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and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

March 29, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on March 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified. Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported on March 26 that Ukraine and the United States agreed on a list of energy facilities that Russia must stop striking during an energy infrastructure ceasefire but that the US-Ukraine list is at odds with Russia's demands.[1] The Ministry stated that Russia’s list does not prohibit strikes on Ukrainian oil and gas facilities – although the Kremlin reported that the ceasefire protects Russian oil and gas facilities from strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 28 that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will present US officials with evidence of Russian ceasefire violations during Umerov's upcoming trip to the United States.[2] The exact terms of the energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, as an official trilateral statement or agreement has not been released.

Zelensky stated that Turkey, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States, France, Romania, and Bulgaria could act as potential ceasefire monitors, including a Black Sea moratorium, but stated that all sides “will” hold internal and international consultations regarding “readiness” to conduct monitoring.[3] US Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the United States and Ukraine have “obviously” achieved an energy infrastructure ceasefire and were “almost done” negotiating a maritime ceasefire.[4] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all appear to be under the impression that an energy infrastructure ceasefire is currently active despite the lack of a formal trilateral agreement or any apparent agreement on the exact terms of the ceasefire.[5]

The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief. *Bloomberg* reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding the European Union (EU) reconnect the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank), one of Russia's largest banks, to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to implementing a Black Sea truce with Ukraine and as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief.[6] Unspecified sources close to the Kremlin said Russia is gauging what it can secure from the Trump Administration regarding sanctions in the negotiation processes and is viewing initial success on a Russian reconnection to SWIFT as a precursor to achieving broader sanctions relief in the future. Russia appears to be exploiting the ceasefire negotiations process in an effort to extract

concessions from the West, possibly as a tactic to gain leverage for future negotiations and improve its economic situation after three years of diplomatic and economic isolation from the West. Russia, the United States, and Ukraine could implement a Black Sea truce without sanctions relief — as Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey did during the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022 and 2023.[7] European leaders advised European countries on March 27 to refrain from lifting any sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[8]

European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that European countries agreed at the "Coalition of the Willing" summit in Paris on March 27 to expand Ukraine's access to European intelligence, relevant technologies, and satellites and that several unspecified European countries agreed to grant Ukraine an unspecified degree of access to their ammunition stockpiles.[9] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also agreed with unspecified partners on air defense production licenses, investments in Ukraine's production of drones and missiles, and to continue to work toward artillery licensing. It remains unclear whether the agreed upon licenses stipulate domestic production in Ukraine or foreign production elsewhere in Europe. Zelensky stated that the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany will organize a Ramstein meeting in April 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron pledged on March 26 to provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package valued at 2 billion euros (roughly \$2.1 billion) that will include anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air defense missiles, armored vehicles, drones, and additional Mirage fighter jets.[10] Sweden instructed its armed forces on March 28 to allocate a total of 80 million Swedish Kronor (roughly \$7.5 million) to Ukraine's Demining and Drone coalitions.[11] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 27 that Denmark pledged an additional 300 million Danish Kroner (roughly \$43.5 million) to a Ukrainian innovation fund that will focus on, among other things, further developing electronic warfare (EW) and drone capabilities.[12]

Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations. The *Associated Press (AP)*, citing Ukrainian officials, reported on March 29 that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive operation in an unspecified sector of the frontline in the coming weeks in order to maximize pressure on Ukraine and increase Russia's leverage in ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[13] Two diplomats from the Group of Seven (G7) countries told *AP* that they agree with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent warnings that Russia is preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[14] Two Ukrainian commanders stated that Russian forces have recently intensified reconnaissance missions along the frontline and offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov told *AP* that Russian forces have "recovered" after conducting a temporary operational pause in the Pokrovsk direction in early March 2025. A Ukrainian servicemember stated that Ukrainian intelligence has observed indicators of a significant Russian force grouping near Selydove (south of Pokrovsk). A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Donetsk Oblast told *AP* that there are concerns that Russia may redeploy forces from the Kursk Oblast to other areas of the frontline, such as the Pokrovsk direction.

ISW has recently observed intensifications in Russian offensive operations in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Orikhiv directions and ongoing Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast aimed at pushing

Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[15] Russian forces have yet to make tactically significant advances in these directions as a result of the intensified activity, and ISW continues to observe localized Ukrainian counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions. Russian forces have at minimum advanced within three kilometers of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in two areas of the Pokrovsk direction, and the Kremlin will likely leverage future Russian advances into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to sow chaos and fear within the information space.[16] The Russian military command is unlikely to redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast if Russia intends to conduct a concerted offensive operation to seize or advance closer to Sumy City, and Russia likely does not have enough readily deployable operational-level reserves to conduct significant offensive operations against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia cities without redeploying forces already committed to other areas of the frontline.

It is unlikely that the Russian military is capable of conducting three significant offensive efforts against major Ukrainian cities even after conducting such redeployments, as Russia has suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting and has not demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations involving multiple simultaneous axes of advance since Winter 2022. The Kremlin has thus far appeared unable to generate enough new recruits via ongoing cryptomobilization efforts to significantly increase the Russian force grouping in Ukraine or Russia's strategic- and operational-level reserves available to enter combat in Ukraine — unless Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to conduct a deeply unpopular partial reserve call up in the near future, which currently appears unlikely.[17] ISW has not observed open-source reports of significant Russian redeployments to the Sumy, Kharkiv, or Zaporizhzhia directions — which would indicate preparation for a renewed offensive effort in these areas — as of this report and will continue to report on any notable Russian redeployments, though Russian forces may have conducted rotations not observed in open-source reporting. Russian forces may be attempting to advance within artillery range of these cities, however, ahead of a possible ground ceasefire in order to make civilian life in these settlements untenable or prepare for ground operations until a ceasefire is established. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin would likely use any gains into oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy to gain leverage in future peace negotiations and justify future Russian demands for Ukraine to cede additional territory to Russia, including territory that the Kremlin currently does not demand beyond Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[18]

Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 29 that Russian forces launched 172 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight on March 28 to 29.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones and that 69 decoy drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported on March 29 that Russian forces also launched ballistic missile strikes against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[20] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged a hotel-restaurant complex, houses, and buildings in Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians.[21] ISW continues to assess that Russia is targeting Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, contradicting US President Donald Trump's stated objective of using the temporary ceasefire to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.[22]

Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella. German outlet *BILD* reported on March 28 that Russia has intensified and adjusted its use of long-range strike drones, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept them.[23] *BILD* noted that more Russian drones have recently been successfully breaching the Ukrainian air defense umbrella and that Russian forces have altered their tactics and are now having drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones. Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on any changes in Russian strike tactics.[24]

Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on March 28 that Ukraine's MoD and General Staff initiated a large-scale reform of aviation management and established a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff with the aim of optimizing the development of Ukraine's air capabilities.[25] Zelensky appointed Oleksandr Kozenko as Deputy Defense Minister for Aviation tasked with heading the new effort.[26] Zelensky noted that Kozenko has been involved in integrating the F-16 and Mirage aircraft into the Ukrainian Air Force. Zelensky also appointed Major General Oleksiy Marchenko as Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Aviation, Brigadier General Serhiy Holubtsov as Deputy Commander of the Air Force, and Colonel Oleksandr Dyakiv as Commander of Aviation and Deputy Commander of the Air Force. Ukrainian officials have not elaborated on the structure of the new chain of command or how it may impact interaction between Ukrainian air and ground forces in joint operations.


Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.**
- **The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief.**
- **European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations.**
- **Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics.**

- **Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.**
- **Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.**
- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the launch of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian MoD claimed on March 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy facilities in Belgorod Oblast and the Sudzha gas metering station in Kursk Oblast on March in violation of the energy infrastructure ceasefire.[27] Russian sources claimed that the UK and France participated in the reported Ukrainian strike on the Sudzha gas metering station.[28] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on March 29 that Ukrainian forces shelled solar panels in occupied Kherson Oblast, which he claimed violates the ceasefire against energy infrastructure.[29]

See topline text for Ukrainian statements on Russian ceasefire violations.


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued assaults in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on March 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and advanced in Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[30] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Veselivka (north of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) seized the settlement.[31]

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues near Guyevo in Kursk Oblast and along the Volodymyrivka-Veselivka-Zhuravka-Basivka line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[33]




Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City along the international border).[34]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Popovka and Demidovka (east of Popovka).[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[36]



The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian border checkpoint along the international border near Sluchovsk, Bryansk Oblast, on March 27.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike killed 15 to 40 Russian personnel and destroyed military infrastructure and equipment that Russian forces were using to support drone strikes on civilian objects in Sumy Oblast.


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 28 and 29.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion and elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Udy (north of Kharkiv City).[39]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (east of Kupyansk).[40]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 28 and 29 that Russian forces seized Krasne Pershe (northwest of Kupyansk).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Russian forces advanced south of Zapadne, entered Mala Shapkivka, seized Kindrashivka, and advanced to Tyshchenkivka (all northeast of Kupyansk).[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 28 and 29.[43]


A Russian source claimed on March 29 that Russian forces consolidated positions near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; and southwest of Borova near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka on March 28 and 29.[45]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction published footage on March 28 showing Ukrainian drone operators repelling an at least reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault with 13 pieces of equipment north of Lozova (northeast of Borova) on the morning of March 27.[46] The Ukrainian brigade reported that they destroyed 12 armored vehicles and one tank.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 29 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna and east of Lyman near Torske on March 28 and 29.[47]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 29 that Russian forces are accumulating forces in the Lyman direction but have not attacked recently and are conducting costly reconnaissance missions with small groups.[48] The commander noted that Russian forces are suffering from equipment shortages in the Lyman direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and south of Siversk near Pereizne on March 28 and 29.[49]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Maiske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Pretechyne, Bila Hora, and Oleksandro-Shulytne on March 28 and 29.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian

targets near Predtechyne.[52] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Shevchenko Microraion.[53]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the western outskirts of Toretsk, west of Toretsk, and north of Druzhba (immediately northeast of Toretsk).[54]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on March 28 and 29.[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Panteleymonivka and artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Toretsk and Panteleymonivka.[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[57]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka and east of Bohdanivka during an assault with armored vehicle support and seized Preobrazhenka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) participated in the advance near Kotlyarivka.[59] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the Russian assault stated that it destroyed five Russian vehicles.[60]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, Upsenivka, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, Shevchenko, and Troitske on March 28 and 29.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[62]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently intensified attacks in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to use first-person view (FPV) drones to isolate the battlefield and complicate Russian logistics in the area.[63] ISW observed a temporary pause in Russian offensive operations and advances in the Pokrovsk direction in late January, February, and early March 2025 as Ukrainian forces intensified counterattacks and drone operations in the area.[64] Russian forces have again intensified attacks in the area over the last three weeks (since early March 2025) and appear to be attempting to advance northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and southwest of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border area. Russian forces do not appear to be focused on attacking immediately around or into Pokrovsk, however, and Ukrainian forces continue to conduct localized counterattacks immediately south of the town.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[65] Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment and drone operators of the “Vizantiya” detachment reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 29 that Russian forces advanced near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and at least one milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the settlement but did not seize it.[67]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove toward Rozlyv on March 28 and 29.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Skudne, and Dniproenerhiya; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Novopil on March 28 and 29.[69]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 29.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA), and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 29 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on March 29 that Russian forces seized Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Robotyne toward Shcherbaky and southwest of and within Lobkove.[73]

Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 28 and 29.[74] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[75]

Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on March 29 that Russian forces recently increased their use of armored vehicles in assaults in the "southern direction" — likely in reference to western Zaporizhia Oblast.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Shcherbaky.[77] Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kamyanske direction.[78]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 28 and 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the direction of Prydniprov'ske and Sadove (both east of Kherson City in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast) on March 28 and 29.[79]

The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on March 29 that Russian forces are transferring air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems from occupied Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast to compensate for equipment losses in the area.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[81]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction
March 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD announced the launch of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.[82] Russian Pacific Fleet Detachment Commander Captain First Rank Alexei Antsiferov stated that the drills will test joint Russian-Indian readiness and problem-solving at sea and will begin on March 31.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian sources claimed on March 29 that Russia's Unmanned Competence Center has designed and fielded at least 30 new hand-launched "Klyuch-Fortuna" fixed-wing strike drones in Ukraine.[83] The drone reportedly costs 100,000 rubles (\$1,177) to manufacture, has a range of 50 kilometers, and can carry a payload up to 1.7 kilograms. The Unmanned Competence Center is reportedly working to increase the drone's payload to 3 kilograms.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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