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August 1, 2024, 6:20pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.


Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continue to make slow, steady advances in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka), largely enabled by Ukrainian manpower shortages and the terrain in the area immediately northwest of Avdiivka. Russian advances will likely slow further as Russian forces advance into a line of larger and more urban settlements. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky identified the Pokrovsk direction as the Russian military's current priority on August 1 and noted that Russian forces are currently able to advance in certain areas of the front because Ukraine is still struggling with manpower shortages and challenges in properly staffing and equipping new brigades.[1] Zelensky observed that some Ukrainian brigades are unable to conduct rotations because their replacement brigades are not yet staffed or equipped, which creates exploitable weaknesses that Russian forces can attack.[2] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Ukrainian defenders in the Pokrovsk direction have inferior equipment and defensive means and are therefore currently unable to slow Russian advances.[3] Delays in the provision of Western and especially US military assistance have contributed to delays in equipping newly-raised Ukrainian units and re-equipping those that have been fighting.[4]

Russian forces appear to be exploiting such weakness to make gradual tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka, where ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are attempting to achieve a limited tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces east of the T0511 (O0544) Ocheretyne-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad highway, particularly on the left bank of the Vovcha River.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows that Russian forces have advanced further within Vesele towards the T0511 road, placing the current furthest confirmed Russian advance about 3.5 kilometers from the outskirts of Hrodivka.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking south of Vesele along the railway line and windbreaks towards Serhiivka and Zhelanne (just south of Vesele), which could

further efforts to tactically encircle Ukrainian forces in this area if Russian forces properly exploit it.[7] Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that Russian forces seized Tymofiivka (north of the O0544 road and the Vesele area).[8] Mashovets characterized recent Russian advances in the area southeast of the O0544 road as a tactical penetration of Ukrainian lines and stated that Russian forces have advanced 6.5 kilometers deep and 7.5 kilometers wide from Sokil to Serhiivka, crossing both the Vovcha and Kazennyi Torets rivers (running through Prohres-Vovche and Lozuvatske, respectively) in recent weeks.[9] Mashovets warned that Russian forces are close to achieving an operationally significant breakthrough in the Pokrovsk direction by the end of August.



Russia's current rate of tactical advance towards Pokrovsk will likely not continue indefinitely, however, as Russian forces are approaching a line of larger and more urban settlements. Current Russian efforts in the Pokrovsk direction are concentrated on achieving a tactical breakthrough near Zhelanne and Novohrodivka.[10] The next defensible line between the current forward Russian line of advance and Pokrovsk runs between the towns of Selydove, Novohrodivka, and Hrodivka, with many of the current Russian tactical advances focused specifically on the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka sector of the line (about five kilometers west of Russian positions in the Vesele area). Novohrodivka and Hrodivka had pre-war populations of about 14,000 and 2,000, respectively, and are larger and relatively more urban than many of the smaller settlements that Russian forces have seized since they began moving west of Avdiivka in February 2024.[11] These towns are by no means as large and urban as Mariupol or even Bakhmut, for example, but they pose a very different tactical problem set for advancing Russian forces, who have recently been mostly advancing across open fields, small windbreaks, and settlements that are a few blocks long. Russian forces in Ukraine have historically struggled with completing combat operations

rapidly in more urbanized or residential areas—for example Russian forces fought in earnest over five months to seize Avdiivka, which is only a little larger than Novohrodivka. Ukrainian troops are notably more exhausted and attrited now than they were in early 2024 when Russian forces seized Avdiivka, which was also heavily fortified, and Russian troops will likely continue to exploit that reality to enable tactical advances. The rate of Russian advance is likely to slow nevertheless as Russian forces become engaged near and in these larger towns and settlements.

Russia's Central Grouping of Forces appears to be more rapidly redeploying and committing forces between different sectors of its recently expanded area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast than has been the norm in most of the theater recently. The Russian military recently expanded the Central Grouping of Forces AOR to include both the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions and possibly to support select operations west and southwest of Donetsk City.[12] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces committed operational reserves of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division's 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) to the start of offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024 while the majority of the CMD's other elements remained committed in the Pokrovsk direction.[13] Elements of the 41st CAA's 90th Tank Division reportedly conducted a roughly reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City on July 24, although the majority of the 90th Tank Division's regiments appear committed to operations west of Avdiivka.[14] Mashovets stated on August 1 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces regrouped ahead of the start of the Toretsk offensive operation in mid-June 2024 and planned to assign responsibility for the Toretsk front to the 41st CAA's three motorized rifle brigades (the 35th, 74th, and 55th motorized rifle brigades) and responsibility for the Pokrovsk effort to the 2nd CAA and the 90th Tank Division.[15] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command was attempting to opportunistically exploit relatively rapid tactical gains by committing elements of two regiments of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division to the Toretsk effort and that the Russian military command is now recommitting these elements to achieve the desired tactical encirclement in the Pokrovsk direction.[16] Mashovets stated that elements of the 35th, 74th, and 55th motorized rifle brigades are currently conducting offensive operations in the Toretsk area, although ISW has observed widespread reporting of these elements fighting northwest of Avdiivka in recent weeks, and elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Avdiivka area as recently as July 19.[17]

ISW has yet to observe confirmation that elements of the 41st CAA are operating near Toretsk beyond comments made by Mashovets, although Mashovets' reporting is consistent with what appears to be more rapid deployments between different sectors of the front within the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR. It is possible that the Russian military command is splitting formations and units between different sectors and committing smaller elements of the same units to exploit tactical opportunities in different areas. ISW will continue to track the Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in the Central Grouping's AOR to determine the contours of these apparently more rapid redeployments.

The Central Grouping of Forces may have established a more flexible command and control (C2) structure and may be responding more quickly to potential Ukrainian tactical vulnerabilities than other Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine. Russian forces have rapidly redeployed forces across different operational directions on several occasions to address vulnerabilities and strengthen groupings of forces conducting offensive and defensive operations, but

rarely have groupings of forces rapidly redeployed the same elements multiple times in quick succession across different sectors within their AORs.[18] Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine have increasingly tasked smaller sectors of their AORs to the same units and formations in order to create more cohesive C2 and have typically only redeployed elements after regrouping those units in the rear for reconstitution and replenishment.[19] The Central Grouping of Forces' reported redeployment and commitment of elements of the same units in rapid succession suggests that the grouping has established a more flexible C2 structure and is attempting to improve how quickly Russian forces can commit forces to areas where tactical opportunities emerge. The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and flexible and more rapid force redeployments and commitments to exploit tactical Ukrainian vulnerabilities on separate smaller sectors of a wider front are consistent with that purpose.[20] The Central Grouping of Forces' expanded AOR has lengthened the front along which the grouping is attempting to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities, but the Central Grouping of Forces appears to be maintaining the more flexible C2 it likely created while trying to make significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka in Spring 2024.[21]

The Russian military command is pursuing consistent offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine in an effort to stretch Ukrainian forces and weaken Ukrainian defenses, but the Russian military has largely failed to exploit these effects to achieve significant tactical gains or further meaningful operational objectives.[22] The Central Grouping of Forces may be more capable of achieving this goal than other Russian forces in Ukraine, however, if it can maintain its apparent flexible C2 structure and retain enough combat power to continue operations for a long enough period. The Central Grouping of Forces may be able to intentionally create pressure that generates tactical vulnerabilities along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast and then quickly seize on those tactical opportunities by redeploying forces within its AOR in a manner that other Russian force groupings have not demonstrated a capacity for.

A limited number of F-16 fighter jets have reportedly arrived in Ukraine, but it will likely be several months before Ukraine will be able to field the jets at scale. Western media reported on July 31 that the first batch of F-16s recently arrived in Ukraine and that Ukraine will receive more jets soon at an unspecified time.[23] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed that an unspecified number of F-16s were in Ukraine on July 31 and recent footage purportedly shows an F-16 operating over Ukrainian airspace, but Ukrainian officials have declined to comment on the matter.[24] Ukrainian officials have previously discussed their intention to use F-16 and other fixed-wing aircraft as part of Ukraine's broader air defense umbrella in coordination with Ukraine's existing air defense systems but have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine will need to receive a substantial number of jets in order to implement this vision.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged Western countries to support Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia during an interview on August 1 and noted that the survival of the Ukrainian state depends on Western support for long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia.[26] Ukrainian forces will almost certainly not be willing or able to integrate F-16s into routine air defense or long-range strike missions until they receive additional jets.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will not compromise its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for a diplomatic resolution to

Russia's invasion. Zelensky stated during an interview with French media on August 1 that Ukraine is willing to pursue a diplomatic solution with Russia, but that Ukraine will never make territorial concessions to do so.[27] Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian government does not have the right to unilaterally renounce Ukrainian territory, stating that this would violate the Ukrainian constitution because this decision must take into account the will of the Ukrainian people. Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian government would have to hold a referendum to formally renounce any territory but did not suggest that the Ukrainian government or population has any interest in or intention to hold such a referendum. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine will not violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity by conceding any Ukrainian territory to Russia, and recent polling suggests that most Ukrainian citizens do not support territorial concessions.[28] Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will have a plan for a second Global Peace Summit by November 2024 and that Ukraine's plan has wide international support. Kremlin officials, meanwhile, continue to demand complete Ukrainian capitulation and the revocation of Ukraine's NATO aspirations while engaging in information operations intended to portray Ukraine's commitment to its sovereignty and territorial integrity as an outrageous ultimatum.[29]


Russia, Belarus, the US, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, and Norway conducted a high-profile prisoner exchange involving 26 prisoners from multiple countries on August 1. Turkey mediated the 26-prisoner swap, which took place in Ankara.[30] US officials confirmed the release of three US citizens — retired US Marine Paul Whelan, *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) journalist Evan Gershkovich, and *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (RFE/RL) journalist Alsu Kurmasheva — seven Russian political prisoners, including Russian opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza — four German citizens from Russian detention — and one German citizen from Belarusian detention.[31] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed pardons for the 15 individuals released from Russian detention, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a pardon for the German individual released from Belarusian detention.[32] The US, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia released eight imprisoned Russian nationals, including Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) contract killer Vadim Krasikov, Russian intelligence agents Artem and Anna Dultsev, Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) agent Pavel Rubtsov, hacker Roman Seleznev, and businessman Vladislav Klyushin, and also returned two minors (reportedly the children of two of the released Russians).[33] Putin met the returned Russian prisoners on the tarmac at Vnukovo-2 airport in Moscow and stated that he is nominating them for state awards.[34]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces continue to make slow, steady advances in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka), largely enabled by Ukrainian manpower shortages and the terrain in the area immediately northwest of Avdiivka. Russian advances will likely slow further as Russian forces advance into a line of larger and more urban settlements.**
- **Russia's current rate of tactical advance towards Pokrovsk will likely not continue indefinitely, however, as Russian forces are approaching a line of larger and more urban settlements.**

- **Russia's Central Grouping of Forces appears to be more rapidly redeploying and committing forces between different sectors of its recently expanded area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast than has been the norm in most of the theater recently.**
- **The Central Grouping of Forces may have established a more flexible command and control (C2) structure and may be responding more quickly to potential Ukrainian tactical vulnerabilities than other Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine.**
- **A limited number of F-16 fighter jets have reportedly arrived in Ukraine, but it will likely be several months before Ukraine will be able to field the jets at scale.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will not compromise its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for a diplomatic resolution to Russia's invasion.**
- **Russia, Belarus, the US, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, and Norway conducted a high-profile prisoner exchange involving 26 prisoners from multiple countries on August 1.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, and Donetsk City.**
- **Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* reported on August 1 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have significantly overstated the number of contract soldiers it claims to have recruited between Fall 2022 and April 2024.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on July 31 and August 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 1 that Russian forces regained limited positions within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Hlyboke on August 1.[36] Elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating within Vovchansk, and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[37]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET


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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Tom Thacker, Benjamin Cordola, and Harrison Hurwitz
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▭ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Svatove amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 1. Geolocated footage published on August 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Nadiya (southwest of Svatove).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[39] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove near Stepova Novoselivka, Berestove, Pishchane, Kolisynkivka, Stelmakhivka, and Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoserhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Nevske; and west of Kreminna near Torske on July 31 and August 1.[40] Russian milbloggers posted footage on August 1 purporting to show Russian aircraft striking a Ukrainian crossing across the Oskil River near Osynove (south of Kupyansk on the west bank of the Oskil River) with a Kh-38 missile, likely part of ongoing Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian GLOCs across the Oskil River and isolate the battlespace along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[41]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces in the Siversk direction are reportedly struggling with the prevalence of Ukrainian drones on this sector of the front. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that the situation in the Siversk direction is "catastrophic" and that Russian forces are facing high losses due to Ukrainian drone use, inhibiting Russian advances.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, Spirne, and Ivano-Darivka on August 1.[43] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating south of Siversk near Pereizne.[44]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal north of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on August 1 indicates that Russian forces have advanced further west across the canal in the area where it runs underground just north of the Zhovtnevyi Microraiion of Chasiv Yar.[45] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskiy


noted that heavy fighting is ongoing near the canal.[46] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are consolidating positions on the outskirts of Zhovtnevyi and Novyi microraiions in eastern Chasiv Yar, although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating in these areas.[47] Several Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in the area.[48] Klishchiivka has likely been a contested grey zone for some time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued Russian ground attacks north of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[49] Drone elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other unspecified elements of the 98th VDV Division and 78th Special Purpose "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Toretsk direction on August 1, but these advances remain unconfirmed. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and captured the Artema waste heap on the outskirts between Zalizne and Toretsk.[51] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also seized new positions, including in some factories and industrial areas, within central Niu York (south of Toretsk).[52] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of any of these claims, however.[53] 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) elements, including the 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades, reportedly continue to operate near Toretsk.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Toretsk as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Toretsk City Limits

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

See topline text for updates on the Pokrovsk (west of Avdiivka) direction.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on August 1. Geolocated footage published on August 1

shows that Russian forces seized a house in northern Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[55] Several Russian and Western sources claimed that Russian forces have seized additional territory within northwestern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and essentially control the whole town.[56] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued Russian offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane.[57] Elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in Krasnohorivka; elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are operating northwest of Marinka; and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces) are reportedly striking targets within Kostyantynivka.[58]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Velyka Novosilka, south of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske.[59] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking south of Velyka Novosilka along the Urozhaine-Staromayorske line.[60] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian aviation activity has intensified in recent days over occupied Mariupol, particularly in the direction of Volnovakha Raion (southeast of the Velyka Novosilka area).[61] Russian opposition media amplified footage from Russian soldiers reportedly deployed in Staromayorske complaining about heavy losses and lack of food.[62]

Russian milbloggers largely denied claims that Ukrainian forces downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter with a drone as it was taking off in Donetsk City on July 31.[63] Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used missiles or rockets and not a drone to shoot down the helicopter.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Robotyne near Verbove and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area four kilometers wide and up to 800 meters deep northwest and west of Robotyne.[66] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued ground assaults in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and on islands in the Dnipro River delta on July 31 and August 1, but there were no changes to the frontline.[68]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of August 1, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 31 to August 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea and seven

Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Kursk Oblast.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all seven Shahed drones over Kyiv, Poltava, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that debris from falling drones injured several people in Kyiv City, and Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim stated that Russian forces struck Bashtanka Raion with an unspecified type and number of missiles.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* reported on August 1 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have significantly overstated the number of contract soldiers it claims to have recruited between Fall 2022 and April 2024.[71] *Vazhnye Istorii* cited data from Russian federal budget expenditures from Fall 2022 to April 2024 indicating that the MoD has only paid out 426,000 one-time 195,000 ruble (\$2,300) payments (the promised amount at the time) even though the MoD has claimed to have recruited about 640,000 contract soldiers during the same time period. *Vazhnye Istorii* noted that some fighters, including members of volunteer units, irregular units, and private military companies do not receive one-time payments, but assessed that there are not enough of these fighters to explain the discrepancy in data. *Vazhnye Istorii* also cited a source at a Russian recruitment center claiming that Russian federal subjects only met 50-60 percent of their recruitment goals in 2023. Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine frequently complain that they do not receive some or all of their regular salaries from the Russian MoD and the Russian MoD may also be failing to issue one-time payments, which may account for some of the discrepancy that *Vazhnye Istorii* has identified.[72]

The Kremlin continues efforts to crack down against corruption within the Russian MoD. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) detained the head of Russian military goods provider Voentorg, Vladimir Pavlov, for embezzling 400 million rubles (roughly \$4.7 million) worth of state contracts.[73] Russian authorities also arrested businessman Timur Isakov as part of the case and are investigating former Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgakov's involvement in the embezzlement case.[74] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested Bulgakov on July 26 on corruption charges related to supplying low quality food to the Russian military at high prices.[75] A Russian source claimed that Pavlov is associated with a mistress of former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu, but ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[76]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces are reportedly trying to capture, repurpose, and field Ukrainian drones. Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed that Russian forces on the Svatove-Kreminna line are re-arming and fielding downed Ukrainian drones and that up to 25 percent of the drones that Russian forces are using here were originally downed Ukrainian drones.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces burned bread and trench candles in a covered and camouflaged position to create a heat signature to lure a Ukrainian Baba Yaga drone to attack it, and that Russian soldiers then fired on the drone with small arms.[78]

Russian forces continue modifying anti-ship missile launchers to use against ground targets in Ukraine. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction published footage on August 1 of a drone strike against a Russian SBU-6000 "Smerch-2" anti-submarine rocket launcher mounted on a Russian MT-LB armored fighting vehicle.[79] Ukrainian sources have reported that Russian forces began to mount ship-borne launchers on armored vehicle chassis due to a shortage of MLRS, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently began mounting "Smerch-2" rocket launchers on T-72B tank chassis.[80]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue to reiterate the Kremlin's uncompromising conditions for a "diplomatic solution" to the war in Ukraine. Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko stated on August 1 that Russia "cannot and will not" make any territorial concessions in Ukraine and that the illegally annexed and occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts are "part of Russia" now and that this cannot be undone.[81] Matviyenko claimed that Russia must focus on completing the "special military operation" in Ukraine - a euphemism for Russian President Vladimir Putin's genocidal and expansionist invasion and war against Ukraine. Putin issued similarly uncompromising conditions for peace negotiations - including international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and Ukraine's full withdrawal from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia does not control - during a speech on June 14.[82]

Russian state media amplified a Ukrainian official's criticism of Ukrainian forces on August 1.[83]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran, Iran during a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on August 1.[84] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov previously accused Israel of conducting the airstrike that killed Haniyeh, and Lavrov and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the assassination but did not explicitly implicate Israel.[85]

Russian officials and milbloggers continued to criticize the Moldovan government for perceived "anti-Russian" policies on August 1. The Russian MFA condemned Moldova's decision to declare a Russian diplomat *persona non grata* and threatened to retaliate.[86] Moldovan authorities detained the head of the Moldovan Parliament's Legal Department, Ion Creanga, on July 30 for allegedly collecting and providing information to a Russian embassy employee.[87] Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Moldovan government for military cooperation with NATO.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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