

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023

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June 2, 2023, 6pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD's ability to respond to perceived threats. The Russian MoD issued a second update about the June 1 Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast border raid, largely fixating on the timeliness and scope of the Russian response to the raid.[1] The MoD claimed that additional Russian Western Military District (WMD) elements reinforced the border area within an hour of the start of the raid and conducted heavy air, artillery, and flamethrower strikes against the raiding units and their reserves. The MoD claimed that over 135 people and 35 vehicles in total conducted the raids and that various Russian defensive efforts - including small arms fire and mines - repelled the raids. The MoD later celebrated the commander of an unspecified motorized rifle battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Nikitin, for leading the defensive effort, likely to preempt attempts to attribute the "victory" achieved by Belgorod border defense on Russian Colonel General Alexander Lapin as the information space did during the May 23 raid.[2] The Russian MoD's fixation on portraying Russian forces and the Russian military command as capable defenders of Russia likely reflects internal and broader information space anxiety over the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive as well as any reverberating informational impacts from any failures to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks.

Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger stated that the Russian MoD is not treating Belgorod Oblast like Russian territory and claimed that it is only adding to the list of settlements affected by Ukrainian shelling.[3] A milblogger called on Russian forces to destroy increasingly well-equipped Ukrainian forces at their deployment points along the border and not to lie in their reports about the situation in the area.[4] Some milbloggers stated that Russian forces have responded well to the raids, which they claim are merely

“terrorist attacks” aimed at creating a psychological impact as opposed to securing concrete territorial goals.[5] A prominent Russian milblogger absurdly claimed that Ukrainian forces have concluded that it is too risky to start the counteroffensive now after observing Russia’s responses to recent probing efforts.[6] The raids, any Ukrainian probing efforts, and Russian responses in the past few weeks have all been on an extremely small scale compared with the announced forces Ukraine is reportedly preparing for the counter-offensive. The Russian hyperfocus on minor tactical engagements highlights Russian nervousness and insecurity about the forthcoming counteroffensive.

Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 15 Kh-101/555 missiles at Kyiv City from Tu-95 aircraft over the Caspian Sea and that Ukrainian air defense destroyed all 15 missiles.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 21 Shahed 131/136 drones that Russian forces launched at Kyiv from southern Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are attempting to attack in atypical patterns and at unexpected times to deceive Ukrainian air defense, but that newly supplied air defense systems nonetheless allow Ukrainian forces to shoot down all Russian missiles flying along a ballistic trajectory.[9] Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated on June 2 that Ukrainian air defenses shot down a Russian drone over Mykolaiv Oblast during the June 1 to 2 overnight strikes.[10]

Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) “Military Commissariats of Russia” journal published an article by Burdinsky in its June 2023 edition in which he stated that it is necessary for Russian forces to create the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and organize and staff new combined arms and air armies, army corps, the Azov naval regional formation, five divisions, and 26 brigades in 2023.[11] Burdinsky emphasized that the main organizational task for the MoD remains contract service recruitment and the implementation of conscription, however.[12] Burdinsky did not expound upon how the Russian military plans to generate the necessary personnel and equipment required to form these new formations and it is unclear if Burdinsky’s statements were meant to represent a formal MoD deadline for the creation of the new formations.

Burdinsky’s statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military. Shoigu delivered a series of public proposals at the MoD’s Collegium on December 21, 2022 aimed at significantly increasing the size of the Russian military which included the reestablishment of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts as well as the formation of a new army corps.[13] Shoigu proposed that the Russian Armed Forces increase its strength to 1.5 million servicemen, including 695,000 contract servicemen, but did not specify a timeline for any of his proposals.[14]

Shoigu also proposed an increase in the age of conscription, a measure that Russian officials have decided to implement in a phased manner over the course of three years instead of by the end of the year.[15] The creation of two military districts and these formations is a significant undertaking, and the Russian MoD's current force generation efforts do not signal that the MoD intends to generate the necessary number of personnel to fulfill these tasks by the end of 2023.

Both a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and Igor Girkin, an ardent nationalist milblogger who is increasingly critical of the Kremlin, questioned where the MoD plans to acquire the personnel and equipment from to create these new formations. [16] Girkin stated that 26 brigades would require 80,000 personnel, a figure roughly correct if brigades were formed at full staff with 3,000 personnel per brigade.[17] Girkin added that five divisions would require another 40,000 personnel and argued that the MoD would have to conduct another mobilization wave to generate the roughly 120,000 required personnel.[18] ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely hesitant to launch another mobilization wave and that the MoD's current hybrid force generation effort of contract service recruitment and crypto mobilization is aimed at avoiding such a mobilization wave.[19] **The Russian MoD is highly unlikely to institute any of Shoigu's long-term force restructuring and expansion proposals by the end of 2023 with the possible exception of re-establishing the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.**

Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian forces have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger stated that there are disputes within the Russian information space over who took more control of Marinka even though Russian forces have not yet fully captured the settlement.[20] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed the elements of the 150th and 20th Motorized Rifle Divisions (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) are primarily responsible for the gains around Marinka.[21] The milblogger claimed that the DNR's 100th Brigade, Sparta Battalion, and the "Kaskad" and "Rusich" Operational Tactical Combat Formations deserve responsibility for gains around Marinka as well.[22]

These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.[23] These discussions are likely aimed at undermining Kadyrov's ability to use any subsequent tactical gains to elevate his standing and reintroduce his paramilitary forces as a main irregular offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.[24] Many irregular formations, primarily DNR forces, have served on the Donetsk front and may be resentful of Kadyrov's attempt to assume responsibility for any success following months of attritional offensives.[25] This discussion around Marinka also coincides with a concerted attack from Chechen commanders against Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, which has generated

debates between Chechen and Wagner commanders about which forces have been more successful fighting in Ukraine.[26] Prigozhin routinely emphasized Wagner's responsibility for tactical gains around Bakhmut throughout the offensive to capture the city to advocate for more supplies for Wagner and increased influence.[27] Other irregular forces may be trying to replicate this informational campaign in Marinka and elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely competing amongst each other for envisioned favor from the Kremlin. The capture of Bakhmut, despite offering no operational advantages, did allow the Kremlin to present a Russian victory, if only temporarily, to the Russian public. The capture of Marinka, a settlement with a pre-war population of 10,000 people and with no tactical or operational significance, would likely present marginal informational benefit to the Kremlin at most. Russian forces have advanced less than 2km from 2014-controlled territory around Marinka since the start of the full-scale invasion, suggesting that this entire conversation is premature.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.[28] Blinken noted that the war is a strategic failure for Russia and Russia is worse off militarily, economically, and geopolitically than before the start of its full-scale invasion – all contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin's broader strategic aims. Blinken noted that the war undermined many of Putin's broader goals, including to divide NATO, foster a partnership with China, and strengthen the Russian military. Blinken stated that Russian forces in Ukraine suffered 100,000 killed and wounded “in a meat grinder of its own making” just within the past six months. Blinken stated that Putin believes he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters but reiterated that NATO remains committed to supporting Ukraine, as “Ukraine will never be Russia.”

Key Takeaways

- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD's ability to respond to perceived threats.**
- **Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids.**
- **Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2.**
- **Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. Burdinsky's statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military.**

- **Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian sources have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.**
- **US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.**
- **Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Marinka.**
- **A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles.**
- **Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia.**
- **Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivka (30km southeast of Kupyansk), west of Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk), and near Kuzemivka (30km southeast of Kupyansk).[29] Ukraine's Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Russian forces intensified combat operations along the entire Kharkiv-Luhansk frontline, particularly in the Kupyansk direction.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that fierce fighting occurred near Masyutivka and Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River near Dvorichna.[31] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) striking Ukrainian positions near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces fired TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian positions in the 1st Guard Tank Army's area of operation near Kupyansk.[33]

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Kremenna on June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kremenna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kremenna), and Spirne (24km south of Kremenna).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Group of Forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack in the

Serebrianske forest area (about 10km southwest of Kreminna), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops advanced in this area.[35]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click [here](#) to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

There were no reported combat engagements in the Bakhmut direction on June 2. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that no combat engagements occurred in the Bakhmut direction in the past day.[36] Cherevaty reported that the Russian forces relieving Wagner forces in Bakhmut do not want to engage in the same attritional fighting as Wagner forces previously did. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report any ground attacks in or around Bakhmut.[37] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces only advanced 29km during the entire battle for Bakhmut, which works out, the UK MoD noted, to 48 centimeters of ground territory for each of the 60,000 personnel killed or wounded near Bakhmut since May 2022.[38]


Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks near Avdiivka and prioritized the Marinka direction (directly southwest of Donetsk City) on June 2. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made incremental advances in northwestern Marinka as of June 1.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled eight Russian ground attacks near Marinka.[40] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on June 1 that Akhmat special forces arrived in Marinka on May 30 and that Russian forces have captured 70 percent of the town.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on June 2 that Akhmat forces are conducting assault operations in Marinka.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that a meeting engagement (encounter battle) occurred near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka).[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a reconnaissance-in-force attempt in the Avdiivka direction.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Bakhmut and Marinka as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast on June 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains after attacking near Volodymyrivka (11km southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Pavlivka-Volnovakha-Mariupol highway).[45] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions near Pavlivka (3km southwest of Vuhledar) and Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[46] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Major Railroads
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Bakhmut City Limits	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles on June 2. Geolocated footage posted on June 2 shows smoke plumes and explosions following a strike near the Berdyansk port area.[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukraine may have used British-provided Storm Shadows for the strike.[49] Ukrainian officials have not confirmed a strike on Berdyansk as of the time of this publication.

Russian forces continued routine artillery and air strikes throughout southern Ukraine on June 2.[50] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces shelled frontline territories on the southern axis 77 times with 365 shells and launched 5 KAB aerial bombs at Kozatske and Beryslav, Kherson Oblast.[51]

Ukrainian sources warned that Russian forces may be preparing a provocation at the Armyansk Chemical Plant in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on June 2 that Russian forces are bringing unspecified chemicals to the territory of the Crimean “Titan” Plant, risking setting off an explosion that will release various toxic substances into the air.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that the Russian military leadership decided to strengthen positions near the Ukrainian border in unspecified western Russian regions with 200 third-year cadets.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the cadets deployed to the border area under the pretext of training and received small arms and grenade launchers.[54] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 24 that Russian cadets are undergoing training at the deployment points of elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and the 76th Air Assault Division in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[55] Russian cadets from higher military academies recently graduated several months ahead of schedule, and ISW assessed that Russian forces are likely expediting education paths for cadets to generate new lower-level commanders and fill gaps within the Russian command cadre.[56] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of recent graduates from Russian higher military academies serving in Ukraine nor current cadets operating near the Ukrainian border.

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Russian aerospace forces received an unspecified number of newly produced Su-34 attack aircraft from the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.[57] One milblogger claimed that the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association Plant, one of the largest aerospace manufacturers in Russia and a subsidiary of the Sukhoi Company, produced the batch of Su-34 aircraft.[58]

Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 2 that Wagner has recruited 300 personnel from Kirov Oblast since opening a recruitment center there in March 2023.[59] Prigozhin also stated that Wagner recruited 800 to 900 convict recruits from Kirov Oblast during its prison recruitment campaign from fall 2022 to February 2023.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes. Chair of the Kherson Oblast occupation government Andrey Alekseyenko claimed on June 2 that Russian doctors determined that 8,000 children require medical treatment in Russia after conducting full medical evacuations on children in occupied Kherson Oblast.[61] Alekseyenko claimed that 500 children are already undergoing operations in high-tech Russian hospitals free of charge.[62]

Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify measures to passportize residents of occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities announced September 1, 2023, as the deadline for

residents to obtain Russian passports and submit mandatory written refusals of their Ukrainian passports.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities continue to pressure residents to accept Russian documents by threatening to terminate their electricity supply, deport them to Russia, evict them from their homes, and confiscate their personal property.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian MoD reported that Belarusian forces are continuing the phased formation of electronic warfare (EW) units and that Special Forces Commander Major General Vadi Denisenko delivered special EW equipment to newly formed Belarusian units.[65]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian territorial troops are completing the final stage of command and staff training in Minsk.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/27025

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/27033;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[3] https://t.me/grey_zone/18955

[4] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11814>

[5] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36759; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9878

[6] <https://t.me/sashakots/40045>

[7] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vppdmmq8yKcTMF9Ac8417HXaXigoqkmbNYcEawQZnRNi8NetrRohB1oTGtXwbvcZl>

[8] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wAb84TSM1HJBC58BQh...>
<https://t.me/CinCAFU/509>
; <https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid0ysXQcuteWGKP P...>

[9] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/02/epiczentrom-nichnoyi-ataky-znovu-stala-stolyczya-yurij-ignat/>

[10] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/02/vorogu-v-jogo-povitryanyh-atakah-ne-dopomagayut-aniyaki-hytroshhi-nataliya-gumenyuk/>

[11] <https://iz dot ru/1522353/2023-06-02/v-minoborony-rf-rasskazali-o-formirovanii-dvukh-armii-i-voennykh-okrugov> ; <https://voenkom.ric.mil dot ru/> ; <https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17909891>;

[12] <https://iz dot ru/1522353/2023-06-02/v-minoborony-rf-rasskazali-o-formirovanii-dvukh-armii-i-voennykh-okrugov> ; <https://voenkom.ric.mil dot ru/> ; <https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17909891>;

[13] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122122>

[14] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122122>

[15] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122122> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323>

[16] <https://t.me/sashakots/40053> ; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5194>

[17] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5194>

[18] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5194>

[19] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623>

[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87674

[21] https://t.me/grey_zone/18953

[22] https://t.me/grey_zone/18951; <https://t.me/dshrg2/945>;
https://t.me/grey_zone/18952; <https://t.me/shalnyak/6837>

[23] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar053123>

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