

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson,
and Frederick W. Kagan

January 20, 2025, 8:00pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on January 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskiy reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.[1] Syrskiy stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskiy's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024.[2] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump.[4] Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[5] Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government.[6] Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 20 that unspecified drones struck Russian military facilities in Kazan.[8] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* posted footage of a fire at the Gorbunov Aircraft Plant in Kazan, and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram account geolocated a picture of the

aftermath of the strike to the fuel tanks of the Gorbunov plant.[9] The Gorbunov Aircraft Plant is a subsidiary of the Russia Tupolev United Aircraft Company, which produces and repairs Tu-160 strategic bombers.[10] Tatarstan authorities claimed on January 20 that Russian forces shot down all the drones and that the strike caused no damage or casualties.[11] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 20 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise on the outskirts of Kaluga City.[12] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on January 20 that sources within the Kaluga Oblast emergency services stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against Lyudinovo on January 17 damaged three diesel fuel tanks and one gas fuel tank.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast on the night of January 17 to 18, causing a fire at the facility.[14]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on January 20 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia's military facilities, including oil refineries and those that produce ammunition, missile components, and dual-use products, have significantly disrupted Russian forces' combat capabilities and ability to maintain a high intensity of combat operations.[15] Syrskyi noted that Russian forces are using half as many artillery shells per day than they were an unspecified period of time ago. Syrskyi emphasized that Ukrainian forces target Russia's ammunition, missile component, and dual-use production enterprises as well as oil refining facilities that support Russia's war efforts. ISW has observed reports from Ukrainian personnel in the field noting decreases in Russia's artillery usage and of Russia's overall artillery advantage in some areas.[16]


Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas. Russian and Transnistrian authorities were reportedly recently discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025, but Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted on January 16 that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria.[17] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated on January 20 that Transnistria will allow Moldovagaz to supply Transnistria with gas, presumably from Europe, despite initially refusing offers in early January 2025 from Moldovagaz to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms.[18] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria can guarantee payment – possibly referring to Moscow's recent reported proposal to use Russian budget funds to buy European gas for Transnistria's domestic consumption.[19] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz sent a letter to Moldovagaz on January 18 requesting that Moldovagaz outline the procedure for supplying gas to Transnistria.[20] Moldovan President Maia Sandu responded on January 20 that Krasnoselsky's proposal does not appear to be about Transnistria's purchase of gas through Moldovagaz but that Krasnoselsky rather is proposing that "someone else" buys the gas and delivers it to Moldovan territory, after which Moldovagaz transports it through Moldova to Transnistria.[21] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities are currently determining which companies would be involved in this process, since Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.**
- **Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.**
- **Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.**
- **Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**
- **A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

January 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Mitchell Belcher, Tom Thacker, Harrison Hurwitz, and David Schulert
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| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Sudzha near Nikolskiy and towards Viktorovka from Novoivanovka and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina and Novaya Sorochina and south of Sudzha in Makhnovka.[23] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), 83rd VDV Brigade, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the "Kashtan" unit of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly striking targets north of Sudzha near Nikolayevka.[25]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction

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Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian Border Guards Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on January 20 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon along the Sumy Oblast-Kursk Oblast international border on an unspecified date in January 2025.[26] Demchenko stated that Russian forces have conducted several attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area since January 1.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[27] Elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the "Vakha" Battalion of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz reportedly continue operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[28]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

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|  Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours |  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine |  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
|  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 |  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |  Russian Field Fortifications |
|  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory |  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within northern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[29] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Stroivka, north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 19 and 20.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 20 but did not advance. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohuslavka (north of Borova), up to Zeleny Hai (east of Borova), and in windbreaks to the northeast and east of Zeleny Hai.[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova; east of Borova near Nadiya and Zeleny Hai; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Makiivka on January 19 and 20.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized heights north of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced in fields north and east of Terny (northeast of Lyman).[34] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman towards Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novosadove, Kolodyazi, and Terny; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and the Serebryanske forest area on January 19 and 20.[35] Drone elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking targets in the Serebryanske forest area.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

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


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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[37]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Desyatnyi Microraiion in northern Chasiv Yar and that elements of the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) advanced west of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[38] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 19 and 20.[39] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in southern Chasiv Yar, and elements of the BARS-31 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) unit are reportedly operating near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[40]

Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued fighting in the area on January 20. Geolocated footage published on January 18 and 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southern and northern Toretsk, respectively.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 20 that Russian forces seized a waste heap on the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk and are bypassing Toretsk from the north near Krymske.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacking within Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 19 and 20.[43] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Toretsk direction stated on January 20 that Russian forces did not make significant advances near Krymske and Ozaryanivka as other sources claimed but are sending small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to assault Ukrainian positions on the flanks of Toretsk.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk

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
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| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 20. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced at the Pokrovske Mine no. 2 north of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) and in southern Kotlyne.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the mine but that fighting continues for the northern part of Kotlyne.[46] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized all of Kotlyne and advanced east of Kotlyne, in eastern Udachne (west of Kotlyne), in Novoandriivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Mykolaivka (southeast of Myrnohrad), and towards Oleksandropil (northeast of Pokrovsk).[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Nadiivka, Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novotroitske, and Novoandriivka; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 19 and 20.[48] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), Zvirove, Yelyzavetivka, and Vodyane Druhe.[49] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces have reduced the number of infantry-led frontal assaults in the Pokrovsk direction due to personnel shortages and are trying to enter Pokrovsk from the west.[50] A Ukrainian officer in a brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are rarely using armored vehicles and that the Russian military command redeployed unspecified units from other sectors of the front to the Pokrovsk area.[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

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
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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 20. Geolocated footage published on January 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and southeast of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced west of Petropavlivka and west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 20 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove), and a Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) with the seizure.[54] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Shevchenko as of January 3.[55] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly; and southwest of Kurakhove near Sukhi Yaly, Zelenivka, Yantarne and Rozlyv on January 19 and 20.[56] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenivka.[57] Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dalne (south of Kurakhove); elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dachne; and drone operators of the "Somali" Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Slovyanka.[58]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction

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
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|  Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours |  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine |  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
|  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 |  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
|  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | | |

Russian forces continued offensive operation in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Velyka Novosilka.[59] One milblogger claimed on January 20 that Russian forces seized the entirety of Velyka Novosilka, but other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized the rest of the settlement.[60] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims of advance, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself and northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards Pryvilne on January 19 and 20.[61] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking targets near Velyka Novosilka.[62]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[63]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction, including near Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City), on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[64] Drone operators of the Russian "Bears" company of the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and elements of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[65]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 19 and 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 141 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast targeting Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 93 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts; that 47 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that two drones flew into Russian airspace as of 0800 local time. The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on January 20 that Russian forces launched an unspecified missile strike on Shostka Hromada, Sumy Oblast during the day, damaging residential buildings and infrastructure.[67]

Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on January 20 that Russian forces have intensified strikes, including with guided and unguided glide bombs, against Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts in order to force Ukrainian forces to defend the entire border area.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.[69] The milblogger claimed that the inconsistent amount of gunpowder in artillery shells is causing Russian artillery to perform inconsistently and inaccurately and that the Russian military command has not fixed the issue but instead continues to prohibit soldiers from disassembling munitions and weighing the gunpowder inside. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in May 2024 for similar gunpowder inconsistencies and for failing to address this issue.[70]

Russian occupation authorities continue cryptomobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine, in violation of international law.[71] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev reported on January 20 that the Sevastopol occupation administration has increased the regional one-time payment for soldiers who sign a Russian MoD contract after January 1, 2025 from 400,000 rubles (roughly \$3,950) to 500,000 rubles (roughly \$4,950).[72] Those who sign a MoD contract in occupied Sevastopol will now receive 900,000 rubles (roughly \$8,900) between the regional and federal one-time payments.

Kremlin newswire *TASS* reported on January 20 that law enforcement officers in the Tuva Republic opened an investigation after footage emerged showing Russian military police beating wounded soldiers from unit 55115 (55th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District [CMD]).[73] The press service of the CMD stated that Russian authorities detained a servicemember suspected of beating a fellow soldier in Tuva.[74] A Russian insider source claimed that similar beatings in the Southern Military District (SMD) are common and systemic and that such beatings usually go unpunished due to a lack of video evidence.[75]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to establish branches of the All-Russian Cossack Society in occupied Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing cryptomobilization efforts. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy head Anton Titsky announced on January 20 that occupation authorities officially registered the first pro-Russian Cossack society organization in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[76] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced the registration of the first five Cossack societies in occupied Kherson Oblast on December 24 as part of the broader establishment of the state-controlled All-Russian Cossack Society, which will operate jointly with Russian law enforcement in occupied Ukraine.[77] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in March 2024 enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve as of September 2024.[78]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky published a video on January 20 showing an interrogation of a North Korean prisoner of war (POW), who states that he served in a reconnaissance battalion and that some North Korean underwent training with Russian heavy military equipment.[79] The North Korean POW claimed that he did not know that he would fight for Russia before arriving in Russia.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

North Korea may be setting conditions to increase its cooperation with Belarus. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un's sister and Vice Chair of the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee Kim Yo Jong stated on January 20 that North Korea is receptive to developing bilateral relations with Belarus, but that Belarus needs to more explicitly clarify its intentions.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABEL STREET

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