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March 26, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear to agree that a ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March 25, but US and Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that technical negotiations are ongoing.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still working to develop monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements on March 25 jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy infrastructure ceasefire.[2] Palisa stated that both ceasefires on Black Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March 25.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 26 that Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes.[4] The absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating the specifics of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms remain unclear.[5]

Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike energy infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25, gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25 to 26, and electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff responded on March 26 and denied the Russian MoD's accusations.[7] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein, Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz notably did not report Ukrainian drone strikes in their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike infrastructure in their regions. Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18, when Putin claimed to have ordered the Russian military to stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities.[8] Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have damaged civilian infrastructure across Ukraine almost every night since March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged energy infrastructure.[9]


Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is "impossible" and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is "unacceptable." [11] The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd" to allow any international organization to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States.[12] The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces occupied the area in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin also routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]

The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea. European Commission's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditional[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[16] Hipper's statement is likely a response to the Kremlin's recent demand that it will not implement the terms of the ceasefire in the Black Sea with Ukraine until the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[17] The United States will likely require EU cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.

Key Takeaways:

- **The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.**
- **Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.**
 - **Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).**

- **The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk.**
- **Russia continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF).**




We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued attacks in Kursk Oblast and the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[18]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements advanced near Veselivka (northeast of Sumy City along the international border).[19]

Russian forces attacked west of Sudzha near Gogolevka, near the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha, and northeast of Sumy City along the international border near Veselivka and Zhuravka.[20]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), the "Arctic" Battalion of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 22nd and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[21] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka.[22]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.



Assessed advances: Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[23]

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that the intensity of fighting in the Belgorod international border area has decreased due to unfavorable weather conditions.[25]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) and "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating near Popovka (west of Demidovka).[26] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has deployed elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 88th and 85th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD), and unspecified elements of the 6th CAA (LMD) to Belgorod Oblast.[27] Mashovets added that the Russian military command already moved a part of its 6th CAA (LMD), 20th CAA, and 3rd CAA reserves to Belgorod Oblast from Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk-Chasiv Yar directions, respectively.

Russian	Main	Effort	–	Eastern	Ukraine
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 26 but did not advance.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 26 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault with four armored vehicles toward Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored vehicles and damaged one armored vehicle.[28] Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on March 25 and 26.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Mala Shaplivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[30]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk along the Zapadne-Kalynove line; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Sahunivka, and Holubivka and toward Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 25 and 26.[31]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a column of Russian armored vehicles, likely attempting to dismount infantry, in the Kupyansk direction on March 25 and that Russian forces lose up to 50 armored vehicles

per week.[32] Trehubov reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction regularly use armored vehicle columns to transport infantry to the frontline rather than to conduct mechanized assaults.



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova towards Olhivka, Nove, and Katerynivka on March 25 and 26.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 500 meters near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[34]


Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne on March 25 and 26.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 25 and 26.[36]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast
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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 26 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, and near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Dylivka on March 25 and 26.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[38]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on March 26 that Russian forces have increased the number of guided glide bomb and fiber-optic drone strikes in the

area.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian personnel operating in the area are poorly trained and that Russian forces usually attack in smaller groups.[40]

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Odeska Street in northwestern Toretsk and along Darhomyzhskoho Street in northern Toretsk.[41]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and westward along the O0524 highway northwest of Toretsk.[42]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.5 kilometers west of Niu York (south of Toretsk), in northern Toretsk, and toward Avanhard Stadium in central Toretsk, and in the Fomikha Mine waste heap (northern Toretsk).[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are clearing Olesksandropil and Panteleymonivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[44]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk near Krymske; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on March 25 and 26.[45]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on March 26 that Russian forces use green tape identification marks to mimic identification marks used by the Ukrainian military in order to prevent Ukrainian drone operators from easily identifying and striking them.[46] Such deceptive tactics may amount to acts of perfidy - a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[47] The Geneva Convention defines perfidy as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Aпти Alaudinov, recently claimed that Russian forces similarly used blue electrical tape identification marks - which he claimed Ukrainian forces also use - during an attack in Kursk Oblast to "prevent the Ukrainian military from understanding what was happening."[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 238th Artillery Brigade (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction March 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and in northwestern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novopavlivka, and Vidrozhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Novoserhiivka, Pishchane, and Novooleksandrivka on March 25 and 26.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lysivka, Solone, and Uspenivka.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of a tank battalion of the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and 1.5 kilometers near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[55]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 25 and 26.[56] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Rozlyv.[57]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in the Kurakhove direction is more active since the seizure of Kostyantynopil has allowed Russian forces to press on Rozlyv from the north and south.[58] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynopil as of March 9.[59]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction
March 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60]


Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, and Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on March 25 and 26.[61] Ukrainian sources reported on March 25 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a reduced company-sized mechanized assault near Velyka Novosilka.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[63]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 26.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Polohy direction.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 Vasylivka-Orikhiv highway in western Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 26 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division), advanced north, west, and east of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and within central Lobkove.[66]

Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 25 and 26.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove, Lobkove, and Shcherbaky.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kamyanske direction.[69]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[70]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction March 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and that 49 were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts and conducted the largest Shahed strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast since the start of the war in February 2022.[72]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on March 26 that Russian forces are preparing new Shahed launch sites and expanding Shahed crews to increase the number of Shahed strikes against Ukraine.[73]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continued to reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF). Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin announced on March 25 that Russian authorities have reorganized the BARS-Sarmat Detachment into the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.[74] Rogozin also noted that the BARS-Sarmat Center added two new combat testing battalions. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts to establish a separate branch for unmanned systems within the Russian Armed Forces in mid to late 2024 by reorganizing informal drone detachments into MoD-controlled units.[75]

The Kremlin continues efforts to militarize Russian youth as part of long-term force generation efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the board of the “Movement of the First” youth military-patriotic organization on March 26 and claimed that 11 million people have joined the organization since its founding in 2022.[76] The Kremlin uses the Movement of the First to militarize society in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly among children, and Movement of the First's Board Chairperson Artur Orlov stated that the organization aims to attract up to 18 million participants by 2030.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone designer VVZ Drones stated on March 26 that it developed the "Sifa" first-person view (FPV) drone, which can strike helicopters and other drones.[78] VVZ Drones claimed that the Sifa drone has a payload of up to 0.7 kilograms and a flight speed of over 225 kilometers per hour.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



- [1] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025>
- [2] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025>
- [3] <https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/pfbid02DqN3gqGZojFHnPyHFJxjhSRKkRf5TNhYCRj3YT3Ef41XofWqn61Y9t9BQ9kEbJpWl?rdid=liOa5JELmSNyLabK>
- [4] https://t.me/tass_agency/307689
- [5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025>
- [6] https://t.me/mod_russia/50573
- [7] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22384> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031AbZGpscTy486rb6L34FK5jSkYCw68um1z2MeSVhnHQ52baxQZ8JEppGR65Kxbml>
- [8] <https://x.com/dmtrltvn/status/1904620272247845159>
- [9] <https://t.me/kpszsus/31391> ; <https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/03/25/v-den-peregovorov-s-ssha-rossiya-nanesla-udar-po-tsentru-sum> ; <https://t.me/syNEGubov/13541> ;
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- [11] https://t.me/MID_Russia/54347
- [12] <https://ria dot ru/20250326/novak-2007531565.html>

- [13] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025>;
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