

# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2023

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June 25, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group's June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Russian President Vladimir Putin's chief of staff.** Russian opposition outlet *Meduza*, citing unnamed internal Kremlin sources, reported that Prigozhin initially tried to get in touch with the Russian Presidential Administration midday June 24 as Wagner fighters moved north from Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow, but that Putin refused to speak with Prigozhin.[1] *Meduza* noted that, once Prigozhin observed the lack of widespread military support for Wagner's actions and changed his mind on Wagner's prospects, the Kremlin turned to negotiations involving Lukashenko, Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Office Anton Vaino, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov. Vaino and Gryzlov's possible involvement was not reported on June 24. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also questioned whether the deal will hold Wagner or Prigozhin accountable in any way for the deaths of at least 13 Russian airman on June 24.[2] Prigozhin's whereabouts cannot be verified beyond his departure from Rostov-on-Don late on June 24. Russian outlet *RTVI* claimed that Prigozhin's press service told *RTVI* that Prigozhin "sends his regards" and will answer all questions "when he is on normal communication," and a prominent Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an AI-generated image of Prigozhin holding a finger to his lips and stating "plans love silence," a copy of the phrase commonly used in Ukraine about operational security.[3] As ISW noted on June 24, the specifics of the deal are still unclear in the open source beyond speculation and rumor. The fallout of Wagner's armed rebellion has not yet concluded, and it remains to be seen how the deal will be implemented, if all involved parties will comply fully, how the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intend to do with Wagner personnel - and if Wagner fighters will cooperate, regardless of Prigozhin's wishes.

**The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian MoD also remain ambiguous.** Some Russian sources, including internal Kremlin sources cited by *Meduza*, suggested that the Kremlin may be considering changes to MoD leadership as part of the deal.[4] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov have not been seen or heard from since before Prigozhin announced the beginning of the armed rebellion on June 23. Some Russian sources suggested that Alexei Dyumin, the current governor of Tula Oblast, former security officer to Putin, and former head of Russia's Special

Operations Forces, may replace Shoigu as the Defense Minister, although ISW cannot confirm these speculations.[5] Any changes to the MoD leadership would notably represent a significant victory for Prigozhin, who justified his armed rebellion by directly accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.[6]

**Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin's intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.** Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows armed Wagner forces driving south away from Moscow near Voronezh City.[7] Footage published on June 25 purportedly shows Wagner forces returning to training camps in southern Russia.[8] The fact that Wagner is returning to their training camps with military equipment indicates that the Kremlin intends to maintain at least certain elements of Wagner's manpower rather than seek to immediately demobilize them, although the future of Wagner's command and organizational structure are unclear. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrei Kartapolov announced on June 25 that the State Duma is working on a law that would regulate private military companies (PMCs) but emphasized that it is not necessary to ban the Wagner Group as it is "the most combat-ready unit in Russia." [9] Kartapolov further noted that the future of the Wagner Group is undetermined and emphasized that the personnel of the Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don were "following orders of their command" and "did nothing reprehensible." [10] Kartapolov's efforts to absolve Wagner personnel of responsibility for taking part in an armed rebellion and separate them from Prigozhin may indicate the Russian government's desire to continue to use Wagner personnel in some capacity, and as ISW assessed on June 24, the Russian leadership could redeploy Wagner to Ukraine or instead commit them to international missions. Russian state-affiliated news outlets reported on June 24 that the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Rozkomnadzor) blocked Prigozhin's official press service on Russian social media site VKontakte, indicating the Kremlin's efforts to restrict Prigozhin's organizational actions.[11]

**Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.** Russian sources claimed on June 25 that the first Wagner column that began moving towards Moscow on June 24 consisted of 350 pieces of equipment, including nine tanks, four Tigr infantry fighting vehicles, a Grad MLRS system, and a howitzer.[12] Russian sources claimed that the three other Wagner columns that moved towards Moscow had 375, 100, and 212 pieces of equipment respectively, the majority of which were non-armored trucks, cars, and buses.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 24 that the columns moving towards Moscow were comprised of 4,000 personnel with 40 to 50 pieces of equipment, including MRAPs, T-90M main battle tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Pantsir air defense systems, and Grad MLRS systems.[14] CNN reported on June 24 that US and Western intelligence officials observed Wagner amassing equipment and ammunition for the rebellion for several weeks, indicating that the columns likely comprised Wagner's greatest available strength.[15] ISW cannot confirm the exact composition of the Wagner columns at this time, although current reporting suggests that Prigozhin's force would have struggled to fully occupy Moscow or conduct prolonged engagements with elements of the Russian Armed Forces, if they deployed. ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin likely sought and failed to win military support for his rebellion, and Wagner's move on Moscow was likely predicated on the assumption that military support would strengthen the rebellion's forces and capabilities.[16] Prigozhin may have become more amenable to the alleged

negotiations with Lukashenko as these insufficient forces drew nearer to Moscow and that time was running out to garner the necessary military support for a potential armed conflict with the MoD.

**The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion had exposed.** A Wagner-affiliated milblogger praised all of the parties for bringing the rebellion to an end and avoiding bloodshed, ignoring the fact that Wagner forces killed at least 13 Russian pilots and airmen during the rebellion.[17] Other Russian sources continued to characterize the rebellion as solely Prigozhin's doing and called on Russian authorities to show clemency towards the Wagner fighters who have fought for Russian interests in Ukraine.[18] A Russian milblogger specifically accused Moscow Oblast officials and the MoD of failing to stop the Wagner advance towards Moscow.[19] The milblogger questioned how the MoD would be able to respond to external incursions if it was unable to stop Wagner's movement towards Moscow.[20] A former Russian occupation official criticized how the internal Russian structures were slow in publicly addressing the rebellion.[21] Several other Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian elites for failing to publicly support Putin and for fleeing Russia.[22] Another Russian ultranationalist bemoaned that Prigozhin's rebellion indicated that Russia is one step closer to its final and irrevocable death.[23] A prominent milblogger asked how Russian authorities will punish those involved in the deaths of Russian servicemen, indicating that clemency for the Wagner fighters that participated in the rebellion may become a longstanding grievance for elements of the Russian military and the ultranationalist community.[24]

**The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin's rebellion.**[25] The Angry Patriots Club is a pro-war social movement that aims to correct perceived issues in the war-effort in Ukraine so that Russian forces can achieve victory, and the club's members have used that mission to launch routine scathing criticisms of the MoD, the Kremlin, and Putin himself.[26] The Angry Patriots Club has also notably called for "revolution" if the Kremlin freezes the war in Ukraine or pursues negotiations.[27] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin spoke at the livestreamed event in Moscow and delivered a set of longstanding theses on what Russia needs to do to win the war in Ukraine.[28] Girkin publicly reiterated that Putin needs to legally transfer certain presidential authorities to other parties if Putin is unwilling to assume control over the war in Ukraine as the supreme Commander-in-Chief.[29] The Angry Patriots Club had promoted the event for several weeks, and Russian officials were likely aware of it to some extent.[30] If the Kremlin intends to use Prigozhin's rebellion as pretext to start immediately suppressing antagonistic ultranationalists, then this event would have likely been a prime candidate to start that effort. The Kremlin likely risks Prigozhin's armed rebellion expanding the window of acceptable anti-Kremlin criticism, particularly if the Kremlin does not intend to retaliate further against Prigozhin. The Kremlin's continued careful response to the armed rebellion will likely prompt other Russian nationalists to test Russian official reactions to more explicitly critical rhetoric.

**Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 25.** Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut, along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced

southwest of Velyka Novosilka, although ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[32] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated in an interview with *Fox News* published on June 25 that the main assault of the counteroffensive has not yet started.[33]

**Russian forces' ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner's June 23-24 armed rebellion.** Russian and Ukrainian sources both reported that fighting continued as usual along the entire frontline, with Russian forces conducting a relatively higher number of ground attacks near Bakhmut than over the past few days.[34] Some Russian sources used the armed rebellion as a rhetorical device to preemptively exculpate Russian forces from any Ukrainian gains made on June 24 and 25.[35]

**Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).**[36] Budanov stated that Russian forces have mined the ZNPP's cooling pond and have moved vehicles loaded with explosives to four of the six ZNPP power units.[37] As ISW previously assessed, intentional Russian sabotage of the ZNPP resulting in a radiological catastrophe would potentially be more detrimental to Russian forces on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir than to Ukrainian forces on the opposite bank.[38] Russia has frequently invoked threatening rhetoric surrounding the ZNPP in order to dissuade potential Ukrainian counterattacks into occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Russian forces may be disseminating information about mining of the cooling pond and power units to discourage Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. However, Russia demonstrated a willingness to put its own troops in harm's way after the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP), so ISW cannot rule out the potential that Russian forces may be setting conditions to sabotage the ZNPP.

## Key Takeaways


- **Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group's June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin's chief of staff.**
- **The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.**
- **Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin's intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.**
- **Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.**
- **The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.**
- **The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin's rebellion.**

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- **A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.**
- **Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.**
- **Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



# Wagner Group's Armed Rebellion in Southern Russia on June 24



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**


The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully tried to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast near Rodionivka on June 25.[39]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove amid claims of continued Ukrainian offensives along the Kreminna-Svatove line on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Berestove, Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove).[40] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna).[41]

Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City with Storm Shadow cruise missiles on June 25.[42] Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a column of smoke in the vicinity of Luhansk City.[43] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian air defenses operated in the area.[44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City on June 25.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a relatively higher number of Russian offensive operations near Bakhmut than over the past few days and stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka (14km northeast) and Vesele (16km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka (10km northwest) and Minkivka (12km northwest); and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (3km southwest).[45] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces took advantage of distraction caused by Wagner Group’s armed June 23-24 rebellion and launched several counterattacks in the Bakhmut area, including southwest of Bakhmut near Kurdiumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest); northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (3km northwest); and northeast of Bakhmut on the Vasyukivka-Rozdolivka line.[46] The Russian MoD claimed that units of the Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut.[47] Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade reported that it defeated elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in the Bakhmut area and destroyed a Russian bridgehead in an unspecified area on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which runs southwest of Bakhmut between Mayorsk and Kurdiumivka.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 25. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and that 13 combat clashes took place near Marinka over the past day.[49] Geolocated footage posted on June 24 and June 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances on the northern outskirts of Donetsk City just south of Avdiivka and between Pisky and Pervomaiske on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[50] Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade spokesperson Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi notably reported on June 24 that Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” elements and unspecified Russian special forces suddenly withdrew from Marinka. The details of this reported withdrawal are unclear, but some contingent of Akhmat and other special forces may have departed from Marinka to Rostov Oblast in order to guard against the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- + Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian Tavriisk Operational Direction Spokesperson Valerii Shershen reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces captured positions near Krasnohorivka that had been under Russian control since 2014. ISW cannot assess the exact areas of advances at this time due to a lack of sufficient evidence.

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



### **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 25. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km due east of Velyka Novosilka).[51]


Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize lost positions near Novodarivka (15km

southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Makarivka (7km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Zolota Nyva (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Priyutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv).[54] Russian sources claimed that neither side controls Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv), although ISW has not observed footage suggesting that Ukrainian forces have lost control of the settlement since they captured it on June 19.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Robotyne.[56]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 24 that fighting occurred between Russian airborne forces (VDV) and Ukrainian forces near the Antonivskyi Bridge (8km northeast of Kherson City).[57] Another Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Ukrainian forces had established positions on the east (left) bank of Antonivskyi Bridge.[58] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, and it is unclear if floodwaters have receded enough for Ukrainian or Russian forces to establish positions near this area.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers north of Robotyne over the last 24 hours.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 25, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported on Jun 25 that Russia imports these components under the guise of household goods from countries that have not joined international sanctions regimes against Russia.[59] Skibitsky also reported that Russian officials secure access to critical components by

creating temporary shell joint ventures and enterprises that act as one-time conduits for imports before disappearing.[60]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces will receive new camouflage equipment for tanks deployed to Ukraine.[61] The milblogger claimed that the Kalashnikov Group's Research Institute of Steel started supplying Russian forces with the Nakidka complex, a camouflage fabric that covers most of a tank's hull and turret. The milblogger claimed that the Nakidka complex will further complicate detection by radar and thermal imaging devices.

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas. The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on June 24 that LNR authorities held a ceremony to "award" youth in occupied Krasnodon Russian passports following their 14th birthdays.[62] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported that occupation authorities in Berdyansk and Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are forcing schoolchildren to write letters to Russian soldiers.[63] The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally noted that Russian occupation officials are using summer holidays to escalate measures to deport children from southern and eastern Ukraine to Russia under the guise of "rest and relaxation" measures.[64]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).**

**ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] <https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/06/25/putina-ne-bylo-nigde>

[2] <https://t.me/rybar/48990>

[3] <https://rtvi dot com/news/peredaet-vsem-privet-v-press-sluzhbe-prigozhina-rasskazali-kogda-on-vyjdet-na-svyaz/>; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/19323](https://t.me/grey_zone/19323)



- [4] <https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/06/25/putina-ne-bylo-nigde>; <https://t.me/rybar/48996>
- [5] <https://kirov-portal dot ru/news/vopros-otvet/kto-takoj-dyumin-kotoryj-mozhet-zanyat-post-ministra-oborony-vmesto-shojgu-29547/>; <https://news.obozrevatel dot com/russia/v-rossii-uzhe-nashli-novogo-ministra-oboronyi-dlya-prigozhina-v-seti-nazvali-imya.htm>
- [6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023>
- [7] <https://t.me/Ateobreaking/91743> ;  
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- [15] <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/24/politics/us-western-officials-russia-prigozhin-putin/index.html>
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- [20] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48750>

- [21] <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26885>
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