

**Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward,
Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter**

March 4, 2025, 9:20pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the *Wall Street Journal* on March 3 that the United States is "pausing and reviewing" military aid to Ukraine until Trump "determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace negotiations with Russia."^[1] The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.

The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.^[2] Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine's warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid to affect the frontline.^[3] Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously anticipated timelines.^[4] A Ukrainian official told *CNN* on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles could run out "in a matter of weeks."^[5] Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine's rear areas. The

shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles.[6] As Ukraine runs short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.

The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time. Two anonymous US officials told *ABC News* on March 3 that about 90 percent of the weapons that the United States committed to Ukraine through past Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages has already arrived in Ukraine, including munitions and anti-armor systems.[7] *ABC News* reported that the remaining 10 percent of PDA equipment is still slated to arrive in Ukraine by August 2025 and that private weapons contracts between Ukraine and US companies - many of which Ukraine has already paid for — will likely facilitate at least a small flow of arms deliveries to Ukraine "for at least the next several years." [8] The United States reportedly supplies about 30 percent of Ukraine's arsenal with Ukraine's European partners supplying another 30 percent and Ukraine itself supplying domestically supplies about 40 percent from domestic production according to the editor-in-chief of Ukrainian defense-focused outlet *Defense Express*, Oleh Katkov.[9] Ukraine will continue to fight with the materiel it currently has, with the materiel European partners have given and will continue to provide, and with the materiel Ukraine itself produces. The Trump administration's aid pause will detrimentally impact Ukraine's ability to defend itself and pursue offensive operations at its current rate, but it will not collapse the front entirely in the coming months.

Russian forces will likely exploit expected Ukrainian materiel shortages if the suspension of US military assistance persists, as Russian forces did during the previous suspension of US military assistance in early 2024. Russian forces significantly increased their tempo of operations in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in early 2024 in order to take advantage of Ukrainian supply shortages.[10] Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces had a roughly 20 to one artillery shell advantage and "overwhelming air superiority" over Ukrainian forces in this direction during the peak of the Ukrainian supply shortage in May and June 2024 and that these were the main factors enabling Russian forces' creeping and costly advances northwest and west of Avdiivka at the time.[11] Russian forces also began offensive operations in May 2024 along the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast international border as part of efforts to seize Kharkiv City, likely as part of attempts to take advantage of delays in US aid disbursement and to advance before US military assistance reached Ukrainian forces on the frontline once US aid resumed.[12] Russian forces are currently conducting active offensive operations in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts, have recently intensified efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and continue attempts to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[13] Russian forces will likely attempt to take advantage of the pause in US aid in order to make further gains in eastern and southern Ukraine in order to justify their territorial claims to the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.

The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine. European

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on March 4 the five-part ReArm Europe Plan that aims to help EU member states "quickly and significantly increase expenditures in defense capabilities." [14] Von der Leyen stated that the EU is ready to significantly increase its defense spending in order to both "respond to the short-term urgency to act and to support Ukraine" and "to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for...European security." The first part of the ReArm Europe Plan calls for the EU to activate the "national escape clause" of the Stability and Growth Pact in order to allow EU member states to increase their defense spending without triggering the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The Stability and Growth Pact limits the budget deficits of EU members, and the activation of the "national escape clause" would allow EU states to maintain larger budget deficits than usual in order to increase their defense spending. [15] Von der Leyen stated that should EU member states increase their defense spending by 1.5 percent of their GDPs on average, this would make close to 650 billion euros (about \$687 billion) available over four years. The second part of the plan would provide 150 billion euros (about \$159 billion) of loans to EU member states for defense investments, including in air and missile defense, artillery systems, missiles, drones, and anti-drone systems. Von der Leyen stated that EU member states will have to "pool demand and buy together" and that EU states can "massively step up their support to Ukraine" with this equipment. The third part of the plan calls for the use of "the power of the EU budget" to direct additional funds to defense related investments. Von der Leyen stated that the last two parts of the proposed plan aim to mobilize private capital by accelerating the Savings and Investment Union and through the European Investment Bank. Von der Leyen concluded that the ReArm Europe plan could "mobilize" close to 800 billion euros (about \$849 billion).

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that he spoke with Finnish President Alexander Stubb, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and German Christian Democratic Union party leader Friedrich Merz about support for Ukraine. [16] Zelensky highlighted that the European Commission's defense funding will support additional air defense systems and missiles for Ukraine and create a "solid additional foundation" for Ukrainian efforts to end the war. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), citing European officials, reported on February 25 that EU countries, the UK, and Norway provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately \$25 billion in 2024 and that this was more than the United States sent to Ukraine in 2024. [17]

Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on March 4 that Ukraine currently domestically produces about 33 percent of the weapons Ukraine uses on the battlefield and currently produces \$35 billion worth of weapons and ammunition annually — exceeding the production capabilities of many of Ukraine's partners. [18] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine should be able to meet at least 50 percent of its total military needs by the end of 2025, with Ukraine meeting all of its artillery system needs and much of its 80mm and 120mm mortar shell and 105mm, 122mm, and 155mm artillery shell requirements. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine has significantly increased its defense production since 2023 - tripling its artillery production, increasing its ammunition production by a factor of 2.5, doubling its production of anti-tank weapons, and increasing its production of armored personnel carriers fivefold. Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine

currently domestically produces nearly all of the air-, sea-, and ground-based drones that Ukrainian forces use in combat operations. Shmyhal previously stated that Ukraine increased its drone production tenfold in 2024 and invested an additional 7.9 billion hryvnia (about \$189 million) to boost drone production in 2025.[19] Shmyhal stated that Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom has grown to become one of the 50 most productive defense companies in the world.[20] Shmyhal credited European investments in the Ukrainian defense industry for much of Ukraine's defense industrial growth, especially the Danish initiative for joint defense production initiatives.[21] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine attracted nearly \$1 billion in European defense investments in 2024, including \$351 million from Denmark, \$436 million from the EU, \$67 million from the UK, and \$45 million from Norway. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine has created a number of joint defense enterprises with European states, especially with the UK and Germany. Shmyhal stated that at least three international defense companies have provided licenses for Ukraine to start producing NATO- and EU-standard weapons within Ukraine. Ukraine has dramatically built out its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2023 but still requires investments and time to reach full self-sufficiency.[22] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's prospects for sustaining its military needs in the future with limited foreign assistance are excellent.[23] Ukraine's DIB expansion continues to rely on monetary investment from partner states, and continued military assistance from partners gives Ukraine the time to continue to develop its DIB towards self-sufficiency.

The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine. Verkhovna Rada leadership and parliamentary factions and groups issued a joint statement welcoming Trump's efforts to begin peace negotiations and reiterating the need to develop a strategic partnership with the United States through the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[24] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table "as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer." [25] Zelensky added that he and his administration are ready to "work under President Trump's strong leadership" to achieve a lasting peace and proposed a partial ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia to advance a possible peace settlement. Zelensky offered for Ukraine and Russia to release prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in the Black Sea. Zelensky thanked the United States for its support of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, expressed regret over the meeting with Trump at the White House on February 28 that "did not go the way it was supposed to," and reiterated Ukraine's readiness to sign the mineral deal. **Russian President Vladimir Putin notably has not made any ceasefire offers since Trump assumed office on January 20. Kremlin officials instead formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than Ukraine's and the West's complete capitulation in late February 2025.**[26]

The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses. Russian forces have been conducting highly attritional, infantry-led assaults along the frontline that result in high losses but only return disproportionately limited territorial gains.[27] Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia is unable to secure a rapid victory in the war and so Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual victory.[28] Putin claimed at the time that Russian forces are trying to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those

territories that should be under Russian control." Putin is committed to gradual, creeping gains at the expense of high losses and likely believes that these limited gains can set conditions over time for Russia to demand more Ukrainian territory during future peace negotiations or allow him to conquer Ukraine entirely. Putin's desire to continue this deadly approach is driving the high loss rates on the battlefield. Russia is also conducting nightly drone and missile strikes against rear Ukrainian areas that are killing civilians and destroying and damaging Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure – further increasing the death toll in the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the US military aid pause in a statement to Kremlin propagandist Pavel Zarubin on March 4, noting that Russia can hope "without indulging in excessive optimism" that the military aid suspension will "incline" the Ukrainian government towards "peace."^[29] Peskov deliberately misrepresented the Kremlin's desired outcome of the war – a full Ukrainian surrender brought on by the end of Western military aid to Ukraine – as a "peaceful" outcome. Peskov also remarked that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data, such as satellite reconnaissance data - likely in an attempt to set informational conditions for the Kremlin to demand that the United States stop providing intelligence support to Ukraine as a precondition for a future "peaceful settlement." Peskov additionally demanded that the United States remove sanctions on Russia as a precondition for improving US-Russia bilateral relations.^[30] Russian officials and propagandists also continued to falsely frame increased European support for Ukraine as an obstacle to a peaceful resolution to the war.^[31] On March 3, Peskov framed European support for Ukraine as the emergence of a European "pro-war party," and the Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to demand that the United States cease arms sales to Europe that support Ukraine's defense.^[32] The Kremlin's rhetoric aims to confuse and mislead US policymakers into committing the United States and Ukraine to make additional preemptive concessions under the guise of setting preconditions for "peace," while the Kremlin continues to avoid making any concessions of its own.

Key Takeaways:


- **US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel.**
- **The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS – many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.**
- **The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.**
- **The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-**

term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.

- **Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term.**
- **The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.**
- **The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses.**
- **The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.**
- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July 2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of Russian mobilized troops for over two years.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on March 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nikolskiy and Novaya Sorochina (both northwest of Sudzha) and advanced near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and Lebedevka; north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka; and south of Sudzha near Guyevo.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malaya Loknya and Kurilovka (north of Sudzha).[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 4 that elements of the Ukrainian Air Force destroyed a military facility of the Russian 28th Rifle Battalion of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) near Troitskoye (south of Korenevo) on March 3.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces used this facility to plan and conduct attacks and launch first-person view (FPV) strikes against Ukrainian positions and that the strike killed up to 30 Russian servicemembers.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[37] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya.[38] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Sudzhansky Raion.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted offensive operations near the international border in Sumy Oblast on March 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Zhuravka and Novenke.[40] Another Russian milblogger said that Russian claims of the seizure of Zhuravka are false.[41]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Zhuravka.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka.[43]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Rostov and Samara oblasts on the night of March 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 4 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil pumping infrastructure in Rostov Oblast, causing an explosion and fire.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on March 4 that there were explosions near the main gas pipeline operation facility in Sokhranovka, Rostov Oblast. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage posted by a local Telegram channel on March 3 claiming that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery, Rostov Oblast.[45] The local Telegram channel also published geolocated footage on March 3 of an explosion and fire at an industrial facility in Sokhranovka, Rostov Oblast.[46] Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones near Novoshakhtinsk and that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial facility in Sokhranovka, resulting in a fire at an oil pipeline.[47]

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on March 4 that Ukrainian forces struck production facilities at the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing a fire.[48] Kovalenko stated that the Syzran Oil Refinery stopped operations in February 2025 after previous Ukrainian strikes on the facility.[49] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against an unspecified industrial enterprise in Syzran and that Russian air defense systems shot down all the drones.[50] A Russian insider source published footage purportedly showing a fire at the Syzran Oil Refinery.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 4 that Russian forces seized two housing blocks within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and towards Bochkove on March 3 and 4.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction
March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on March 3 and 4.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 4 indicating that Russian forces advanced east of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in an unspecified area along the Oskil River.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[58]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Bohuslvaka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on March 3 and 4.[59]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 4 that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 1st Tank Regiment (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) have advanced roughly 1.5 kilometers east and west of Zahryzove.[60]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Nove (northeast of Lyman).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, Ivanivka, and Yampolivka and towards Nove and Novomykhailivka and east of Lyman near Dibrova on March 3 and 4.[62]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 4 that Russian forces have shifted their efforts towards Nove, Yampolivka, and Novomykhailivka in order to seize the heights closes to the frontline.[63] The commander noted that Russian tactics in the Lyman direction remain unchanged as Russian forces continue to use small assault groups consisting of one to three personnel and very rarely use armored vehicles.


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on March 3 and 4.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 4 that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar.[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on March 3 and 4.[67] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 4 that Russian forces used motorized vehicles to transport personnel to the frontlines near Stupochky.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on March 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske; and northeast of Toretsk near Dachne on March 3 and 4.[70] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 4 that Russian forces used motorized vehicles to transport personnel to the frontlines near Toretsk.[71]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command introduced at least two battalions of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and up to two tank companies of the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) into combat near Toretsk.[72] Mashovets stated that one battalion and an

unspecified number of reconnaissance and assault companies of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are also operating near Toretsk



Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the Donetska Railroad in southeastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 4 indicating that Russian forces advanced east of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Berezivka, Malynivka, and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin;

southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Kotlyne, and Udachne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 3 and 4.[75]


Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating along the Vozdvyzhenka-Tarasivka line (east of Pokrovsk) and that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) to the area from the Kurakhove direction.[76] Drone operators of the "Vizantiya" detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) seized Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[78] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized part of Oleksiivka (west of Andriivka) over two weeks ago (about mid-February 2025).[79]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka on March 3 and 4.[80]



The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a control point of the Russian 98th VDV Division in occupied Manzhykiv Kut (southeast of Donetsk City in the Russian rear) on March 3.[81] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that this strike disrupted elements of the 98th VDV Division's command-and-control (C2).


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka in southern Pryvilne, northwest of Pryvilne, and towards Vilne Pole.[82]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Dniproenerhiya, Burlatske, Skudne, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne on March 3 and 4.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Burlatske, Pryvilne, and Dniproenerhiya.[84]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attempting to advance in the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole area (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and support 36th CAA (EMD) efforts to advance towards Komar and Odradne (both north of Velyka Novosilka).[85]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction March 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 4 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields south of Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Nesteryanka, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 3 and 4.[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, and drone operators of the “Shaman” detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle


Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[88]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction in Kherson Oblast on March 4 but did not advance.[89]

Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on March 4 to *The Guardian* that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Dnipro River and establish footholds on the west (right) bank in four locations: the marshy islands at the mouth of the Dnipro River; east of Kherson City near the Antonivka road and rail bridges; and northeast of Kherson City near Llove and Zmiivka.[90] Prokudin noted that Russian forces are incurring high casualties during these cross-river raids and that the islands at the mouth of the Dnipro River are contested "gray zones."

Order of battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kherson Oblast, and elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment reportedly struck Ukrainian targets in Monastyrsk (northwest of Nova Kakhovka).[91]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces shot down 65 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa

oblasts and that 32 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa, Sumy, and Donetsk oblasts, including a children's hospital in Sumy City.[93]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Directorate of Personnel is reportedly developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July 2025.[94] This plan does not indicate that the Kremlin seeks to end its war in Ukraine but is instead part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of Russian mobilized troops for over two years.[95] A Russian insider source, who has previously published accurate information about Russian military command changes, stated that Russian officials are developing a plan to begin partial demobilization in late Spring and early Summer 2025 after the graduation of new cadets from military academies and the officer contract renewal period.[96] The insider source claimed that the Russian Main Directorate of Personnel plans to demobilize personnel who were mobilized during the involuntary partial reserve call-up in September 2022 and who did not sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD. The insider source estimated that there are roughly 78,000 Russian mobilized servicemembers who refused to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. ISW observed several reports in early 2025 that indicated that the Russian MoD was coercing Russian mobilized personnel into signing military service contracts in order to retain mobilized personnel on the frontlines as "professional servicemembers" in the event of a ceasefire in Ukraine.[97] The insider source claimed that the Russian Presidential Administration, namely Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, will be strictly overseeing the demobilization efforts.

The Kremlin is reportedly worried that even the partial demobilization of Russian veterans may result in regime instability as the Kremlin is unprepared to reintegrate, sponsor, and control thousands of battle-hardened veterans. The insider source claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's active mobilization order from September 2022 and concerns over internal political security are restraining the scale of the demobilization. The insider source claimed that some Russian departments fear any peace or ceasefire on the frontlines more than they fear the continuation of Russia's war in Ukraine due to the vast bureaucratic challenges associated with integrating thousands of Russian servicemembers into society and the economy. The Kremlin recently intensified a coordinated campaign to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society in Russia by launching state initiatives such as the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to appoint veterans to positions of political power.[98] The insider source claimed that the "Time of Heroes" program has been "sabotaging" the Kremlin's objective of widely co-opting veterans and integrating them into the Russian government, as the program was designed only for people with higher education – which only accounts for seven percent of the veteran population. The insider source indicated that Russian officials are considering employing Russian demobilized personnel in law enforcement and Rosgvardia and in the protection of Russian infrastructure in the rear – likely implying that these servicemembers may not be fully demobilized upon their return to Russia.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces continue to face challenges in adopting tactical drones at scale to support combat operations. A Russian milblogger and former Russian "Storm Z" instructor amplified reports allegedly from Russian servicemembers on March 4 that claimed that Russian forces are losing many drones and loitering munitions due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) and Russian friendly fire.[99] One report attributed Russian drone losses to poor manufacturing and defects, which are especially widespread among the drones manufactured by the Russian state-controlled "Sudoplatov" drone initiative. The Russian servicemember recalled numerous instances during which Sudoplatov drones self-detonated so that Russian engineers had to avoid using electric detonators. Another servicemember noted that the quality of Sudoplatov drones dramatically varies between batches.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ratified the Russian-Belarusian Union State security framework on March 4.[100] Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin first signed the security framework in December 2024, and the Belarusian parliament ratified it on February 26, 2025.[101]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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[101] <https://belta.by/society/view/parlament-rossii-ratifikatsiya-dogovor-s-belarusju-o-garantii-bezopasnosti-698651-2025/>; <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23248193>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024>