



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, and George Barros

March 31, 2025, 6:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:50am ET on March 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West. Trump responded to a question on March 30 about whether there is a deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a ceasefire for land warfare and stated that "it's a psychological deadline."^[1] Trump added that "if I think [Russia] is tapping [the United States] along, I will not be happy about it."^[2] Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on March 30 that he proposed April 20 as a potential deadline for a "full ceasefire without any conditions" during his meeting with Trump on March 29.^[3] Russia is unlikely to agree to a "full ceasefire without any conditions" within three weeks given that Russia has demanded that the West provide some sanctions relief as a precondition for a temporary Black Sea ceasefire. The Kremlin stated on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade, and *Bloomberg* reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding that the European Union (EU) reconnect the Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to implementing a Black Sea ceasefire as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief.^[4] The United States and Ukraine proposed on March 11 temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and in the Black Sea, and Ukrainian and US officials have continued to negotiate the terms of these ceasefires in the three weeks since March 11 — indicating the ceasefires' terms are not yet fully codified.^[5] It is also unlikely that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia could negotiate the terms of a general ceasefire within the next three weeks.

Russian officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russian rare earth mining projects. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 31 that US companies are interested in joint rare earth metals mining projects with Russia and that these projects are the first step to improving bilateral relations, although the United States and Russia have not yet signed any documents concerning rare earth metals.^[6] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev told Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestia* on March 31 that Russian and US officials have started discussions about joint rare earth mineral projects.^[7] Dmitriev also told the *BBC's Russian Service* on March 30 that US-Russian economic

cooperation should be a primary focus if the United States wants to end the war in Ukraine but that such cooperation would only begin after the conclusion of peace negotiations.[8] The Kremlin is attempting to undermine the Trump administration's objectives of linking US and Ukrainian economic interests through the US-Ukraine mineral deal by presenting Russia as a rare earth commodities trader superior to Ukraine. The Trump administration seeks to use the US-Ukrainian deal to establish concrete US economic interests in Ukraine as part of US efforts to transition Ukraine from solely a military aid recipient to also an economic partner.[9] The kind of economic cooperation that Russia seeks with the United States would not deter Russia from invading Ukraine again in the future and will fail to advance the Trump administration's objectives of economically linking the US and Ukraine. Such cooperation would also accelerate Russian military reconstitution faster than it would otherwise. Russia's access to minerals in occupied Ukraine will likely augment the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) ability to access Ukraine's minerals. Russia has notably partnered with the PRC to extract Russian rare earth commodities since at least 2005.[10] Russian companies are also involved in current and potential deposit exploration projects in various African countries.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia is using economic incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[12] These concessions would give away leverage that is crucial to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving an enduring and mutually beneficial peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between the United States and Europe.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused "almost the entire European West" of attempting to prolong the war in Ukraine and contributing to the "rehabilitation of Nazism," and continued to falsely portray the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazis during an interview on March 30.[13] Lavrov claimed that Europeans "unleashed" "all the tragedies of humanity before 1939, including World War II" and that elites currently in power in most European Union (EU) and NATO countries retain the "instincts" to bring about these tragedies. Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Department, Kirill Logvinov, reiterated to Kremlin newswire *TASS* on March 31 that Russia continues to view a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as unacceptable and criticized ongoing UK and French efforts to create such a contingent.[14] Logvinov similarly blamed European countries, specifically European elites, of causing the war in Ukraine and seeking to extend the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly criticized European countries for alleged "Russophobia" about the war and threatened Europe with Russian missiles.[15] Medvedev routinely makes extreme statements aimed at persuading Western states to act according to Russia's interests.[16] These statements are part of the Kremlin's broader efforts to falsely portray European countries as seeking to prolong the war in contrast to ongoing US efforts to secure interim ceasefires and eventually a full peace in Ukraine. This rhetoric is aimed at undermining Western unity in supporting Ukraine.[17]

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine. The Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly \$541 million) for Ukraine's Drone Line project that aims to integrate drone and ground operations in the Ukrainian military.[18] The Dutch MoD stated that this package is part of the Netherlands' two billion euros (roughly \$2 billion) accelerated support package in 2025. Sweden announced on March 31 its largest military aid package to Ukraine to date, worth roughly 16 billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$1.6 billion) to strengthen Ukraine's air defense, artillery, satellite


communications, and naval capabilities.[19] The package includes 9.2 billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$920 million) for the supply of materiel from the defense industrial bases (DIBs) of Sweden, other Nordic states, and European states; over five billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$500 million) in financial donations to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; and roughly 500 million Swedish kronor (roughly \$50 million) worth of materiel donated from the Swedish military.

Key Takeaways:

- **US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West.**
- **Russian officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russian rare earth mining projects.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between the United States and Europe.**
- **Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka.**
- **Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on March 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a facility of the Bryanskenergo electric and thermal power generation company in Bryansk Oblast and its nearby transformer substation on March 30.[20]


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border amid continued Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Veselivka, Sumy Oblast (north of Sumy City).[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on March 31, which ISW geolocated, indicating that elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced in central Gogolevka, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[22]

Russian forces attacked along northeast of Sumy City near Novenke and Zhuravka; southwest of Sudzha near Oleshnya; and south of Sudzha near Guyevo on March 31.[23]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued assaults in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 31 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 that fighting continues near Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[25] Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reported operating in Belgorod Oblast.[26] Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies expert Viktor Kevlyuk stated on March 31 that the Russian military command transferred elements of the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), and 88th and 85th

motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) to Belgorod Oblast from the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, and Siversk directions.[27] Kevlyuk added that Russian authorities also transferred Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards from Primorsky Krai to Belgorod Oblast.




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 30 and 31.[28]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway and in fields northeast of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[29]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and made additional gains northeast of Kindrashivka.[30]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, north of Kupyansk toward Radkivka, east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 30 and 31.[31]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating north of Kupyansk.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Bohuslavka and east of Borova near Nadiya on March 30 and 31.[33]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kolisnynivka (northeast of Borova) and Zahryzove; that elements of the 4th Tank Division and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA) are operating along the Lozova-Pershotravneve line (east of Borova); and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating near Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[34]

Russian armed forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman).[35]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Nove, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on March 30 and 31.[36]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults in the area and that Russian forces are rarely using armored fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers as compared to 2024.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on March 31 that Russian forces intensified infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and have significantly more infantry in the area, mostly including well-trained contract servicemembers (*kontraktniki*).[38]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, MMD) are operating along the Ivanivka-Nove-Zelena Dolnya line (northeast of Lyman) and that elements of the 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 19th Tank Regiment (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[40]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 30 and 31.[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly fighting southwest of Bilohorivka.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechnye and Bila Hora on March 30 and 31.[43] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian mechanized counterattack near Chasiv Yar on March 31.[44] A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault with at least three vehicles east of Stupochky on March 29.[45]

A soldier in a Ukrainian anti-aircraft artillery platoon operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 31 that Russian fiber-optic drones are the largest issue for Ukrainian forces both in the Chasiv Yar direction and elsewhere along the frontline.[46] The soldier stated that Russian drones employ fiber-optic cables upon encountering Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) to hit their targets. Drones piloted via fiber-optic cables are resistant to EW interference. The soldier stated that Ukrainian forces can only protect themselves from Russian fiber-optic drones by employing anti-drone nets along ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[47]

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[48]

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces recently seized Panteleymonivka.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and east of Toretsk near Krymske on March 30 and 31.[50]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly fighting southwest of Toretsk on the Novoselivka-Oleksandropil and Niu York-Panteleymonivka lines.[51] Drone elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Panteleymonivka.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 31 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Bohdanivka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Oleksandropil, east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Promin, and Kalynove and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Serhiivka, Shevchenko, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Upsenivka, Udachne, Sribne,

Kotlyarivka, Troitske and Bohdanivka on March 30 and 31.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Upsenivka and Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]

Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka and Sribne-Troitske directions (southwest of Pokrovsk).[56]




Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced farther into eastern and western Rozlyv.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly one-half to two-thirds of the settlement.[59] ISW has only observed confirmation that Russian forces occupy roughly four percent of Rozlyv.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 30 and 31.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces occasionally unsuccessfully counterattack on the Andriivka-Kostyantynopil line.[61]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, MD) are operating near Rozlyv.[62]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[63]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Burlatske, and Dniproenerhiya; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 30 and 31.[64]

The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 31 that Russian forces conducted 39 more assaults from March 24 to 30 than from March 16 to 23 and that Russian forces are attempting to leverage rainy weather conditions to advance, likely because rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of drones.[65]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are operating north of Velyka Novosilka along the Mokri Yaly River.[66] Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Division (29th CAA, EMD) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 31.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 31 that Russian forces are accumulating forces and means for limited and small attacks in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.[68] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces aim to take control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. Voloshyn stated on March 31 that Russian forces conducted 530, including first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, on March 30 — a significant increase from the running daily average of 450 to 470 strikes per day.


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Stepove on March 30 and 31.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove.[70]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems do not always function properly in the Zaporizhia direction.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 417th Reconnaissance Battalion, 1455th and 71st motorized rifle regiments, (all of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka.[72]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Sadove (east of Kherson City) on March 30 and 31.[73]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction March 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 131 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over northern, eastern, and central Ukraine and 45 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that strikes affected Sumy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[75]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks. Ukrainian research outlets *Resurgam* and *Viskovyi Vishchun* published an analysis of satellite imagery on March 28 and concluded that Russia has 3,463 tanks at its main open air storage bases and 1,253 tanks at armored vehicle plants and that restoration rates have dropped from 120 tanks per month in 2022 to 30 to 35 tanks per month in early 2025.[76] The analysis estimated that Russia has an additional 2,000 tanks in closed (not open-air) storage warehouses. The analysis determined that Russia could restore roughly 1,200 of these tanks more quickly than newly producing them and that Russia would likely source spare parts from the remaining tanks for existing tanks. The analysis concluded that Russia has likely pulled all tanks most suitable for restoration from its existing stores and will have exhausted its stocks of tanks in "satisfactory condition" for restoration by the second half of 2025. The analysis stated that Russia will likely only be able to compensate for a maximum of 30 percent of its total tank losses since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 at its current loss rates and will likely field fewer armored vehicles due to shortages. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) in 2024 and that Russia could theoretically sustain these losses until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing Soviet-era tanks, though it is unclear if Russia could sustain these loss rates with a significantly slowed refurbishment rate.[77] Russia may not be willing to sustain these increased armored vehicle loss rates and has been conducting fewer mechanized assaults thus far in 2025.[78]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 31 authorizing Russia's regularly planned semi-annual military conscription, which will conscript 160,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.[79] The decree states that men aged 18 to 30 are subject to a 10-month conscription and that conscripts will not serve in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, or Kherson oblasts and will not conduct "special military operation tasks." The decree exempts men in 54 raions of Russia's far north due to inclement weather. Russia continues gradually increasing the number of men conscripted in its spring conscription cycles. Putin previously signed decrees conscripting 134,500 Russians in Spring 2022, 147,000 in Spring 2023, and 150,000 in Spring 2024.[80] Russia conscripted 133,000 Russians in the Fall 2024 conscription cycle.[81]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bq69K-uKYM> ;
<https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5222868-trump-theres-a-psychological-deadline-for-putin-to-agree-to-ceasefire/>

[2] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bq69K-uKYM> ;
<https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5222868-trump-theres-a-psychological-deadline-for-putin-to-agree-to-ceasefire/>

[3] <https://www.reuters.com/world/finlands-stubb-says-he-told-trump-deadline-needed-ukraine-ceasefire-2025-03-30/>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925>

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/308665 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308666

[7] <https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1906386194545434989> <https://iz dot ru/1862486/2025-03-31/dmitriev-rasskazal-o-diskussiah-s-ssa-po-redkozemelnym-metallam>; <https://iz dot ru/1862462/kirill-fenin-alena-nefedova/dobycnye-dela-rf-i-ssa-nacali-peregovory-po-redkozemelnym-metallam> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67991 ; <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/31/kirill-dmitriev-zayavil-cto-rossiya-i-ssha-nacali-diskussii-o-proektah-po-redkozemelnym-metallam> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/77876>

[8] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xsNGsyeILLU>

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425>; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/03/remarks-by-president-trump-on-investment-announcement/>;
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/02/press-gaggle-by-president-trump-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-joint-base-andrews/>

[10] <https://weldex.ru/ru/media/news/2024/may/29/rossiya-kitaj-sotrudnichestvo/>;
https://rosnedra.gov.ru/press/news/rossiya_i_kitay_planiruyut_sovmestnuyu_rabotu_po_geologicheskomu_issledovaniyu_mirovogo_okeana/;
<https://dvp-audit.com/blog/sovместныe-predpriyatiya-rossii-i-kitaya/>;
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6594013>;
<https://trends.rbc.ru/trends/industry/665439809a7947f47f2527e2>;
http://ru.china-embassy.govcn/rus/zewlzxdt/202202/t20220203_10638562.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20210619154105/https://economy.gov.ru/material/departments/d16/mezhpravitelstvennaya_rossiysko_kitayskaya_komissiya_po_investic ionnomu_sotrudnichestvu/

[11] <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/990933>

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525>

[13] https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2006186/ ; <https://archive.ph/h8xbP> ;
https://t.me/MID_Russia/54667

[14] <https://tass.ru/interviews/23549763>

[15] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/574 ; <https://tass.ru/politika/23554145> ;
https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/61

[16] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323>

[17] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725>

[18] <https://x.com/DefensieMin/status/1906413647326269823>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025>;
<https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/03/31/nederland-financiert-drone-project-van-500-miljoen-voor-oukrajine>

[19] <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2025/03/biggest-support-package-to-ukraine-so-far-increases-swedish-support-to-sek-29.5-billion-for-2025>

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/50746

[21] <https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1906428776319529059>;
<https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1906272655071736223>;
<https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1906268319335805218>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22126>

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/50752

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/308620 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22217 ; <https://suspilne.media/sumy/983233-rosijska-armia-namagaetsa-zalucati-mali-sturmovi-grupi-po-napramku-novenkogo-ta-zuravki-na-sumsini-recnik-dpsu/>

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/67985 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/25647> ;
https://t.me/rusich_army/22220

- [25] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89099>
- [26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159767
- [27] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/03/31/slona-slid-yisty-chastynamy-shho-zavadylo-rosiyanam-pid-chas-nastupu-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny/
- [28] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEigXfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8773; <https://t.me/answertime1/112>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159821
- [30] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31192 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159821
- [31] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEigXfwG5SnQd2yEdl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [32] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2658>
- [33] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEigXfwG5SnQd2yEdl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [34] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2658> ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659>
- [35] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659>
- [36] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEigXfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [37] https://suspilne_dot_media/donbas/983367-armia-rf-na-limanskomu-napramku-zastosovue-taktiku-malenkogo-postijnogo-tisku-60-ombr/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8
- [38] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7163
- [39] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659>
- [40] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26244>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34015>

- [41] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2252>; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985
- [42] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34015>
- [43] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [44] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89135>
- [45] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26868; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/158
- [46] <https://suspilne dot media/983741-droni-na-optovolokni-najbilsa-bida-zaraz-artileristka-runa/>
- [47] https://t.me/mod_russia/50747; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89141>;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20961; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159764
- [48] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906458876985147573>;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906458619303850036>;
https://www.instagram.com/stories/nikolay_burmant/3599723563855553201/
- [49] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2660>
- [50] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>
- [51] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2660>
- [52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159774
- [53] <https://t.me/rybar/69271> ; <https://t.me/rybar/69270>
- [54] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89091> ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/67985 ; <https://t.me/rybar/69271>
- [55] <https://t.me/rybar/69271>
- [56] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661>
- [57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8776 ; <https://t.me/hunterfpv/69>
- [58] <https://t.me/rybar/69270> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63228> ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/67985

[59] <https://t.me/rybar/69270> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63228>

[60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; <https://t.me/rybar/69270> ; ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/25647> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63230>

[61] <https://t.me/rybar/69270>

[62] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661>

[63] https://t.me/Petliura_NOVA/121 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8774

[64]
[https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02oraGp3f8d8f23sRVvR2jeHEfIbnI6xSDe8q8jcdvRUZY6UbFJqrM8wqS6SDec6tVl?__cft__\[o\]=AZVuOvJVYuH4vN_dayGhVL2iTfomLXNWQ87r83N6eiTBtCcAo-b36TGwi2ipu-2Kuv2d9fzh6bJa9GQNkyQPQ5Fi-M25HQEbtV8zlbQ-31BpR-T8pFyG970E_qJXdOn42wkNFdszh2nTXx4yaSRUfHUwYoSRYufVUz3yOIwCSPOcj13bDLafJWhqvfNwpSCI58I&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02oraGp3f8d8f23sRVvR2jeHEfIbnI6xSDe8q8jcdvRUZY6UbFJqrM8wqS6SDec6tVl?__cft__[o]=AZVuOvJVYuH4vN_dayGhVL2iTfomLXNWQ87r83N6eiTBtCcAo-b36TGwi2ipu-2Kuv2d9fzh6bJa9GQNkyQPQ5Fi-M25HQEbtV8zlbQ-31BpR-T8pFyG970E_qJXdOn42wkNFdszh2nTXx4yaSRUfHUwYoSRYufVUz3yOIwCSPOcj13bDLafJWhqvfNwpSCI58I&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R) ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14169 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63230>

[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7180

[66] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661>

[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/14154

[68] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/03/31/cze-ne-nastup-a-taktychni-diyi-na-pivdni-vorog-nakopychuye-syly-lyshe-dlya-nevelykyh-shturmiv/>

[69]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/25647>

[70] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26267>

[71] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12787

[72] <https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2533> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67975 ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26248>

[73]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVh>

MBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523>

[74] <https://t.me/kpszsus/31711>

[75] <https://t.me/kpszsus/31711> ; <https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/983129-vnoci-u-harkovi-prolunalo-sist-vibuhiv-rosia-sahedami-atakuvala-misto-vinikla-pozeza/>

[76] https://www.vishchun.com/post/tanky_bazy_ta_zavody_moskovii_stanom_na_pochatok_2025 dot

[77] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025>

[78] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage;>
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025>

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/50756 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50758 ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/50759 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50762 ; <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503310001> ; <https://tass.ru/politika/23557497> ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/308701 ; <https://meduza.io/news/2025/03/31/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-vesennem-prizyve-v-armiyu-zaberut-160-tysyach-rossiyan>;

[80] <https://tass.ru/politika/23557497>

[81] https://t.me/mod_russia/50761