



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan**

**December 11, 2024, 5:30pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on December 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.** Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line.[1] This advance places Russian forces about six kilometers south of Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on December 11 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian fortifications west of Novyi Trud, south of Novotroitske (southwest of Shevchenko), and on the southwestern outskirts of Shevchenko itself. Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces lost two positions during these attacks and are working to restore them.[2] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Pokrovsk characterized the situation in this direction as "critical," largely because each Russian battalion-sized formation receives about 200 fresh personnel per month.[3] The Ukrainian commander also emphasized that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions up to 30 times per day and have an advantage in artillery fires—suggesting that Russian forces are currently relying on a superior number of personnel and artillery ammunition to secure tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that the Russian command has resumed offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but that this maneuver is coming at a massive cost to Russian manpower and equipment.[4] Another Ukrainian brigade officer reported that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks.[5] Continued Russian losses at this scale will impose a mounting cost on Russia's already-strained force generation apparatus. Russian forces may well continue making gains towards Pokrovsk, but the losses they are taking to do so will temper their ability to translate these gains into more far-reaching offensive operations.

**US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.** *Bloomberg*, citing an unspecified US official, reported on December 11 that Russia may conduct a new Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine in "the coming days." [6] Russia first employed the Oreshnik missile in a strike against Dnipro City on November 21, 2024. ISW assesses that Russian Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine and the rhetoric surrounding Russia's use of the missile are part of a broader Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.[7] Russian Chief of the General

Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov previously undermined this sustained Kremlin information operation, however, by claiming that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Russian officials are likely to amplify similar narratives about the Oreshnik if Russian forces use it again.

**Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 11 that units of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck a loading point for the Druzhba oil pipeline in Bryansk Oblast, causing a massive fire.[9] The pipeline receives, stores, and distributes fuel and supplies to Russian forces, and the strike caused a massive fire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 14 Ukrainian drones over Bryansk Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike against an unspecified industrial facility in Bryansk Oblast caused a fire.[10] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched six ATACMS missiles at the Taganrog military airfield in Rostov Oblast, that Russian Pantsir air defenses downed two missiles, and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) "deflected" four missiles.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that falling missile fragments damaged two buildings near the airfield, three military vehicles, and cars in the nearby parking lot.[12] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on December 11 that it geolocated footage of the strike to the area near the Taganrog 325th Aircraft Repair Plant.[13] Ukrainian defense outlet *Militarnyi* reported that the plant repairs Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, Il-76 military transport aircraft, Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft, among other foreign aircraft.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched "Palyanitsa" drone missiles at Taganrog, and residents purportedly reported sounds of at least 10 explosions.[15] ISW has not observed confirmation of which systems Ukrainian forces used in the strikes.

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.**
- **US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.**
- **The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within Russian regional administrations.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

## Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced east of Novoivanovka.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently seized Darino (southeast of Korenevo) and Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[17] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims. Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Sudzha, and drone elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]), and the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), are reportedly operating near Plekhovo.[18] Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Sudzha Raion, elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Darino, and elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and "Tigr" Volunteer Detachment (Russian Army Combat Reserve [BARS]) are operating in the Kursk direction.[19]

# Ukrainian Incursion into Kursk Oblast as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET




**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on December 10 and 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.<sup>[20]</sup> A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.<sup>[21]</sup> Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke, Strilecha, and Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on December 10 and 11.<sup>[22]</sup> The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 11 that Russian forces are now conducting assaults on the Ukrainian flanks instead of frontal assaults due to high losses.<sup>[23]</sup> The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on December 11 that Russian forces occasionally conduct assaults with heavy equipment and change assault tactics, sometimes attacking with small groups of four to five soldiers (about a fireteam) and other times with company-sized infantry groups.<sup>[24]</sup> The brigade spokesperson added that Russian forces task initial infantry groups with gaining a foothold near Ukrainian positions so that better trained Russian forces can advance afterwards.<sup>[25]</sup> The brigade spokesperson warned that Russian forces have accumulated large quantities of manpower and equipment and may launch renewed offensive operations against Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but did not specify when these offensive operations may begin.<sup>[26]</sup> The brigade spokesperson stated that elements of the Russian Africa Corps, including remnants of the Wagner Group who reportedly had prior combat experience in Syria, are operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<sup>[27]</sup>

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET




## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian milbloggers continued to claim on December 11 that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Sumy Oblast near Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City along the international border and near the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast).[28] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration and Ukraine's State Border Service dismissed claims on December 10 that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Sumy Oblast as disinformation.[29] ISW has not observed any evidence of Russian forces operating in or near Oleksandriya.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on December 11 that the battalion repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon involving tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored vehicles on an unspecified date.[30] Russian forces continued attacking east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, and Hlushkivka; northwest of Svatove near Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Kopanky, Zeleny Hai, Nadiya, Makiivka, Cherneshchyna, Tverdokhlibove, and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske, Zarichne, Torske, and Yampolivka; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on December 10 and 11.[31] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Oskil River and seize the east (left) bank of Kupyansk by January 1, 2025, but that Ukrainian forces are successfully repelling Russian forces and counterattacking in unspecified areas.[32] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area; and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Terny.[33]



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET




## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on December 10

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on December 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, while other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized most of the plant during a fair-weather period, but that Ukrainian forces retain positions on the plant's western outskirts.[35] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attempts to gain a foothold across the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal near Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and that the area is currently a contested "gray" zone.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on December 10 and 11.[37] Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[38]


# Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET



Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Toretsk amid continued fighting in this direction on December 11. Geolocated footage posted on December 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwestward along Fabrychna Street in central Toretsk.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing along Rudnychna and Mayakovskoho streets in the direction of the Tsentralny Market in central Toretsk and seized the Tsentralna mine and nearby waste heaps in Zabalka Microraion in southern Toretsk, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed advances.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that it is difficult to assess Russian advances in central Toretsk and Zabalka Microraion due to lack of communication from Russian frontline forces, extensive destruction in the city, and because other areas of the front are occupying more attention in the information space.[41] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the purported Russian seizure of Zabalka Microraion allowed Russian forces to advance to the southern

outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) from the southeast by protecting the right flank from possible Ukrainian counterattacks.[42] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russian forces occupy all of Zabalka Microrraion, however. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing towards Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[43] Russian forces conducted ground attacks within and near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on December 10 and 11.[44]

## Assessed Control of Terrain Around Toretsk as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Toretsk City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Field Fortifications

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

*See topline text for updates on the situation in the Pokrovsk direction.*

Russian forces recently advanced south of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on December 11. Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dalne (south of Kurakhove).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and advanced to the outskirts of Petropavlivka (further northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Kurakhove, in Yuzhnyi Microraion (southern Kurakhove) and around Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir).[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kurakhove itself; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka, Zorya, and Stari Terny; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on December 10 and 11.[48] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near the grain elevator in central Kurakhove, and elements of the 112th Motorized Rifle Regiment (51st CAA), 3rd Battalion of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kurakhove area.[49]


# Assessed Control of Terrain East of Pokrovsk as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET



\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Russian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on December 11. Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced to positions along Peremohy Street in Veselyi Hai (north of Vuhledar).<sup>[50]</sup> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Veselyi Hai from the south (as opposed to from the east via Yelyzavetivka), although ISW has not yet observed evidence of Russian forces operating in the fields directly south of Veselyi Hai but has observed evidence of Russian forces operating along Peremohy Street east of Veselyi Hai.<sup>[51]</sup> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance on the outskirts of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar), and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces have occupied roughly one third of the settlement.<sup>[52]</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Sukhi Yaly, and Trudove; north of Vuhledar near Uspenivka, Veselyi Hai, and

Hannivka; and northeast of Vuhledar near Yelyzavetivka, Antonivka, and Katerynivka on December 10 and 11.[53] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue operating near Sukhi Yaly.[54]



Russian forces continued intensive offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along windbreaks near Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked south of Velyka Novosilka near Blahodatne and Makarivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on December 10 and 11.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and Novyi Komar and south of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Blahodatne.[57] Assault elements of the 1st Motorized Battalion of the

Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly fighting near Velyka Novosilka, and drone operators and assault units of the Russian 5th CAA (EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) direction including west of Storozheve (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]






## **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novoandriivka and Pyatykhatky (both northwest of Robotyne) on December 10 and 11 but did not advance.[59]


Russian forces continue to endanger the safety of the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated on December 10 that an unspecified actor conducted a drone strike on an IAEA vehicle on the road to the ZNPP.[60] Ukrainian Deputy Serhiy Rudyk, who accompanied the IAEA vehicle, published a photo on December 10 of the damage to the vehicle from the attack and stated that Russian forces conducted the drone strike.[61] X (formerly Twitter) users geolocated the strike to west of Stepanohirsk in Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast.[62] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused Ukrainian forces of the attack.[63] Environmental activism organization Greenpeace, citing a commissioned report from McKenzie's Intelligence Services, reported on December 11 that satellite intelligence indicates that Russian forces have increased military activity at the ZNPP and have established new firing positions for "Uragan" and "Smerch" multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) near the plant.[64] The report noted that Russian forces are also building new trenches and fortifications near the ZNPP cooling pond. ISW has reported at length on Russian forces' continuous endangerment of the ZNPP since their military occupation of the plant in March 2022.[65]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET



Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka), on December 10 and 11 but did not advance.[66]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of December 11, 2024, 1:30 PM ET



## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes against Ukraine on December 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 11 that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles towards Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the Sea of Azov and that Ukrainian forces downed both missiles.[67] The Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration reported on December 11 that Russian strikes in Dnipro Raion damaged residential areas, a gas pipeline, and a powerline.[68]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within Russian regional administrations. The Time of Heroes program announced on December 11 that it appointed Time of Heroes participant Kirill Losunchukov as Moscow Oblast's Deputy Minister for Investments, Industry, and Science.[69] Losunchukov has reportedly served as deputy commander of an unspecified Spetsnaz unit since 2020.

The Wagner Group reportedly continues to incentivize recruitment by advertising high salaries and signing bonuses. A Russian milblogger claimed that a prominent Wagner commander reportedly met with personnel from the "Istra" Regiment (a battalion comprised of former Wagner personnel with organizational support from Moscow Oblast officials) near Moscow who intend to soon deploy to an unspecified location.[70] The Istra Regiment reportedly offers a 2.3 million ruble (approximately \$21,800) one-time payment and a 4.8 million ruble (approximately \$45,500) yearly salary for the first year of service. ISW has observed that as of at least December 4 official Wagner recruitment channels continue to offer competitive salaries for operations in Africa.[71]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

Belarus continues efforts to modernize and increase its air defense and military communications capabilities. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on December 10 that the Belarusian military started using the "Kulisa" mobile communications system and claimed that it is an analogue to Starlink.[72] The Belarusian State Military Industrial Committee announced reported on December 10 that the Belarusian military successfully tested a domestically-produced 9M318 guided anti-aircraft missile in a Buk-MB2 air defense system and claimed that the missile has a range of 70 kilometers.[73]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other**

**geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] [https://x.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/1866449795847688554](https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1866449795847688554);  
[https://x.com/auditor\\_ya/status/1866853158640558572](https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1866853158640558572); [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/7782](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7782);  
<https://t.me/khornegroup/2965>

[2] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/899473-boi-trivaut-u-selisi-sevchenko-recnik-osuv-hortica-pro-vidstan-linii-frontu-do-pokrovska-i-vtratu-troh-pozicij/>; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/11/maksymalne-vymotuvannya-voroga-i-znyshhennya-jogo-resursu-syly-oborony-strymuyut-nastupalni-diyi-protyvnyka/>

[3] <https://suspilne dot media/899533-komandir-vovkiv-da-vinci-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-pokrovskomu-napramku/>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724>

[5] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/11/try-tysyachi-moskovskomu-bogu-vijny-vtraty-rosiyan-pid-pokrovskom-nagaduyut-kryvavi-zhertvy/>

[6] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-11/us-says-russia-may-fire-oreshnik-missile-at-ukraine-in-days>; <https://archive.ph/OMVnY> ; <https://apnews.com/article/russia-oreshnik-missile-ukraine-intelligence-war-28bf28d09087844544874df151bd3a9a> ;  
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-could-launch-another-new-missile-ukraine-soon-us-official-says-2024-12-11/>

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024>

[9] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02UXFcuPgYA3tSfjzKaUwEMdLvPQtao7FBPAyWSsrzE3932wJV6Rg2YBgvKwsJ6bTRL>

[10] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/46738](https://t.me/mod_russia/46738) ; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/290310](https://t.me/tass_agency/290310) ;  
<https://t.me/avbogomaz/9657> ; <https://t.me/avbogomaz/9658> ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/46749](https://t.me/mod_russia/46749)

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