



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on June 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction since activating in the area on June 18 and likely aim to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the area, but there is little current likelihood of rapid Russian gains near Toretsk. Russian forces have committed only limited forces to this operation so far, which suggests that Russian forces continue to prioritize gradual advances through consistent grinding assaults over operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver. Russian forces increased the intensity of their assaults in the Toretsk direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Avdiivka) on the night of June 18 after being generally inactive on this sector of the front so far in 2024.[1] Russian forces have so far conducted mainly frontal infantry-heavy assaults on small settlements south and east of Toretsk and have yet to conduct any significant mechanized assaults in the area.[2] Russian forces have yet to make any notable tactical gains in the area. Russian forces have sought to exploit how renewed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast have drawn and fixed Ukrainian forces from other sectors of the frontline to pursue gains in critical frontline areas, particularly in Donetsk Oblast.[3] It is noteworthy, however, that Russian forces have recently intensified operations in a previously inactive sector of the front instead of their efforts to advance in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka) or to seize the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar.[4] The further Russian forces advance in the Chasiv Yar area and northwest of Avdiivka without making similar gains in the Toretsk direction, the deeper the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction would become, offering Ukrainian forces an area from which to conduct routine fire against immediate rear areas of the Russian advance in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions. A deeper salient in the Toretsk area would also leave Russian forces more vulnerable to significant Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front of the Chasiv Yar direction and the northern front of the Avdiivka salient. Russian offensive operations near Toretsk likely aim to reduce the threat posed by this Ukrainian salient while Russian forces continue to pursue gains in the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar directions.

Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction suggest that the Russian military command does not consider a large-scale operation to advance towards Kostyantynivka from multiple operational directions feasible. Kostyantynivka is the southern edge of a belt of four major Ukrainian cities that forms the backbone of Ukraine's defense of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have long sought to seize cities within this Ukrainian fortress belt.[5] Russian forces made relatively rapid tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka in April 2024, and ISW assessed at that time that Russian forces may have intended to advance northward along the H-20 (Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka) highway towards Kostyantynivka from the south to support future offensive operations from Chasiv Yar towards Kostyantynivka from the east. [6] Russian forces have not succeeded in seizing Chasiv Yar or making further significant tactical gains into the town in recent months, however, and the rate of Russian advance northwest of Avdiivka has since slowed significantly.[7] A Russian operation to advance north along the H-20 highway and westward from Chasiv Yar would also have pursued the operational envelopment and encirclement of the Ukrainian grouping in the Toretsk area, a considerable undertaking that Russian forces have routinely failed to achieve against other Ukrainian force groupings throughout the full-scale invasion.[8] Continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Avdiivka and the continued Russian focus on advancing northwest of Avdiivka towards the T0504 (Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk) highway instead of further north of the Avdiivka salient suggests that Russian forces currently aim to advance westward towards Pokrovsk instead of pursuing operations that could support a wider operation to seize Kostyantynivka from the south and east. The Russian military command may intend for operations in the Toretsk direction to support an envisioned push from Chasiv Yar towards Kostyantynivka in a narrower offensive operation to seize the city. Russian forces may alternatively have no intention of making significant tactical gains in the Toretsk direction and may hope that offensive operations in the area will apply pressure on Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast and facilitate gains in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions.

Russian forces have so far committed limited combat power to their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction and will struggle to make significant tactical gains in the area without significant reinforcement. Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) and 1436th and 1st motorized rifle regiments of Russia's Territorial Troops are operating in the Toretsk direction – significantly less combat power than what the Russian military has committed to the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions.[9] DNR and Russian Territorial Troops also tend to be less combat effective than more conventional or formerly elite Russian units and formations, although it is unclear to what extent this differential remains given the overall degradation of the quality of all Russian units and formations.[10] It is possible that other Russian elements are fighting in the Toretsk direction but have not been identified yet, but DNR and Russian Territorial Troop elements appear to be the main forces currently fighting in the area. Toretsk is roughly the same size as Chasiv Yar, and elements of a brigade and two regiments are very likely insufficient for an operation to seize the town. The arrival or commitment of Russian reinforcements in the area would be an indicator that Russian forces intend for operations in the Toretsk direction to be more tactically significant than diversionary. Even if Russian forces were able to succeed in seizing Toretsk, however, advances beyond the settlement would be equally if not more difficult given the open terrain and large water features to the north and northwest. ISW currently assesses rapid Russian tactical gains in the Toretsk direction to be unlikely. Russian forces may nonetheless intend to conduct consistent offensive operations in the area to pursue creeping tactical gains as they are throughout the theater.

Slow grinding Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[11] The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and Russian forces may accept the prospect of conducting offensive operations for months to seize Toretsk and advance northwestward towards Kostyantynivka.[12] The Russian military command likely hopes that offensive pressure in the Toretsk direction will aid its efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the theater-wide initiative, and this objective may supersede any specific territorial operational objective that Russian forces have in the Toretsk area.[13] **The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable.**

Ukraine signed long-term security agreements with the European Union (EU), Lithuania, and Estonia on June 27. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and European Council President Charles Michel signed a security agreement that pledges that the EU will provide 50 billion euros (\$53.5 billion) worth of support to Ukraine through the Ukraine Facility program from 2024-2028, long-term defense cooperation, and urgent consultations within 24 hours of any future aggression against Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian-Estonian agreement pledges that Estonia will allocate at least 0.25 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to military support for Ukraine from 2024–2027 and long-term Estonian assistance to Ukraine in the form of artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), missiles, mines, grenade launchers, drones, and electronic warfare (EW) systems.[15] The Ukrainian-Lithuanian agreement pledges that Lithuania will allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP to military support for Ukraine annually.[16]

Russian officials and information space actors continue to frame migrants as a threat to Russian society amid ongoing efforts to utilize migrant communities to address Russia's force generation needs. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on June 27 that migrant crime is spreading across Russia and intensifying in various Russian federal subjects, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.[17] Bastrykin claimed that migrants committed 38,936 crimes in Russia in 2023 and that an increased percentage of crimes committed by migrants were "especially serious" and "extremist" crimes.[18] Bastrykin advocated for a change in Russia's migration policy and suggested that Russia should strictly regulate migration and hold employers responsible for the actions of their employees who are migrants. Bastrykin claimed that Russian officials have identified and registered 30,000 recently naturalized migrants for military service since October 2023 and sent 10,000 of these recently naturalized migrants to the "special military operation zone" in Ukraine.[19] Bastrykin claimed that the migrants are digging trenches, building fortifications, and replenishing rear Russian units. Bastrykin claimed that the Russian Constitution requires naturalized Russian citizens to register for military service and participate in the war in Ukraine if necessary. The legal mechanism that the Russian government is using to recruit and deploy recently naturalized migrants to Ukraine is unclear and is unlikely to be part of Russia's existing conscription system or reserve mobilization system. The Russian

government may be offering naturalized migrants the opportunity to sign a contract for military service or volunteer units in order to avoid deportation or jail time.

Russian milbloggers seized on Bastrykin's speech to levy increasingly xenophobic criticisms against migrants. Several Russian milbloggers praised and defended Bastrykin's recommendation to restrict Russia's migration policy and criticized other Russian officials for not taking steps to address Russia's ongoing migration issues.[20] One milblogger insinuated that labor migrants are stealing job opportunities from ethnic Russians.[21] Another milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase penalties for migration violations, while another Russian source claimed that Russian authorities should confiscate Russian passports from any recently naturalized migrants who refuse to fight in Ukraine.[22] A Russian milblogger blamed Russia's migration policy for the perceived recent growth in terrorism and extremism in Russia and amplified a statement that Russian authorities should bury Islamic terrorists with a pig's head in order to defile their bodies.[23] ISW previously assessed that the recent likely Islamic State (IS) affiliated Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further terrorist attacks and instability in the North Caucasus.[24] The IS also claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Moscow in March 2024.[25] The terrorist attacks coupled with Bastrykin's speech appear to have encouraged increased xenophobic rhetoric within the ultranationalist Russian information space, which, alongside exploitative force generation efforts, may be exacerbating the radicalization of migrants. A Russian insider source recently claimed that Dagestan's force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to move to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections, where the June 23 attackers were supposedly radicalized.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russian force generation efforts and ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities in Russia and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[27]

The Kremlin may be using indirect means to bypass Russian law and codify a state ideology that emphasizes Russia's "traditional" social values while attempting to increase Russia's birth rate. Russian Deputy Minister of Justice Vsevolod Vukolov stated on June 27 that Russian State Duma deputies are preparing a bill to ban the so-called "child-free" "ideology," which Vukolov claimed promotes the "extremist" idea that women "do not need to give birth" and "can do without children." [28] Vukolov claimed that the ban is necessary to encourage higher birth rates - echoing Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent emphasis on Russia's demographic crisis.[29] Vukolov also stated that the Ministry of Justice is preparing a draft presidential decree that will include the concept of "traditional values" in the official "normative dictionary" of the Russian language, which the Russian government publishes every five years and describes the norms of the Russian language.[30] Vukolov claimed that officially defining "traditional values" will allow Russia to avoid having to "defend itself against Western manuals." [31] Russian authorities have previously designated non-existent organizations meant to encompass broad "social movements" as "extremist," most notably with the ban of the "LGBT Movement" and the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" in November 2023 and June 2024, respectively.[32] Russian President Vladimir Putin also declared 2024 the "Year of the Family" and used his annual New Year's address in December 2023 to emphasize the Russian family as the "backbone" of Russia.[33] The Russian Constitution forbids Russia from proclaiming a state ideology and commits the Russian state to recognize ideological diversity, yet select Russian officials have called for Russia to codify a state ideology.[34] The Kremlin may be attempting to circumvent the official ban on a state ideology and signal its envisioned, desired ideology by instead identifying the concepts that do not comply with this ideology and defining core concepts of this ideology in official platforms outside of the constitution. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is highly aware of the potential for ethnic, religious, and national tensions to prompt discontent in Russia and is therefore unlikely to codify an explicit state ideology in the short term.[35]

There is currently no evidence supporting recent reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, and ISW has been unable to locate the North Korean confirmation that some Western amplifications allege has been made. Western news outlets circulated reports that North Korea is planning to send engineering forces to occupied Ukraine, largely citing a June 25 statement from Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Pat Ryder.[36] Ryder stated that he questions a hypothetical North Korean decision to send "forces to be cannon fodder" in Russia's war in Ukraine, and the reports implied that Ryder's statement confirms that North Korea is sending engineering forces to Ukraine.[37] Ryder did not confirm these reports, however; Ryder was responding to a question claiming that the North Korean Central Military Commission "confirmed" the report, and Ryder himself hedged his answer by stating that "that's something to keep an eye on." [38] ISW has been unable to find any such statement by the North Korean Central Military Commission. The most recent press release from the North Korean Central Military Commission is from its Vice Chairperson Pak Jong Chon on June 24, in which Pak expresses support for Russia in its war in Ukraine but does not confirm any force deployments to Ukraine.[39] Similar statements from North Korean officials mentioning Russia or Ukraine since June 21 also do not mention any force deployments.[40] As ISW has recently

reported, the original report regarding North Korean engineering troops deploying to Ukraine came from South Korean television network *TV Chouson*, which reported on June 21 that an unspecified South Korean government official stated that South Korea expects North Korea to dispatch engineering forces for reconstruction efforts in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[41]

At this time, all actors involved have either explicitly denied or refused to confirm reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to support Russia in occupied Ukraine. Claims that such reports are "confirmed" by US officials are inaccurate. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 27 that the Kremlin is unfamiliar with recent reports that North Korea may send engineering units to occupied Ukraine.[42] US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller was also asked on June 26 about the alleged North Korean troop deployments, which the question described as having been officially "announced," but Miller responded that he does not "have any specific comment" and that he "had not seen that report." [43] ISW will continue to monitor North Korea's evolving relations with and military assistance to Russia, including continued provision of weapons for use in Ukraine and speculation of force deployments to Ukraine.

Western media reported that the US, Israel, and Ukraine are discussing the transfer of up to eight Israeli Patriot air defense systems set to retire to Ukraine according to unnamed sources, some of which also caution that the transfer may not occur. [44] The *Financial Times* (FT) and the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported on June 27, citing multiple people briefed on the negotiations, that the US, Israel, and Ukraine are actively negotiating a deal to send the eight Patriots first from Israel to the US then from the US to Ukraine and that senior officials and ministers have engaged in the negotiations process.[45] FT and the WSJ noted that Israel previously said it would retire these Patriots but has not yet done so due to fears that the Israel-Hamas war may escalate. Four sources told FT that even though Israel is negotiating the transfer of all eight Patriots, Ukraine may not receive all eight Patriots.[46] FT and its sources did not provide further information about this deviation.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction since activating in the area on June 18 and likely aim to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the area, but there is little current likelihood of rapid Russian gains near Toretsk. Russian forces have committed only limited forces to this operation so far, which suggests that Russian forces continue to prioritize gradual advances through consistent grinding assaults over operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver.**
- **Slow grinding Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces**
- **Ukraine signed long-term security agreements with the European Union (EU), Lithuania, and Estonia on June 27.**
- **Russian officials and information space actors continue to frame migrants as a threat to Russian society amid ongoing efforts to utilize migrant communities to address Russia's force generation needs.**
- **The Kremlin may be using indirect means to bypass Russian law and codify a state ideology that emphasizes Russia's "traditional" social values while attempting to increase Russia's birth rate.**
- **There is currently no evidence supporting recent reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, and ISW has been unable to locate the North Korean confirmation that some Western amplifications allege has been made.**
- **Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Siversk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on the long-term future of the Russian Navy and Russian shipbuilding on June 26 and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans to introduce more than 40 new ships and vessels to the Russian Navy in 2024.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted a cross-border assault in the Zolochiv direction (northwest of Kharkiv City) on the evening of June 26, but Russian forces have not launched offensive operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Zolochiv) on the evening of June 26, and Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group crossed into Ukrainian territory near the border settlement and engaged in small arms battles before Ukrainian border guards repelled the Russian assault.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are probing Ukrainian defenses in the area and that the assault is likely part of Russian efforts to create operational ambiguity along the international border area in northeastern Ukraine.[48] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing for new offensive actions and are concentrating a grouping of an unspecified size near the Ukrainian border 90 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv City, which could allow Russian forces to launch offensive operations southward in the Zolochiv direction or westward into Sumy Oblast.[49] This operational ambiguity is part of Russian efforts to further fix and draw Ukrainian forces along a wider front in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian forces continued fighting north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsy and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City within and near Vovchansk on June 26 and 27.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked within Vovchansk and regained positions along Korolenka, Soborna, and Khilboroba streets.[51] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on June 26 that Russian forces are consistently digging trenches at their first and second lines of defenses in the area, but that Ukrainian artillery and drone units are complicating Russian efforts to construct fortifications.[52] Elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly recently transferred to the Kharkiv direction from the Kherson direction.[53]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers towards Petropavlivka from Vilshana (both northeast of Kupyansk) and that effective Russian electronic warfare (EW) facilitated Russian advances near Synkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[54] Russian forces also attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Stelmakhivka, Pishchane, and Berestove; west of Svatove near Andriivka; and southwest of Svatove near Makiivka, Kopanky, and Nevske; and west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske on June 26 and 27.[55] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently intensified assaults in the Lyman direction but that it is unclear whether Russian forces have advanced in the area.[56] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces likely advanced east of Terny but that the information is unconfirmed.[57] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Synkivka.[58]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Russian forces have advanced one and a half kilometers towards Petropavlivka. A Russian source claimed on June 23 that Russian forces advanced 800 meters west of Novovodyane.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 27. Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the eastern outskirts of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[59] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Airborne VDV Division) seized Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and advanced west of the settlement, while other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Rozdolivka but have not yet completely seized the settlement.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) from the southeast and near Spirne (southeast of Siversk).[61] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne, and near Rozdolivka on June 26 and 27.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced almost two kilometers towards Druzhba as well 500 meters deep in Pivnichne. A Russian source claimed on June 24 that Russian forces advanced 6.03 kilometers wide and 2.08 kilometers deep north of Volodymyrivka. A Russian source claimed on June 23 that Russian forces sized 50 percent of Rozdolivka. A Ukrainian source claimed on June 23 that Russian forces advanced along a 3.5 kilometer wide and 2.3 kilometer deep frontline near Shumy.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn made multiple statements on June 27 that Ukrainian forces either pushed all Russian forces from the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) or pushed most Russian forces from the Kanal Microraion but that limited, isolated Russian groups remain in the microraion, suggesting that small Russian infantry groups can enter Kanal Microraion but may struggle to establish enduring positions.[63] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are conducting TOS thermobaric artillery strikes on Chasiv Yar.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 26 and 27.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) but did not specify the outcome.[66] Elements of the "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Ukrainian source claimed on June 27 that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces out of the Chasiv Yar Kanal Microrraion.

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Toretsk on June 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Niu York (south of Toretsk) and entered the settlement.[68] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and advanced about 1.7 kilometers from the Mayorske railway station (east of Toretsk).[69] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Dachne; east of Toretsk near Shumy, Druzhba and Pivnichne; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York on June 26 and 27.[70]

Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 27. Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka).[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Karlivka from Netaylove (both southwest of Avdiivka) and within Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[72] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and preventing Russian forces from advancing near the northern shore of the Karlivske Reservoir (north of Karlivka).[73] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that information that Russian forces entered Vozdvyzhenka (northwest of Avdiivka) is not reliable and that Russian forces have not advanced to the settlement yet.[74] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novoselivka Persha, and Sokil; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 26 and 27.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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- Avdiivka and Pokrovsk City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced 900 meters towards Vozdvizhenka from Novooleksandrivka as well as advanced 500 meters westward north of Sokil. A Russian source claimed on June 24 that Russian forces advanced up to 1.3 kilometers wide northeast of Yevhenivka as well as up to 700 meters deep in central Sokil.

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 27. Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently advanced south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[77] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka on June 26 and 27.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Volodymyrivka, Vodyane, and Vuhledar (all southwest of Donetsk City).[79]


The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings in Selydove with a FAB-500 glide bomb on the morning of June 27.[80]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 27. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[81] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[82]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) and northeast of Verbove (east of Robotyne) on June 26 and 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are accumulating reserves near Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and Mala Tokmachka to prepare for future counteroffensive operations.[84] The Ukrainian Crimean-based "Atesh" partisan group stated that an Atesh agent within the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) stated that the brigade is conducting infantry-led attritional "meat" assaults near Myrne (northeast of Robotyne and southwest of Hulyaipole).[85] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[86]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of June 27, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Field Fortifications |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky and the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky on June 26 and 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction.[88] Another Russian milblogger complained that Russian units in the Kherson direction have an insufficient number of boats to support their operations in the area.[89]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 26 to 27. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the northeastern Black Sea, a Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from Tambov Oblast, and a Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast.[90] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all four Kalibr cruise missiles, the Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and all 23 Shahed drones.[91] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed three Kalibr cruise missiles over Mykolaiv Oblast and nine Shahed drones over Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[92] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian airfields.[93]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on the long-term future of the Russian Navy and Russian shipbuilding on June 26 and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans to introduce more than 40 new ships and vessels to the Russian Navy in 2024.[94] Putin emphasized the importance of equipping Russian ships and vessels with remote threat detection systems, including air defense systems to defend against aerial drones and surface and underwater surveillance systems to defend against naval drones. Putin noted that the Russian MoD also needs to better protect Russian naval bases, develop naval reconnaissance aviation, and increase access to electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare (EW) systems among Russian naval forces. Ukrainian forces have previously used naval drones to strike Russian Black Sea Fleet assets previously based in and around occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, including reportedly damaging at least seven Russian ships with these drones as of March 2024.[95]

Russian officials continue efforts to address bureaucratic issues within the Russian military. Former Russian Prime Minister and Russian Lawyers Association Head Sergei Stepashin stated on June 26 during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that the Russian MoD forces military personnel to spend half of their salaries on necessary uniforms and equipment.[96] Stepashin claimed that Russian military personnel also do not have paid leave from the frontline and criticized the Russian government's policy. Stepashin asked Russian State Duma Deputy Irina Yarovaya to address the issues of clothing and equipment provisions, but St. Petersburg-based outlet *Fontanka* reported that Yarovaya discounted Stepashin's concerns and praised Putin for the positive changes in the Russian military since the 1990s.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated during a Russian Cabinet of Ministers meeting on June 27 that the Russian government will grant citizens supporting Russia's war effort and occupation in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts the status of "combat veteran." [97] Mishustin stated that civilian military personnel, doctors, military correspondents, and occupation administration employees will be eligible for "combat veteran" status and noted that this program is already in place for these professions in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Mishustin stated that "combat veteran" status will provide additional social benefits, including tax breaks, vouchers for sanatoriums, and the right to purchase land. Mishustin encouraged the Cabinet of Ministers to quickly submit and adopt legislation to support this program. Kremlin newswire TASS reported later on June 27 that the Cabinet of Ministers submitted draft legislation for this program to the Russian State Duma.[98]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 27 claiming to show Russian servicemen using heavy rotary-wing drones to carry 82mm mines to mine Ukrainian positions in the south Donetsk direction.[99] The Russian MoD noted that the drones are modeled after Ukraine's "Baba Yaga" drones and can also deliver ammunition, medicine, and food to frontline positions.

Russian state space agency Roscosmos reported on June 26 that it is preparing to release a new "Gonets-Avtonomny" portable satellite terminal for personal communications.[100] Roscosmos will test the terminal in Summer 2024.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Senior Russian officials, including Deputy Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, continue to reiterate the Kremlin's consistent rhetorical line that further US and other Western military assistance to Ukraine will result in deteriorating relations and future conflict with Russia.[101] Kremlin officials routinely threaten the West over continued military assistance to Ukraine as part of Russia's reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision making in Russia's favor.[102]

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers continue to amplify propaganda material highlighting Russia's continued territorial claims over areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that it does not control, signaling ultranationalist support for broader Russian territorial ambitions within Ukraine.[103]

A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated ongoing Russian information operations aimed at discrediting the Moldovan government, including Moldovan President Maia Sandu, and fomenting discontent within Moldova.[104] The milblogger also criticized protests within Georgia against Russian-style repressions bills, including the new foreign agents law.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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