiberbezpeku.html>
- [83] <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30/new-us-made-longer-range-bomb-expected-to-arrive-as-soon-wednesday-in-ukraine-00138566>
- [84] <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30/new-us-made-longer-range-bomb-expected-to-arrive-as-soon-wednesday-in-ukraine-00138566>
- [85] [https://t.me/socialpolitics\\_ks/3375](https://t.me/socialpolitics_ks/3375); [https://t.me/VGA\\_Kherson/17828](https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/17828)
- [86] [https://t.me/socialpolitics\\_ks/3375](https://t.me/socialpolitics_ks/3375); [https://t.me/VGA\\_Kherson/17828](https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/17828)
- [87] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2024/01/30/tabory-karczery-zalyakuvannya-i-poboyi-yak-rosiyany-denacyfikuyut-ukrayinskyh-ditej/>
- [88] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2024/01/30/tabory-karczery-zalyakuvannya-i-poboyi-yak-rosiyany-denacyfikuyut-ukrayinskyh-ditej/>
- [89] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011323>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012723>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040123>
- [90] [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/1278](https://t.me/multi_XAM/1278) ; <https://t.me/sashakots/44740> ; <https://t.me/sashakots/44744> ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/18951> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/14411> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/14415> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/14417> ; [https://t.me/negumanitarnaya\\_pomosch\\_Z/14416](https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14416) ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/111216](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111216); <https://t.me/vrogov/14054> ; [https://t.me/SALDO\\_VGA/2005](https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2005) ; [https://t.me/miroshnik\\_r/14133](https://t.me/miroshnik_r/14133) ;

[91] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229028](https://t.me/tass_agency/229028) ; <https://t.me/rusembassyarm/2291>

[92] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/229073](https://t.me/tass_agency/229073)

[93] <https://t.me/rybar/56551>

[94] <https://t.me/rybar/56551> ; <https://t.me/rusembassyarm/2291>

[95] <https://t.me/modmilby/35680> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/35686>; <https://t.me/modmilby/35680>  
; <https://t.me/modmilby/35686>

[96] <https://t.me/modmilby/35662>