

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023

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June 4, 2023, 6pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows LSR and RDK personnel advancing towards Novaya Tavolzhanka (3.5km from the Ukrainian border).[1] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov confirmed that there was fighting within Novaya Tavolzhanka, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Western Military District and the Russian Border Guard Service struck a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near the settlement, forcing them to withdraw.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that a sabotage and reconnaissance group of 20 personnel entered Novaya Tavolzhanka without armored vehicles.[3] *Wall Street Journal* Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Yarsoslav Trofimov reported that the pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters remain in Novaya Tavolzhanka as of 1700 (Moscow Standard Time).[4]

Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs). The LSR and RDK addressed a video to Gladkov purporting to show RDK and LSR fighters with two Russian POWs whom they said they captured near Novaya Tavolzhanka. The RDK and LSR demanded that Gladkov arrive at the temple in Novaya Tavolzhanka by 1700 (Moscow Standard Time) to negotiate for the release of the POWs.[5] Gladkov stated that he was ready to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters at the Shebekino checkpoint to negotiate the exchange of the POWs.[6] Gladkov later reportedly refused to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters because he believed that the Russian POWs were already dead.[7] The RDK and LSR released a subsequent video showing themselves with 12 Russian POWs, criticizing Gladkov for lacking courage, and stating that they would send the POWs to Ukraine.[8] **The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids.** The contradictory reporting from official Russian sources about the situation in Belgorod Oblast and Gladkov's apparent personal decision to respond to the RDK and LSR suggests that the MoD and Gladkov are not coordinating their responses to the raids.

ISW has previously reported that Russian officials have disproportionately responded to the limited raids into Russian territory in an effort to assuage growing Russian anxiety about the war in Ukraine while also supporting ongoing information operations that aim to present the war as existential to Russia.[9] Russian responses have primarily centered on informational effects, and there is no indication that the Russian leadership has set a wider policy for preventing further limited raids into Russian border oblasts. It is also not clear if Russian authorities are orchestrating the evacuation response to this activity. An RDK fighter claimed on June 4 that Belgorod Oblast authorities have not organized the announced evacuation measures in the Shebekino area and that Russian citizens have largely fled of their own accord, leaving many settlements in a semi-abandoned state.[10] Gladkov claimed that 4,000 residents from the area are currently staying at temporary accommodation centers in connection with evacuation efforts, however.[11] Ukrainian Advisor to the Internal Affairs Minister Anton Herashchenko stated on June 4 that the RDK and LSR activity has prompted Russian leaders to divert significant forces to stop border incursions, although ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have done so.

The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD on June 3 and 4, specifically calling out the lack of response from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valeriy Gerasimov.[12] Prigozhin offered to negotiate the release of POWs held by the RDK and LSR if Russian authorities failed to do so, and responded to criticism of his offer by sarcastically stating that Russia has a problem with people who have “balls.”[13] Other ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the latest raid by criticizing Gladkov for being willing to negotiate with the RDK and LSR, and Russian authorities for failing to consistently inform the public about the situation in Belgorod Oblast.[14] A prominent milblogger used the raid in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD for not funding Belgorod territorial defense volunteer formations and for not considering the volunteers as actual combatants.[15] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin argued that the Kremlin cannot do anything about the situation in Belgorod Oblast without engaging in a costly diversion of resources that would likely end in an attritional operation reminiscent of Bakhmut.[16]

Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4, marking the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched five Shahed-136/131 drones from Bryansk Oblast and six Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from six strategic Tu-95 bombers in the Caspian Sea in the early morning of June 4.[17] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down three Shahed drones and four cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that two Russian missiles struck an active Ukrainian airfield near Kropyvnytskyi in Kirovohrad Oblast.[18] Ihnat added that two Shahed drones struck unspecified infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[19] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all drones and missiles that targeted Kyiv.[20]


Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that the Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city. Prigozhin claimed that some unspecified reports suggest that Ukrainian forces established observation posts in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[21] Prigozhin recommended that the Russian forces in Bakhmut take action if these reports are true. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister

Hanna Malyar and other Ukrainian officials have continuously reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut since May 20, when Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces seized the entirety of the city.^[22]

Key Takeaways

- **Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement.**
- **Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs).**
- **The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids.**
- **The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership.**
- **Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4 making it the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine.**
- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and Marinka.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual's presence at an enlistment office for military registration.**
- **Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces reportedly conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force northeast of Kharkiv City on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted an unsuccessful attempt to penetrate through Ukrainian defenses near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are attempting to regain the initiative on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and are reinforcing their troops along the Luhansk-Kharkiv frontline.[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces are attempting to restart their offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (27km south of Kreminna).[25] Syrskyi added that Russian forces are reinforcing their positions with “Storm Z” assault units that are staffed with convicts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed a group of 500 convicts to reinforce an unspecified element operating in Kharkiv Oblast, and that the Ukrainian forces injured almost 100 of these convicts with artillery fire.[26]

Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 4. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces successfully advanced 400 meters in an unspecified area in the Svatove direction and liberated a significant area of the Ivanivskiy forest.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River and seized Novomlynsk (21km northeast of Kupyansk) but noted the absence of photo or video evidence for this claimed advance.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Novoselivske, while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Andriivka (14km west of Svatove), and Novoselivske.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kreminna on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohorivka and Spirne.[30] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in combat along the R-66 highway near Kreminna.[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

[Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.](#)


Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivanivske and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Ivanivske direction and that Ukrainian forces conducted assault operations near Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[33] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Wagner forces continue to withdraw from Bakhmut and that regular Russian airborne (VDV) forces are replacing them.[34] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported that the loss ratios of losses of Russian forces to Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut was 7.5 : 1.[35]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Vodyane, while some Russian milbloggers refuted this claim.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations near Avdiivka.[38]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Marinka on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian ground attacks near Marinka.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) continue offensive operations in the Marinka direction.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Akhmat units and elements of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) with artillery support from the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) conducted assault operations in Marinka while Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in Marinka.[41]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in southern Donetsk Oblast on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pavlivka (2km southwest of Vuhledar) and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[42] Another milblogger characterized the Ukrainian attacks near Pavlivka and Mykilske as unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations.[43]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- +— Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4.[44] Geolocated footage posted on June 4 shows that mechanized Ukrainian forces made limited advances northeast of Rivnopil.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the direction of Pryyutne (15km southwest of

Velyka Novosilka) and Makariivka (within 4km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and captured Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Neskuchne (2km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of Russian defenses and advanced 500 meters to three kilometers in this area.[47] There is no visual evidence for these reports as of this writing. The language of these reports suggests that Russian forces also lost their positions in Levadne (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although it is unclear if this is a recent development or occurred on an earlier date. Footage posted on June 2 shows artillery elements of a Ukrainian artillery brigade conducting fire missions against Russian positions near Staromaiorske, about 7km south and 7km southeast of Neskuchne and Rivnopil, respectively.[48] Some milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted limited counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka (28km southeast of Hulyaipole), and that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against attacking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian “Vostok” volunteer battalion and elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) successfully defended against further Ukrainian advances.[50] Russian sources largely claimed that the Ukrainian localized counterattacks were reconnaissance-in-force operations.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued to target frontline and rear areas in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted Ukrainian missiles targeting Berdyansk and Melitopol on June 3.[52] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck additional areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4: near Melitopol, northeast of Melitopol near Chernihivka, and near the frontline near Verbove and Polohy.[53] Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems destroyed or disabled nine Ukrainian UAVs targeting Dzhankoi, Crimea on June 3.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 4, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual's presence at an enlistment office for military registration. The draft decree states that Russian officials

will be able to register citizens for military service “without the personal appearance of citizens in the military [recruitment office] on the basis of information contained in the state information resource, other state information systems and information resources.”^[55] Russian citizens will reportedly receive notifications of registration and deregistration in their personal accounts on the Russian State Services Portal.^[56] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 11 approving the creation of a digital unified register of Russian citizens eligible for military service.^[57] ISW assessed that the Kremlin advocated for the digital register in order to use tools of digital authoritarianism to improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers, and this new draft government decree is likely a part of this effort.^[58]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian servicemembers continue to desert their positions in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 4 that roughly 40 Russian servicemembers near Svatove, Luhansk Oblast left their combat positions and deserted.^[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces dispatched two helicopters and a Rosgvardia unit to look for the deserters.^[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik stated on June 4 that the “Helping Ours” volunteer organization has sent 103 people, 67 children and 36 mothers, from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts to the Klyazma sanatorium in Moscow Oblast.^[61] Miroshnik stated that “Helping Ours” reached a new agreement with the Russian Federal Medical and Biological Agency to send another 162 people, primarily children ages five to 13, to the Klyazma sanatorium by the end of 2023.^[62] A Russian news aggregator reported on June 3 that children’s health camps in Bryansk Oblast will receive 750 children from Bryanka, Luhansk Oblast and that 90 children from the settlement will arrive in Bryansk Oblast in June.^[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

- [1] <https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1665279874150563840?s=20> ; <https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1665279322586771457?s=20> ; <https://t.me/legionoffreedom/852> ; <https://t.me/russvolcorps/581>
- [2] https://t.me/mod_russia/27090
- [3] <https://t.me/rybar/48007> ; <https://t.me/sashakots/40099> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46569>
- [4] <https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1665375351265001473?s=20>
- [5] <https://t.me/russvolcorps/582> ; <https://t.me/legionoffreedom/853>
- [6] <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2465> ;
- [7] <https://twitter.com/TWMCLtd/status/1665393266613780487?s=20>
- [8] <https://t.me/russvolcorps/584> ; <https://t.me/legionoffreedom/854>
- [9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060223> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060123>
- [10] https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1665335960668708864?s=20
- [11] <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2456>
- [12] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3578
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- [15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7814 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7815
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- [17] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LFwiYuKqUsvzjMGM6sXvA3yfEZNnrPWTcu4VabyDiThFgy2Fk48LdMkJ9E9SUPFnI>
- [18] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/06/4/7405228/>
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- [20] <https://t.me/bbcussian/47300>; <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/air-defence-systems-engaged-repelling-air-attacks-kyiv-ukrainian-officials-2023-06-04/>
- [21] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3581; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46579>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48158>
- [22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2023>
- [23] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZvUzU7yZw43tXmGgL3kow3hkFUiEkR89YdvU7hvPMP2MwnEs21ZFtDdG56cTfEhEl>
- [24] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/04/na-bahmutskom-nyapryamku-pvk-vagner-zaminyuyut-povitryano-desantni-pidrozhdily-rosarmiyi-sergij-cherevatyj/>
- [25] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/06/04/na-okremyh-dilyankah-frontu-ye-prosuvannya-syl-oborony-ukrayiny-oleksandr-syrskyj/>
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- [27] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/06/04/na-okremyh-dilyankah-frontu-ye-prosuvannya-syl-oborony-ukrayiny-oleksandr-syrskyj/>
- [28] <https://t.me/kommunist/17542>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87856; <https://t.me/milchronicles/2010>
- [29] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PFbA7btkrnkkyUxvNvvqrK53g9LNWCj8LKnRhDm7ebP3owQBhuMcjuKhSQHVcutel>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/>

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[30] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoPFbA7btkrnkkyUxvNvvqrK53g9LNWCj8LKnRhDm7ebP3owQBhuMcjuKhSQHVcutel>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoZvUzU7yZw43tXmGgL3kow3hkFUieKR89YdvU7hvPMP2MwnEs21ZFtDdG56cTfEhEl>

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[32] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoPFbA7btkrnkkyUxvNvvqrK53g9LNWCj8LKnRhDm7ebP3owQBhuMcjuKhSQHVcutel>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoZvUzU7yZw43tXmGgL3kow3hkFUieKR89YdvU7hvPMP2MwnEs21ZFtDdG56cTfEhEl>

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[37] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5233>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5235>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12956>; <https://t.me/milchronicles/2010>; <https://t.me/milinfolive/101622>; <https://t.me/sashakots/40099>

[38] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoPFbA7btkrnkkyUxvNvvqrK53g9LNWCj8LKnRhDm7ebP3owQBhuMcjuKhSQHVcutel>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoZvUzU7yZw43tXmGgL3kow3hkFUieKR89YdvU7hvPMP2MwnEs21ZFtDdG56cTfEhEl>

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[41] <https://t.me/rybar/48000>

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[43] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36779

[44] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12958>

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<https://t.me/rybar/47992>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87854; <https://t.me/rybar/47992>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87874; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12958>; <https://t.me/milinfoolive/101620>;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46590> <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46603>

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87874; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46590>;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46603>

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[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87877; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46605>;
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[63] <https://t.me/readovkanews/60082>