

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Mason Clark

June 11, 2023, 6:40pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three areas of the front and made territorial gains on June 10 and 11. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian sources reported continued Ukrainian ground attacks on Bakhmut's northern and southern flanks.[1] Geolocated footage and Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces liberated multiple settlements during continued ground attacks south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued to attack southwest of Orikhiv in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces made gains in this area.[3]

Ukrainian forces made visually verified advances in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast, which Russian sources confirmed but sought to downplay. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 300 to 1,500 meters in southern Ukraine.[4] Malyar and other Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made gains south of Velyka Novosilka between June 10 and 11, including liberating Makarivka, Neskuchne, Blahodatne, Storozheve, and Novodarivka.[5] Some Russian sources reported that battles are ongoing in "grey zone" or contested areas or that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas that Russian forces did not fully occupy before Ukrainian attacks in southern Ukraine.[6] Russian sources are likely referring to Ukrainian territorial advances through Russian defenses as capturing "grey zones" in order to downplay Ukrainian gains and omit reporting on Ukrainian forces breaking through defensive lines. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns, but claims of a Ukrainian "breakthrough" are premature at this time.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are transferring their most combat-capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions. Malyar stated on June 11 that Russian forces are transferring elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and unspecified naval infantry and airborne forces elements from the Kherson direction in connection with the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[7] Malyar noted that Russian forces likely blew the KHPP dam in order to shorten their defensive lines in Kherson Oblast as part of the response to the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Flooding downriver of the KHPP has drained the Kakhovka Reservoir, resulting in landmasses emerging from the water. It is unclear how these terrain changes will affect maneuver warfare in southern Ukraine at this time.[8] If the terrain changes from flooding in the Dnipro River do not foreclose any possible Ukrainian river crossings in

coming weeks and months, Russian forces may struggle to defend Kherson Oblast with remaining or then-available units if and when Ukrainian forces choose to conduct offensive operations across the river, assuming they have the ability to do so.

Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone strikes targeting eastern Ukrainian border areas overnight on June 10 to 11. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Russian Shahed drones that targeted border areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts overnight.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces are working to produce more high-precision, long-range ballistic missiles and stated that Ukraine's stock of Western air defense systems is currently insufficient to replace its stock of Soviet air defense systems.[10]

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin characterized the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) plan to formalize volunteer formations by July 1 as an attack on him and his forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on June 10 that all volunteer formations must sign military contracts with the Russian MoD by July 1.[11] Prigozhin defensively claimed that Wagner private military company's (PMC) servicemen will not sign contracts with the Russian MoD in his media response to Shoigu's announcement.[12] Prigozhin proceeded to criticize Shoigu and the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and specified that Wagner is entirely subordinate to the interests of Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin's mention of Putin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief closely mirrors the language Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov used in his accusation on June 9 that Prigozhin is being insubordinate to Putin.[13] Prigozhin also noted that Wagner approves its actions with the Russian military command via Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin.

Some members of Russia's veteran community indicated Shoigu's statement is not intended to target Wagner. A member of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee (and former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army) Viktor Sobolev stated that Shoigu's order excludes Wagner.[14] Sobolev is an avid critic of Wagner and claimed that Wagner personnel are mercenaries, not volunteers.[15] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin supported the order and stated that cohesive armies win wars rather than separate detachments or private military companies (PMCs).[16] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger contrarily (baselessly) claimed that Wagner is not a PMC and that a secret decree legalized Wagner's existence in Russia.[17] The milblogger also claimed that Shoigu and the Russian MoD are Girkin's patrons who are using Girkin to prevent Prigozhin from assuming more authority and reshuffling leadership in the Russian MoD.

Russia and Ukraine conducted a near one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on June 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukraine returned 94 Russian POWs of unspecified ranks to Russia.[18] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that Russia returned two Ukrainian officers and 93 privates and sergeants to Ukraine.[19]

Key Takeaways

- **Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three areas of the front and made territorial gains on June 10 and 11.**
- **Ukrainian forces made visually verified advances in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast, which Russian sources confirmed but sought to downplay.**

- **Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are transferring their most combat-capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions.**
- **Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone strikes targeting eastern Ukrainian border areas overnight on June 10 to 11.**
- **Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin characterized the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) plan to formalize volunteer formations by July 1 as an attack on him and his forces.**
- **Russia and Ukraine conducted a near one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange.**
- **Russian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Ukrainian forces made gains near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of June 10.**
- **Russian milbloggers claimed that rain along the Zaporizhia Oblast front may slow Ukrainian operations in the coming days.**
- **The Republic of Chechnya reportedly formed two new regiments – Akhmat-Russia and Akhmat-Chechnya – equipped with commercially-available Chinese armored equipment.**
- **Saboteurs, reportedly including Ukrainian partisans, conducted two discrete improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against railways in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian forces are engaged in heavy fighting near the settlement.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Movchanove, Kharkiv Oblast (11km northeast of Kupyansk) and Torske, Donetsk Oblast (14km west of Kreminna).[23]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- - - Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian military officials reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced by 1.4 kilometers in the Bakhmut area but ISW cannot assess the exact areas of Ukrainian advances at this time.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click [here](#) to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and that Russian Spetsnaz units are trying to push Ukrainian forces from positions near Klishchiivka.[24] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks in the Soledar-Bakhmut direction.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted failed ground attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[27]

Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Avdiivka as Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line as of June 11. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances south of Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka) as of June 11.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled eight Ukrainian ground attacks near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[29] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) on June 10.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a failed ground attack near Sieverne on June 11.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka and Marinka.[32] Footage published on June 11 indicates that the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) continues to operate near Avdiivka.[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian military officials reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced by 1.4 kilometers in the Bakhmut area but ISW cannot assess the exact areas of Ukrainian advances at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher
 © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Bakhmut City Limits | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and made gains as of June 11. Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated Neskuchne (immediately south of Velyka Novosilka) and Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 10.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Neskuchne and Blahodatne without a fight and that personnel of the “Kaskad” Operational Combat Tactical Formation (a Donetsk People’s Republic formation) retreated to avoid encirclement.[35] The Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces liberated Makarivka (7km south of Velyka Novosilka) - a settlement further south of Russian positions in Neskuchne and Blahodatne.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces retreated from Storozheve (3km south of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces have advanced further to the northern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[37] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces established positions in Levadne (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a dam on the Mokri Yaly River near Klyuchove (18km south of Velyka Novosilka), however there is no visual confirmation of damage to the dam at this time.[39] The milblogger also claimed that elements of the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) struck a Ukrainian equipment column near Klyuchove. Russian sources claimed that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army) and the 36th Combined Arms Army (both of the Eastern Military District) are operating in western Donetsk Oblast.[40]



Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 11. A Russian milblogger posted footage purportedly showing Ukrainian forces capturing Lobkove (24km southwest of Orikhiv) and Pyatykhatky (23km southwest of Orikhiv).[41] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing in Lobkove, which is in the “gray zone.”[42] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows elements of the 429th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating near Lobkove.[43] Russian sources claimed that the volunteer “BARS-3” Battalion (part of the volunteer “Tsar’s Wolves” strike brigade) is operating in the Orikhiv direction.[44] North Ossetian volunteer battalions “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” are operating alongside the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[45] Elements of the 71st Guards Motorized Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army) are also likely operating near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[46]

Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy rain along the Zaporizhia Oblast front may hinder Ukrainian operations. A Russian milblogger claimed that heavy Western tanks and armored vehicles and Soviet T-72 tanks will get caught in mud from rain, making it easier for Russian forces to target Ukrainian kits.[47] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would not likely advance after heavy rains which would provide time (one milblogger suggested about 48 hours) for Russian forces to transfer reserves to combat areas.[48]

Continued Russian endangerment of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has forced Ukraine to transfer the ZNPP’s last reactor from hot to cold shutdown mode. The Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate ordered Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom to transfer reactor No. 5, the last ZNPP reactor in hot shutdown mode, into cold shutdown on June 9.[49] The Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate cited the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam, continued Russian shelling of the ZNPP, and the degradation of the ZNPP

emergency response system as necessitating the shutdown of reactor No. 5. ISW has previously reported on ZNPP personnel transferring reactors from normal operations into hot, then later cold shutdowns in response to Russian forces endangering the ZNPP.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Clamed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Clamed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Republic of Chechnya reportedly formed two new regiments – Akhmat-Russia and Akhmat-Chechnya – equipped with commercially available Chinese armored infantry mobility vehicles.[51] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that both regiments will deploy to Ukraine on an unspecified date and noted in a speech to servicemen that “whether we want this or not, everyone will eventually need to die - whether you are in Ukraine or you are in Grozny [Chechnya].”[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Chechen officials equipped new regiments with Chinese armored vehicles, and Russian *Radio Liberty* previously reported that Akhmat units have received eight Chinese-made ShaanXi Tiger 4x4 armored infantry mobility vehicles.[53] Chechen forces likely purchased these light vehicles from China, which is consistent with US official reports that China is selling non-lethal equipment to Russia.[54] A Russian independent human rights group focused on repressions in the Northern Caucasus previously reported that Chechen security forces are recruiting personnel via blackmail, coercion, and threats.[55] A Russian independent outlet also claimed that the region increased monthly salaries up to 700,000 rubles (\$8,460) for anyone who signed military contracts with Chechen units.[56]

Pskov Oblast Governor Mikhail Vedernikov announced on June 11 that the region will form local territorial defense units to prevent incursions.[57] Vedernikov claimed that local militia will learn from the experience of border incursions made by all-Russian anti-government forces in Belgorod Oblast and claimed that recruitment into territorial units will begin in the near future. Vedernikov added that the territorial defense units will assist law enforcement agencies in case of a possible emergency.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to struggle with the quality of Russia’s defense industrial output and low morale among personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are unable to use large batches of newly produced 122mm and 152mm shells due to shells self-detonating.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, ordered commanders to form assault units from personnel who express low morale, desert, or sabotage Russian positions.[59] Russian personnel are reportedly suffering from low morale due to a lack of established deadlines for the completion of the mobilization period.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian sources claimed that unspecified saboteurs carried out an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a railway bridge in occupied Crimea, and a Ukrainian officer claimed that Ukrainian partisans detonated a railway bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on June 11.[60] Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov stated that the sabotage targeted a segment of the railroad in Kirovskiy Raion in southeastern Crimea, and Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified individuals detonated an explosive device on the tracks in front of a freight train.[61] Aksyonov also noted that the explosion delayed railway transport for three to four hours.[62] A Ukrainian serviceman reported that Melitopol-based partisans planted an IED on a railway bridge in Yakymivka, Melitopol Raion.[63] Russian sources have not confirmed a Ukrainian partisan attack on the railway bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as of the time of this publication.

The North Ossetia-Alania Republic is participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast under the guise of summer vacations for children in Russia. Head of the North Ossetia-Alania Republic Sergey Menyaylo announced on June 11 that 25 Ukrainian children from occupied Chernihivka Raion arrived at “Tamisk” rehabilitation center in North Ossetia.[64] Menyaylo added that North Ossetia is the patron of Chernihivka Raion and will assist the district with providing summer vacations to Russia. Menyaylo added that 500 children from occupied Ukrainian territories will arrive in North Ossetia for summer vacations.

Russia continues to expand patronage networks in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky stated that he signed a cooperation framework with Nenets Autonomous Okrug Governor Yuri Bezudny that will establish cooperation between occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug on culture, sports, and other unspecified areas.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense’s television channel, *Voen TV*, released new footage on June 10 of the Russian S-400s given to Belarus, possibly deployed near the new S-400 site at the Luninets Air Base.[66] Independent analysis of the observed transporter erector launcher and munitions indicate that Belarus’ S-400 systems are using - at minimum - the baseline 48N6 surface-to-air missiles with an operational range of 150km.[67] It is unclear if Belarus also received missiles with greater operational ranges.[68]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://t.me/annamaliar/836>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/60561>; <https://t.me/rybar/48384>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88653

[2] <https://t.me/rybar/48377>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13161>; <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667843641392414721?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/Azovsouth/status/1667832335427829760?s=20> ; <https://t.me/chatDeepState/3551233> ; <https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1667826114834714625?s=20> ; <https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta/status/1667830950833664000?s=20>; <https://t.me/astrapress/29411> ; <https://t.me/bbcussian/47681> ; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/42361; <https://t.me/rybar/48365>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88678; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692; <https://t.me/vrogov/10221>;

<https://t.me/vrogov/10222>; <https://t.me/vrogov/10222>;
<https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667914415629279233?s=20>;
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/166792322664565553?s=20;
<https://twitter.com/PijkerenTb/status/1667924678218743816?s=20>;
https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/73133;
<https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1667918144441135106?s=20>

[3] <https://t.me/moscowcalling/25445>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47120>;
<https://twitter.com/LoLManya/status/1667923545261834240?s=20>;
https://twitter.com/3_bm15/status/1667928018508021760?s=20; <https://t.me/batalyon15/1957>;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7990; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13158>;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47107>; <https://t.me/batalyon15/1943>; https://t.me/rusich_army/9338;
https://t.me/rusich_army/9338; https://t.me/rusich_army/9332;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/13161>; <https://t.me/rybar/48384>

[4] <https://t.me/annamaliar/840>

[5] https://t.me/grey_zone/19083; <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47124>;
https://t.me/romanov_92/39216; https://t.me/grey_zone/19083; <https://t.me/annamaliar/840> ;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/22010?single;
<https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667843641392414721?s=20>;
<https://twitter.com/Azovsouth/status/1667832335427829760?s=20> ;
<https://t.me/chatDeepState/3551233> ;
<https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1667826114834714625?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta/status/1667830950833664000?s=20>;
<https://t.me/astrapress/29411> ; <https://t.me/bberussian/47681> ;
https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/42361; <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=186365787722722>;
https://24tv_dot_ua/ru/vsu-uvolili-poselok-blagodatnoe-pokazyvaem-na-karte_n2332181;
https://gordonua_dot_com/news/war/sily-oborony-ukrainy-osvobodili-blagodatnoe-v-doneckoy-oblasti-1668047.html; https://tsn_dot_ua/ato/zsu-zvilnili-blagodatne-na-donechchini-karta-video-2347699.html; https://www.pravda_dot_com.ua/news/2023/06/11/7406347/;
<https://t.me/rybar/48365>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88678; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692;
<https://t.me/moscowcalling/25449>; <https://t.me/vrogov/10222>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/13174>;
https://t.me/grey_zone/19083; <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47109>;
<https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667914415629279233?s=20>;
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/166792322664565553?s=20;
<https://twitter.com/PijkerenTb/status/1667924678218743816?s=20>;
https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/73133;
<https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1667918144441135106?s=20> ;
<https://t.me/milinfoive/102023>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47124>;
<https://t.me/rybar/48365>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692; <https://t.me/vrogov/10221>;
https://t.me/grey_zone/19083; <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1058542928884905> ;
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1667919144535171072?s=20 ;
<https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667914415629279233?s=20>

[6] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88678; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7970;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7990; <https://t.me/batalyon15/1957>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692

[7] <https://t.me/annamaliar/837>

[8] <https://twitter.com/georgewbarros/status/1667906938263183361>

[9] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/06/11/vnochi-ukrayinski-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-shhonajmenshe-shist-vorozhyh-droniv-yurij-ignat/>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02boNK8qfWoRqTTHVWGY...>

[10] <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/06/11/7406309/>

[11] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...>

[12] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2023>; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1194; https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3660;
<https://t.me/idelrealii/27994>; <https://t.me/severrealii/17468>; <https://t.me/bazabazon/18486>;
<https://t.me/sotaproject/60665> ; https://t.me/istories_media/2691;
<https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12676>; <https://t.me/astrapress/29413> ;
<https://t.me/bbcussian/47688>

[13] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2023>

[14] <https://t.me/severrealii/17469>; <https://forpost-sevastopol.ru/newsfull/852657/deputat-sobolev-chvk-vagner-ne-kasaetsya-prikaz-shojgu-ob-obyazatelnyh-kontraktah-s-minoborony.html>

[15] <https://t.me/severrealii/17469>;

[16] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5378>

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/19095

[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/27320; <https://t.me/astrapress/29435>; <https://t.me/rybar/48385>

[19] <https://t.me/ermaka2022/2918>

[20] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036E7YmkYAEV3miW9TYiS87rykzE4y6124MVTjrj4tBJjSrJcDGnmN6J3SX8VVvVsFl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DRBsAxmd7QtXJhTLfD...>

[21] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DRBsAxmd7QtXJhTLfD...>

[22] <https://t.me/wargonzo/13161>

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/27314; https://t.me/mod_russia/27307

[24] <https://t.me/readovkanews/60561>; <https://t.me/rybar/48384>

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88653

[26] <https://t.me/wargonzo/13161>

[27] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036E7YmkYAEV3miW9TYi...>

[28] <https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1667612784844996608?s=20;>
https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1667622880824160259?s=20;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47102>

[29] ovobakhmutivka, Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, and Marinka

[30] <https://t.me/readovkanews/60561>

[31] <https://t.me/wargonzo/13161>

[32] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DRBsAxmd7QtXJhTLfDfjbn24i8dGovgaMR4vBKSVtPYnjT2wm7AiiZdBdUhHp9EGl;>
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036E7YmkYAEV3miW9TYi...>

[33] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7995

[34] <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667843641392414721?s=20;>
<https://twitter.com/Azovsouth/status/1667832335427829760?s=20> ;
<https://t.me/chatDeepState/3551233> ;
<https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1667826114834714625?s=20> ;
[https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta/status/1667830950833664000?s=20;](https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta/status/1667830950833664000?s=20)
<https://t.me/astrapress/29411> ; <https://t.me/bbcussian/47681>;
[https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667914415629279233?s=20;](https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667914415629279233?s=20)
[https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/166792322664565553?s=20;](https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/166792322664565553?s=20)
[https://twitter.com/PijkerenTb/status/1667924678218743816?s=20;](https://twitter.com/PijkerenTb/status/1667924678218743816?s=20)
https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/73133; <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=186365787722722>

[35] <https://t.me/rybar/48365>

[36] <https://t.me/annamaliar/840>

[37] <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47124>; https://t.me/romanov_92/39216; <https://t.me/rybar/48365>;
<https://t.me/milinfoolive/102023>

[38] https://t.me/grey_zone/19083; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88692

[39] <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47133>

[40] <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47111>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkorf/47099>;
<https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/8091>; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2726;
https://t.me/mod_russia/27299

[41] <https://t.me/moscowcalling/25445>

[42] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7990; <https://t.me/batalyon15/1957>

[43] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47120>;
<https://twitter.com/LoLManya/status/1667923545261834240?s=20>;
https://twitter.com/3_bm15/status/1667928018508021760?s=20

[44] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11773; https://ria_dot_ru/20230611/orekhov-1877508055.html;
https://dzen_dot_ru/media/radiosputnik.ria.ru/zaporojskie-dobrovolcy-presekli-popytku-kontrataki-vsu-pod-orehovom-6485acc0f915ae45f21bd727

[45] <https://t.me/batalyon15/1959>; https://t.me/rusich_army/9327

[46] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11928>

[47] <https://t.me/vrogov/10218>; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7937;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7941

[48] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7921

[49] https://minre.gov_dot_ua/2023/06/11/ostannij-robochyj-blok-zaes-vyvedeno-u-holodnyj-zupyn/; https://snriu_dot_gov.ua/news/rozporiadzhenniam-derzhatomrehuliuvannia-ekspluatatsiia-enerhobloku-5-zaes-obmezheni-stantom-kholodnyi-zupyn

[50] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11>

[51] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7988; <https://t.me/astrapress/29369>

[52] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7988; <https://t.me/astrapress/29369>

[53] <https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-chechnyu-dostavili-bronetehniku-kitayskogo-proizvodstva/32450835.html>

[54] <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-china-xi-ends-visit/32329045.html>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2023>; <https://www.reuters.com/world/any-china-lethal-aid-russia-would-come-rea...>

[55] <https://t.me/astrapress/29369>

[56] <https://t.me/astrapress/29369>

[57] https://t.me/MV_007_Pskov/2850; https://www_dot_severreal.org/a/v-pskovskoy-oblasti-poyavyatsya-otryady-sodeystviya-oborone-i-bezopasnosti/32454148.html; <https://t.me/s/severrealii>;
<https://t.me/astrapress/29421>; <https://t.me/kedmi/40515>; https://theins_dot_ru/news/262491

[58] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DRBsAxmd7QtXJhTLfDfjbn24i8dGovgaMR4vBKSvtPYnjT2wm7AiiZdBdUhHp9EGl>

[59] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido36E7YmkYAEV3miW9TYiS87rykzE4y6124MVTrjq4tBJjSrJcDGnmN6J3SX8VVvVsFl>

[60] https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/26082 ;
<https://twitter.com/Shtirlitz53/status/1667886687576289281?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1667893691271266304?s=20>; <https://t.me/astrapress/29432> ;
<https://twitter.com/ruslantrad/status/1667931922910027779?s=20>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48411>;
<https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1667894827084664833>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47117>;
<https://t.me/rybar/48383>

[61] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48411>;
<https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1667894827084664833>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47117>;
<https://t.me/rybar/48383>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48416>

[62] <https://t.me/Aksenov82/2653>

[63] <https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1667890228768514049>;
https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/26082 ;
<https://twitter.com/Shtirlitz53/status/1667886687576289281?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1667893691271266304?s=20>; <https://t.me/astrapress/29432> ;
<https://twitter.com/ruslantrad/status/1667931922910027779?s=20>

[64] <https://t.me/batalyon15/1952> ; <https://t.me/sergeymeniaylo/1543>

[65] <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1183>

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQc4SknPZQA&ab_channel=%D0%92%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%A2%D0%92%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8;
https://twitter.com/benreuter_IMINT/status/1667827524347330560

[67] <https://twitter.com/GuyPlopsky/status/1667801959838142464>

[68] <https://twitter.com/GuyPlopsky/status/1667803291949076487?s=20>