

**Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel,
Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan**

January 4, 2025, 4:00 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on January 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for

at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[5] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[6] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[8] The *New York Times* reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[9] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[10]

Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows damage to the Novatek gas terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[11] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that its sources stated that Russian forces shot down most of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, causing minor damage to a building at the port.[12] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed three drones near Luga Bay but that there was no damage.[13] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a total of four drones over Leningrad Oblast.[14] The Ust-Luga sea trade port is the second largest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against the Novatek gas terminal at the port in January 2024.[15]


Astra reported that its sources in the Russian emergency services stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City with at least five drones on the night of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down all the drones.[16] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that

Russian forces destroyed at least five drones over Voronezh City overnight and that several drones fell on residential buildings.[17] *Astra* also reported on January 4 that its sources in the Kursk Oblast emergency services stated that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[18] Ukrainian and Russian sources previously stated that the strike targeted a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]).[19]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.**
- **Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.**
- **Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**
- **The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War 4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations along Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast on January 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing southeast of Korenevo near Leonidovo, Aleksandriya, Viktorovka, and Kruglenkoye, and another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several counterattacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[20] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast reported that Russian forces are sending most newly trained Russian personnel to fight in either Kursk Oblast or western Donetsk Oblast.[21] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults in small groups using light vehicles, motorcycles, buggies, and scooters in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka (both southeast of Korenevo).[22] Elements of the Russian 83rd and 11th VDV brigades reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast, and artillery elements of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[23]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction 4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 3 and 4.[24]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction
4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST**



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Note: ISW is now orienting Russian activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions to reflect Russian forces' priority operational goals in these areas.


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 4 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kupyansk to the west and southwest of Zapadne, to northeastern Kalynove and to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River east of Holubivka; east of Kupyansk to the north and northeast of Petropavlivka and south and

southwest of Stepova Novoselivka; and southeast of Kupyansk in fields east of Kivsharivka.[25] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces also continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka on January 3 and 4.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 4 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 4 that Russian forces seized Nadiya (east of Borova), which ISW assessed Russian forces had seized as of November 6.[27] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya, Pershotravneve, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka and Cherneshchyna on January 3 and 4.[28]

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna in the Lyman direction. Geolocated footage published on January 2 shows that Ukrainian forces recaptured positions in central Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[29] Additional geolocated footage published on January 4 shows that Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River and into central Ivanivka (northwest of Kreminna).[30] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on January 3 and 4.[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast 4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka (both northeast of Siversk) on January 3 and 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and towards Predtechyne and Stupochky on January 3 and 4.[33] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that the Russian military command has currently committed over 10,000 personnel to offensive operations near Chasiv Yar.[34] Elements of the Russian

98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 7th Military Base (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[35]


Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along 1-Hirskyi Street in northwestern Toretsk.[36] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 3 and 4.[37]



Russian forces recently advanced southeast and southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and northwest of


Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Vovkove.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pokrovsk from Vozdvyzhenka to the western outskirts of Vodyane Druhe (northwest of Vodyzhenka) and 1.5 kilometers north of Tymofiivka (southwest of Vozdvyzhenka) and that Russian forces are currently one kilometer from the T-05-04 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to envelop Pokrovsk because they want to avoid urban combat and noted that Russian forces are currently conducting fewer glide bomb strikes along the frontline in eastern Ukraine than in early 2024.[40] Fighting continues near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Myrne, Vodyane Druhe, and Tymofiivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Zelene, Novyi Trud, Shevchenko, and Pishchane and in the direction of Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Solone, Novoolenivka, Kotlyne, Novovasylivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Nadezhdynka, and Ukrainka and towards Sribne on January 3 and 4.[41] Russian sources credited elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) with the recent seizure of Novoolenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction 4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




Ukrainian forces likely maintain limited positions near the Kurakhivske Reservoir amid ongoing Russian advances southwest of Kurakhove on January 4. Geolocated footage published on January 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions south of Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove) on the western edge of the Kurakhivske Reservoir.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on January 3 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kostyantynopolske (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing limited Ukrainian positions in western Kurakhove, are trying to bypass Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) from the north, and advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway toward Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[45] A Russian source also claimed that Russian forces entered Petropavlivka.[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Footage published on January 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the

Kurakhove direction on an unspecified day.[47] Russian forces continued assault near Kurakhove itself, northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, west of Kurakhove near Dachne and in the direction of Kostyantynopil, south of Kurakhove towards Yantarne, and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozlyv on January 3 and 4.[48] Drone operators of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) and artillery units of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near the reservoir; elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dachne; elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Zelenivka; and elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the general Kurakhove direction.[49]




Note: ISW will be incorporating data previously reported as the Vuhledar direction as part of the Kurakhove direction moving forward to reflect the shifting operational situation in this area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 3 and 4.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and towards Novosilka south of the O0510 Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole highway, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on January 4. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 4 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya.[52] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces also conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on January 4.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[54] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-1 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Orikhiv direction.[55]



Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on January 3 and 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction 4 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine during the day on January 3 and overnight on January 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five S-300 air defense missiles at Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles at Chernihiv Oblast; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles at Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and 32 Shahed and decoy drones from the northeastern direction during the day on January 3.[57] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 13 drones, and that 19 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, as of 2000 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted three missile strikes on a single residential building on the outskirts of Chernihiv City within just a few hours on the afternoon of

January 3, damaging the surrounding houses and killing one civilian.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 4 that Russian forces launched 81 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai overnight on January 3 to 4.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 34 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 47 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, as of 0900 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that debris from downed drones damaged residential homes in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command reported on January 4 that most likely a Russian Shahed drone damaged two industrial locations in Stari Borovychi, Chernihiv Oblast.[60]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel. Russian opposition outlets *Astra* and *Mobilization News* reported on January 4 that Russian officials in Samara Oblast increased one-time lump payments for signing a contract with the Russian military to four million rubles (about \$36,222), which Samara Oblast officials characterized as the highest one-time payment currently offered in Russia.[61] A Ukrainian source reported on January 4 that recruitment posters show that Voronezh Oblast increased one-time payments to individuals who refer someone else to sign a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) by 50 percent to 75 thousand rubles (about \$679) - just two weeks after Voronezh Oblast officials last increased the one-time payment (since about December 21).[62]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military has so far failed to modernize its naval drones as Ukrainian forces continue to successfully innovate their naval drone fleet.[63] The milblogger claimed on January 2 that the Russian military has long been developing and testing various naval drone prototypes and questioned why the Russian military has not widely deployed these drones. The milblogger insinuated that Russia lags behind Ukraine in terms of drone innovation and noted that Russia plans to develop a manufacturing hub for Russian naval drones at the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant in St. Petersburg in 2025.

A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces are adapting older tank models, such as the T-62 tank, to serve as modified armored personnel carriers (APCs).[64] The milblogger posted an image of a modified Russian T-62 tank with a flat platform and claimed that Russian forces adapted the tank in an attempt to solve a chronic shortage of Russian APCs.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido5dAQaG5aiGzgNEkZ6EKkdWCfHKi1pMcbSsjr3YYv5fDD2WR3UBAaXH9nQrW6ynhXl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido37c3snFuGLFo6nU4eW8F6KMudrMzGH9c59hZu3d4zSPuTyLyAgsPDrcR2D8cZjhPzl>

[2] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024>

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324>

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024>

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024>

[8] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/03/prosto-spalyuyut-svij-osobovyj-sklad-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku-vorog-shturmuye-lyshe-pihotoyu/>

- [9] <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/world/europe/ukraine-russia-attacks-eastern-front.html>
- [10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024>
- [11] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10884; <https://x.com/blinzka/status/1875497620082503980>;
<https://x.com/kava220/status/1875487339243565124>
- [12] <https://t.me/astrapress/71709>
- [13] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/6241; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/6242;
https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/6243
- [14] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/6244
- [15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/71709>
- [16] <https://t.me/astrapress/71703>
- [17] https://t.me/gusev_36/3280; https://t.me/gusev_36/3281
- [18] <https://t.me/astrapress/71719>
- [19] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225>
- [20] https://t.me/dva_majors/61780; <https://t.me/wargonzo/24098>
- [21] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/04/vybyty-do-20-sichnya-rosijskomu-komanduvannyu-vstanovyly-dedlajn-na-kurshhyni/>
- [22] https://t.me/rusich_army/19842; https://t.me/rusich_army/19839;
https://t.me/mod_russia/47611
- [23] https://t.me/rusich_army/19839; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5397
- [24]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFog96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBFl>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923;
<https://t.me/otukharkiv/3365>
- [25] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30376
- [26]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/47607 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83864> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/18586>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024>

[28]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl>

[29] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24299; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/764

[30] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1875463273220550940; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/767;
<https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875467188628598897>;
<https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1875461048939188347>;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1875472577843622384; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24287;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8006

[31]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61200>

[32]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1> https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923

[33]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDU1>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1>; https://t.me/dva_majors/61780;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/24098>

[34] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/915543-proti-nas-stoat-ponad-10-tisac-oborona-casovogo-aruv-intervu-z-komandirom/>

[35] <https://t.me/RVvoenkora/83867> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150088 ;
https://t.me/nm_dnr/13217

[36] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1875576876414201971> ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/349

[37]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/24098>

[38] <https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1875482176252461376> ;
<https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1875474912716190148> ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8007 ;
https://t.me/ZSU_32_OMBR/251 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8008 ;
https://t.me/moment_war/258

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/61780 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkora/83844> ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21925> ; <https://t.me/voenkoraKotenok/61192> ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21930> ; <https://t.me/voenkoraKotenok/61199> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkora/83856>

[40] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/04/otochyty-pokrovsk-i-pererizaty-logistyku-u-osuvhortyच्या-povidomyly-plany-voroga/>

[41] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21925> ; <https://t.me/voenkoraKotenok/61192> ;
<https://t.me/voenkoraKotenok/61193> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznyFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1>

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150130 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47616 ;
<https://t.me/sashakots/51072>

[43] <https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/11266> ;
<https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1875395535898861833>

[44] <https://x.com/giK1893/status/1875251362650574859> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3944543522533689> ;

<https://x.com/blinzka/status/1875271727162495006>;
<https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1875241361529827713>

[45] <https://t.me/wargonzo/24098> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61204>

[46] <https://t.me/vrogov/18580> ; <https://ria dot ru/20250103/svo-1992416016.html>

[47] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/10604 ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/04/majzhe-2-pihotnyh-viddilennya-voroga-i-3-bronemashyny-nashi-morpihy-znyshhyly-pid-kurahovym/>

[48] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923 ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznYFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3923

[49] <https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/11266> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83850> ;
https://t.me/voin_dv/12613

[50]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznYFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1> ;
[https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2ZxSrAagETb8FBM2GVkJu62GJE7icZkjX6jNK1dGqjvkYzCVeiTnr4Agc7nLXcEGzl?__cft__\[o\]=AZWKGM_yOOz2KZcQ1v8udlRUjXDR-7XBuqzVEgJXgUnzFZmeZAGbugueOlgaSSvoF8saVl56oFBbH7CyoCraYU6y3d4jduJ8rm4t35nnuNfr4_ZCA-iI4A5A9bVn8dUzMTP7siq7s1IJPcCv9et7WBbRR__qKDMD4teuoZPcBeNB7FNT4q5gQVxcnoOikcrDrY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2ZxSrAagETb8FBM2GVkJu62GJE7icZkjX6jNK1dGqjvkYzCVeiTnr4Agc7nLXcEGzl?__cft__[o]=AZWKGM_yOOz2KZcQ1v8udlRUjXDR-7XBuqzVEgJXgUnzFZmeZAGbugueOlgaSSvoF8saVl56oFBbH7CyoCraYU6y3d4jduJ8rm4t35nnuNfr4_ZCA-iI4A5A9bVn8dUzMTP7siq7s1IJPcCv9et7WBbRR__qKDMD4teuoZPcBeNB7FNT4q5gQVxcnoOikcrDrY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R)

[51] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61202>

[52] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21928>

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoXkEaDsWyz382XFtrWomGYsT9TyaQUdjTpT5AzdZ3Wk46AeRuoMundo3x8V4kr6Vtl>

[54] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21928>

[55] <https://t.me/vrogov/18584> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47582

[56] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2NtQAf6bCaG9tCiRiZoJsd9AA2jEGtU99qMKVbec35B1p8wpRv1s1nJNtnJpT2HDUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidorixrwo8YrznYFo96cg8zrxwLGagZHEZw9ve4zpf7UqruyExUndBBcQ4edHxAcgBF1> ;

[https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2ZxSrAagETb8FBM2GVkJu62GJE7icZkjX6jNK1dGqjvkYzCVeiTnr4Agc7nLXcEGzl?__cft__\[o\]=AZWKGM_yOOz2KZcQ1v8udlRUjXDR-7XBuqzVEgJXgUnzFZmeZAGbugueOlgfaSSvoF8saVl56oFBbH7CyoCraYU6y3d4jduJ8rm4t35nnuNfr4_ZCA-iI4A5A9bVn8dUzMTP7siq7s1IJPcCv9et7WBbRR__qKDMD4teuoZPcBeNB7FNT4q5gQVxcnoOikcrDrY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2ZxSrAagETb8FBM2GVkJu62GJE7icZkjX6jNK1dGqjvkYzCVeiTnr4Agc7nLXcEGzl?__cft__[o]=AZWKGM_yOOz2KZcQ1v8udlRUjXDR-7XBuqzVEgJXgUnzFZmeZAGbugueOlgfaSSvoF8saVl56oFBbH7CyoCraYU6y3d4jduJ8rm4t35nnuNfr4_ZCA-iI4A5A9bVn8dUzMTP7siq7s1IJPcCv9et7WBbRR__qKDMD4teuoZPcBeNB7FNT4q5gQVxcnoOikcrDrY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R)

[57] <https://t.me/kpszsu/26157>

[58] <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/917451-potrijnij-raketnij-udar-po-cernigovi-pricina-smerti-zagiblogo-ta-so-vidomo-pro-stan-poranehiv/> ; <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/17389>; <https://t.me/bryzynskyi/2859>; <https://t.me/gunpChernihiv/3392>; <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/917403-odna-ludina-zaginula-vnaslidok-potrijnogo-raketnogo-udaru-po-zitlovij-zabudovi-na-okolici-cernigova/>

[59] <https://t.me/kpszsu/26188>

[60]

https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=993039116188446&id=100064471011124&mibextid=wwXifr&rdid=Q7A7QKJ2sygkZQd9 ; <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/916801-poskodzeni-9-privatnih-budinkiv-promislovi-sporudi-ta-vantazivki-naslidki-ataki-sahedami-i-kabami-na-cernigivcini/>

[61] <https://t.me/astrapress/71707> ; <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21582>

[62] <https://t.me/andriyshTime/31597>

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/61785 ; <https://t.me/rusfleet/11419>

[64] <https://t.me/milinfoLive/139130>