

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2024

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March 16, 2024, 5:20pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on March 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted a series of successful drone strikes against three Russian oil refineries in Samara Oblast on March 16. Sources in Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian outlet *RBK-Ukraine* that the SBU struck the Novokuibyshevsky, Kuibyshevsky, and Syzran Rosneft oil refineries in Samara Oblast.[1] *RBK-Ukraine* reported that the three refineries process an estimated 25 million tons of oil per year, or 10 percent of Russia's annual oil refinement output.[2] Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows a fire at the Syzran oil refinery following the drone strikes, and Samara Oblast Governor Dmytro Azarov stated that there was also a fire at the refinery in Novokuibyshevsky.[3] Russian outlet *Kommersant* reported on March 13 that Russian authorities recently strengthened anti-drone protection at the Novokuibyshevsky, Kuibyshevsky, and Syzran oil refineries following previous Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian oil infrastructure and reported on March 14 that Russian oil and gas and industrial enterprises are currently the main purchasers of anti-drone systems in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[4] *Kommersant* also reported that Rosneft has not restarted operations at the Tuapse oil refinery following the January 25 Ukrainian drone strike against the facility, indicating that the January 25 strike likely significantly damaged the facility.[5] Russian milbloggers deliberated whether the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Rosgvardia are to blame for not protecting Russian oil refineries and criticized general Russian bureaucracy for delaying the deployment of anti-drone countermeasures and air defense systems to defend Russian critical infrastructure operators against Ukrainian drone strikes.[6] One Russian milblogger asked why Russia has not been able to implement even an "elementary decision," such as copying Ukraine's mobile fire groups, to defend against drone strikes.[7]

All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers continue limited cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) stated on March 16 that it is continuing a "limited military operation" in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and denied previous Russian claims about the RDK, Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion suffering heavy losses in raids in recent days.[8] The RDK posted footage of alleged Russian

prisoners of war (POW) that it recently captured and called on Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov to meet in order to negotiate the exchange of 25 Russian POWs.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled the cross border raids near Popivka, Sumy Oblast, and in the direction of Spodaryushino and Kozinka in Belgorod Oblast.[10]

Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported “personal banker” Yuri Kovalchuk, to a position within the Russian Presidential Administration. Russian news outlet *RBK*, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported on March 15 that Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk the deputy head of the Presidential Control Directorate, a department of the Russian Presidential Administration that monitors how Russian federal and regional authorities implement Russian President Vladimir Putin’s orders and directives.[11] Russian outlet *Kommersant* reported on March 6 that Kovalchuk left Russian energy company Inter RAO, which he headed for 15 years, and that Russian authorities initially gave Kovalchuk four positions to choose from – head of Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, head of Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft, Deputy Prime Minister for the Fuel and Energy Complex, or governor of St. Petersburg.[12] *Bloomberg* also reported on March 12 that Russian authorities were considering appointing Kovalchuk as Russian Minister of Energy.[13] The Kovalchuks are also longtime friends of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, who has gained increased influence with Putin since the start of the full-scale invasion.[14] Boris’ Kovalchuk’s new position within the Russian presidential administration suggests that both the Kovalchuk family and even Kiriyenko’s wider faction are gaining increased influence within the Kremlin and with Putin himself.


Russian authorities threatened Russian election disruptors and some Russian citizens’ continued attempts to disrupt voting in the Russian presidential election on March 16. Russian opposition outlet *Sever Realii* reported on March 16 that Russian authorities have opened at least 15 criminal cases across Russia for attempts to disrupt the election and sent at least two people to pre-trial detention centers.[15] Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated that “simple-minded people” tried to disrupt the voting process by committing arson or damaging ballot boxes at 29 polling stations in 20 Russian federal subjects.[16] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed that Russian citizens who attempt to disrupt the election are “scoundrels” and “traitors” who can face criminal charges for obstructing the exercise of electoral rights.[17] Medvedev threatened that attempts at election disruption are a form of “direct” assistance to Ukraine and the perpetrators could face charges of high treason. Russian State Duma deputy Yana Lantratova told Russian state news outlet *RIA Novosti* on March 16 that Duma deputies are preparing a bill that would increase the sentencing severity for Russians who attempt to disrupt elections and are allegedly acting on instructions from a foreign state opposing Russia during wartime.[18] The bill reportedly imposes stricter sentences of five to eight years in prison for disrupting elections. Lantratova stated that Duma deputies are preparing the bill as quickly as possible so Russian lawmakers have time to adopt it before the 2026 Russian legislative elections. Isolated public protests against the Russian presidential election and Russian President Vladimir Putin are highly unlikely to impact the course or outcome of the choreographed Russian presidential election, but Kremlin officials may be quickly responding to these incidents out of concerns that continued disruptions will tarnish the Kremlin’s effort to portray the election as Russia unifying around Putin.

Group of Seven (G7) countries issued a joint statement on March 15 warning Iran against transferring ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia.[19] The G7 stated that it is prepared to respond swiftly and in a coordinated manner should Iran provide Russia with ballistic missiles or related technology, including new and “significant measures” against Iran.[20] The G7 statement did not specify what those measures may be, but a senior US official reportedly told journalists that one option under consideration is an effective ban on Iran Air flights to Europe.[21] *Reuters* reported in late February 2024 that Iranian sources stated that Iran had begun ballistic missile transfers to Russia and that Russia has already received 400 Iranian short-range ballistic missiles.[22] Western media reported on March 15 that the senior US official stated that the United States and its allies have not confirmed that Iran has transferred the missiles to Russia, however.[23] Russia and Iran have been reportedly negotiating transfers of the Iranian short-range ballistic missiles in recent months as Russia continues to increasingly rely on Iran for key components and weapons for its war effort in Ukraine.[24]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted a series of successful drone strikes against three Russian oil refineries in Samara Oblast on March 16.**
- **All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers continue limited cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.**
- **Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported “personal banker” Yuri Kovalchuk, to a position within the Russian Presidential Administration.**
- **Russian authorities threatened Russian election disruptors and some Russian citizens’ continued attempts to disrupt voting in the Russian presidential election on March 16.**
- **Group of Seven (G7) countries issued a joint statement on March 15 warning Iran against transferring ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia.**
- **Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.**
- **A Russian insider source claimed on March 16 that Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov revoked a reported agreement allowing former Wagner Group units to operate independently within Rosgvardia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that tried to cross the international Russian-Ukrainian border into Sumy Oblast near Stara Huta and Brusky.[25]

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[26]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on March 15 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters in the area east of Yampolivka and Terny between March 13 and 14.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[27] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske, and elements of the Russian “Vostok” Volunteer Reconnaissance Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the direction of Chasiv Yar.[28]



Russian forces likely captured Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) and Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka) no later than March 16. Geolocated footage published on March 15 shows that a Russian armored column recently advanced west of Tonenke, and additional geolocated footage published on March 16 shows elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) advancing into and raising a flag in Nevelske.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 12 that Russian forces captured Nevelske.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and between Berdychi and Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[31] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that an armored Russian group advanced west of Tonenke and reached the outskirts of Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) but did not advance further.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling on the northern flank of Berdychi near Stepove (both northwest of Avdiivka) because Ukrainian forces still control tactical heights and conduct counterattacks in the area, but that it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to counterattack near Orlivka and Tonenke (both west of Avdiivka). Positional fighting continued west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Novokalynove.[33] Elements of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly operating near Orlivka.[34]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating near Avdiivka stated on March 15 that Russian forces near Avdiivka are innovating and changing classical Wagner Group-style infantry-led “meat assaults” with assaults using armored vehicles to increase and maintain constant pressure on Ukrainian forces.[35] The Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces are attacking with multiple “divisions” – likely referring to elements of divisions that are unlikely to be staffed and equipped at full end-strength – and that Russian forces aim to achieve a ten to one numerical superiority over Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka direction. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have slowed the Russian advance but cannot say confidently that the situation is stable. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Avdiivka have lost momentum and suggested that Ukrainian forces either lack reserves or are withdrawing to lines further back, though ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[36] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recovered “quickly enough” following the fall of Avdiivka and asserted that Ukrainian forces achieved numerical superiority in the Avdiivka direction, however, ISW is unable to confirm this claim as the tactical situation west of Avdiivka remains dynamic.[37]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours		Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Major Railroads
	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
	Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives		


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on March 12 that Russian forces advanced 200 meters in Yar Laptev.

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka amid continued positional fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on March 16. Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows that Russian forces recently advanced to a windbreak west of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka

Novosilka).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in depth north of Shevchenko (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), though ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[41] Positional fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske.[42] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) reportedly recently attacked west of Staromayorske and north of Novodonetske, respectively, and elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade and of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly supported these assaults.[43]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on March 16.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) advanced up to a kilometer in depth north of Verbove, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[45]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Field Fortifications


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 16.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge, but did not specify whether he was referring to the Antonivsky railway bridge or the Antonivsky roadway bridge.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of March 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of March 15 to 16. Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Konotop, Sumy Oblast with an unspecified missile on the evening of March

15.[48] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure in Kozacha Lopan with an unspecified number of Shahed-136/131 drones and Zolochiv with an Iskander missile on March 16.[49] Ukrainian officials in Donetsk Oblast reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk with an unspecified missile and Myrnohrad with four S-300 missiles.[50]

Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on March 16 that the death toll from a Russian Iskander missile strike on Odesa City on March 15 has risen to 20.[51] Russian sources asserted that Russian forces struck a sanatorium in Odesa City on March 15 and killed up to 550 Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) personnel, although ISW has not observed any evidence of these Russian claims.[52]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian insider source claimed on March 16 that Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov revoked a reported agreement allowing former Wagner Group units to operate independently within Rosgvardia.[53] The insider source claimed that Zolotov disbanded the former Wagner base in Kazachi Lageri, Rostov Oblast, which Wagner reportedly retained control over when operating as part of the Rosgvardia Volunteer Corps. Rosgvardia authorities reportedly assured former Wagner personnel that there would be “a new gathering” following the Russian presidential election, but that their units would no longer be considered “separate and independent.” Russian sources widely speculated about a reported agreement between the Wagner Council of Commanders and Rosgvardia that would allow Wagner to retain its existing command structure and independence while subordinated to Rosgvardia following the death of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and founder Dmitry Utkin in September 2023.[54] Zolotov reportedly reneged on the purported agreement after learning that Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (call sign “Lotos”) severely overestimated his ability to convince additional former Wagner personnel to join Rosgvardia.[55]

Russian opposition outlet *Mobilization News* reported on March 15 that Russian officials are no longer providing combat veteran certificates for veterans of Russian “Storm Z” convict units in the Southern Military District.[56] *Mobilization News* reported that Russian officials refused to issue combat veteran certificates to “Storm Z” veterans in Krasnodar Krai, Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, and Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts. This change, if confirmed, is likely a cost-saving measure to prevent ballooning costs related to providing Russian veterans service benefits.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these

efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian authorities continue efforts to portray the Russian presidential election as a popular and legitimate election and claimed that Western states are interfering in the election. The Russian Central Election Commission stated that 51.77 percent of all eligible voters had voted as of 1620 Moscow time on March 16.[57] Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 16 that foreign observers from several dozen countries are reportedly observing the elections.[58] Russian sources have reported on cases of irregularities and voting violations, however. Stanislav Andreychuk, the Co-Chairperson for the Russian “Golos” Movement for Defense of Voters’ Rights, reported on March 16 that “Golos” had observed footage of ballot stuffing in Krasnodar Krai.[59] Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* (*iStories*) reported on March 16 that observers in Moscow Oblast reported differences between data on claimed and actual voter turnout numbers and that Russian authorities registered on average 100 more ballots than were actually cast.[60] Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova claimed on March 16 that she appealed to the United Nations High Commission about the way Estonian authorities are allegedly obstructing Russian “compatriots” from voting there.[61] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 16 that some “unfriendly countries” are threatening Russian citizens and physically obstructing them from voting abroad.[62] Zakharova also claimed that the Russian MFA may summon the British ambassador to Russia if alleged, unspecified attempts to interfere in the election do not stop.[63]

Russian actors are reportedly attempting to exploit the relatives of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) to incite domestic discontent in Ukraine, likely as part of the wider “Maidan-3” Russian information campaign. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on March 16 that unspecified Russian actors are calling relatives of Ukrainian POWs and claiming that Russia is ready to return Ukrainian POWs but that the Ukrainian leadership is preventing this. The Russian actors reportedly encourage the relatives to protest about this issue. Lubinets stated that Ukraine has never stopped POW exchanges. These Russian information operations are likely part of the “Maidan-3” information campaign, which Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) previously reported intends to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and drive a wedge between

civilians and military and political leadership.[64] Russia has successfully used information operations, including direct correspondence via cell phone to Ukrainian civilians, to foment violent protests in Ukraine before.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on March 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone call with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and discussed bilateral issues and the regional situation.[66] Russian and Belarusian sources have yet to offer further details about the call.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87584

[2] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87584

[3] <https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1768873567549100245?s=20>; <https://x.com/Liveuamap/status/1768870980393288182?s=20>; <https://x.com/moklasen/status/1768911752266203180?s=20>; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1768873365836599576?s=20; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54823>; <https://t.me/milinfoLive/118386>; <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1768875779671114129>; <https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1769007568456733178>; https://t.me/rian_ru/235709; https://t.me/tass_agency/236898; <https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/u-rf-drony-atakuvaly-vidrazu-dva-naftozavody/>; <https://t.me/news63ru/49396>; <https://t.me/admsyzran/11982>; <https://t.me/idelrealii/34336>

[4] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6562980?from=63_top_main_1; <https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-samarskoy-oblasti-usilili-zaschitu-neftezavodov-ot-atak-bespilotnikov/32859732.html>; https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6563929?from=52_top_main_3

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524>; https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6562980?from=63_top_main_1; <https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-samarskoy-oblasti-usilili-zaschitu-neftezavodov-ot-atak-bespilotnikov/32859732.html>

[6] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15008>; <https://t.me/rusengineer/3172>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/34061>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116713; <https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/23607>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/34062>; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10015

[7] <https://t.me/rusengineer/3172>

- [8] <https://t.me/russvolcorps/910> ;
- [9] <https://t.me/russvolcorps/910>
- [10] https://t.me/mod_russia/36675
- [11] <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/03/2024/65f46d159a79474774463907> ; <https://udprf.ru/content/glavnoe-kontrolnoe-upravlenie>
- [12] <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6559757?tg>
- [13] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-12/russia-elections-no-sign-putin-plans-to-change-course-in-ukraine>
- [14] <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-vice-roy>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2023>
- [15] <https://t.me/severrealii/23770>
- [16] https://t.me/tass_agency/237016
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- [18] <https://ria.ru/20240316/gosduma-1933436741.html>
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