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**March 27, 2025, 5:30pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.** Zelensky stated on March 26 that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia must still resolve unspecified "technical" issues related to the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea but did reach agreements on these ceasefires during talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24 and 25.[1] Zelensky added that the Ukrainian, US, and Russian technical teams have not yet determined the monitoring mechanisms for temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea, which makes it difficult to assess Russia's compliance.[2] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25 that Ukraine regards any movement of Russian military vessels outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea as a violation of the "commitment to ensure safe navigation of the Black Sea." [3] The Kremlin, however, said on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on March 26 that the European Union (EU) must be involved in lifting sanctions on Russia.[5] European Commission Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia only if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditional[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[6]

**Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.** Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on March 27 that neither Ukraine nor Russia struck each other's energy facilities since March 25, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire agreement on the nights of March 25 to 26 and 26 to 27.[7] The temporary ceasefire does not include protections for civilian or non-energy critical infrastructure, and Russian forces have intensified strikes against these objects in recent days.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March 26 to 27, Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 86 Shahed and other drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones and that 26

drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, Sumy, and Kharkiv cities.[10] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 24 that Russia is intentionally targeting populated cities with drones in order to destroy infrastructure and terrorize the local civilian population.[11] Russian forces have repeatedly conducted large strikes against civilian areas in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast; and Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast and port infrastructure in Odesa City since early March 2025 amid discussions of a temporary ceasefire.[12] The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary general ceasefire (which Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected) as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement.[13] Continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, even under the conditions of an alleged ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, will be detrimental to the establishment of a sustainable peace in Ukraine.

**The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that the Ukrainian drone strike destroyed 96 air-launched cruise missiles and that Russian forces intended to use these missiles in at least three separate strike series against Ukraine on unspecified dates in March and April 2025.[14] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted on March 20 that the Engels Airbase stored Kh-101 cruise missiles, suggesting that many or all of the 96 destroyed missiles were Kh-101s.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Engels Airbase drone strike also destroyed significant aviation fuel reserves that supplied Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[16] Russian forces have frequently used Kh-101 cruise missiles in overnight strike series against Ukraine and notably hit the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in central Kyiv with a Kh-101 missile in July 2024.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told Ukrainian state news outlet *Ukrinform* on March 26 that Russia is producing high numbers of Kh-101 and Kaliber cruise missiles and Iskander ballistic missiles to replenish its stockpiles and augment their strike packages with more accurate missiles with higher payloads.[18] Skitbitsky reported that Russia is also producing Kinzhal ballistic missiles and Zirkon hypersonic missiles.

**Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.** Zelensky told French outlet *Le Figaro* on March 26 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to delay ongoing peace negotiations to buy time for an offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in Spring 2025.[19] Zelensky noted that Russian forces wanted to conduct these offensive operations in Fall 2024 but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 spoiled this plan. Zelensky warned on March 15 and 18 that Russian forces may be preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts, although Ukrainian officials have expressed doubts about Russian forces' ability to conduct successful offensive operations in these areas, particularly against Sumy City.[20] Sumy City had a population of 256,000 in 2022 and is roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline. Putin also recently told Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border, including in Sumy Oblast.[21] Russian forces have been conducting intensified ground assaults within northern Sumy Oblast since early March 2025 as

part of their effort to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast on March 27 and reported that Russian attacks have intensified in recent days.[22] These Russian assaults are not part of a new offensive effort in Sumy Oblast, although Russian forces could use new positions and momentum gained in the Sumy Oblast border area to support a potential spring offensive operation in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct a successful offensive operation to seize Sumy City but would likely leverage future offensive operations into Sumy Oblast and other oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy to demand that Ukraine cede additional territory to Russia, particularly amid discussions of a potential future peace in Ukraine.[23]


**Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.**[24] Leaders and representatives from 30 countries including the UK, Ukraine, France, and Germany discussed strengthening Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB) to deter future Russian aggression and ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position amid ongoing negotiations with Russia.[25] French President Emmanuel Macron stated that coalition members are developing a plan to send "reassurance forces" to "strategic locations" in Ukraine in the event of a peace treaty with Russia.[26] Macron stated that these forces will aim to deter potential Russian aggression against Ukraine and help train Ukrainian forces but will not serve as peacekeepers or be stationed on the frontlines to monitor possible ceasefires.[27] Macron stated that France and the UK will soon send a joint military delegation to Ukraine to assist in long-term Ukrainian military planning.[28] Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated that European countries should not lift sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[29]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.**
- **Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.**
- **The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.**
- **Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to**

ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts; near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk; and in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
- The Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

#### **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and northern Sumy Oblast.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st and 137th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) recently seized Gogolevka, Kursk Oblast (west of Sudzha) and the Sudzha border checkpoint (southwest of Sudzha on the international border).[30] Additional geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[31]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian advanced southwest of Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha), into northern Guyevo (south of Sudzha), and towards Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized positions near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City).[33]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Oleshnya and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo) and that fighting continues in Kursk Oblast near Gogolevka and Oleshnya and in northern Sumy Oblast north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Veselivka and northeast of Sumy

City near Zhuravka and Basivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Guyevo.[35]

South Korea's *Yonhap News Agency* reported on March 27 that the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that North Korean forces suffered 4,000 casualties from the 11,000 troops originally deployed to Russia and that North Korea sent at least 3,000 additional troops to Russia in January and February 2025.[36] *Yonhap News Agency* reported that North Korea is sending additional missiles, shells, and artillery systems to Russia, including a "considerable amount" of short-range ballistic missiles and roughly 220 170mm artillery systems and 240mm rocket launchers. South Korean news outlet *JoongAng* reported on February 27, citing multiple sources familiar with the matter, that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025.[37]



**The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a Russian battalion command post of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Viktorovka and Uspenovka (west of Sudzha).[38]** The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike killed the commander of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 1st Battalion and other unspecified battalion personnel.

**Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in Belgorod Oblast on March 27 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced within and west of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[39]


Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka) and that Ukrainian forces continue to operate near Grafovka (southwest of Demidovka) and Prilesye (south of Demidovka).[40]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck bridges in Grafovka and Annovka (southwest of Demidovka) to complicate Russian efforts to transfer reinforcements to the area.[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[42]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- |                                    |  |                              |
|------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| Russian Advances in Russia         | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine             | Russian Field Fortifications |
| Claimed Russian Advances in Russia | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |                              |
| Ukrainian Advances in Russia       | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              |                              |



## **Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 27 but did not advance.[43]**


A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Vovchansk direction and destroyed five Russian armored vehicles.[44] A Russian source claimed on March 27 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kharkiv direction.[45]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are using networks of underground basements, tunnels, sewer passages, and heating ducts which run two-to-three meters below ground to mass infantry before assaults and store ammunition.[46] The spokesperson added that Russian forces constantly assault Ukrainian positions in the Vovchansk direction.[47]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 27 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on March 26 and 27.[48]

**Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Borova direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 showing elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) striking Ukrainian positions indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[49]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on March 26 and 27.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Cherneshchyna (southeast of Borova).[51]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Nove (northeast of Lyman).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lyman near Myrne, north of Novolyubivka, and into Katerynivka.[53]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Myrne, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Olhivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Dronivka on March 26 and 27.[54]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[55]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 27 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 26 and 27.[56]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 27 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne and near Bila Hora on March 26 and 27.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]

**Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[59]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23, 26, and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk, in central Toretsk, and along Sormovska Street in southern Toretsk.[60]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil (both southwest of Toretsk).[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 26 and 27.[62]

A deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces continue to use small infantry groups to attack and bypass Toretsk.[63] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces prefer to attack during the day and strike Ukrainian logistic routes at night.

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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Geolocated footage posted on March 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced near the Toretzk Waste Heap.

Geolocated footage posted on March 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central and southern Toretsk.

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein  
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- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

## **Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[64]

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on March 24 and geolocated on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Lenina Street in southeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Pokrovsk in a forested area northwest of Uspenivka; along Stepova Street in eastern Novooleksandrivka; in the fields southeast of Bohdanivka; and up to 600 meters toward Kotlyarivka from Nadiivka.[66]


Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Bohdanivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[68]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 27 that Russian forces recently attacked with 40 motorcycles in the Novopavlivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk) and noted that the terrain has a large number of open areas where Russian forces can attack on motorcycles and buggies.[69] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are trying to gain a foothold in the Ukrainian rear and using motorcycles and light equipment to transport infantry and advance through small barriers and engineering formations while avoiding Ukrainian drones. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones; scaling up protection measures, including anti-drone nets, to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes; and increasingly using fishing boats to cross water features and other civilian vehicles to advance across open fields in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian drones are complicating Russian forces' logistics in the Pokrovsk direction despite Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 27 that Russian forces are leveraging foggy weather conditions in the area to advance, as Ukrainian forces cannot effectively operate drones in such conditions.[71]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.**


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to a windbreak southeast of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Andriivka and to the eastern outskirts of Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove).[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers toward Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Rozlyv and consolidated positions in the eastern part of the settlement.[74]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 26 and 27.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynopil and Oleksiivka.[76]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
|  Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours                      |  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine             |  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
|  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 |  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
|  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory                |  |   |

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced in Vesele and west of Burlatske (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Pryvilne to Vilne Pole (both west of Velyka Novosilka) and up to 500 meters near Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]

Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka itself; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, and Rivnopil on March 26 and 27.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[81]

**Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**


**Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced to central Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[82]


Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 26 and 27.[83]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction

## March 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 26 and 27 but did not advance.[84]



## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

See topline text.

## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.[85]

A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin plans to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine as the heads of several Russian regions in Fall 2025. A Russian insider source claimed on March 25 that the Russian Presidential Administration plans to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine as the governors of the Mari El and Udmurt republics and Vladimir and Ryazan oblasts.[86] Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the "Time of Heroes" initiative in Spring 2024.[87] This initiative aims to appoint Kremlin-selected Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine as regional and local government officials, in an effort to militarize Russian society and maintain a cadre of loyal regional officials.

## **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

## **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

## **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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