

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2023

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July 2, 2023, 5pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front on July 2 and made gains in some of these areas. The Russian Ministry of Defense and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces are continuing to make unspecified advances on the flanks around Bakhmut.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made unspecified gains southwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[3] Geolocated footage published on July 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Volodymyrivka (12km southeast of Vuhledar) in western Donetsk Oblast.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Russian trench positions near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and that there is ongoing close combat in these trenches.[6] Some Russian sources continue to describe these Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as smaller tactical operations than earlier Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[7]

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine and Kyiv on July 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 11 missiles and eight Shahed drones at Ukraine, including three Kalibr missiles at Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted all three Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Shahed drones.[9] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all Russian Shahed drones targeting Kyiv, and

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two drones over Mykolaiv Oblast.[10]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to consolidate control over the Russian information space by undermining select Russian milbloggers who did not repeat the MoD's desired framing regarding the claimed defeat of a Ukrainian presence on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1. The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 and July 2 that Russian forces successfully repelled Ukrainian landings near the Antonivsky Bridge and disproportionately celebrated defeating a small Ukrainian landing on the eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[11] Some Russian milbloggers, however, contrary to the MoD's reports noted that fighting is still ongoing and that Ukrainian forces maintained some positions near Antonivsky Bridge as of July 2.[12] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified a post on July 1 from an unspecified Telegram channel, which criticized several prominent Kremlin and Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels for contradicting the Russian MoD's official narrative.[13] The post accused select milbloggers of spreading false information about the situation around the Antonivsky Bridge and other Russian MoD claims - ultimately accusing these channels of assisting Ukrainian "psychological operations." [14] Russian milbloggers who contradicted the MoD's report responded in turn by accusing the Russian General Staff of launching an attack on the Russian milblogger community.[15] These defiant milbloggers claimed that the Russian General Staff and the MoD previously attempted to open a criminal case against milbloggers in 2022 and claimed that milbloggers' accurate coverage of frontline realities greatly undermines defense officials' efforts to exaggerate Russia's successes.[16] Some of these defiant milbloggers directly interact with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and it is likely that the Russian MoD seeks to censor some Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers out of a concern that these ultranationalists may expose Russian military failures to Putin during their monthly "special military operations" milblogger working groups within the Kremlin.[17]

The Russian MoD's conflict with the milblogger community over a trivial combat operation may indicate that the Russian military command does not think it has any other successes to report to Putin amidst the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive. One milblogger noted that Russian defense officials worry that milbloggers' coverage of the war endangers their official positions and implied that the Russian MoD may be attempting to recover from the Wagner Group's rebellion on June 24.[18] ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD may have exaggerated its victory in east Kherson Oblast to repair the reputation of the Russian "Dnepr" Group of Forces and the Southern Military District (SMD), whose headquarters in Rostov-on-Don the Wagner Group surrounded a week before.[19] The Russian MoD has consistently exaggerated Ukrainian losses since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and may not be confident that such tired narratives are sufficiently offsetting the lack of any Russian progress on the battlefield as Ukrainian forces continue to make limited but steady advances in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The Russian MoD's attempt to overstate a potential tactical Russian victory

near the Antonivsky Bridge and its efforts to restrict opposing information has backfired. Russian milbloggers began to blame Russia's military command for failing to provide Russian servicemen in east bank Kherson Oblast with boats and other supplies and generally accused the Russian MoD of lying about the situation on the frontlines for its own self-interested reasons.[20] One milblogger observed that the Russian MoD failed to provide Russian forces with more boats despite the fact that an acute and persistent Russian lack of patrol boats for littoral security has been widely known since at least April 2023, while another milblogger claimed that Russia should authorize the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to create a parallel control system over the Russian MoD to resolve bureaucratic problems.[21] The Russian pro-war community thus continues to criticize the Russian MoD even after Wagner's failed rebellion and even as Prigozhin loses his platform in Russia.

Putin continues to face the choice of either siding with the Russian MoD to defend its weakened reputation or maintaining his support among pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers and their patronage networks. The Russian MoD had launched similar organized attacks against hostile milbloggers in July and October 2022 that did not result in milbloggers' arrests or punishments for their criticism of the Russian military command.[22] ISW assessed that Putin was not interested in restricting the milblogger community as he valued its support for the invasion of Ukraine and instead increasingly co-opted select milbloggers by bringing them into the pro-Kremlin fold - likely in part to check the Russian MoD.[23] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin had extensively used Russian milbloggers to promote his efforts to replace Russian MoD leadership with Wagner-affiliated officials prior to his rebellion, and Putin now faces the choice of censoring or appeasing Russian milbloggers in the aftermath of the rebellion.[24] Putin will need to restrict Russian milbloggers from criticizing the Russian MoD if he seeks to reestablish and reinforce the MoD's credibility, but the MoD's failures, struggles, and apparent pervasive dishonesty may make that task infeasible. Putin may thus instead decide to continue appeasing the milblogger community and scapegoating the Russian MoD for military failures in Ukraine, a far easier undertaking. That course of action could let Putin retain support for the war among the Russian ultranationalist camp at the expense of the Russian MoD. But that course of action also carries risk for Putin: the continued erosion of the MoD's credibility could enable other ambitious Russian figures to promote their interests at its expense, as Prigozhin tried to do.

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front on July 2 and made gains in some of these areas.**
- **Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine and Kyiv on July 2.**
- **The Russian MoD's conflict with the milblogger community over a trivial combat operation may indicate that the Russian military command does not think it has any other successes to report to Putin amidst the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive.**
- **The Russian MoD's attempt to overstate a potential tactical Russian victory near the Antonivsky Bridge and its efforts to restrict opposing information has backfired.**
- **Putin continues to face the choice of either siding with the Russian MoD to defend its weakened reputation or maintaining his support among pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers and their patronage networks.**
- **Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and have advanced as of July 2.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as of July 2.**
- **Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian officials plan to create regional centers for the development of drones in Nizhny Novgorod as well as in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian and Belarusian sources reported that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and other Belarusian officials and citizens are actively involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Belarus.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of July 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline on July 2. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Group of Forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks near Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) within the area of responsibility of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District).[25] The Russian MoD additionally claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Torske (13km west of Kreminna) and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) and stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian positions near Torske and Terny (15km west of Kreminna).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in the Nevske area (17km northwest of Kreminna) and south of Dibrova.[28] Russian sources reported that elements of the 1st Tank Guards Army continue to operate near Kyslivka (22km southwest of Kupyansk) and that elements of the 79th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (2nd Luhansk People's Republic's Army Corps) struck Ukrainian positions with drones in the Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna) direction.[29] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast no longer engage in Wagner Group-style "meat assaults," and are instead conducting reconnaissance operations and attacking in small platoon-sized groups on the Luhansk Oblast frontline.[30]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of July 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEF's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200 meters in the Klishchiivka direction and 1,500 meters in the Kurdyumivka direction as of June 29. The Commander of the Ukrainian 57th Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky and a Russian source stated on June 29 that there is heavy fighting near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 2. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and unsuccessfully attacked from the northwest of Bakhmut.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut and Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut).[32] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance on the flanks of Bakhmut.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Minkivka (14km northwest of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces deployed reinforcements to the area near the E40 highway near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and conducted unsuccessful assaults near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and from Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) in the Bohdanivka direction.[35] Footage published on July 1 purportedly shows elements of the 11th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (VDV) operating on the outskirts of Bakhmut and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic’s Army Corps) operating in an unspecified area in the Bakhmut direction.[36]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Marinka.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) from Pisky (9km southwest of Avdiivka).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 1 that positional battles are ongoing along the Opytne-Vodyane line (3-8km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted raids along the Sieverne-Vodyane road (6km west to 8km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] Footage published on July 1 purportedly shows elements of the “Vladlen Tatarsky” UAV detachment of the Southern Military District operating near Niu York (23km northeast of Avdiivka) and elements of the 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 80th Reconnaissance “Sparta” Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Pervomaiske and Lastochkyne (4km northwest of Avdiivka).[40] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka),

Vodyane (8km southwest of Avidiivka), Pervomaiske, and Marinka.[41]



Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of July 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200 meters in the Klishchiivka direction and 1,500 meters in the Kurdyumivka direction as of June 29. The Commander of the Ukrainian 57th Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky and a Russian source stated on June 29 that there is heavy fighting near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of this advance at this time.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and likely made tactical gains as of July 2. Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Volodymyrivka (12km southeast of Vuhledar) as of July 1.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[43]

Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblast border area on July 2. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked in the Rivnopil area and recaptured unspecified positions.[45] The Russian “Vostok” volunteer battalion indicated that it is operating near the Yevhenivka area (25km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[46]


Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counterattacks south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 2. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv) and captured the first Russian line of defense west of the settlement.[47] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully repelled Ukrainian attacks overnight and during the day, however.[48] Russian sources claimed that the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled small Ukrainian attacks near Pyatakhatky (24km southwest of Orikhiv) overnight.[49] A Russian milblogger indicated that the Russian 38th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) is operating in the Luhivske area (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[50]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as of July 2. The Russian MoD claimed on July 2 that Russian forces successfully destroyed all Ukrainian forces near the Antonivsky Bridge, but several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank.[51] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from under the Antonivsky Bridge to the dacha area on July 1, and former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that an unspecified Russian commander was wounded during the engagement.[52] Girkin also claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian 7th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division transferred from the Oleshky area (7km southeast of Kherson City) to an unspecified area in Zaporizhia Oblast, supporting Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar’s prior reports that Russian forces transferred most combat capable units from the Kherson direction following the start of the counteroffensive in early June.[53]

Enhanced Russian security measures likely continue to hinder Russian logistics from Russia to occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.[54] Crimean occupation Transport Minister Nikolai Lukashenko stated that the traffic jam across the Kerch Strait Bridge

increased to eight kilometers long as of 14:00 local time on July 2.[55] Lukashenko continued to blame the long wait on security measures at inspection points near the bridge.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of July 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian officials plan to create regional centers for the development of drones in Nizhny Novgorod as well as in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[56] Peskov stated on June 29 that these centers would produce both naval and aerial drones.[57] Peskov added that these centers would operate on the basis of a state transport leasing company but did not offer a timeline for their construction.[58]

Russian sources claimed that Russian officials are deploying a newly formed Armenian volunteer battalion to Ukraine.[59] Russian sources amplified pictures of the “Arbat” volunteer battalion attending a sendoff ceremony at the Armenian Cathedral of Moscow on July 2.[60] One Russian source speculated that the volunteer battalion includes Armenian citizens as well as ethnic Armenians from Russian-occupied Abkhazia.[61]

The mothers and wives of personnel of a mobilized regiment from Irkutsk Oblast released a video appeal on July 2 describing attritional conditions near Kreminna and blaming Russian commanders for indifference to their men.[62] The wives and mothers alleged that the regiment is suffering huge losses around Kreminna and that little less than a company remains of one of the regiment’s battalions.[63] The wives and mothers claimed that the regiment suffered heavy losses on June 19 when commanders failed to communicate with the personnel of the regiment during combat.[64] The wives and mothers alleged that Russian forces also did not attempt to evacuate killed personnel from the battlefield.[65]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian and Belarusian sources reported that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and other Belarusian officials and citizens are actively involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Belarus. Belarusian opposition figure Pavel Latushka stated on June 28 that Lukashenko signed documents facilitating the deportation of children from occupied territories to Belarus and that there are currently five Belarusian summer camps and health resorts involved in the deportation campaign.[66] Latushka stated that Belarusian paralympian Alexei Talai, State Secretary of the Union State Dmitry Mezenstev, Belarusian fertilizer company Belaruskali CEO Ivan Golovaty, and Russian activist Olga Volkova are involved in the deportation of children to Belarus.[67] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 2 that Talai is the general director of the Russian “Believe in Yourself” foundation, which has organized the deportation of children from occupied territories to Belarus.[68] Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian government reached out to the Kremlin about the deportation effort and that it agreed to fund the children's allegedly temporary stay in Belarus from the Russian state budget.[69]

Russian officials are continuing to focus on infrastructure projects in occupied Kherson Oblast in a likely effort to further secure Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on July 2 that Russian repair workers have successfully restored 75 percent of the commercial seaport in Skadvosk, Kherson Oblast and plan to fully restore the port by the end of this summer.[70]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Russian and Belarusian sources reported that the Wagner Group in Belarus will resemble the Wagner Group's former organization prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[71] A Russian source reported on July 1 that the Wagner Group will continue to perform its normal missions in Africa, just operating from Belarus instead of from Russia.[72] An apparent Belarusian source additionally reported on July 1 that the Wagner Group will operate behind the scenes rather than as publicly as it did when it took up a larger role during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine; Wagner personnel will distance themselves from public media and Wagner activity will revert back to an opaquer domain of Telegram channels and Wagner's human network.[73] The Belarusian source reported that this transition will take one-to-two months as Wagner transfers its heavy equipment to the Russian Ministry of Defense.[74] This source also reported that Russian authorities will not close the Wagner Group's recruitment centers in Russia and that the Wagner Group will continue to recruit in Russia. It is unclear if any Wagner presence will remain in Russia or if the Russia-based Wagner recruitment centers will send new recruits to Belarus (or elsewhere). These sources did not touch on how - if at all - Yevgeny Prigozhin or his entourage will be involved in the future of Wagner Group.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/rusich_army/9699 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9703 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13618> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13607> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48551> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48534> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/10697> ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2182> ;

https://t.me/mod_russia/28017 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13607> ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/28018 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28020 ;

[2] https://armyinform_dot_com.ua/2023/07/02/za-mynulu-dobu-ukrayinski-zahysnyky-prosunulysya-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[3] <https://t.me/wargonzo/13607>

[4] <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1675495039688929280> ;
<https://t.me/EjShahidenko/5>

[5] https://t.me/rusich_army/9699 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9703 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/13618> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13607> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48551> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48534> ;
<https://t.me/vrogov/10697> ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2182>

[6] <https://t.me/vrogov/10700>

[7] <https://t.me/vrogov/10697> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48534> ;
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[8]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ywbjf1XYt4vbEXwnMZ...>

[9]
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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02W6FkewDfVNdGqwYHW4RAaXKEF8sfTR1sBji3fWGsisDiFbi2nqfoEVUJojQHravl>

[10]
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoyzrnfu3aHj4...>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28018

[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90996 ; <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10105> ;
https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/17547 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20010 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/20009 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/1540>

[13] https://t.me/dva_majors/19948 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/39874

[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/19948

[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/19948 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19956

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/19956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19958

[17] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2023>

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/19958

[19] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023>

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/19977; https://t.me/dva_majors/19976 ; https://t.me/onf_front/9580; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91025 ; <https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14668> ; <https://t.me/rusfleet/8958>; <https://t.me/rybar/49232>; <https://t.me/rusfleet/8960> ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/16632> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12144>; <https://t.me/sashakots/40715> ; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12145> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20015 ; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5841> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19979 ;

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