

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2024

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March 9, 2024, 5:55pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:40 pm ET on March 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting Rostov Oblast overnight on March 8-9 and may have struck a Russian aircraft plant refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 41 Ukrainian drones overnight over Rostov Oblast, and eyewitnesses reportedly stated that the strike caused at least five explosions.[1] Geolocated footage of a strike shows an explosion at the Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[2] The Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog is reportedly refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 aircraft for use in Ukraine, and Russian sources claimed that the plant was repairing an A-50 damaged in a previous drone strike (possibly referring to the attack on a Russian A-50 at the Machulishchi Air Base in Minsk, Belarus, in February 2023).[3] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* published satellite imagery dated February 29 indicating that the geolocated explosion occurred roughly 900 meters from a Russian A-50 aircraft that previously had been present at the Beriev Aircraft Plant, although it is unclear whether the A-50 was in the same location at the time of the strike.[4] Senior Ukrainian officials have not commented on the strike at the time of this publication. ISW is unable to confirm that the reported strike damaged any Russian A-50 aircraft, facilities repairing or refurbishing aircraft, or other Russian military infrastructure in the area.

Russian sources widely circulated footage of a Russian strike on March 9 to claim that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system in eastern Ukraine, although there has yet to be any confirmation of these claims. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on March 9 purportedly of Russian forces striking a Ukrainian S-300 air defense missile launcher with Iskander missiles near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian sources amplified additional footage of the strike's aftermath purportedly showing destroyed German MAN KAT1 trucks, which can be used as a base for Patriot air defense missile launchers.[6] Russian sources used this footage to claim that Russian forces destroyed a MIM-104 Patriot air defense system, although the Russian MoD has yet to revise its earlier claim about destroying a Ukrainian S-300 system.[7] Russian state media outlet *RIA Novosti* reported that a source in Russian law enforcement stated that the Russian Iskander strike destroyed two Patriot air defense systems.[8] Several OSINT

social media accounts concluded that the strike likely destroyed a Ukrainian Patriot air defense system, although another OSINT account noted that Ukrainian forces also use the MAN KAT1 trucks as logistics vehicles.[9] ISW has not yet observed evidence confirming that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system.

US officials reportedly told CNN that Russia considered using “tactical or battlefield” nuclear weapons in Ukraine in 2022 – during the same time Russia conducted an intense information operation aimed at the West about Russia potentially using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine to deter Western support for Ukraine. CNN reported on March 9 that two senior Biden administration officials stated that the United States began “preparing rigorously” for a potential Russian “tactical or battlefield” nuclear strike in late 2022 after collecting intelligence indicating that Kremlin officials at various levels were discussing this possibility.[10] The United States reportedly contacted multiple high-level Kremlin officials, discussed the issue with US allies, and asked China and India to discourage Russia. CNN reported that one US official assessed that Chinese and Indian public statements were a “helpful, persuasive factor” that showed Russia the costs of their potential decision. The sources reportedly stated that the United States believed that significant Russian territorial or personnel losses in Ukraine could have been a “potential trigger” for a Russian tactical nuclear strike as the Kremlin viewed areas of occupied Ukraine, such as Kherson City, as Russian territory and potentially viewed the loss of such territories as a direct threat to the Kremlin or the Russian state – one scenario in which Russia would contemplate using nuclear weapons. CNN reported that US officials believed that the Kremlin may have tried to use claims that Ukraine intended to use a “dirty bomb,” which Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and other Kremlin officials were reportedly promoting in conversations with Western military and political officials at the time, as “cover” for a Russian tactical nuclear strike. Shoigu and other Kremlin officials routinely publicly promoted claims about a Ukrainian “dirty bomb” in October 2022 as part of an information designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine following Ukrainian forces’ rout of Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022.[11] Ukrainian forces have transgressed Russia’s nuclear “red lines” several times over the course of the war with no Russian nuclear strike, indicating that many of Russia’s “red lines” are most likely information operations designed to deter Ukrainian and Western action to defeat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s liberation of Russian-occupied territories during counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in fall 2022 and subsequent Ukrainian strikes against occupied Ukraine violated Russia’s “red lines.”[12] Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession also violated Russia’s so-called red lines. ISW continues to assess that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains highly unlikely.[13]

Senior Armenian officials stated that Armenia is considering seeking membership in the European Union (EU), against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated in a March 9 interview with Turkish TV channel *TRT World* that Armenia is considering new opportunities “taking into account the challenges [Armenia] has faced in the last three to four years” including “the idea of joining the EU.”[14] Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan stated on February 29 that “[Armenia] should think about [seeking EU candidate status].”[15] Russian officials have not responded to Armenian officials’ statements as of this publication. ISW continues to assess that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s acknowledgement and criticism of Armenia’s lack of participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) indicates that the Kremlin may be preparing a more concerted response to its deteriorating relations with Armenia.[16] The Kremlin has conducted hybrid wars against former Soviet states that have sought EU accession.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be open to negotiations with Russia only after Ukraine and its partners develop a peace plan and as Turkey continues to promote its own negotiation platform for the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would invite representatives of Russia to a peace summit only after Ukraine and other countries have developed a peace plan at a first peace summit.[17] Ukraine plans to hold the first Ukrainian Peace Formula Summit in Switzerland in 2024.[18] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated on March 8 that Turkey is ready to host a peace summit between Ukraine and Russia.[19] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and has no interest in ending the war on anything but Russia’s articulated maximalist terms of destroying Ukraine’s sovereignty and eradicating the notion of a unique Ukrainian national identity.[20]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting Rostov Oblast overnight on March 8-9 and may have struck a Russian aircraft plant refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft.**
- **Russian sources widely circulated footage of a Russian strike on March 9 to claim that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system in eastern Ukraine, although there has yet to be any confirmation of these claims.**
- **US officials reportedly told CNN that Russia considered using “tactical or battlefield” nuclear weapons in Ukraine in 2022 – during the same time Russia conducted an intense information operation aimed at the West about Russia potentially using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine to deter Western support for Ukraine.**
- **Senior Armenian officials stated that Armenia is considering seeking membership in the European Union (EU), against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be open to negotiations with Russia only after Ukraine and its partners develop a peace plan and as Turkey continues to promote its own negotiation platform for the war in Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting along the entire frontline on March 9.**
- **Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities, although ISW cannot independently verify this report.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced west of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 9. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[21] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Spirne.[22] Elements of the Russian 123rd and 7th motorized rifle brigades (2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[23]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced within Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces control over half the settlement, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[24] Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Druzhba and Shumy.[25] Elements of the Russian “Vostok-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka.[26]



Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on March 8 that the situation in the Avdiivka direction has stabilized and that Russian forces are currently only achieving


localized marginal advances.[27] Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka as fighting continued in the area on March 9. Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows that Russian forces recently advanced further in central Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[28] Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows that Russian forces also marginally advanced in fields south of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), though Russian forces likely did not make this advance recently.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters deep on a 1.27-kilometer-wide front south of Orlivka and up to 1.35 kilometers in depth near southwestern Tonenke.[30] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove, Berdychi, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[31] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) continue to operate in the Avdiivka direction, and elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Nevelske.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Avdiivka as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional fighting continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Volodymyrivka (southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Vuhledar-Volnovakha-Mariupol highway).[33] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Krasnohorivka.[34]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Shaylei Dauphinais, Tom Thacker, and Kaitlyn Thomas
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- + Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have decreased the tempo of their offensive operations near Robotyne due to Ukrainian drone strikes and difficulties clearing seized Ukrainian trenches.[36] The milblogger

claimed that Russian forces are also struggling with inadequate electronic warfare (EW) protection near Robotyne.[37] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and 165th Artillery Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction; elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne; and elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Robotyne and Verbove.[38]



Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on March 7 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer northwest of Verbove.

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky as of March 9.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of March 9, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Shaylei Dauphinais, Tom Thacker, and Kaitlyn Thomas
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

The main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea reportedly remains the only Russian naval base on the Black Sea capable of repairing certain types of ships despite Russian efforts to move some BSF naval assets away from the Sevastopol base. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 9 that Russian forces are currently repairing the project 775 Ropucha-class *Olenegorsk Miner* and *Azov* large landing ships and the project 1171 Tapir-class *Nikolai Filchenkov* large landing ship at the Sevastopol base as this is the only Black Sea

naval base that can repair these types of ships.[40] Mashovets also stated that Russian forces currently have docked the project 1135M *Inquisitive* Burevestnik-class patrol ship; the project 22800 *Cyclone* Karakurt-class corvette; the project 1124 *Kasimov*, *Muromets*, and *Eisk* Grisha-class corvettes; the project 12411 *Naberezhnye Chelny* Tarantul-class corvette; the project 266M *Kovrovets* and *Ivan Golubets* Natya-class minesweepers; and the project 12700 *Georgiy Kurbatov* and *Ivan Antonov* Alexandrit-class minesweepers at the Sevastopol BSF base. Mashovets stated that the project 775 *Yamal* Ropucha-class landing ship is currently preparing for sea trials in Sevastopol after Russian forces repaired the ship.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 15 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 of the drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Poltava oblasts.[41] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a Ukrainian substation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[42] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-31 missile at Odesa City and that the missile struck an open field outside of the city.[43]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 8 that elements of the Russian 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) stationed in Voronezh Oblast used at least 16 North Korean KN-23 (Hwasong-11 Ga) missiles during the Russian strike series on January 23, February 7, and February 15.[44]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities, although ISW cannot independently verify this report.[45] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Russia and Eurasia Program Senior Fellow Dara Massicot assessed that Russia likely removed its best equipment from strategic reserve and that Russia still retains "worse" or "unsalvageable" equipment in storage. Massicot also assessed that Russia's "remaining inventory will dwindle in the next couple of years" if Russia continues its current tempo of operations.[46] ISW has observed that reports of Russia's reported tank "production" numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[47] These assessments suggest that the Russian military has been largely leveraging vehicles from storage to sustain its war effort, rather than using new production to offset battlefield losses. Russia may face equipment shortages in the next several years if Russia's current loss rate remains the same or accelerates and Russia's current level of new vehicle production remains the same.

Reuters reported on March 8 that the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) announced that it uncovered "a major human trafficking network" that lured Indian citizens to work in Russia but would force them to join the Russian military.[48] The CBI stated that Russian authorities have coerced about 35 Indian citizens into joining the Russian military after promising them work opportunities. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated in late February that India is aware of

several Indian nationals serving in the Russian military and trying to secure the “early discharge” of 20 Indian nationals who were reportedly working as support staff for Russian forces.[49]

Russian forces may have formed their first-ever specialized drone brigade. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military formed the “Grom-Kaskad” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Brigade consisting of more than 820 personnel and up to 40 UAV crews that operate throughout Ukraine.[50] Mashovets stated that the Russian military formed the “Grom-Kaskad” UAV Brigade on the basis of the “BARS-Kaskad” Combined Tactical Detachment and units of the 55th Helicopter Regiment (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District [SMD]). Mashovets stated that the brigade is composed of two battalions of reconnaissance and strike UAV operators, one squadron of reconnaissance UAV operators, and up to a company of support units. Mashovets stated that the “Grom-Kaskad” UAV Brigade uses Zala, Orlan-30, Supercam, and first-person view (FPV) drones. This is the first time ISW has observed a report about Russian forces standing up a specialized drone unit at the brigade level.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Air Force (VKS) reportedly started using guided glide bombs against Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently started conducting air strikes with guided glide bombs with universal interspecific glide ammunition (UMPB), as opposed to using unguided glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK), in unspecified areas in Ukraine.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that the guided glide bombs with UMPB have jet engines, which are absent from FAB-250/500 bombs with UMPC, and thus can increase the range of a FAB-250/500 from 40-60 kilometers to 80-95 kilometers.[52]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 9 that the Russian military conducted 22 joint aerial reconnaissance flights with Belarusian forces along the Belarusian border with Poland and Lithuania in recent days.[53] Mashovets stated that up to two Russian Su-24 aircraft of the 4th Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron participated in the reconnaissance flights and at least one Russian aircraft operated from the Belarusian 61st Fighter Airbase in Baranovichy, Brest Oblast.[54]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://t.me/astrapress/50461>; https://t.me/mod_russia/36438; <https://www.svoboda.org/a/hronika-voiny-v-ukraine/31715636.html?lbis=374119>

[2] <https://twitter.com/Dmojavensis/status/1766288510905143657>;
<https://t.me/vchkogpu/46433?single> ;
<https://twitter.com/Dmojavensis/status/1766350946119110691>

[3] https://t.me/dva_majors/36188 ; <https://t.me/svarschiki/7926>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2023>

[4] <https://www.svoboda.org/a/hronika-voiny-v-ukraine/31715636.html?lbis=374119>

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/36445

[6] <https://t.me/rybar/58015> ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/14934 ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63387> ; <https://t.me/rybar/58017> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115869 ;
<https://t.me/epoddubny/19293> ; https://t.me/grey_zone/22301 ; <https://t.me/milinfo/117942> ;

[7] <https://t.me/rybar/58015> ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/14934 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63387> ; <https://t.me/rybar/58017> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115869 ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/19293> ; https://t.me/grey_zone/22301 ; <https://t.me/milinfo/117942> ;

[8] https://t.me/rian_ru/234603

[9] <https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1766445017046904864> ; <https://twitter.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1766442864899137772> ; <https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766485479602450775> ; <https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766490533763969169> ; <https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1766493220433703141>

[10] <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24>

[12] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23>

[13] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023>

[14] <https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32855075.html> ; <https://www.politico dot eu/article/armenia-mulling-eu-membership-application-foreign-minister-mirzoyan-says/>

[15] <https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32842668.html>

[16] https://t.me/MID_Russia/35828 ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2024>

[17] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-stress-ukraine-support-during-zelenskiy-visit-turkish-source-says-2024-03-08/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/701740-erdogan-zaproponuvav-poserednictvo-u-mirnih-peregovorah-za-ucastu-rosii-ale-zelenskij-zapereciv/>

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