

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2023

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July 3, 2023, 8pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front and made marginal advances on July 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted counteroffensive operations in the Lyman direction.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[2] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces recaptured nine square kilometers of territory in eastern Ukraine, and geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Bakhmut.[3] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces also recaptured 28.4 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in the past week for a total of 158.4 square kilometers in southern Ukraine during an unspecified time period.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited gains south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5]

Russian milbloggers have seized on recent Ukrainian activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to call for an increased presence of small river vessels and equipment in the Dnipro River to prevent further Ukrainian advances. Russian milbloggers appealed on July 2 to the heads of the Dagestan and Tatarstan republics, Astrakhan Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, and Primorsky Krai to send boats confiscated from poachers to the Kherson Oblast frontline, specifying that 10 regiments and brigades of the Southern Military District's "Dnepr" (the Russian word for Dnipro) Grouping of Forces sorely need the vessels.[6] ISW previously reported on July 2 that milbloggers are accusing the Russian MoD of failing to provide Russian forces on the east bank with requisite boats and other equipment, and it appears that milbloggers outsourced their requests for additional logistical support to Russian regional heads.[7] Dagestan Republic Head Sergey Melikov responded to the milblogger appeal on July 3 and ordered Dagestan to solve the issue of transferring confiscated poaching boats to Russian forces.[8] One Russian milblogger called for the resurrection of the "Dnepr" flotilla," a special military river unit that was active in the 1735-1739 and 1787-1792 Russo-Turkish wars, the Russian Civil War, and World War II.[9] The milblogger claimed that a resurrected "Dnepr" flotilla could significantly ameliorate the position of Russian troops in the Kherson direction and that this grouping could be reinforced with simple, civilian-use boats.[10] Several other milbloggers, including former Russian officer Igor Girkin, claimed that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast need small boats and equipment in order to keep Ukrainian troops

as far back from the Dnipro delta as possible.[11] The overall anxious milblogger response to recent Ukrainian activity across the Dnipro River suggests that many Russian milbloggers fear Ukraine's ability to cross the river and believe that the current command of the "Dnepr" grouping has not sufficiently prepared its troops for that potentiality.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev published an essay that reamplified inflammatory Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and the West, likely to undermine support for Ukraine at the upcoming NATO summit.[12] Medvedev's July 3 essay paints his usual alarmist rhetoric in new colors; he again portrayed the war in Ukraine as part of a broader existential conflict against the West, restated many of Putin's extreme pre-war demands that transcended Ukraine, and implied that Russia is prepared to engage in this broader conflict for "decades" if these demands are not met.[13] Medvedev claimed that "armageddon" is "probable" if the West does not agree to negotiate a new world order with Russia, absurdly claiming that the nuclear "taboo" is broken (presumably by the US use of atomic weapons in 1945--it is otherwise entirely unclear to what he might be referring) to falsely imply that nuclear war is a certainty.[14] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia as connected to partners outside of the West despite Western sanctions, and that states not aligned with the West actively stand against it. Medvedev's essay is consistent with his and other senior Kremlin officials' prior attempts to scare Western states, organizations, and media prior to significant international discussions about military, political, and economic support for Ukraine and its effort to liberate Russian-held territories.[15] Medvedev's essay is a restatement of existing Russian narratives and does not represent a true inflection in Russian political, military, or nuclear rhetoric.[16]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about the current state of the war in Ukraine and the Wagner Group rebellion on July 3.[17] Shoigu notably did not directly name the Wagner Group or its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin while discussing the "provocation," opting instead to denounce the rebellion and credit the loyalty of the Russian military as the reason for the rebellion's failure. Shoigu also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost 2,500 pieces of military equipment since June 4, likely intending to undermine Western support for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu's speech did not present any new rhetorical arguments and is likely continued projection of claimed internal stability following the rebellion and portraying the Russian military as capable of defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russian forces continued drone and missile strikes against rear areas in Ukraine overnight and during the day on July 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 17 Shahed drones at unspecified areas of Ukraine overnight on July 2-3, and Ukrainian forces shot down 13 of the drones.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its evening situational report that Russian forces targeted civilian infrastructure with three S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and 20 Shahed drones in Sumy, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia Oblast during the day on July 3, and Ukrainian forces shot down 16 of the UAVs.[19] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that Shahed drones struck a residential building in Sumy City, killing two and injuring 19 civilians.[20]

The Kremlin continues to use tools of digital authoritarianism to surveil Russia's domestic population and aim to expand domestic production of surveillance technology. The *New York Times* (NYT) reported on June 3 that the Kremlin has given Russian law enforcement, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), more tools to monitor the location of phones, break into personal

accounts, and track activity in encrypted applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Signal.[21] According to Russian internal records that *NYT* reportedly obtained, the Russian government reportedly aims to expand its surveillance technology tools by supporting the transition of Russian technology firms into producing advanced tools for Russian intelligence services. Russian technology firms may be experiencing a shortage of skilled employees given the number of skilled workers that left Russia after the start of the war in February 2022.[22] ISW has previously reported on the Kremlin's use of automated technology to censor the Russian information space and trading of surveillance tools in exchange for weapons to use in Ukraine.[23]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front made marginal advances on July 3.**
- **Russian milbloggers have seized on recent Ukrainian activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to call for an increased presence of small river vessels and equipment in the Dnipro River to prevent further Ukrainian advances.**
- **Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev published an essay that reamplified inflammatory Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and the West, likely to undermine support for Ukraine at the upcoming NATO summit**
- **Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about the current state of the war in Ukraine and the Wagner Group rebellion on July 3.**
- **Russian forces continued drone and missile strikes against rear areas in Ukraine overnight and during the day on July 3.**
- **The Kremlin continues to use tools of digital authoritarian to surveil Russia's domestic population and aim to expand domestic production of surveillance technology.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.**
- **Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.**
- **Ukrainian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **Official Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces repel all Ukrainian assaults on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge.**
- **The Wagner Group is reportedly suspending regional recruitment on a temporary basis.**
- **Russian officials continue efforts to portray Russia as a safe custodian of Ukrainian children while inadvertently confirming that Russia is facilitating mass deportations of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on July 3. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Torske (14km west of Kreminna), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Zolotarivka (16km south of Kreminna).[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and in the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) on July 2 and 3.[26] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov confirmed on July 2 that Chechen Akhmat special forces continue to operate in the Kreminna area. Russian milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian 228th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, Central Military District) are operating near Kreminna and that the 85th Brigade of the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Army Corps is operating near Bilohorivka (12km southwest of Kreminna).[27]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200 meters in the Klischiivka direction and 1,500 meters in the Kurdyumivka direction as of June 29. The Commander of the Ukrainian 57th Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky and a Russian source stated on June 29 that there is heavy fighting near Klischiivka and Berkhivka. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations west of Bakhmut itself, and northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Minkivka (13km northwest), and Bohdanivka (5km northwest).[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 3 that Ukrainian troops continue to advance in unspecified parts of the Bakhmut direction.[29] Russian milbloggers continued to discuss Ukrainian counteroffensive operations southwest of Bakhmut, particularly between Kurdiuvivka (13km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[30] Geolocated combat footage posted on July 2 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced towards the treeline west of Klishchiivka.[31] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Klishchiivka, Kurdiuvivka, and Ozarianivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] Several Russian sources claimed that elements of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd LNR Army Corps repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka.[33]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces repelled 14 Russian ground attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[34] Geolocated footage posted on July 3 shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance southeast of Pervomaiske (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks southwest of Avdiivka and within Marinka.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- + Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200 meters in the Klishchiivka direction, 1,500 meters in the Kurdyumivka direction, and 1,300 meters in the Berdyansk direction as of June 29. The Commander of the Ukrainian 57th Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky and a Russian source stated on June 29 that there is heavy fighting near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200 meters in the Klishchiivka direction and 1,500 meters in the Kurdyumivka direction as of June 29. The Commander of the Ukrainian 57th Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky and a Russian source stated on June 29 that there is heavy fighting near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack in the Vuhledar area in western Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack north of Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar).[37]

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on July 3. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct successful offensive operations in the Novosilka direction (immediately west of Velyka Novosilka) and the Staromaiorske direction (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and conducted offensive operations in the Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) directions.[38] Malyar also reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated an additional 28.4 square kilometers in southern Ukraine, for a total of 154.4 liberated square kilometers in an unspecified time frame (presumably since the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in early June). The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Makarivka (7km south of Velyka Novosilka), Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), Pryyutne, and Staromaiorske. [39]


Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 2. Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) directions.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified number of Russian positions near Luhivske (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and advanced toward Robotyne.[41] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces attacking with a grouping of up to two assault platoons near Robotyne.[42] Russian sources did not report ground attacks near Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) but claimed that Russian and Ukrainian artillery is active near the settlement.[43] Footage published on July 3 purportedly shows units of the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[44] Russian sources claimed on July 2 that elements of the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment of Territorial Troops (TRV) are operating near Robotyne and that elements of the 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (GRU) are operating in the Orikhiv direction.[45]

Russian forces are accumulating military equipment in the rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery published on July 2 shows new helicopters and vehicles at the Berdyansk airport.[46] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on July 3 that Russian military helicopters are accumulating in Berdyansk and Kyrylivka[47] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 2 and 3 that Russian forces are transporting military equipment in the Berdyansk direction.[48]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that an unspecified actor, likely Ukraine, reconnected the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) only available back-up power line on July 1.[49] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi stated that the ZNPP's power situation remains "extremely fragile" and is not sustainable due to the combat activities.[50] The IAEA reported that Russian shelling disconnected the power line on March 1, causing the ZNPP to rely on a single main power line for external electricity needed for reactor cooling and other safety functions.

Official Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces repel all Ukrainian assaults on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed on July 3 that Russian forces repel all of the Ukrainian forces that attempt to cross the Dnipro River.[51] The Russian MoD claimed that it takes only two minutes for Russian observation posts on the east bank of the Dnipro River to observe Ukrainian forces operating near Russian positions and order Russian forces to strike them.[52] Another Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Antonivsky Bridge.[53]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




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-  Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
-  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
-  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
-  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
-  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
-  Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
-  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
-  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Russian milblogger WarGonzo claimed on July 1 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers deep and 6 kilometers wide in the Robotyne direction in the last 24 hours. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of July 3, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Wagner Group is reportedly suspending regional recruitment on a temporary basis. Several Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels that focus on dissemination of recruitment information

reported that due to Wagner’s “temporary non-participation” in the war in Ukraine and its relocation to Belarus, Wagner is “temporarily suspending the work of regional recruitment centers” for a one-month period.[54] Wagner may have paused domestic recruitment as it attempts to grapple with formalization processes under the Russian MoD and move some of its training capacity to Belarus. A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the announcement and called for Russian authorities to call a new wave of mobilization to compensate losses in Russian force generation capacity as a result of suspended Wagner recruitment.[55] State Duma Defense Committee head Andrey Kartapolov previously told Kremlin newswire *TASS*, however, that there is no need for a new wave of mobilization despite Wagner’s withdrawal from the combat zone.[56]

An investigation by Russian opposition outlet *Protokol* confirmed the details of a reported deal between Russia and Iran pertaining to a drone manufacturing factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. *Protokol* cited an unnamed internal source who claimed that the Russo-Iranian contract is valued at between 115 to 130 billion rubles (about \$1.3-1.5 million) and that Iran supplies all components for the production of Shahed drones, which are assembled at the Alabuga SEZ.[57] *Protokol* also found that the contract includes a stipulation for the training of specialists from the Alabuga SEZ in Iran and that the first of these training trips took place in March 2023.[58] The *Protokol* investigation noted that the contract provides that the number of components imported from Iran should gradually decrease as the Alabuga SEZ is able to increase independent production of individual components.[59] The White House previously reported on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone plant in Alabuga, and ISW assessed on July 1 that Iran may be sending material and personnel to the Republic of Tatarstan for the manufacture of combat drones for use in Ukraine.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue efforts to portray Russia as a safe custodian of Ukrainian children while inadvertently confirming that Russia is facilitating mass deportations of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin claimed on July 2 that over 700,000 Ukrainian children have fled Ukraine for Russia during an unspecified timespan allegedly in recent years.[61] It is unclear whether Karasin’s claimed timespan includes only 2022-2023 or 2014-2023. However, Karasin’s statement confirms ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia is using the guise of humanitarian necessity to justify the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Russian sources continued to speculate about the construction of Wagner field camps in Belarus. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger posted images on July 3 reportedly of the construction of a Wagner base near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast, and claimed that some Wagner units have already begun training with tanks, heavy equipment, and artillery.[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/28042

[2] <https://t.me/annamaliar/899>

[3] https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1675490280072413184?s=20;
<https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1675551821136384002?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1675507786178875393?s=20>; <https://t.me/annamaliar/899>

[4] <https://t.me/annamaliar/899>

[5] <https://t.me/wargonzo/13625>

[6] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48561>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13622>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar070223>

[8] <https://ria dot ru/20230703/lodki-1881923032.html>; <https://t.me/rybar/49273>; <https://t.me/sashakots/40742>

[9] <https://t.me/sashakots/40747>

[10] <https://t.me/sashakots/40747>

[11] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5866>; <https://t.me/rusfleet/8978>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5865>

[12] https://rg dot ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiiia.html?fbclid=IwARoVs7twSB1aTq5R64IkVx3cySkvQPDwbKcmZDwNDFDDK1YhCsKd_AILsQo

[13] <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/world/europe/russia-nato-security-deal.html> ; https://rg dot ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiiia.html?fbclid=IwARoVs7twSB1aTq5R64IkVx3cySkvQPDwbKcmZDwNDFDDK1YhCsKd_AILsQo

[14] https://rg dot ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiiia.html?fbclid=IwARoVs7twSB1aTq5R64IkVx3cySkvQPDwbKcmZDwNDFDDK1YhCsKd_AILsQo

[15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive->

campaign-assessment-february-9-2023; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2023>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20>

[16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20>

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/28034; <https://telegra.ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-tematicheskome-selektornom-soveshchanii-07-03>;
<https://t.me/severrealii/18174>

[18] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w86UXfwkv448VdfPxFXuaoFiYPUzCeFMAhJpTN9rkGh3yaQWPQxs6AnFC6v43g6Dl>

[19] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidohu1Bk7wqdzk6pZ5TDxiNrFejGv3vraX7AbzkhZHGQCeJ8xxeQzBbGNQJ3k77eqDPl>

[20] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/17511; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/17515

[21] <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/03/technology/russia-ukraine-surveillance-tech.html>

[22] <https://www.npr.org/2023/05/31/1176769042/russia-economy-brain-drain-oil-prices-flee-ukraine-invasion>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/13/technology/russia-tech-workers.html>

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