



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov,
Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan**

May 21, 2024, 9:15pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on May 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-rattling to coincide with major policy discussions in the West as part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-makers. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 21 that missile elements of the Southern Military District (SMD) began the first stage of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons exercises.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces will also exercise with Iskander ballistic missiles and Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles. The Russian MoD announced the preparations for these exercises on May 6.[2] A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger explicitly tied Russian tactical nuclear weapons exercises to Kremlin efforts to influence Western decision-making — particularly targeting the recent discussions about the restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia — echoing ISW's assessment that Russia's tactical nuclear weapons tests are part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign that often uses nuclear saber-rattling to influence Western decision-makers to engage in self-deterrence.[3] Reflexive control is a key element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit — it is a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated to the *New York Times* (NYT) on May 20 that Russia currently enjoys a sanctuary in Russian territory from which Russian forces can conduct missile and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine and launch offensive operations with forces amassed in the international border area, as is the case with the ongoing limited Russian offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[5] ISW continues to assess that US and Western policies limiting Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia are severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against current Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast or any area along the international border where Russian forces may choose to conduct offensive operations in the future.[6]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the limited Russian offensive in northern Ukraine is achieving its goal of drawing attention away from intense Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated in an interview with *Reuters* published on May 20 that the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is now stable but that “no one” is paying attention to the wave of Russian offensive operations in Donbas in the Chasiv Yar (Bakhmut), Pokrovsk (Avdiivka), and Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City) directions.[7] Zelensky stated that the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has been stable for about a week, which is consistent with the slowing pace of Russian advances in the Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk directions following the initial few days of relatively rapid tactical advances.[8] Russian forces recently intensified their efforts to seize the operationally-significant town of Chasiv Yar west of Bakhmut as the tempo of operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast decreased, highlighting how the northern Kharkiv Oblast effort aims to draw and fix Ukrainian forces and create opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater.[9] As ISW has consistently reported, Russian forces' most immediate prospect for operationally-significant gains remains the Chasiv Yar direction, as seizing Chasiv Yar would enable Russian forces to set conditions to attack part of a "fortress belt" of cities forming the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defenses, and Russian forces likely seek to exploit unfavorable situations for Ukrainian forces defending near Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka before US military assistance arrives at the frontlines at scale.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff has reported for the past week that Russian forces maintain a higher tempo of offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction even as the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has stabilized.[11]

The Russian military command reportedly initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but the limited force grouping deployed to the area suggests that the Russian military command likely changed these plans in the lead up to offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast. The *Economist* reported on May 20 that it viewed Russian military plans from an unspecified date about a planned Russian offensive in the Kharkiv City and Vovchansk directions.[12] The Russian plans reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Borshchova (about 20 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City and about 16 kilometers from the international border) within 72 hours in order to place Russian forces within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. The Russian plans also reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Pechenihiy (south of Vovchansk and about 50 kilometers from the international border) in an unspecified time frame. The Russian offensive was reportedly initially planned to begin May 15 to 16, and the *Economist* stated that it is unknown why Russian forces pushed forward their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to May 10 instead. ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced a maximum of about 10 kilometers deep in the Kharkiv City direction and a maximum of about seven kilometers deep in the Vovchansk direction since May 10. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on May 2 that Russian forces had concentrated about 35,000 personnel in the international border area and planned to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel.[13] Russian forces reportedly launched offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength and have only committed a limited amount of combat power to the area thus far.[14]

The Russian military command very likely did not expect these limited and understrength forces to be able to reach these objectives, and a Ukrainian reserve officer observed that Russian forces have focused on “creeping advances” rather than swift drives to an operational depth since their military failures in 2022.[15] The *Economist* did not specify when the Russian military command created these reported

plans, and it is possible that the Russian military command created the plans before it became clear that the Northern Grouping of Forces would not be staffed at its desired end strength or that an earlier or more limited attack was desired. The Russian military command may have also decided to start offensive operations with an understrength grouping to take advantage of Ukrainian manpower and materiel shortages before the arrival of Western aid at scale to the frontline.

Russian authorities recently arrested the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Major General Ivan Popov, on fraud charges. Popov was largely responsible for Russian defenses against the Ukrainian Summer 2023 counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] The 235th Garrison Military Court reported that authorities arrested Popov on May 17 for large-scale fraud and will hold Popov in detention for two months.[17] Popov's lawyer stated that authorities investigated the case for eight months before arresting Popov.[18] A prominent Russian milblogger, who alleged that they knew about Popov's arrest before it was officially announced, claimed that authorities charged Popov with fraud worth 100 million rubles (about \$1.1 million) after Popov was involved in the sale of 2,000 tons of metal products intended for the construction of fortifications in the 58th CAA's area of responsibility in the Zaporizhia direction.[19] The milblogger claimed that an unspecified entrepreneur from Krasnodar Krai and an unspecified high-ranking Southern Military District commander are also defendants in the case. A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian military command summoned Popov to Moscow from Syria at an unspecified date and threateningly urged him to resign but Popov refused.[20] A Kremlin-awarded milblogger claimed that when they tried to clarify information last year about Popov's removal, unspecified sources did not mention any corruption charges but only discussed Popov's "military mistakes." [21] Select Russian milbloggers responded to the news of Popov's arrest by praising Popov as a competent and respected military commander and expressing hope that authorities would forgive him and allow him to return to military service.[22] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov fired Popov in July 2023 after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid the Ukrainian Summer 2023 counteroffensive.[23] Popov claimed in leaked audio that former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24]

The Kremlin is likely using the pattern of recent arrests of high-ranking officials on corruption charges in the Russian MoD to conceal the real reasons for Popov's punishment almost 10 months after his conflict with the Russian military command and subsequent dismissal from his command position. Russian authorities likely did not want to publicly punish Popov in July 2023 out of fear of a rush of public support for the competent commander. The Kremlin also likely did not want to draw attention to issues in the Russian military command in the aftermath of the June 2023 Wagner Group's rebellion.[25] Popov's arrest comes after multiple recent high-profile arrests of MoD officials reportedly close to Shoigu on corruption charges.[26] The Kremlin likely hopes that arresting Popov in the middle of this alleged wide-scale anti-corruption campaign will minimize attention to Popov's previous insubordination. Popov's arrest, however, sends a clear signal to Russian military commanders that insubordinate senior officers will face serious punishments eventually and that Russian President Vladimir Putin values loyalty over competence.

Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces likely damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) *Tsyklon* small missile ship in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on May 19. Satellite imagery dated May 20 shows a damaged building, a rescue ship, and a floating crane near

the port where the *Tsyklon* was docked on May 17.[27] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian *Tsyklon* Karakhut-class (project 22800) small missile ship in Sevastopol Bay with three US-provided ATACMS missiles on May 19.[28] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command and Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on May 21 that there are no more Russian Karakurt-class ships in the Black Sea following the Ukrainian strike against the *Tsyklon* on May 19.[29] Pletenchuk stated that the *Tsyklon* was the "last missile carrier" in occupied Crimea and that Russian forces have likely moved all remaining BSF missile carriers to basing in Novorossiysk.[30] Pletenchuk stated that the *Tsyklon* had only been in service for a year and had not yet launched a cruise missile strike. Pletenchuk stated that Russia planned to deploy five Karakurt-class ships in the Black Sea, but that Ukrainian forces previously destroyed the *Askold* in November 2023, that Russian forces moved the *Amur* and *Tucha* from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, and that the fifth unnamed ship is still under construction in Taganrog, Krasnodar Krai.[31]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-rattling to coincide with major policy discussions in the West as part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-makers.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the limited Russian offensive in northern Ukraine is achieving its goal of drawing attention away from intense Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.**
- **The Russian military command reportedly initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but the limited force grouping deployed to the area suggests that the Russian military command likely changed these plans in the lead up to offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.**
- **Russian authorities recently arrested the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Major General Ivan Popov, on fraud charges.**
- **The Kremlin is likely using the pattern of recent arrests of high-ranking officials on corruption charges in the Russian MoD to conceal the real reasons for Popov's punishment almost 10 months after his conflict with the Russian military command and subsequent dismissal from his command position.**
- **Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces likely damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) *Tsyklon* small missile ship in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on May 19.**
- **Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, and Donetsk City.**
- **A Russian milblogger claimed that frequent Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles that lack electronic warfare (EW) systems along the frontline have created an "urgent" shortage of off-road vehicles.**
- **Russian authorities continue to illegally and forcibly deport Ukrainian citizens, including children, to Russia and to forcibly remove Ukrainian citizens deeper into occupied Ukraine.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi amid continued fighting on May 21. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between 300 and 450 meters in the Lyptsi direction, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on the evening of May 21 that Russian forces have significantly increased operations in the Kharkiv direction, after the number of Russian attacks decreased on May 20.[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▬ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▬ Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on May 21 that Russian forces advanced between 300 and 450 meters near Lyptsi. A Russian source claimed on May 21 that Russian forces advanced between 100 and 350 meters in Vovchansk. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 17 that the maximum extent of Russian advances into Kharkiv Oblast was 10 kilometers. A Russian source claimed on May 17 that Russian forces advanced between 300 and 600 meters toward Lyptsi.


Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance southwest of Vovchansk amid continued fighting in and around the settlement on May 21. Geolocated footage published on May 18 shows that Russian forces have advanced further into Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk).[34] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 100 to 350 meters within Vovchansk and marginally crossed the Vovcha River into southwestern Vovchansk towards a police station and oil extraction plant, but one milblogger claimed that Russian forces have only reached, not crossed, a destroyed bridge on Haharina Street.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces maintain a limited position on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River and has not observed visual confirmation of Russian armored vehicles or a significant number of infantry operating on the south bank.[36] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking Prylipka (southwest of Vovchansk on the southern [left] bank of the Siverskyi Donets River), but ISW has not observed confirmation of Russian forces crossing this river.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in Vovchansk and near Starytsya.[38]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces have deployed "African mercenaries" on the axis.[39] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are conducting infantry-led "meat assaults" with the "mercenaries" before regular Russian forces attack. It is unclear what the Ukrainian serviceman meant by "African mercenaries." A Russian milblogger, who had previously amplified insider information about the Wagner Group, claimed on May 13 that former Wagner Group elements are fighting in Kharkiv Oblast, but the milblogger did not specify under which formations these elements are subordinated.[40] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 20 that elements of the Russian MoD's Africa Corps are operating near Lyptsi.[41] The Ukrainian Crimean-based "Atesh" partisan group recently reported, citing sources allegedly in the Russian 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), that elements of the Africa Corps, "mercenaries" who have fought in African countries, and people implied to be from African countries are fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[42] The Ukrainian Resistance Center previously reported that Russia is recruiting from African countries.[43] While these reports are cumulatively unclear, it is possible that some combination of citizens from African countries, elements of the Africa Corps, and former Wagner Group elements are currently fighting with Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on May 21. Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Makiivka.[45] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces secured positions 1.18 kilometers along a forested area east of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove).[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Ivanivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; west of Kreminna near Dibrova and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kupyansk as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Russian forces advanced into Myasozharivka.

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine *
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian MoD for its May 20 claim that Russian forces seized Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna). Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not seized Bilohorivka.[48] A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger complained that the Russian military command is pursuing "political" objectives that have no effect on the battlefield.[49] Another Russian milblogger, who has previously served as a Storm-Z instructor, claimed that the Russian MoD is lying and quoted recently appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's statement that "you can make mistakes, but you cannot lie." [50]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged a fuel warehouse in occupied Dovzhansk, Luhansk Oblast with ATACMS missiles and drones on May 20.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances south of Siversk (northeast of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces continued to attack in the Siversk direction and advanced north of Vesele (south of Siversk) but observed that Ukrainian drone usage is complicating Russian advances in the area.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka.[53] A Russian milblogger, who previously served as a Storm-Z instructor, claimed that Russian forces are stubbornly concentrating on assaulting on the Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna)-Spirne (east of Siversk) lines despite such efforts failing to accomplish any results and resulting in significant Russian manpower and equipment losses.[54] Elements of the Russian “GORB” detachment (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and “Kanada” group of the “Akhmat” Spetsnaz are reportedly fighting near Spirne.[55]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently advanced in southern and central Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction. Russian milbloggers amplified a video on May 21 purportedly showing a Russian tank driving through Klishchiivka to deliver assault groups of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) to the southern outskirts of the settlement before returning to its unspecified positions north of the settlement.[56] Russian milbloggers amplified another video on May 21 reportedly showing Russian forces operating in central Klishchiivka.[57] ISW geolocated both videos, confirming that Russian forces advanced in southern and central Klishchiivka. Russian sources claimed that this footage confirmed that Russian forces have entirely seized Klishchiivka and pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement but are not actively occupying the settlement because


Ukrainian forces control the commanding height in the area.[58] ISW had not observed visual evidence indicating that Russian forces seized northern and western Klishchiivka, however. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces only advanced 600 meters along the central road in Klishchiivka, and that fighting for the settlement was still ongoing as of May 21.[59] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces expanded their positions in the Stupky-Holubovski 2 nature reserve area (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[60] Russian forces reportedly continued to attack Chasiv Yar and the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar); and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[61] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces control Chasiv Yar and that there are no Russian forces in the settlement.[62] Elements of the Russian "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade, the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC), and the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[63] Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly fighting on the Andriivka-Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), and foreign mercenaries from the Russian "Africa Corps" are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Netaylove (west of Avdiivka) and continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on May 21. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) and other unspecified units forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Netaylove.[65] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced 450 meters deep in Netaylove and are clearing the western part of the settlement after seizing the remaining houses in the area.[66] ISW recently observed geolocated footage published on May 18, which showed that Russian forces advanced in western Netaylove.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff observed on May 20 that Russian offensive activities were intense near Netaylove.[68] Fighting continued northwest of

Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Sokil, Prohres, Yevhenivka, Ocheretyne, Solovyove, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Sieverne, Netaylove, and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Sieverne.[69] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Ocheretyne.[70]




Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka and in eastern Paraskoviivka (both southwest of Donetsk City).[71] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters in southwestern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[72] Russian forces reportedly attacked west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka, and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and in Paraskoviivka.[73] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Paraskoviivka; and elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), “GRACHI” Spetsnaz, and 5th Division (unknown parent formation) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[74] Elements of the Russian 87th Separate Rifle Regiment (formerly the 119th regiment, 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk direction; and elements of the Russian 14th Guards Special Purpose Brigade (subordinate to the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional battles continued on May 21 near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area.[76]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on May 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command and Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces have not seized Robotyne.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 3.5 kilometers wide and

one kilometer deep southeast of Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[78] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[79]




Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on May 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Krynky in the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[80] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger denied recent Russian claims that Russian forces seized Krynky and claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement. The milblogger claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have conditional control over the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements are operating in difficult conditions on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[82] ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division redeployed from western Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Krynky.[83]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 21, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 20 to 21 and a missile strike against Ukraine during the day on May 21. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola

Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 29 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot 28 Shaheds down over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the night of May 20 to 21.[84] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that falling Shahed debris damaged four civilian objects in Kharkiv City, and Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that there was an explosion at a transportation infrastructure facility in the city.[85] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a strike against production infrastructure in Konotop with an unspecified missile.[86]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with *Reuters* published on May 20 that Russian forces are using 300 aircraft in Ukrainian territory and reiterated that Ukrainian forces need about 120 to 130 F-16s or other advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia.[87]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger claimed that frequent Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles that lack electronic warfare (EW) systems along the frontline have created an "urgent" shortage of off-road vehicles.[88] The milblogger claimed on May 21 that increasing Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles along the frontline has increased the Russian military's need for off-road vehicles to transport ammunition to positions along the frontline and evacuate wounded personnel. The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces need motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to use in assault operations in areas with significant Ukrainian drone usage. The milblogger claimed that employees of the military representative office, a department of the Russian MoD that regulates military-technical support for Russian troops, try to expropriate and sell vehicles. The Russian milblogger called on the Russian MoD and government to provide more vehicles and motorcycles to the Russian military and send confiscated civilian vehicles to Russian forces for use in Ukraine. ISW has recently observed efforts in at least one Russian federal subject to send confiscated vehicles to the Russian military for use in Ukraine.[89]

The Russian MoD launched the Project 22870 rescue and tugboat *Mikhail Chekhov* on May 21 at the Zvezdochka Shipyard in Astrakhan Oblast on May 21.[90] The Astrakhan Oblast Governor's Press Service announced that the *Mikhail Chekhov* is the seventh ship of this series.[91] Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against the Project 22870 *Vasily Bekh* in June 2022.[92]

A source close to the Russian MoD told Russian investigative outlet *Dossier Center* that newly-appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov previously supervised the activities of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[93] The source noted that Belousov had close relations with Prigozhin, and Prigozhin's personal calendar obtained by *Dossier Center* further confirmed previous meetings between Prigozhin and Belousov. *Dossier Center* revealed that Belousov received a document in 2018 analyzing Russia's prospects for expanding private military companies (PMCs) and emphasizing the importance of PMCs against the backdrop of Russia's confrontation with the United States and the United Kingdom and growing "gray areas" in international conflicts. The document reportedly stated that the Russian PMCs should form under "full state control and in accordance with the main objectives of ensuring security," and labeled Wagner as a PMC managed by the Russian MoD.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue to illegally and forcibly deport Ukrainian citizens, including children, to Russia and to forcibly remove Ukrainian citizens deeper into occupied Ukraine. Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on May 18 that there are plans to remove more than 1,000 Ukrainian children from occupied Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts to a children's camp in occupied Berdyansk in 2024.[94] Balitsky also claimed that Russian authorities will remove and deport more than 6,700 Ukrainian children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to health centers in occupied Crimea, the Chuvash Republic, and the North Ossetia-Alania Republic in 2024.[95] Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on May 20 that Russian authorities organized a "vacation" for 12 Ukrainian children and their families from occupied Novoluhanske, Donetsk Oblast to Krasnodar Krai where they met with Russian servicemembers and veterans.[96] Lvova-Belova also claimed on May 21 that Russian authorities deported 32 Ukrainian families from occupied Ukraine to Moscow Oblast to attend a youth festival.[97] Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on May 21 that Russian authorities plan to install drone protection systems at the Artek children's camp in occupied Crimea, which frequently houses Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed from other occupied Ukrainian territories under the guise of recreational vacations.[98] Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets stated on May 21 that 52,673 Ukrainian citizens, including 3,676 children, have been missing since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[99]

Russian federal subjects continue to establish patronage networks with Russian occupation authorities. Russian Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Kherson Oblast occupation officials met with the head of the Permanent Mission of Krasnodar Krai to the Russian Government Andrei Volf on May 20 and discussed attracting small and medium businesses to occupied Kherson Oblast and the provision of humanitarian aid to occupied Kherson Oblast.[100] Saldo also claimed on May 21 that schools in occupied Kherson Oblast and the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic continue educational exchanges as part of "sister city" programs.[101]

Russian exiled opposition outlet *Novaya Gazeta Europe* reported on May 20 that Russian authorities have nationalized 13,300 houses and apartments in occupied Ukraine.[102] *Novaya Gazeta* reported that Russian authorities have nationalized half of these homes since the start of 2024. Russian authorities reportedly claim to only seize housing from those that do not intend to return to Ukraine, but *Novaya Gazeta* stated that 77.5 percent of the seized homes are in areas that Russian forces recently occupied.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev attempted to cast the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland as illegitimate and threatened countries that participate.[103] Medvedev claimed that Russia will "remember" which countries participate and that this will "definitely" influence these countries' bilateral relations with Russia in the future. Medvedev made these claims on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, suggesting that his threats were specifically aimed at international audiences. Kremlin officials will likely intensify their information operations targeting the Swiss peace conference in the lead up to the event on June 15-16, 2024.

A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger continued to promote known Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova on May 21.[104]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russia and Belarus continue Union State integration measures. Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Pyotr Parkhomchik and Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov discussed on May 20 creating a unified industrial policy within the Union State framework as well as closer cooperation in machine tool, shipbuilding, and aircraft manufacturing – all of which could support Russia's war effort.[105] Union State Parliamentary Assembly Commission for economic policy member Viktor Nikolaikin stated on May 21 that Russia and Belarus are also developing a unified property law within the Union State.[106]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/38968

[2] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2024>

[3] <https://t.me/rybar/60252>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-warfare>

[5] <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/21/world/europe/zelensky-interview-times-transcript.html>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias>

[7] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-president-zelenskiy-speaks-reuters-exclusive-interview-2024-05-20/> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/western-aid-ukraine-too-slow-risks-us-election-limited-zelenskiy-2024-05-20/> ;

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324>

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824>

[10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042824>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724>

[11] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NRBpKVNvb5AmnyP3Sjc7b2xyUENHFrs5j3xTFuHgoEr1qJTrzktfdPG6HYSCQ5A6l>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WM55JvZsx8iKWEvXyxVJWMgvA3Hnn6v7o4GpZMpjrTB8ysQPpePb1g3GDojxzNBil>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXH05dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0B3zWGHwXpsXH7aCDMcccGcZskb6Hv5ARHnj4UXLo7Z9bgXahCGL57VqRh82kmZXVl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidop9sXxmzgyVccjPYkT2CY7cys4i3V5ijj51dzBjeWtnWMGe5BvszF38UNYAgkoix5l>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol>;

[12] <https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/20/ukraines-desperate-struggle-to-defend-kharkiv>

[13] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024>

[14] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824>

[15] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1792832029442052598

[16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2023>

[17] <https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/664c9f119a79471b6b680ca3>; <https://ria dot ru/20240521/moshennichestvo-1947465506.html> ;

[18] <https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/664c9f119a79471b6b680ca3>

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/43168; https://t.me/dva_majors/43133

[20] <https://t.me/vchkogpu/48369>

[21] <https://t.me/rybar/60257>

[22] https://t.me/grey_zone/23142; https://t.me/Dead_heads/1558 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10536; https://t.me/grey_zone/23140; <https://t.me/RuFront/11053>; https://t.me/grey_zone/23138

[23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2023>

[24] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2023>

[25] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2023>

[26] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424> ;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324>

[27] <https://x.com/WarVehicle/status/1792943699137056828> ;
https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1792946345981931978 ;
<https://x.com/therawe2/status/1792928900420403239>

[28] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2024>

[29] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/21/proyekt-raketnyh-korabliv-typu-czyklon-pohovanyj-v-azovo-chornomorskemu-regioni-dmytro-pletenchuk/>

[30] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/21/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-yak-urazhennya-korablya-czyklon-vplyne-na-zdatnist-rf-zapuskaty-kalibry/>

[31] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/21/proyekt-raketnyh-korabliv-typu-czyklon-pohovanyj-v-azovo-chornomorskemu-regioni-dmytro-pletenchuk/> ;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2023>

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/43139

[33] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoirZABhozPCuDW8eHB2fCWNYJFCnuZThySGRZVpqhwWqth3MyzPYN5yNeKX1tryYml>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoirZABhozPCuDW8eHB2fCWNYJFCnuZThySGRZVpqhwWqth3MyzPYN5yNeKX1tryYml>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a0a9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQT C49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aQe2Mmi7ZFycS6iWfv5rySKBmfFwBFkp8cxENygfLFhQE9RLjbPVk2MPFeJMnFPel>

[34] https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/288; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5591

[35] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/17829; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10924>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10945>; <https://t.me/rybar/60244>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/43139

[36] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2024>

[37] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10945>

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/38956

[39] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/750493-na-harkivskomu-napramku-rf-zastosovue-najmanciv-z-afriki-dla-masnih-sturmiv-major-13-i-brigadi-ngu-hartia/>

[40] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/34666; https://t.me/dva_majors/42490

[41] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2024>

[42] https://t.me/atesh_ua/4571

[43] <https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/russia-recruits-thousands-of-african-and-1708033780.html>; <https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/en/russians-continue-to-recruit-mercenaries-in-africa-and-asia/>

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5587; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/17993

[45] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10951>

[46] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68663>

[47] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoirZABhozPCuDW8eHB2fCWNyJFCnuZThySGRZVpqhwWqth3MyzPYN5yNeKX1tryYml> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoDDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoaQe2Mmi7ZFycS6iWfv5rySKBmfFwBFkp8cxENygfLFhQE9RLjbPvk2MPFeJMnFPel>; https://t.me/mod_russia/38956

[48] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10952> ; <https://t.me/rybar/60239> ;
https://t.me/philologist_zov/988

[49] <https://t.me/rybar/60239>

[50] https://t.me/philologist_zov/988

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/43128; https://t.me/tass_agency/250140 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/43139 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68640> ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2451; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68674> ;

[52] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10924>; <https://t.me/rybar/60239>

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoiKkvEYyYaqJ8Nh4oC4yK8PK2vUkAxQPvHaCgaSN5rUCPBd6ewk3dQgbaUEjD9RQcl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful>

[54] https://t.me/philologist_zov/989

[55] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14508; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4789

[56] <https://t.me/rybar/60253>; https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/834; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68700>; https://t.me/dva_majors/43182

[57] https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/833; <https://t.me/rybar/60253>

[58] <https://t.me/rybar/60253>; https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/834; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68700>; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/17829;

[59] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10942>; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26881;

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/43139; <https://t.me/rybar/60244>

[61] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoirZABhozPCuDW8eHB2fCWNYJFCnuZThySGRZVpqhwWqth3MyzPYN5yNeKX1tryYml> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoiKkvEYyYaqJ8Nh4oC4yK8PK2vUkAxQPvHaCgaSN5rUCPBd6ewk3dQgbaUEjD9RQcl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoDDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoaQe2Mmi7ZFycS6iWfv5rySKBmfFwBFkp8cxENygfLFhQE9RLjbPVk2MPFeJMnFPel>; <https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3865958-vovcansk-i-casiv-ar-kontroluut-sili-oboroni.html>; <https://t.me/rybar/60244>

[62] <https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3865958-vovcansk-i-casiv-ar-kontroluut-sili-oboroni.html>

[63] <https://t.me/milinfolive/122630>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68688>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68656>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68663>

[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/38951; <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10450>

[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124345; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68644>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10950> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26880; <https://t.me/wargonzo/20054>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68663>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124345; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56430>; https://t.me/pri gozhin_2023_tg/11363

[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124345; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68644>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10950> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26880; <https://t.me/wargonzo/20054>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68663>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124345; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56430>

[67] <https://www.understandingwar.org/background/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2024>

[68] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful>

[69] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0irZABhozPCuDW8eHB2fCWNyJFCnuZThySGRZVpqhwWqth3MyzPYN5yNeKX1tryYml>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmhehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful>; https://t.me/mod_russia/38956; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10924>

[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124356

[71] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/337; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5590; <https://x.com/small10space/status/1792933395250500090>; <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1792939382199984612>

[72] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10943>

[73] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; https://t.me/dva_majors/43139; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/17829;

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/43161 (Paraskoviivka); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124415; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68662>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68692> (Krasnohorivka)

[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124415 (Donetsk direction); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124358 (Vuhledar)

[76] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHmV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZBR4k8BYL3MHCVHYVGEhkEoouMq8tivMbhBSMksbunyXnMinsgSG8srGMBtc37dl>; https://t.me/mod_russia/38957

[77] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2024/05/21/okupanty-prypynyly-shturmuvaty-krynky-robotyne-vorog-ne-zahopyv/

[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/43139

[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/43139 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10924> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/20054>

[80] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoiKkvEYyYaqJ8Nh4oC4yK8PK2vUkAxQPvHaCgaSN5rUCPBd6ewk3dQgbaUEjD9RQcl>
; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoDDv6RZBnUFwK8LDzmmehJeAT4mbgsT4LdMfyBo898HUgXuARuza8SYikVQgy2Mful> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2aoa9H7Jd5id4pJKH7eEeHVMV97EZtbg17DQTC49FizXhVBDmeAeCqfDQUinmhCQNTl>

[81] <https://t.me/rybar/60243>

[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/43139

[83] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2024>

[84] <https://t.me/ComAFUA/295>

[85] <https://t.me/synegubov/9597> ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1363 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2024/05/21/po-harkovu-rosiyany-zavdaly-udaru-ye-postrazhdalyj/>
; <https://t.me/bbcruussian/65372>

[86] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/26441

[87] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-president-zelenskiy-speaks-reuters-exclusive-interview-2024-05-20/>

[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/43146

[89] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024>

[90] <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/20862875>

[91] <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/20862875>

[92] <https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/vms-ukrayiny-dvoma-raketamy-urazyly-rosijskyj-buksyr-vasylyj-beh/>

[93] <https://dossier.center/belousov/>

[94] <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3192>

[95] <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3192>

[96] <https://t.me/malvovabelova/3321>

- [97] <https://t.me/malvovabelova/3326>
- [98] <https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4914>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2023> ;
- [99] <https://suspilne dot media/750541-lubinec-rozpoviv-skilki-ludej-perebuvaut-u-rozsuku-vid-pocatku-povnomasstabnoi-vijni/>
- [100] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/3254
- [101] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/22133
- [102] <https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/05/20/ukraina-kvartiru-dala-a-rossiia-teper-otbiraet>
- [103] <https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1792861179234210205>
- [104] <https://t.me/rybar/60247>
- [105] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/249011 ; <https://www.belta dot by/economics/view/belarus-i-rossija-obsudili-realizatsiju-edinoj-promyshlennoj-politiki-v-sg-635624-2024/>
- [106] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/249092 ; <https://www.belta dot by/society/view/sojuznye-parlamentarii-rabotajut-nad-unifikatsiej-zakonodatelstva-o-sobstvennosti-635764-2024/>

