

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 10, 7pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is reportedly advancing his political aspirations by seeking to gain control of a Russian political party. Russian opposition outlet *Meduza* reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's growing cooperation with members of the A Just Russia – For Truth party likely indicates that Prigozhin seeks to gain control over the party.[1] *Meduza* noted that four members of the party left to form a new movement, with some members citing the rapprochement between party leader Sergey Mironov and Prigozhin as the reason for their exit.[2] ISW has consistently reported on the growing relationship between Mironov and Prigozhin and assessed that Mironov's advocacy for recognition of Wagner in Russia could trigger further fractionalization within the Kremlin.[3] Two Kremlin sources and one St. Petersburg government insider claimed that Prigozhin is pursuing a leadership position within A Just Russia – For Truth's St. Petersburg branch to compete with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for influence in the city. *Meduza's* sources claimed that Prigozhin previously was interested in investing in the "Motherland" political party and may be interested in pursuing a position on the federal level. Mironov, in turn, is likely attempting to revive his political influence and use Prigozhin as a patron for his political ambitions. *Meduza's* interlocutors indicated that the Russian Presidential Administration is unlikely to allow Prigozhin to gain control of the A Just Russia – For Truth party due to Prigozhin's conflict with administration officials and with Beglov.

The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) directly responded to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's criticisms of its agenda for Russia's presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marking the first time that a Russian government institution has formally responded Prigozhin's criticism. Prigozhin criticized the MFA's work in Africa on April 7, claiming that the Russian MFA does "absolutely nothing" and that Wagner forces face "enormous difficulties" when interacting with the MFA and other government institutions in the region.[4] The MFA responded to Prigozhin's criticism on April 9 and said that it is ready to cooperate with Russian businesses and entrepreneurs to promote Russian businesses abroad and that a number of upcoming events under Russia's UNSC chairmanship are dedicated to African issues.[5] Prigozhin then responded to the MFA, questioning its ability to solve problems through the UNSC, and published a list of 15 issues that Prigozhin believes require urgent discussion at the UNSC, most of which relate to support for Russia's actions in Ukraine and Africa.[6]

The Russian MFA's attack on Prigozhin is a continuation of the Kremlin's efforts to discredit and undermine Prigozhin. The MFA, other Russian government institutions, and Kremlin affiliates likely seek to shut down any attempts by Prigozhin to garner public or political support. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) refused to name Wagner forces as participants in the battle of Bakhmut, referring instead to "assault detachments." [7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov indirectly accused Prigozhin of deliberately exposing conflicts between the MoD and Wagner.[8] Russian political scientist Aleksey Mukhin – who contributes to the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club and Russian state media – criticized Prigozhin for pursuing political objectives that endanger Wagner forces in Bakhmut.[9] Prigozhin likely criticized the Russian MFA agenda in the UNSC in an effort to portray himself as a capable statesman able to influence foreign affairs and to garner support from the Russian ultranationalist community. Prigozhin continues to attempt to aggrandize himself by exaggerating Wagner forces' role in Russian successes in Ukraine and using his prominence in the Russian nationalist information space to criticize the Russian government.[10]

Russian milbloggers adamantly decried the charging of Russian military doctor and "Union of Donbas Volunteers" member Yuri Yevich for "discrediting the Russian armed forces," suggesting that the broad applications of this new law will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space. Russian authorities reportedly charged Yevich under the discreditation law because of a lecture on tactical medicine he gave to Rosgvardia employees, which someone reported to the authorities as offering a "negative assessment" of Russian forces.[11] Yevich fought with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militias in Donbas after 2014 and was a part of the "Union of Donbas volunteers" following the full-scale invasion in 2022.[12] Yevich became popular in the pro-war Russian information space for popularizing and advocating for the application of tactical combat medicine on the battlefield.[13] Several pro-war milbloggers and commentators seized on the news of Yevich's arrest and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone whom they deem to be a true Russian patriot.[14] Many milbloggers noted that Yevich's

charging will become a *carte blanche* for Russian authorities to sanction every Russian soldier, volunteer, and patriot and questioned the legitimacy of both the case against Yevich and the law itself.[15] Yevich likely presented an important truth regarding the state of Russian combat medicine to an internal audience and was arrested for it. If the Kremlin uses this law to shut down honest critiques of the performance of Russian forces or the Russian government even during internal discussions it runs a very high risk of repeating the kinds of fundamental errors that led to the failure of the initial Russian plans and campaign in February 2022.

The Russian State Duma will consider an amendment to the Russian Criminal Code increasing criminal penalties for high treason and terrorist activities on April 13.[16] The Russian State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation approved amendments to the Russian Criminal Code that would introduce life prison sentences for high treason and increase prison sentences for terrorist activities, including conducting terrorist activities, aiding terrorist activities, sabotaging transport and health infrastructure and, organizing and participating in a terrorist society.[17] The Russian Criminal Code's definition of treason is likely intentionally vague, including espionage, passing state secrets to foreign governments or their representatives, and providing financial, logistical, consulting, or other assistance to foreign organizations engaged in activities directed against Russian state security.[18] Such legislative manipulations are part of a larger domestic effort to encourage self-censorship and codify conditions for domestic repressions, as ISW has previously reported.[19]

Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on April 10. Shoigu and Lukashenko mainly used the meeting to reiterate boilerplate rhetoric that emphasized the strength of Russian and Belarusian bilateral cooperation and blamed NATO and the collective West for threatening Belarusian territorial integrity.[20] Lukashenko expressed his gratitude that Russia maintains a military presence in Belarus and accused Poland and Lithuania of threatening the Belarusian borders, while Shoigu thanked Lukashenko for providing Belarusian training grounds for the use of Russian troops.[21]

Key Takeaways

- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is reportedly advancing his political aspirations by seeking to gain control of a Russian political party.**
- **Putin may be unable to satisfy the role of a patron to loyalist figures to the same extent as he had been able to before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.**
- **The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) directly responded to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's criticisms of its agenda at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marking the first time that a Russian government institution has formally responded to Prigozhin's criticism.**
- **The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) attack on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is a continuation of the Kremlin's efforts to discredit and undermine Prigozhin.**
- **Russian milbloggers adamantly decried the charging of Russian military doctor and "Union of Donbas Volunteers" member Yuri Yevich for "discrediting the Russian armed forces," suggesting that the broad applications of this new law will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space.**
- **The Russian State Duma will consider an amendment to the Russian Criminal Code increasing criminal penalties for high treason and terrorist activities on April 13.**
- **Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on April 10.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.**
- **Russian forces continued to make territorial gains in and around Bakhmut, and continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.**
- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) prisoner recruitment efforts, likely in an effort to advertise ongoing Wagner volunteer recruitment campaigns.**
- **Wagner forces are reportedly continuing to commit war crimes by beheading Ukrainian servicemen in Bakhmut.**
- **Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to deport children to Russia under the guise of medical, rehabilitation, and voluntary evacuation schemes.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Chervonopopivka (within 21km northwest of Kreminna), and south of Kreminna near Kuzmyne, Dibrova, Bilohorivka, and Verkhokamianske (all within 3 to 18km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Yampolivka, Torske, Nevske, and Makiivka (all within 14 to 21km west or northwest of Kreminna).[23] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces gained new positions in the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on April 9 that seven engagements occurred in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[25] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov published footage on April 8 that purportedly shows Chechen "Akhmat" Special Forces and elements of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Army Corps operating near Kreminna and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[26] A Russian BARS (Combat Reserve)- affiliated source published footage on April 9 that reportedly shows the BARS-14 Battalion operating on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[27] Several Russian milbloggers posted footage on April 8 and 9 that claims to show Russian Airborne (VDV) units operating near Kreminna.[28]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



ISW
INSTITUTE FOR THE
STUDY OF WAR
AND
CT CRITICAL
THREATS
THE DR. JACK LONDON
GEOSPATIAL FUND

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- ▭ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▭ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▭ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued to make territorial gains in and around Bakhmut on April 9 and 10 but likely continue to suffer significant casualties. Geolocated footage posted on April 9 and 10 shows that Russian forces made marginal advances northwest of Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut), in southwest Bakhmut, and north of Sacco i Vanzetti (15km north of Bakhmut).[29] Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on April 9 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces began to appear in Bakhmut likely to reinforce conventional, rather than Wagner Group, forces.[30] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 10 that Ukrainian forces have exhausted Wagner forces so much that the Russian military command has had to send SPETSNAZ and VDV elements to Bakhmut.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made advances in northwestern Bakhmut and in central Bakhmut near the railway on April 9 and 10.[32] A milblogger claimed on April 10 that Russian forces made advances in central and southern Bakhmut.[33] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed to visit Bakhmut and presented DNR awards to Wagner Group fighters.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks in Bakhmut and near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove.[35]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (9km north of Avdiivka), Berdychi (7km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Vodyane (6km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka), Novokalynove, and Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka).[37] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[38] Geolocated footage posted on April 9 shows that Russian forces made a marginal advance in southwestern Marinka.[39]

A Ukrainian official indicated that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Donetsk direction is slowing, and that Russian forces are engaging in defensive preparations. Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that the tempo of Russian ground attacks has decreased in this sector of the front and that Russian forces are now shelling at a rate one third less than that of February 2023.[40] Dmytrashkivskyi also reported that Russian forces have concentrated 205 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the Donetsk direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[41] These BTGs are unlikely to be at full strength, however.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 9 and 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack near Novosilka (42km northwest of Vuhledar).[42]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Major Railroads

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



ISW
INSTITUTE FOR THE
STUDY OF WAR
AND
CT CRITICAL
THREATS
THE DR. JACK LONDON
GEOSPATIAL FUND

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kiehl, and Mitchell Belcher
© 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued building defensive lines and fortifications in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions on April 9 and 10.[43] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that Russian forces are intensively equipping and mining defensive positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and have concentrated 113 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in this direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[44] It is however highly unlikely that any of these BTGs are at full strength or operating in a manner consistent with Russian doctrine considering widespread Russian manpower and equipment losses in previous phases of the war. Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces constructed additional fortifications around Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast between March 2 and March 22.[45] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported on April 10 that Russian forces are attempting to simulate their withdrawal from Nova Kakhovka to mislead Ukrainian troops and disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive plans.[46]

Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes throughout southern Ukraine on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles at civilian objects in Zaporizhia Oblast over the past day.[47] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated on April 9 that six Russian Su-35 aircraft attacked the Beryslav area of Kherson Oblast with guided aerial bombs and Kh-31 anti-radar missiles on the night of April 8 to 9.[48] Russian forces continued routine shelling of Kherson, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on April 9 and 10.[49] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing Russian forces using a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system to strike Ukrainian positions near Ochakiv, Mykolayiv Oblast.[50] Another Russian milblogger noted that artillery units of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) struck Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast on April 8.[51]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of April 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kiehl, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AET's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for its efforts to recruit prisoners, likely in an effort to advertise ongoing Wagner volunteer recruitment campaigns. Prigozhin responded to a media inquiry about Russian MoD recruitment of prisoners on 18-month contracts, stating that Wagner was first to recruit prisoners because it was felt that convict forces would damage the image of the Russian conventional forces.[52] Prigozhin emphasized that Wagner convicts served only for six months. Prigozhin insinuated that the Russian MoD would treat convicts worse than Wagner treated them to further advertise recruitment into Wagner and discredit the MoD's recruitment efforts. The insinuation seems odd given that Wagner reportedly used convicts in human wave attacks that cost thousands of them their lives. A local Yekaterinburg outlet reported that Wagner established mobile recruitment points in at least eight towns in Sverdlovsk Oblast offering salaries of 240,000 rubles (about \$2,940) with bonuses.[53] Prigozhin's press service also published a recruitment ad for prospective volunteers between 21 and 60 years of age.[54]

Wagner forces are reportedly continuing to commit war crimes by beheading Ukrainian servicemen in Bakhmut. Russian social media users published footage purportedly showing the remains of a head belonging to a Ukrainian serviceman on a spike at an unspecified area in Bakhmut.[55] Social media users recalled similar instances of skulls mounted on spikes in Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, where Wagner troops operated over spring–summer of 2022.[56] The Geneva Convention prohibits the mutilation and despoilment of dead bodies in war.[57]

Russian federal subjects are continuing to expand domestic volunteer recruitment efforts. A Russian online news aggregator reported that Moscow officials launched an online volunteer recruitment website advertising contract service for Moscow residents.[58] Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan Radiy Khabirov stated that the republic is entertaining proposals to form another volunteer motorized rifle regiment and announced the deployment of the “Vatan” volunteer battalion to Ukraine over the upcoming days.[59] A local Khabarovsk Krai outlet reported that the region is recruiting personnel for the “Khabarovsk” and “Kofra” volunteer battalions.[60] The outlet noted that the Khabarovsk volunteer battalion is open to all civilians with or without military training, whereas the “Kofra” signals battalion is recruiting volunteers with past signals experience or civilian professional experience in the field. Khabarovsk Krai officials are planning to form an infantry battalion with mortar elements and drone operators.

Russian sources complained about the mediocre performance of the Russian “Nevsky” volunteer detachment — complaints that likely apply to other Russian volunteer battalions operating in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Nevsky volunteer detachment — which now calls itself a brigade - conducted mediocre assaults on Ukrainian positions through a minefield without armor or artillery.[61] The milblogger claimed that the detachment has some professional servicemen but that many contract servicemen are leaving their units. The milblogger also published footage showing one Nevsky serviceman accidentally shooting at another Russian serviceman.[62] Nevsky detachment is continuing to recruit personnel for a wide variety of positions.[63]

Russian businessmen and personnel are continuing to exploit the Russian war effort for their benefit. The Moscow City Court canceled the international warrant for Russian businessman Alexander Dagutsy who reportedly transferred \$24 million USD abroad after he had reportedly joined the 108th Guards Kuban Cossack Air Assault Regiment.[64] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian military personnel and private military companies are participating in illegal arms exchanges and are selling weapons to locals in Russian border areas.[65]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to deport children to Russia under the guise of medical, rehabilitation, and voluntary evacuation schemes. The Ukrainian Office of the General Prosecutor issued a notice of suspicion against a Crimea-based businesswoman under accusations that she has helped deport 1,000 Ukrainian children and 64 guardians to Sevastopol, Crimea, under the guise of tourism and voluntary evacuation.[66] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroschnik claimed on April 10 that Russia has returned 10 Ukrainian children and their mothers to Horlivka, Luhansk Oblast, after they reportedly received medical treatment at the Klyazma sanatorium in Moscow Oblast.[67] Ukrainian news outlet *Suspilne Novosti* on April 10 shared the story of a 16-year-old boy whom Russian forces had illegally transported to a political re-education camp after he had spent two weeks resting at the “Dream” sanatorium in Yevpatoria, Crimea.[68] *Suspilne Novosti* amplified reports that Russian occupation authorities continue to brainwash Ukrainian children at re-education camps in Russia, coercing them to abandon their Ukrainian identity and instead show pro-Russia sentiment.[69] LNR head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on April 9 that occupation authorities have conducted professional medical evaluations on more than 94,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Luhansk Oblast,

thousands of whom Russian occupation officials have since deported to Russia for medical treatment.[70] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereschuk stated on April 10 that Russia is illegally holding 4,396 deported Ukrainian children in Russia and announced that Ukraine is forming an international coalition to return the children to Ukraine.[71]

Russian federal subjects continue to formalize patronage-like partnerships in an effort to bring the standard of living in occupied territories up to the Russian standard. Russian Minister of Health Mikhail Murashko announced that the Henichesk Central District Hospital in Kherson Oblast will become the leading medical institution in occupied Kherson Oblast. Murashko stated that Krasnodor Krai has allocated 200 million rubles (about \$2.5 million) to sponsor repairs and the purchase of modern medical equipment. Murashko set out measures to complete the repair of old and construction of new buildings at the facility by the end of 2023.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian and Belarusian forces continued combat training in Belarus on April 9 and 10. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage and imagery of Belarusian forces conducting exercises as part of an ongoing combat readiness check.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff noted on April 10 that certain unspecified Russian units continue to serve on Belarusian territory but reiterated that there are no signs of the formation of a Russian offensive group in Belarus.[74] The Ukrainian Resistance Center cited Belarusian partisans on April 10 who reported that Russian forces are training with the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade at the Brest training ground in Brest Oblast and that there are growing frictions between Russian and Belarusian forces during training.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/10/on-hochet-svoyu-partiyu>

[2] <https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/10/on-hochet-svoyu-partiyu>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2023>

[4] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3019

[5] https://t.me/MID_Russia/26900

[6] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/718

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2023>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2023>

[9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2023>

[10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7>;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2023>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2023>

[11] <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/10/voennogo-vracha-obvinili-v-diskreditatsii-armii-iz-za-prochitannoy-im-lektsii-dlya-rosgvardii-za-nego-vstupilis-voenkory-i-gubernator>

[12] <https://theins dot ru/news/260822>

[13] <https://theins dot ru/news/260822>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/10/voennogo-vracha-obvinili-v-diskreditatsii-armii-iz-za-prochitannoy-im-lektsii-dlya-rosgvardii-za-nego-vstupilis-voenkory-i-gubernator>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24086>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24094> ; <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/6367>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82595 ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/56550>

[14] <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24086>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24094> ; <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/6367>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82595; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4467> ; <https://t.me/tvtacticalmed/666>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4475> ; https://t.me/Topaz_Govorit/4031; <https://t.me/moscowcalling/22642>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/56550>; <https://t.me/moscowcalling/22668>; <https://t.me/olegtsarov/5952>

[15] <https://t.me/strelkovii/4475> ; https://t.me/Topaz_Govorit/4031; <https://t.me/pgubarev/611>;
<https://t.me/strelkovii/4493>

[16] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/895213>; <https://ria dot ru/20230410/gosizmena-1864199735.html>

[17] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/895213>; <https://ria dot ru/20230410/gosizmena-1864199735.html>

[18] <https://борисово-адм dot рф/statja-275-gosudarstvennaja-izmena/>

[19] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040823>

[20] <https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-ministrom-oborony-rossii-sergeem-shoygu-168119493>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25495>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25490>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25493>

[21] <https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-ministrom-oborony-rossii-sergeem-shoygu-168119493>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25495>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25490>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25493>

[22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPfTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl>

[23] <https://t.me/wargonzo/11850>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/11867>

[24] <https://t.me/wargonzo/11850>

[25] https://suspilne dot media/439878-povernenna-deportovanih-ditej-sotni-btr-vid-polsi-boi-za-marinku-ta-bahmut-410-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681043625&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrB1YsqU>

[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3513

[27] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36289

[28] <https://t.me/milinfo/99064>; https://t.me/grey_zone/18103; <https://t.me/milinfo/99090>

[29] <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1645004188814802944>;
https://twitter.com/auditor_ua/status/1644830208816455680 ;
https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1644729375739330560;
https://twitter.com/auditor_ua/status/1645392485626130432;

<https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1645380938942013442>;
https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1645407081753718786;
https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1645314796512854016;
<https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1645374066381975553>;
<https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645333170269704194>

[30] <https://suspilne dot media/439878-povernenna-deportovanih-ditej-sotni-btr-vid-polsi-boi-za-marinku-ta-bahmut-410-den-vijni-onlajn/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvr1YsqU>

[31] <https://suspilne dot media/440451-rosiani-namagautsa-zablokuvati-avdiivku-sili-oboroni-z-dobu-vidbili-40-atak-411-den-vijni-onlajn/>

[32] <https://t.me/readovkanews/56515>; <https://t.me/brussinf/5853>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82579; <https://t.me/wargonzo/11850>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/56554>;

[33] <https://t.me/wargonzo/11867>

[34] <https://t.me/pushilindenis/3311>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/56564>

[35] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPftNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl>

[36] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPftNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl>

[37] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46690>;

[38] <https://t.me/wargonzo/11850>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/56515>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/11867>

[39] <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645175760120840194?s=20>;
https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1645150589574082560?s=20

[40] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzh-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozyciyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/>

[41] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzh-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozyciyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/>

[42] <https://t.me/readovkanews/56554>

[43] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl>

[44] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzh-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozyciyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/>

[45] <https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1645105977656582145>

[46] <https://t.me/hueviyherson/37748>

- [47] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRX YHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil>
- [48] <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Gxgj4dT1n1eGimDF4Tt9Hn3CUcEyaoUqWf zEcRGqhmHBxfvkgdGwqKG5djJv1Pl>
- [49] <https://t.me/rybar/45607>; <https://t.me/rybar/45625>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5005>; <https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0NUzxJGzA7prKb2eR3iapFM9nfbPSSWr8zez8pSaSfmK5Dr9fkZpVT7tAk3f2ZwGAl>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/37718>; <https://t.me/milinfoolive/99073> <https://suspilne.media/439920-armia-rf-atakue-silskogospodarski-zemli-na-hersonsini-ce-priklad-terorizmu-bo-voni-nisat-zitta-ludej-gumenuk>/<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5026>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5027>; <https://t.me/mykolaiavskaODA/4741>; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18161
- [50] <https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/16620>
- [51] <https://t.me/rybar/45607>
- [52] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/719
- [53] <https://www.e1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/04/05/72194627/>
- [54] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/724
- [55] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1645314394224484352; https://vk dot com/wall-168586038_370587; <https://archive.is/FUB9V>; <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1645179787118272518?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1645179787118272518?s=20>
- [56] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1645314394224484352; https://vk dot com/wall-168586038_370587; <https://archive.is/FUB9V>
- [57] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule113#Fn_28E57177_00002
- [58] <https://t.me/readovkanews/56567>
- [59] <https://ufa1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/04/10/72206783/>
- [60] <https://transsibinfo dot com/news/2023-04-10/v-habarovsk-prishla-raznaryadka-o-nabore-voennosluzhaschih-pokontraktu-2897405>; <http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202303070007?index=2&rangeSize=1>
- [61] https://vk dot com/wall-217310531_116; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4463>
- [62] https://vk.com/wall-217310531_116
- [63] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/202
- [64] <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/09/mosgorsud-otmenil-mezhdunarodnyy-rozysk-figuranta-dela-o-vyvode-zagranitsu-24-millionov-dollarov-obvinyaemyy-otpravilsya-dobrovoltsem-voevat-v-ukrainu>
- [65] <https://t.me/vchkogpu/37685>
- [66] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/10/kolaborantczi-yaka-dopomogla-rf-deportuvaty-ponad-tysyachu-ukrayinskyh-ditej-povidomleno-pro-pidozru/>; https://t.me/pgogov_ua/11142
- [67] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11011

[68] <https://suspile dot media/440985-sob-a-ne-cuv-so-vi-z-ukraini-vi-narodilisa-u-rf-ak-rosia-perevihovue-vikradenih-ukrainskih-ditej/>

[69] <https://suspile dot media/440985-sob-a-ne-cuv-so-vi-z-ukraini-vi-narodilisa-u-rf-ak-rosia-perevihovue-vikradenih-ukrainskih-ditej/>

[70] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/942

[71] <https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/04/10/formuyetsya-mizhnarodna-koalicziya-dlya-povernennya-ukrayinskyh-ditej-syrit/>

[72] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8436

[73] <https://t.me/modmilby/25455>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25463> ; https://t.me/voentv_by/3657; <https://t.me/modmilby/25487>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25488>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25489>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25491>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25492>; <https://t.me/modmilby/25508>

[74] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPFTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl>

[75] <https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/04/10/rosiyany-ta-bilorusy-prodovzhuyut-spilni-navchannya/>