



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2. Geolocated imagery published on June 3 shows two destroyed launchers and a damaged command post of a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in a field east of Kiselyovo (just north of Belgorod City).[1] Russian sources widely speculated that Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS, but Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on the strike.[2] The S-300/400 air defense system was located roughly 60 kilometers from the current frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and over 80 kilometers from Kharkiv City, which is within the range of HIMARS but exceeds the range of other MLRS systems that Ukrainian forces reportedly use to conduct strikes into Belgorod Oblast.[3] Russian sources have increasingly claimed that Ukrainian forces are using HIMARS to strike Belgorod Oblast since the US partially lifted its restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian border areas with Kharkiv Oblast.[4] Russian sources will likely continue to characterize any successful strike in Belgorod Oblast as a HIMARS strike regardless of the system used.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned. The *Financial Times* (*FT*) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter stated that the PRC and Russia disagree about the details of the PS-2 gas pipeline, with the PRC wanting to pay prices near Russia's subsidized domestic gas prices and to only commit to buying a small part of the pipeline's planned capacity.[5] Gazprom Head Alexei Miller reportedly did not accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin on his recent visit to the PRC due to these disagreements over the pipeline. *FT* reported that Putin asked PRC President Xi Jinping during their May 2024 meetings to come to an agreement on the pipeline, but *FT* reported that sources said that a pipeline agreement "remains distant." *FT* noted that Russia needs the pipeline to launch as expected more than the PRC. *FT* reported that it gained access to an unreleased report by an unspecified major Russian bank that stated that if the PS-2 pipeline does not launch in 2029, Gazprom's profits are forecasted to drop by almost 15 percent, which is especially significant following Gazprom's \$6.9 billion loss in 2023, its largest loss in more than 25 years. *FT*, citing a recent report by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, also stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by about 150 billion cubic meters by 2040.[6] The PRC is likely aware of Russia's more immediate need for the pipeline and is using Beijing's upper hand in the energy sphere to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.

Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.[7] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on June 3 that Russia is trying to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian peace summit by convincing other states that the summit is insignificant, that they should not participate, and that if they do they should participate at the lowest possible level.[8] Other Ukrainian officials have recently emphasized that it is imperative for both the United States and the PRC to attend the June 2024 peace summit as their participation is "decisive" in compelling Russia to participate in the process of restoring peace and security.[9] The PRC announced on May 31 that it would not be joining the peace summit, and Saudi Arabia has reportedly decided not to attend.[10]

Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubynets amplified footage on June 2 showing a group of three Russian servicemen beating, threatening, and harassing a group of four Ukrainian POWs.[11] The footage shows one Russian serviceman shooting the ground immediately next to a POW's head and the Russian servicemen forcing the POWs to sing the Russian national anthem. Lyubynets stated the preliminary information

suggests that the incident was filmed in the Kharkiv direction, where Russian forces recently began offensive operations. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on June 3 that it opened an investigation into the incident.[12] Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* identified the Russian serviceman who filmed the video as Alexei Kirpin, a former soldier in the far-right "Rusich" assault formation.[13] Ukraine-based ZMINA Human Rights Center reported that Russian authorities are also mistreating and beating Ukrainian POWs in pre-trial detention centers in Russia.[14] ISW has observed evidence of widespread violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs committed by the Russian military in recent months, including Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs and using POWs as human shields on the battlefield.[15]

Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov traveled to Benghazi, Libya on May 31 and met with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander-in-Chief Khalifa Haftar at the Ar Rajma military base in eastern Libya.[16] Yevkurov promised to enhance LNA capabilities in eastern Libya.[17] Russia has recently reinforced its military presence in eastern Libya and increased deployments of Russian military personnel and supplies to the area since at least March 2024.[18] The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously assessed that the intensified Russian military efforts in Libya are likely partially contributing to the wider Kremlin effort to secure a naval base in Tobruk, Libya, and that Yevkurov has been particularly involved in negotiations with LNA officials over Russian naval basing in Libya since August 2023.[19] Yevkurov also traveled to Niger on June 3 to meet with Nigerien junta head Abdirahmane Tiani, Nigerien junta defense minister Salifou Modi, and Nigerian junta interior minister Mohamed Toumba, reportedly signing a "multi-sectoral cooperation" memorandum of understanding.[20] Russia has recently increased its military presence in Niger—the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Africa Corps deployed to Niger in April 2023 and stated its intentions to replace US forces in northern Niger, then entered a base housing US military personnel in the country in May 2024.[21] The US notably intends to remove all American troops from Niger by September 15, 2024.[22] Alongside increased Russian military presence in Niger and efforts to supplant US forces, Russia is also reportedly seeking to take over uranium assets in Niger currently held by French state-controlled company Orano SA, and the "multi-sectoral cooperation" agreement signed by Yevkurov and his Nigerien counterparts may support this Russian effort.[23]

While Yevkurov primarily pursues military cooperation with African states, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is also visiting Africa to discuss Russian political and economic engagement with various African partners. Lavrov met with Guinean junta officials in Conakry, Guinea, on June 3 to discuss Russian-Guinean relations.[24] The Guinean junta's relationship with Russia is complicated, but the Kremlin maintains substantial economic and resource-based interests in Guinea. Russia depends on Guinea for a significant share of its bauxite, a refined-mineral-based material that is used in the production of spark plug insulators and other circuit and furnace related industrial goods.[25] The Kremlin may desire to maintain access to bauxite to support the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Lavrov also met Congolese officials in Ollombo, Congo on the evening of June 3, to discuss the situation in Libya, as Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso's is the head of the African Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.[26] Russian officials have attempted to maintain firm relations with Congo over the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, with Lavrov visiting Congo in 2022 and Russian President Vladimir Putin calling Nguesso in March 2024.[27] Lavrov is also expected to travel to Chad on June 5 and Burkina Faso sometime in the coming days as well.[28] Lavrov's visit to Chad in particular continues Russian efforts to grow ties with the Chadian regime since Putin met with Chadian President Mahamat Déby in Moscow in January 2024, and Russia likely aims to establish itself as the primary security partner across the Sahel to advance Russia's economic and military interests in the region.[29] CTP previously forecast that aligning with Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could pave the way for the Chadian junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the West.[30]

The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat. Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on June 3 that Russian military authorities began forcibly sending hundreds of Russian servicemembers who refused to take part in Russian combat operations to the front in Ukraine, including to northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast, in May 2024.[31] *Verstka* stated that the Russian military holds the servicemembers at military unit basepoints in Russia as they await trial for crimes related to their refusal to fight before suddenly cancelling their trials and immediately sending them to Ukraine. *Verstka* reported that Russian authorities used physical abuse to coerce some soldiers into volunteering to go to Ukraine before forcing others from their holding cells at gunpoint and transporting them to the frontlines. *Verstka* reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Merzlyankova claimed on May 6 that she visited a collection point for servicemembers who refused to fight but that management stated that there were no violations of the servicemembers' civil rights. *Verstka* reported that Russian

authorities cancelled the trials of at least 170 servicemembers who refused to fight and deployed them to Ukraine and that investigators, prosecutors, and lawyers were all unaware of this. *Verstka* reported that several sources, including one source from the Russian presidential administration, stated that the Russian military sends conscripts and "incompetent" reservists, who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), to noncombat roles in Russia's border forces to free up experienced military personnel for the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but that the Russian military is also sending deserters to fight. A Russian lawyer, who specializes in cases related to servicemembers refusing to fight, reportedly stated that the Russian MoD may be stopping criminal cases to send such servicemembers to the front due to a shortage of forces needed to fight in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength, and the Russian MoD may be sending servicemembers awaiting their trials to the front in Kharkiv Oblast to strengthen the limited forces in the area.[32]

Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.[33] The Georgian Parliament overwhelmingly overrode Georgian President Salome Zurbishvili's veto of the law on May 28, and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze stated on June 3 that Georgian officials will fine and seize the property of any organizations that refuse to register under the law.[34]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2.**
- **The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned.**
- **Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.**
- **Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.**
- **Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states.**
- **The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat.**
- **Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi, Avdiivka, and Velyka Novoslika and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **The family members of mobilized Russian personnel continue to protest for the demobilization of their relatives.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 3, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance north of Kharkiv City in the Lyptsi direction. Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows that Russian forces advanced to buildings along Studentska Street in northwestern Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi).[35] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also advancing in forest areas southeast of Hlyboke towards Lyptsi.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported fighting near Lyptsi on the evening of June 2 and during the day on June 3.[37]

Ukrainian forces recently regained limited positions within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in and around Vovchansk on June 3. Geolocated footage published on June 2 shows that Ukrainian forces regained a position along Dukhovna Street in central Vovchansk.[38] Additional geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in close combat along Dukhovna Street, suggesting that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking to contest Russian control of positions along the street.[39] Some Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack in central Vovchansk and the general northern Kharkiv Oblast direction.[40] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets sardonically noted that Russian milbloggers are complaining about increased Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kharkiv direction and warned that Russian sources may claim in coming days that Russian forces repelled a "serious" Ukrainian counteroffensive in this direction.[41] Ukrainian "Kharkiv" Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh noted that Russian forces have slightly decreased the intensity of assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast and are storming Ukrainian positions with small troop groupings amounting to "no more than a few motorized rifle units." [42] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting in and around Vovchansk and near Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on June 2 and 3.[43] Elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly fighting in Vovchansk.[44] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is beginning to introduce the main combat elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division and 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the Kharkiv direction.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 3, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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Radius of 25 kilometers around Kharkiv (geodesic distance measurement)

Geolocated footage posted on May 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Hlyboke.

Geolocated footage posted on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Vovchansk.

Geolocated footage posted on June 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced into northern Starytsya.

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealje, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on May 31 that Russian forces advanced 450 meters in Vovchansk. A Russian source claimed on May 30 that Russian forces advanced 150 meters deep in the Lyptsi direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny; southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on June 2 and 3.[46] Ukraine's State Border Service reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified crossing over the Vilshana River northeast of Kupyansk and disrupted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), likely referring to the Vilshana area northeast of Kupyansk.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) destroyed a bridge near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (south of Kupyansk) with guided glide bombs.[48] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on June 3 that Russian forces are launching glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian targets in the Kupyansk direction from Russian territory.[49] ISW continues to note that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia's operational and deep rear with US-provided weapons.[50]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) near Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk), Ivano-Darivka (southwest of Siversk), Rozdolivka (south of Siversk), and Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) on June 2 and 3.[51]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar on June 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and north of Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and 400 meters northeast of Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed and seized an unspecified height on the west (right) bank of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal.[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Recent geolocated footage from late May-early June shows that a small group of Russian infantry on a transport vehicle managed to cross the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal, but constant Ukrainian reconnaissance of and prompt strikes against the group indicate that the group likely did not retain this position.[54] Russian forces also continued attacks east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 2 and 3.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported fighting near "Alebastrove" on June 3, which may refer to the Alebastrova railway stop northeast of Andriivka.[56] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue fighting near Kalynivka, and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue fighting on the northern outskirts of Kanal Microraion.[57]



Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows that Russian forces have advanced along the M-30 highway west of Netaylove (west of Avdiivka) approaching Karlivka, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 450 meters wide and 1.32 kilometers deep east of Karlivka and into the nearby Volna-1 holiday village.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a garden area south of Netaylove, advanced west of the Berdychi-Orlivka line towards Skuchne (all west of Avdiivka), and advanced north and northwest of Arkhanhelske (northwest of Avdiivka).[59] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced to at least the outskirts of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka), and some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces managed to advance as far as central Sokil, but one milblogger claimed that these reports are unconfirmed.[60] ISW has not observed any indications that Russian forces have entered Sokil at this time. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are currently focusing on breaking through Ukrainian positions in small areas of the front between Staromykhailivka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) to set conditions for further offensive operations west towards Pokrovsk.[61] Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Zelene Pole, Ocheretyne, Novopokrovske, Novoselivka Persha, and Kalynove; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodovka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 2 and 3.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces attacked near Ptyche (west of Umanske across the Vovcha River), likely referring to the general direction and not the immediate area around the settlement, as ISW has observed no indicators that Russian forces are even close to crossing the Vovcha River in this area.[63] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting near Sokil.[64] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are fighting near Netaylove and that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are fighting east and southeast of Nevelske.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 3, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Avdiivka and Pokrovsk City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced 450 meters wide and 1.32 kilometers deep east of Karlivka. A Russian source claimed on May 31 that Russian forces advanced one and one-half kilometers toward Novoselivka Persha and 1.3 kilometers toward Yasnobrodivka. A Russian source claimed on May 30 that Russian forces advanced 2.12 kilometers wide and 700 meters deep north and south of Netaylove.


Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced up to Sum'ska Street in central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), seized a farm south of Krasnohorivka, and advanced west of Solodke and north of Volodymyrivka (both southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[66] Fighting also continued southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on June 2 and 3.[67] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are fighting near Heorhiivka; elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Novomykhailivka-Kostyantynivka direction; elements of the 242nd and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) supported by elements of the 10th Tank Regiment (1st DNR AC) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are fighting on the Marinka-Pobieda-Paraskoviivka line; and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are fighting in the Solodke-Vodyane direction.[68] Mashovets reported that Russia has committed elements of both the EMD and SMD to work in tandem in the Kurakhove direction (west of Donetsk City) and that the total force concentration in this direction includes up to 18 regiments, six brigades, nine battalions and battalion-sized tactical groups, and three volunteer formations between both the SMD and EMD.[69]




Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Velyka Novosilka amid continued fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 3. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows that Russian forces advanced within southern Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[70] Fighting also continued near Staromayorske (also south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 2 and 3.[71]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Robotyne.[72] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 2 and 3.[73] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces occupied Ukrainian positions and are gaining a foothold west of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[74] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced almost two kilometers near Mala Tokmachka in the past week.[75] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 3 that Russian assaults in the Orikhiv (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Kherson directions have decreased in the past two days.[76] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[77]



Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky and in the Dnipro River Delta on Nestryha Island on June 3.[78] Pletenchuk stated on June 3 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on Nestryha Island.[79]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Odesa City with a ballistic missile on June 2.[80]

Russian forces launched a guided glide bomb strike against Dachne and Slobzhanske, Kharkiv Oblast (about 40km southeast of Kharkiv City) on June 3, damaging civilian infrastructure.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The family members of mobilized Russian personnel continue to protest for the demobilization of their relatives. Russian opposition media widely amplified footage and photos of at least 10 women protesting for demobilization outside of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on June 3.[82] The women unsuccessfully demanded to meet with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and were accosted by a Russian officer, who reportedly told the women that they did not deserve to be Russian citizens because of their protest.[83] Several women involved in the protest stated that the protest was not organized by the "Way Home" social movement and that the women started their own Telegram channels so Russian authorities cannot accuse them of collaborating with "foreign actors." [84] The Russian Ministry of Justice designated the "Way Home" social movement, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian personnel that has been calling for demobilization, as a "foreign agent" on June 1.[85] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin likely aims to censor and discredit movements that call for demobilization before they can garner wide support in Russian society and interfere with the Kremlin's ongoing force-generation efforts.[86]

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced on June 3 that Rostec's Tula Oktava plant signed a contract to supply the Russian MoD with modernized and more effective "Obereg" body armor.[87]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian Stratim Design Bureau told Kremlin newswire *TASS* on June 3 that the bureau will showcase a "Rusak" quadcopter and a "Tyuvik" light attack drone equipped with homing systems at the HeliRussia-2024 International Exhibition on June 10-12.[88] The Stratim Design Bureau told *TASS* that Russian forces are already testing these designs in Ukraine and claimed that the new homing systems are not susceptible to electronic warfare (EW) interference.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met with representatives of large international defense and technological companies and Western officials at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3.[89] Umerov called on tech and defense companies to invest in weapons production in Ukraine and create joint production initiatives with Ukrainian companies to give Ukraine access to the latest technology and advanced weapons. Umerov also met with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles on June 3 to discuss defense cooperation and highlighted Japan's contributions to Ukraine's war effort.[90]

European countries continue to support Ukraine's war effort. Lithuanian officials announced on May 29 and 30 that Lithuania will sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine that will allocate .25 percent of Lithuania's GDP annually to fund Ukraine's security and defense and that Lithuania joined Ukraine's air defense coalition and allocated 13.5 million euros (\$14.7 million) to purchase radars as part of the coalition.[91] The Lithuanian MoD announced on May 28 that it will provide 35 million euros (\$38.2 million) to the Czech artillery ammunition initiative to source ammunition for Ukraine from outside the EU.[92] The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 30 that Romania's Aeroستا aerospace and defense company and Lockheed Martin opened the first European HIMARS maintenance center in Bacău, Romania and that this center will repair HIMARS systems for Ukraine and NATO member states.[93] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Sprūds stated on May 27 that Latvia will invest 20 million euros (\$21.8 million) in Ukraine's drone coalition.[94] Ukrainian officials recently announced that Spain will join Ukraine's IT coalition and that Portugal recently joined the F-16 coalition.[95]

Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to address Ukraine's requests for additional air defense systems. *Reuters* reported on June 3 that a source close to the matter stated that Italy will likely send Ukraine a second SAMP/T air defense system but did not provide a timeframe for the delivery.[96] Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu told *Euronews* on June 1 that Romania is considering supplying Ukraine with a Patriot air defense system but noted that Romania's Supreme Council of National Defense has to approve the decision.[97]

Ukrainian officials and producers continue domestic efforts to support the Ukrainian DIB. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimentov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian companies are developing almost 100 percent of the drones that Ukrainian forces use, and that Ukraine recently announced a contract to acquire 20,000 drones from Ukrainian producers.[98] The Ukrainian MoD announced on May 30 that it shortened the procedure to introduce new weapons into combat operations to 10 days in order to increase the number of new equipment and weapons on the battlefield.[99]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger seized on a recent training exercise involving the Virginia National Guard and Tajik military forces to accuse the US of spreading destabilizing influence among Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members in Central Asia.[100] The Virginia National Guard reported that some of its engineering elements participated in mountain warfare training with elements of the Tajik peacekeeping and national guard forces in Romit, Tajikistan, between April 29 and May 3, as part of an over 30-year-long State Partnership Program between Virginia and Tajikistan.[101] The Russian milblogger responded to this announcement on June 3, claiming that cooperation between American and Tajik forces is "seriously alarming" and a "political gesture" aimed at showing American cooperation with a member of the CSTO.[102] The milblogger claimed that American influence is now "firmly" in Central Asia and linked the national guard training in Tajikistan with recent efforts by Armenia (another CSTO member) to distance itself from the Russian sphere of influence.

The *Washington Post* published an investigation on June 3 detailing how a prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian propagandist funded far-right politicians in Europe through the Czechia-based *Voice of Europe* outlet.[103] The *Washington Post* found that Artem Marchevsky, a known associate of Kremlin ally and former Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk, launched the pro-Russian *Voice of Europe* outlet in Prague in May 2023 in coordination with Medvedchuk, and in the past year funneled up to one million euros (just over \$1 million) per month to "dozens" of far-right politicians in Europe to encourage them to spread Kremlin propaganda in Western media. The site reportedly originally aimed to convinced audiences in Ukraine and Europe that Medvedchuk was a viable replacement for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The *Washington Post* noted that the *Voice of Europe* has been managed by other Medvedchuk associates with links to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s notorious Fifth Service. The European Union (EU) sanctioned *Voice of Europe*, as well as Marchevsky and Medvedchuk, on May 27 for "information manipulation in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine." [104]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) extended its sanctions list on June 3 to a number of British politicians, journalists, and Russia experts for efforts to "discredit" and "isolate" Russia.[105] The British government was one of the first to allow Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia, and the Russian MFA is likely weaponizing the sanctions list against British officials and journalists in order to retaliate.[106]

Russian milbloggers continued to spread videos and posts on social media intended to discredit Ukraine's mobilization effort.[107] The Ukrainian Ground Forces warned on June 2 that Russian information operation units were conducting exactly such an informational effort by spreading fake videos of staged violence perpetrated by Ukrainian military police against civilians in order to discredit Ukrainian mobilization and foment distrust in the Ukrainian government.[108]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Deputy Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Leonid Davidovich stated on June 2 that Belarusian forces have undergone both "theoretical and practical" training cycles during joint exercises with Russian forces on the use of tactical nuclear weapons.[109]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Belarus on June 3 to participate in the Eurasian Economic Union's (EAEU) Eurasian Intergovernmental Council.[110]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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