

**Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
with Nate Trotter**

February 11, 2025, 7:45pm ET


Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security. Zelensky stated during an interview with UK outlet *The Guardian* on February 11 that Europe will not be able to completely meet Ukraine's military needs and provide adequate security guarantees without US involvement.[1] Zelensky called for the West to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air-defense systems and noted that the United States has an irreplaceable role in supplying these systems to Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Ukraine's allies can help rebuild and restore Ukraine alongside Ukrainian companies and that Ukraine is prepared to discuss such plans in detail. Zelensky stated that he will provide US President Donald Trump during their next meeting with a more detailed plan for how the United States can be involved in Ukraine's reconstruction and the joint extraction of natural resources. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has Europe's largest uranium and titanium reserves and suggested that the West should not let these resources fall under Russia's control. Zelensky told *Reuters* on February 7 that he floated the idea of giving allies the opportunity to invest in critical mineral extraction during closed meetings in Fall 2024.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is offering its partners a "mutually beneficial partnership" to jointly develop Ukrainian resources and is not proposing "giving away" Ukraine's resources. Zelensky stated that the United States will receive prioritized access to this opportunity and that the United States and Ukraine are considering storing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Ukraine's underground gas storage sites.

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.[3] The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction

February 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Russian Advances in Russia
- Claimed Russian Advances in Russia
- Ukrainian Advances in Russia

The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with *The Guardian* that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia.[4] Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.

Russian forces continued to test new strike tactics and packages in a series of missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 19 sea-, air-, and land-based missiles against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast and 124 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and that 67 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and facilities at a Naftogaz gas production plant in Poltava Oblast.[6] Russian forces notably launched all the missiles in this strike package against a single target. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes forced Ukrainian energy operators to restrict electricity.[7] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that that Russian forces first launched Shahed drones, then launched cruise and ballistic missiles - including Kalibr cruise missiles - at a single target in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses' abilities to intercept all incoming projectiles.[8] Khrapchynskyi stated that Russian forces recently began reducing their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, which are launched from Tu-22 (Backfire) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic aircraft and are increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles launched from tactical Sukhoi aircraft. The Russians presumably prefer not to risk their strategic bombers in such strikes. Khrapchynskyi also stated that Russian forces are adapting their strike tactics following the provision of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and are prioritizing striking frontline and border areas where Ukrainian forces are less likely to operate F-16s.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the Ukrainian military struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City causing a fire.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Saratov Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and over 20 types of petroleum products and provides fuel to the Russian military. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial plant in Saratov Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in November 2024 and January 2025.[11] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied that Ukrainian forces also struck Engels Air Base, and Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian air defense operating in the area.[12]


The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11. Russian Duma deputies submitted the proposal to remove Gurulev from the Defense Committee and transfer him to the Regional Policy and Local Government Committee on February 7, and Gurulev expressed support for this move but did not claim responsibility for the initiative.[13] Kremlin-affiliated business outlet *Kommersant* reported on February 7 that some of its sources stated that Gurulev's removal is due to his controversial statements that reflect badly on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] Gurulev has made statements that include proposing to introduce a tax on childless Russians and notably leaked the audio message of former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (SMD) Major General Ivan Popov in July 2023 in which Popov claimed that the Russian command dismissed him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces, resulting in an ongoing criminal case against Popov.[15]

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false-flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on February 11 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with assistance from unspecified Western countries intend to blow up a foreign vessel in the Baltic Sea to prompt NATO to block Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and start a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO.[16] The SVR claimed that unspecified European intelligence services and Ukraine's GUR also plan to assassinate Russian opposition figures living abroad and blame Russia for the assassinations to undermine future peace negotiations. Russia's SVR has previously accused Ukraine and other Western states of planning false flag attacks to discredit Ukraine and drive a wedge in Western unity behind Ukraine, particularly at critical moments in Western discussions regarding support for Ukraine and a possible peace plan.[17]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.**
- **Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.**
- **Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.**
- **The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.**
- **The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.**
- **Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 11. A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki; west of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo; southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) and Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[19]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha) and Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently regained positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[21]

Order of Battle: Artillery units of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the Chechen "Khokhla" Detachment of the 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[22]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 10 and 11.[23] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces are slowly advancing near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv) and using drone operators to destroy Russian positions and logistics to compensate for Russian artillery advantages in the area.[24]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing east of Vovchansk.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz’s “Grom” Detachment and the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[26]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka on February 10 and 11.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian positions between Kupyansk and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[29]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and reached the outskirts of Doroshivka (north of Kupyansk and west of Zapadne).[30] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in the international border area near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction on February 11. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zeleny Hai, Novoyehoriivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 10 and 11.[32] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove.[33]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely recently advanced in fields north of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[34]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, Ivanivka and Terny on February 10 and 11.[35]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely advanced in fields northwest of Ivanivka.[36]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced about one kilometer in depth south of Ivanivka as well as within, west of, and southeast of Yampolivka.[37]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

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


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 GEOSPATIAL FUND

- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 11 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 10 and 11.[38]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks within Chasiv Yar, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on February 10 and 11.[39]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and advanced south of Chasiv Yar and towards Minkivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[40]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported that Russian forces are using armored vehicles to transport infantry to basements in Chasiv Yar and that Russian soldiers in the area are either volunteers or convict recruits.[41] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces simultaneously operate in many small infantry groups in the Chasiv Yar area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[42] Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[43]


Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces conducted ground attacks within Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dylivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 10 and 11.[44]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 and 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Druzhba, in northern Toretsk, and in central Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[45]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in western Toretsk.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Leonidivka.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction February 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Berezivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole, and Tarasivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Shevchenko and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Zaporizhzhia, Novooleksandriivka, Sribne, and Molodetske on February 10 and 11.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to attack Pishchane, and some claimed that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) with remote-controlled machine guns near Pishchane and Zvirove.[50]

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 11 that Russian forces seized Baranivka.[51] Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Udachne.[52]


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia and advanced southwest of Nadiivka.[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 11 that Russian forces seized Yasenove, but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 17.[54]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces have conducted successful counterattacks near Pokrovsk and noted that Russian personnel continue to outnumber Ukrainian personnel in the area.[55] Trehubov added that Russian forces suffered roughly 7,000 personnel killed in action (KIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[56] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties in January 2025, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio along the entire frontline.[57] These figures suggest that Russian forces suffered roughly 21,000 casualties or roughly 43 percent of their total casualties in January 2025 near Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1195th and 1438th motorized rifle regiments (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating north of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[58] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has concentrated elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA); elements of the 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA); most of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD); up to two battalions of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division); and elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) southwest of Pokrovsk.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

February 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on February 10 and 11.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern outskirts of Dachne.[60]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Andriivka and along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil highway west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove).[61]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) seized all or most of Andriivka and that Russian forces advanced north of Andriivka and near Zelenivka and Kostyantynopil.[62] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Slovyanka.[63]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to identify vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, but that rainy and foggy weather conditions are softening the ground and preventing Russian forces from using equipment in the area.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne, and elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kurakhove direction.[65] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction February 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Novoocheretuvate; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and Novosilka; and northwest of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Burlatske on February 10 and 11.[67]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northwest of Vremivka.[68]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), in an area one kilometer in depth and three kilometers wide northwest of Vremivka, and in an area one kilometer in depth and 1.5 kilometers wide north of the Vremivka-Temyrivka area (west of Velyka Novosilka).[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely recently advanced in fields west of Marfopil (southeast of Hulyaipole).[70]

A Russian milblogger claimed that positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 11.[71]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[72]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 11.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits. Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on February 11 that at least 42 Russian federal subjects and occupation authorities in Crimea introduced a reduced payment for Russian soldiers who sustained minor injuries.[74] Russian authorities previously offered a 500,000-ruble (\$5,181) payment to all wounded Russian soldiers regardless of the severity of the injury. The Russian federal government published a decree in November 2024 establishing reduced payments for Russian soldiers who receive only minor injuries in battle rather than providing blanket payments to all injured personnel. *Verstka* noted that some Russian federal subjects, including Kamchatka Krai, changed their injury compensation system to align with the federal system in recent months, while others, including Amur Oblast, already had payment systems similar to the federal government's new system. The Kremlin has recently taken measures to reduce various payments to Russian soldiers, including one-time recruitment bonuses, amid other indicators that the Kremlin is concerned about the long-term costs of the war and ongoing wartime pressures on the Russian economy.[75]

Russian federal subjects continue to establish regional analogues of the Russian "Time of Heroes" veteran program as part of the Kremlin's efforts to militarize all levels of Russian government. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin announced on February 11 that the "Our Heroes" program, the Saratov Oblast analogue to the "Time of Heroes" program, has begun functioning and will begin accepting applications from Russian veterans at the end of February 2025.[76]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/11/zelenskyy-europe-cannot-guarantee-ukraines-security-without-america>

[2] <https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-lets-do-deal-offering-trump-mineral-partnership-seeking-security-2025-02-07/>

[3] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21081> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64324 ;
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<https://t.me/warriorofnorth/6085>

[4] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/11/zelenskyy-europe-cannot-guarantee-ukraines-security-without-america>

[5] <https://t.me/kpszsu/28586>

[6] <https://t.me/kpszsu/28586> ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4449 ;
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