



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 13, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with the United States and Japan on June 13 as other partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and Ramstein formats. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 13 that he signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the ongoing G7 Summit.[1] The US-Ukraine agreement provides for long-term cooperation in defense and security, economic recovery and reform, and the advancement of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.[2] The Japan-Ukraine agreement provides for Japan's \$4.5 billion contribution to Ukraine in 2024 and continued ten-year long support in security and defense, humanitarian aid, technical and financial cooperation, reconstruction efforts, and sanction measures against Russia.[3] Zelensky lauded both agreements as historic breakthroughs for Ukraine's bilateral relations with both the United States and Japan.[4] The United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister's Office reported on June 12 that UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will announce up to £242 million (about \$208 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine's humanitarian, energy, and economic and social recovery needs while at the G7 Summit.[5] French outlet *France24* reported that G7 leaders are also finalizing details on the transfer of up to \$50 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine by the end of 2024.[6] G7 countries collectively possess \$235 billion in frozen Russian assets, and G7 leaders are reportedly brokering a deal that would rely on a US-led \$50 billion loan that would reach Ukraine by the end of 2024 and be "topped up" with contributions by other allies.[7] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also announced during a Ukraine Defense Contract Group at the Ramstein Airbase in Germany on June 12 that NATO partners will agree on a comprehensive military and financial aid package for Ukraine during the upcoming NATO summit in July 2024 and emphasized that NATO will lead efforts to provide security assistance and training for Ukraine.[8] Stoltenberg also stated that the supply of weapons to Ukraine may become mandatory for NATO members in order to ensure that NATO's security assistance for Ukraine remains "reliable and large-scale." [9]

The United States finally sanctioned the Moscow Exchange, other significant Russian financial institutions, and Russian defense manufacturers 839 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The US Department of the Treasury announced on June 12 sanctions against more than 300 individuals and entities supporting Russia's wartime economy, including the Moscow Exchange and its subsidiaries; major banks VTB Bank, Sberbank, and Tochka Bank; and leading Russian defense industrial base (DIB) entities including state owned defense conglomerate Rostec, the state owned aerospace and defense company United Aircraft Corporation, vehicle and vehicle components manufacturer Kamaz, main Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod, and helicopter design and manufacturing company Russian Helicopters.[10] The UK also announced similar sanctions targeting Russian financial institutions, entities supporting the Russian DIB, and Russia's shadow fleet of oil tankers.[11]

The Russian government appears confident that these new sanctions will minimally impact the Russian financial system, and the delay in US and other Western countries sanctioning these entities has given the Russian financial system time to prepare and mitigate such sanctions. The Moscow Exchange immediately suspended trading in US dollars (USD), euros, and Hong Kong dollars (HKD) in several markets on June 12 following the US sanctions announcement, and the Russian Central Bank instituted a fixed exchange rate for over-the-counter trading using the USD and euro on June 13.[12] Western and some Russian media widely circulated reports of some Russian banks appearing to sell USD to Russians at 100-200 rubles per dollar on June 12 and 13, but prominent Russian banks Sberbank and VTB quickly announced on June 12 that the new US sanctions would not impact their operations.[13] The Russian Central Bank has prepared for these sanctions and developed a procedure in October 2022 for setting currency exchange rates when it cannot obtain such data from the Moscow Exchange (data the Moscow Exchange can presumably no longer provide for USD).[14] The Russian Central Bank began publishing information on over-the-counter foreign exchange trade in April 2024.[15] The Russian Central Bank set its rubles per USD exchange rate for June 14 to 88.2080, only 88 kopecks lower than the previous rate, and the ruble-to-euro exchange rate only decreased by 91 kopecks to 94.8342 rubles per euro.[16] *Bloomberg* reported that multiple Russian metals producers and a fertilizer maker are not worried about the end of USD-ruble exchange trading and that Russian state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom has not used the Moscow Exchange for settlements "in a long time." [17] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev complained about the new US sanctions, claiming that Russia is stable enough that it does not need to react to these sanctions out of economic need but that Russia should inflict "maximum harm" on the West in reaction to these sanctions because the United States and its allies "declared war on us [Russia] without rules." [18] Medvedev's choice to publish this only on his Russian language Telegram account indicates he likely means to posture strength and stability to a domestic Russian audience rather than address international audiences.

Bloomberg assessed on June 13 that the new US sanctions would make it more difficult for Russian businesses to trade on the international market due to the increased costs of over-the-counter trading and reduced foreign willingness to do business with Russian entities due to the fear of secondary sanctions.[19] A source close to the Russian Central Bank told *Bloomberg* that Chinese banks will gradually reduce their cooperation with the Moscow Exchange given these issues but that these banks will still provide yuan liquidity to support imports. The source also stated that there is uncertainty whether the Russian Central Bank's new exchange rates will work and how much costs of foreign trading and business will rise.

US President Joe Biden reiterated his opposition to allowing Ukrainian forces to strike military targets in Russia's operational or deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons. Biden acknowledged that it "makes a lot of sense" to allow Ukrainian forces to strike Russian forces on the immediate side of the international border in Russian territory but that the United States has not changed its restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from striking Russia's operational or deep rear in Russian territory.[20] ISW assesses that the Biden Administration's limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia's ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum.[21] ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia's operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[22]

Sustained Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea appear to be forcing the Russian military to commit additional air defense assets to Crimea in order to defend existing bases and logistics infrastructure, and further Ukrainian strikes against such air defense assets may render the peninsula untenable as a staging ground for the Russian military. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 12 that Russian forces placed an S-500 air defense system (essentially a modernized version of the S-300) in Crimea as part of their efforts to strengthen Russia's air defense umbrella over Crimea.[23] Budanov stated that Russian forces have not previously used an S-500 air defense system in combat and characterized the system as "experimental." *Forbes* reported on June 12 that the Belbek Airfield in occupied Crimea is becoming an "attrition trap" for Russian air defenses following several successful Ukrainian strikes on air defenses near the airfield.[24] *Forbes* stated that it is possible that Ukrainian forces have destroyed elements of four or five S-400 batteries during recent strikes but noted that the Russian military has over 50 S-400 batteries. An X (formerly known as Twitter) user, citing satellite imagery, noted on June 11 that Russian forces have placed 17 barges near the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects occupied Crimea to Krasnodar Krai.[25] Russian forces likely intend for the barges to serve as defenses against Ukrainian naval drone strikes against the bridge, and Russian forces previously installed eight barges on the southern side of the bridge for similar reasons.[26] Ukraine's current efforts to attrit the Russian air defense umbrella in Crimea notably may have the exploitable effect of drawing more Russian air defense assets to Crimea, making them vulnerable to further Ukrainian strikes. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may be conducting an organized effort to degrade Russian air defenses, which could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower (namely using F-16 fighter jets) in the long term.[27] The West has long supported Ukraine's right to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea, and Ukrainian forces could in principle be able to replicate their successful strikes against military targets in Russia if the West approved such strikes in Russia's rear.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is reportedly using diplomatic channels to convince other countries to not support the upcoming June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. *Reuters* reported on June 13 that 10 Beijing-based diplomats from unspecified countries stated that the PRC is using meetings with visiting foreign officials, phone calls, and messages on the WeChat platform to lobby other countries to support the PRC's and Brazil's suggested six-point peace plan, which called for a peace conference that includes both Ukraine and Russia.[28] *Reuters* reported that diplomatic sources stated that the PRC has not overtly criticized the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland when speaking with developing states and is instead trying to

subtly bring about certain outcomes. One diplomatic source stated that the PRC has told developing states that the Swiss peace summit will prolong the war in Ukraine, and two diplomatic sources reportedly stated that the PRC has also been telling unspecified Western states that many developing states agree with the PRC's views about the Swiss peace summit. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly asked PRC President Xi Jinping in May 2024 to "snub" the peace conference in Switzerland.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 2 that Russia is using Chinese influence and diplomats to disrupt the Global Peace Summit.[30] The Kremlin is likely trying to exploit the PRC's greater diplomatic connections and influence in the world to forward Russian interests.


The United States, United Kingdom (UK), and Canada released a joint statement on July 13 acknowledging and condemning Russian subversive activity and electoral interference efforts in Moldova, which is consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment of the Kremlin's ongoing hybrid campaign to destabilize Moldovan democracy.[31] The statement noted that the United States, UK, and Canada share Moldovan President Maia Sandu's concerns that the Kremlin is seeking to undermine Moldovan democratic institutions and practices in the lead-up to Moldova's October 2024 presidential election and European Union (EU) membership referendum. The statement noted that the Kremlin is leveraging criminal groups to finance political activities that undermine Moldovan democracy and is supporting candidates for the presidency that are "exacerbating social tensions." The statement heavily emphasizes the role of Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Moldovan democracy. ISW has written at length about recent Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova internally, including by supporting pro-Kremlin Moldovan political parties and conducting targeted disinformation campaigns.[32]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with the US and Japan on June 13 as other partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and Ramstein formats.**
- **The US finally sanctioned the Moscow Exchange, other significant Russian financial institutions, and Russian defense manufacturers 839 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.**
- **The Russian government appears confident that these new sanctions will minimally impact the Russian financial system, and the delay in US and other Western countries sanctioning these entities has given the Russian financial system time to prepare and mitigate such sanctions.**
- **US President Joe Biden reiterated his opposition to allowing Ukrainian forces to strike military targets in Russia's operational or deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons.**
- **Sustained Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea appear to be forcing the Russian military to commit additional air defense assets to Crimea in order to defend existing bases and logistics infrastructure, and further Ukrainian strikes against such air defense assets may render the peninsula untenable as a staging ground for the Russian military.**
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- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Russian forces marginally advanced near Siversk and Avdiivka.**
- **Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives to recruit military personnel.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 13, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 13. Geolocated footage posted on June 13 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a counterattack and seizing positions along a windbreak just southeast of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking around Hlyboke, and one milblogger noted that Ukrainian counterattacks are complicating the situation for Russian forces in the area.[34] Several Russian sources also reported Ukrainian counterattacks in and around Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.8 kilometers deep along a 4.5-kilometer-wide front north of Vovchansk and are making gains in the area of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.[35] Russian and Ukrainian sources both suggested that Russian forces introduced reserves to the northern Kharkiv Oblast axis, although the size of these reserve formations remains unclear.[36] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating near Vovchansk, but ISW has most recently observed that the elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were fighting in the Marinka area (west of Donetsk City) as of June 3.[37] If true, the appearance of elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in the Vovchansk area could indicate a redeployment from the Donetsk direction to the Kharkiv direction in order to bolster the Russian grouping in Kharkiv Oblast, which may also in part account for discussions of Russian reserves arriving in the area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh noted that Russian forces are also trying to build fortifications around their current positions in the northern Kharkiv direction.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Hlyboke, Vovchansk, and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) on June 12 and 13.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 13, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 12 that Russian forces advanced 100 meters in the Vovchansk direction and 100 meters in the Lyptsi direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka, Myasozharivka, and Berestove; northwest of Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka, Nevske, and Hrektivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 12 and 13.[40] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing west of Ivanivka towards Stepova Novoselivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of recent Russian advances in this area.[41] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 13, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk. Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division have been operating on the eastern outskirts Rozdolivka since June 12 and that Russian forces also advanced 1.12 kilometers in depth near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[44] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured an unspecified Ukrainian position near Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[45] Fighting also continued near Bilohorivka (north of Siversk) and Spirne (southeast of Siversk) on June 12 and 13.[46]


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks in eastern Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[48] Elements of the Russian 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (98th VDV Division), 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[49]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 13, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces have seized Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka). Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Russian forces raising a flag in western Novopokrovske, and Russian milbloggers widely claimed on June 13 that Russian forces seized the village after making diverging claims about seizing the settlement on June 12.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Mezbove (southwest of Novopokrovske) for the first time on June 13, also indicating that fighting has advanced beyond Novopokrovske.[51] Additional geolocated footage published on June 13 shows that Russian forces also advanced west of Semenovka and north of Umanske (both west of Avdiivka).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of

Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), west of Netaylove (west of Avdiivka), and 620 meters deep in southeastern Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), though ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[53] Russian forces also attacked northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novoselivka Persha, Yevhenivka, and Sokil on June 12 and 13.[54]




Russian forces intensified offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City as of June 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported in the morning and early afternoon of June 13 that Russian forces

have been most active in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City) and intensified efforts west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka on June 13.[55] A Ukrainian military officer claimed on June 13 that Russian forces conducted a company-sized mechanized attack with 19 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of the vehicles while repelling the attack.[56] ISW has not observed corroborating visual evidence of this specific attack, but if true, footage of the attack will likely become available in open-source in the coming days. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) continued to advance in western Krasnohorivka and north of the Refractory Plant in the northern part of the settlement.[57] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on June 12 that Russian forces are actively operating armored vehicles in attempts to capture Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and Paraskoviivka to reach the Vuhledar-Marinka road and pressure the rear of the Ukrainian grouping near Vuhledar.[58]


Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 12 and 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 13, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northwest of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[60] Elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamianske (west of Robotyne).[61]



The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on June 12 and 13, but there were no confirmed changes in the area.[62] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[63] Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 13 that Ukrainian forces have recently succeeded in destroying five Russian military boats per day in southern Ukraine after

previously only destroying one or two boats per day, but Pletenchuk did not provide a reason why Ukrainian forces are destroying more boats.[64]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against targets in Ukraine on June 13. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported on June 13 that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with an unspecified weapon, injuring six people including children.[65] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck civilian and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast with almost 20 guided glide bombs but conducted fewer S-300/400 air defense system strikes against Kharkiv Oblast over the past day.[66] Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed two Russian Zala reconnaissance drones and two Supercam reconnaissance drones over southern Ukraine on the night of June 12 to 13.[67] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian air defenses have downed 19 Shahed-136/131 drones, 20 Zala drones, five Supercam drones, 28 Lancet loitering munitions, 17 Orlan 10/30 reconnaissance drones, four Privit-82 attack drones, and three unknown drones over unspecified areas of Ukraine between June 6 and 13.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives to recruit military personnel. Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Alexei Teksler proposed increasing one-time regional payments for contract military personnel (*kontraktniki*) to 350,000 rubles (about \$3,900).[69] Russian opposition outlet *Chelyabinsk of the Future* stated that this is the second time in 2024 that the Chelyabinsk Oblast government has increased payments to *kontraktniki* following an increase from 75,000 (about \$850) to 225,000 rubles (about \$2,500).[70] Russian opposition outlets also noted that 14 Russian federal subjects have similarly increased payments to *kontraktniki* in 2024.[71]

The Russian Navy reportedly began sea trials for the Project 885M "Arkhangelsk" Yasem-M class nuclear submarine in the White Sea on June 11.[72] The submarine will reportedly undergo tests in the summer of 2024 and then begin state tests.[73] Russian shipbuilder Sevmash delivered the Project 885M "Arkhangelsk" to the Russian Navy for testing in November 2023.[74]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces reportedly used a modified Kh-101 cruise missile equipped with cluster munitions for the second time during a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 11 to 12. Ukrainian military analyst Ivan Kyrychevskyi stated on June 12 that the modified Kh-101 had a warhead with a total mass of 800 kilograms and that if Ukrainian forces shoot down the missile, the cluster munition warhead can still fall out of the missile and can detonate, causing damage to targets on the ground.[75] Russian forces reportedly used the modified Kh-101 with cluster munitions for the first time during strikes on the night of June 6 to 7.[76]

The Russian military has reportedly developed the "Murena-300" maritime strike drone that can carry up to 250 kilograms of explosives and has a cruising range of 250 kilometers.[77] The maritime drone will reportedly be able to carry 250 kilograms of explosives in the future and includes an inertial navigation system.

The Russian Airburg drone production company reportedly created the "Phaeton" transport and reconnaissance drone that can perform vertical takeoffs, has a flight time of five hours and a flight range of up to 500 kilometers, and can carry payloads of 15 kilograms.[78]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated known Kremlin narratives intended to place the onus for Russian aggression and increasing tension in eastern Europe on the West.[79]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian MoD 12th Directorate Head Lieutenant General Igor Kolesnikov reported on June 13 that Russian and Belarusian forces began the second stage of joint military exercises with non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.[80] Kolesnikov reported that the second stage involves transporting tactical nuclear ammunition and launchers to a specific position. ISW continues to assess that Russian and joint Russian-Belarusian tactical nuclear exercises are part of Russia's ongoing reflexive control campaign designed to influence Western decision-making with nuclear saber-rattling and other forms of manipulation.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABEL STREET

[1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801268384182526460?t=yBGvsZZD_rxup71Px_AmTA&s=35;

<https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801327762193489982>

[2] <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/bilateral-security-agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-ukraine/>

[3] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801268384182526460?t=yBGvsZZD_rxup71Px_AmTA&s=35

[4] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801327762193489982>;
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