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March 6, 2025, 8:00pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6. Putin stated during a visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation's Moscow branch on March 6 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations.[1] Putin stated that Russia must choose a peace option that best suits Russia and will ensure peace in the long-term. Putin noted that Russian societal unity is critical for Russian victory in Ukraine.[2] Putin alluded to the Russian Revolution, noted that Russian society collapsed during the First World War, and urged Russians to maintain support and unity as the war continues. Putin stated that Russia "will not give up" its "own" territory in future peace negotiations — likely referring to illegally annexed territory in occupied Ukraine.[3] The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize control over veterans activities in Russia.[4] Putin has also declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" — underlining Putin's efforts to prioritize militarizing Russian society and rallying support behind Russia's war effort in Ukraine in 2025.[5]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed during a press conference on March 6 that Russia will reject any proposals to station European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire agreement.[6] Lavrov stated that Russia sees "no room for compromise" on this issue and will consider the presence of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine as akin to a NATO deployment in Ukraine. Lavrov stated that Russia will consider the deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in the war and that Russia will reject such a deployment. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along the frontline as unacceptable.[7] Lavrov and Zakharova are explicitly rejecting US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's February 12 suggestion that European and non-European countries should station troops in Ukraine to enforce any future peace agreement.[8]

Lavrov said that any peace agreement must account for the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, including guarantees that NATO will stop expanding, trying to "swallow" Ukraine, and developing

threats against Russia.[9] Lavrov claimed that US President Donald Trump "understands" the need to eliminate these "root causes" while European countries are attempting to ignore the "root causes." Lavrov previously identified the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[10] Russian officials often invoke the concept of "root causes" to allude to their demands for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and to blame the West and Ukraine for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.

Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable. The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, stated on March 6 that Russia should consider conducting a full-scale mobilization, which would build up the Russian military to "at least a couple million [troops]."[11] Alaudinov added that "now is the time" when either "NATO will fall apart" and "[Russia] will destroy Europe" or Europe "can make peace" with Russia and claimed that "it is impossible to defeat Russia on the battlefield." [12] Alaudinov is likely intensifying the false narrative of Russia's inevitable victory to scare the United States and Europe into making concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity at a time when the US has already severely limited its support for Ukraine. Alaudinov, who is the Deputy Head of a Russian MoD directorate responsible for disseminating propaganda within the Russian military, is also likely intensifying this false narrative to maximize Russian morale and drive Russian territorial gains while frontline dynamics are increasingly fluid due to the pause in US military aid.

The Kremlin welcomed a Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the United States is a participant in the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized Russia's war in Ukraine as a "proxy war" between the United States and Russia in an interview with *Fox News* published on March 5.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 6 that the Kremlin agrees with Rubio's characterization of Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war." [14] Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets portrayed Rubio as "admitting" that the United States is waging a proxy war against Russia through Ukraine, supporting the false Kremlin narrative and Putin's personal claims that the war in Ukraine is an existential war between the United States and Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Putin, Lavrov, and Permanent Russian Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya, have consistently used this "proxy war" narrative to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine since the earliest months of the war in 2022.[16] This narrative aims to falsely portray Ukraine as a puppet state that lacks sovereignty, justify the war to Russian audiences, and discourage US and other Western support for Ukraine by stoking fears of escalation. The Kremlin and Russian state media likely aim to portray the Trump administration as conceding to the Kremlin and its false narrative ahead of future peace negotiations and bilateral talks.

US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on March 6 that he had a phone conversation with US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to discuss the "next steps toward a

just and lasting peace" and has scheduled a bilateral US-Ukrainian meeting in the near future.[17] Western media reported on March 6 that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Waltz will meet with a Ukrainian delegation led by Yermak next week.[18] Witkoff stated on March 6 that the US-Ukrainian bilateral meeting is intended to "get down a framework for a peace agreement and an initial ceasefire." [19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 6 that he will meet with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on March 10 after which his team will remain in Saudi Arabia to meet with US officials.[20]

US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg emphasized on March 6 that the early 2022 Istanbul protocols are not an "equitable framework" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and stated that the US should "develop something entirely new." [21] Special Envoy Witkoff previously referred to the Istanbul protocols as "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their framework for future peace negotiations to "end" Putin's war in Ukraine on Russia's terms, as such a framework would force the West to concede all of Russia's long-standing demands and amount to Ukraine's total capitulation.[23] Russia's demands in the Istanbul protocols included banning Ukraine from joining any military blocs, including NATO; limiting the size of the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems; limiting the range of Ukrainian missiles to 40 kilometers (25 miles); prohibiting Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons; and requiring Ukraine to terminate any agreements incompatible with "permanent neutrality." [24]

Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war. Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated on March 6 that Ukraine should only hold presidential elections once martial law ends, and former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated that she also opposes holding elections during the war.[25] Poroshenko stated that Ukraine should hold elections as soon as it is constitutionally acceptable — roughly 180 days after the end of martial law — and Tymoshenko reiterated that Ukraine is committed to peace negotiations to end the war. The Ukrainian constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly called for Ukraine to hold elections and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who Russia claims is "illegitimate." [27]

European countries continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian military. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 6 that France will continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine following the March 5 US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[28] Lecornu stated that French President Emmanuel Macron instructed the French government to accelerate various military assistance packages to compensate for the lack of US military assistance to Ukraine.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Macron on March 6 and discussed the need for additional and more substantive steps to end the war in Ukraine and protect all of Europe.[30] Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof announced on March 6 that the Netherlands will reserve a 3.5 billion euros (\$3.8 billion) fund for Ukraine in 2026, including 700 million euros (\$755 million) to invest in Ukrainian drones, and that the Netherlands could use these funds in 2025 if necessary.[31] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD)


announced a new 30-million-pound (\$38.6 million) contract with US-UK defense technology company Anduril UK to provide Ukraine with Altius 600m and Altius 700m strike drones.[32]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6.**
- **Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable.**
- **The Kremlin welcomed a Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the United States is a participant in the war.**
- **US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week.**
- **Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war.**
- **European countries continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian military.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued attacking the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that unspecified Russian naval infantry units are advancing in southern Sudzha Raion.[33]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Russian forces attacked toward Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[34]


A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Russian forces are exercising fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Sudzha and that Russian drones are "continuously" operating in the area.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have transferred "a significant part" of their best first-person view (FPV) drone crews to the Kursk direction and have gradually improved drone operations in the area since the end of 2024.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have positioned electronic warfare (EW) systems along roads in an effort to prevent Ukrainian FPV drone strikes and that Russian forces have deployed artillery systems almost directly to the international border to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in Sumy Oblast.[37]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) command post in Plekhovo (south of Sudzha) on March 5 and stated that such Ukrainian strikes are part of a broader campaign to reduce Russian offensive capabilities.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and tank elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kursk Oblast.[39] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya.[40]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction

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Russian forces continued offensive operations along the international border in Sumy Oblast on March 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Russian forces advanced near Zhuravka (along the international border northeast of Sumy City).[41]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Russian forces have seized 70 to 80 percent of Vovchansk.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 5 and 6.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction


March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

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Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on February 18 and geolocated on March 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[45]


Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of an unspecified section of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and back across a section of the Kupyansk-Dvorichna P-79 road but that Russian forces are holding some positions northeast of Zapadne.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 6 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Topoli, northwest and west of Dvorichna, near Petrivka (all northeast of Kupyansk), and north of Zapadne.[47] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer near Kupyansk and that Russian forces advanced near Fyholivka (north of Dvorichna), Dvorichna, and Zapadne since March 4.[48] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attacking from Fyholivka toward Krasne Pershe (northeast of Fyholivka) along the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Dvorichna, northeast of Kupyansk and Dvorichna near Petro-Ivanivka and Novomlynsk, and northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka on March 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the right bank of the Oskil River near Zapadne.[51]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 6 that Russian forces are trying to create a new bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River near Krasne Pershe and that Russian forces attempted to expand the pre-existing bridgehead near Kalynove (south of Dvorichna) and are attempting to transfer additional units to the western bank of the Oskil River while weather conditions remain fair.[52] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 6 that warming temperatures are melting the ice on the Oskil River, which will further complicate Russian forces' attempts to cross the river.[53] The deputy commander noted that Russian forces have not transferred any equipment over the river, but that Russian infantry continue to cross the river, including near Dvorichna.[54] The Ukrainian deputy commander reported that up to 500 Russian troops have crossed the river north of Kupyansk but that Russian forces have not been able to leverage their positions on the right bank. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are leveraging artillery and drone superiority and manpower advantages in the Kupyansk direction to advance in the area.[55]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction

March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Nadiya (east of Borova).[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southwest of Borova in the direction of Holubivka on March 5 and 6.[57]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 5 that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and up to one kilometer west of the settlement.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 6 that Russian forces advanced up to 3.5 kilometers in the direction of Nove (north of Lyman) and near Yampolivka and toward Zarichne (both northwest of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Balka Zhuravka (formerly Nevske), Novomykhailivka, Nove, and Katerynivka on March 5 and 6.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Zarichne.[61]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




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|--|--|--|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| | Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| | Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | | Russian Field Fortifications |
| | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | | |

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast
March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 6 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations around and south of Chasiv Yar near Oleksandro-Shulyne, Bila Hora, Predtechnye, and Kostyantynivka on March 5 and 6.[63]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces repelled a "large-scale" Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in the area.[64] The officer noted that Russian forces operating in the Chasiv Yar direction have modified their tactics and have shifted from conducting assaults on motorcycles to assaults using armored vehicles operating in columns. The officer reported that the Russian mechanized assault tactics continue to be ineffective and that Ukrainian forces destroy many armored vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and elements of the 299th and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction

March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on March 6 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk and northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, Ozaryanivka, Dyliivka, and Dachne on March 5 and 6.[66]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have not seized the entirety of Toretsk, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) prematurely claimed that Russian forces did so on February 7, and that Ukrainian forces are conducting defensive operations in northern and central Toretsk.[67] The deputy commander reported that Russian forces are attempting to conduct rotations in Toretsk, control Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) with drones, conduct ammunition resupply operations using drones, and strike Ukrainian positions with incendiary munitions.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and elements of the 134th Motorized Rifle Brigade (subordination unknown) are reportedly operating in the Shcherbynivka-Toretsk direction.[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction

March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in eastern Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk).[71]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), east of Pishchane, north of Kotlyne, and within Uspenivka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[72] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Shevchenko and seized Uspenivka.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from Yelyzavetivka within the past month.[74]


Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Yelyzavetivka and Bohdanivka and toward Mykolaivka; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Pishchane, Kotlyne, Nadiivka, and Kotlyarivka on March 5 and 6.[75]

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Ukrainian drone operations are hindering the Russian military's ability to operate along some ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction.[76] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have lacked sufficient drone operators to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the area since mid-December 2024.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) and "Struna" Battalion are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

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Geolocated footage posted on March 5 indicates that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole.

- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[78]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and south of Kostyantynopil (both west of Kurakhove).[79]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 6 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) seized Andriivka (west of Kurakhove), but ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 26.[80]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne on March 5 and 6.[81]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction

March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka from Pryvilne towards Vilne Pole, and towards Shevchenko and Skudne.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Skudne, Burlatske, Vilne Pole, and Novoocheretuvate, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on March 5 and 6.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Vesele, Fedorivka, and Burlatske.[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue fighting towards Novoocheretuvate and Skudne.[85]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Nesteryanka, Pyatykhatky, Kamyanske, Pavlivka, and Lobkove on March 5 and 6.[86]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Pyatykhatky.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction

March 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
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- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications


Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 6.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Oleshky (south of Kherson City).[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[89]

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Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea and 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda,

Crimea.[90] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 68 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts and that 43 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones struck residential buildings, administrative buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts.[91]

Official Ukrainian sources reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a hotel housing Ukrainian, American, and British humanitarian workers in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of March 5 to 6.[92] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the strike killed four, wounded 30, and damaged the hotel and nearby civilian facilities.[93]

The spokesperson for Kyiv Oblast's State Emergency Service reported on March 6 that Ukrainian authorities have not detected any new embers on the roof of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant for several days.[94]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Putin met with Russian women affiliated with the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund on March 6 and claimed that Russia does not send conscripts to combat zones.[95] Russian law notably forbids conscripts from directly participating in combat operations.[96] Putin is likely attempting to renew the social contract he made with Russian mothers during the first few months of the war in 2022 following outrage in response to conscripts participating in combat operations.[97] The Russian information space recently raised alarm over reports of Russian military commanders forcing conscripts into combat operations by coercing or faking signatures on MoD military service contracts.[98] Russian conscripts notably defended against the August 2024 Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Putin's pledge to not use conscripts in combat operations, and several conscripts have died in Russia's war in Ukraine despite this pledge.[99] Putin met with hand-picked women who held prominent political positions in November 2022 and falsely framed it as meeting with mothers of mobilized personnel, likely to soothe discontent from relatives of mobilized Russian soldiers in the first few months of partial mobilization.[100] Putin's March 6 meeting likely has similar aims amid continued discontent over the treatment of Russian soldiers, mobilized personnel, and conscripts.

Putin also claimed that he is solving issues with social benefits and veteran status for Russian soldiers. Putin instructed the Russian government to resolve issues granting combat veteran status to Russians penal recruits and to provide social benefits for the siblings and adopted children of Russian veterans.[101] Putin also stated that the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation will extend its social support to families of Russian soldiers declared missing in action.[102]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia continues adapting drone-satellite integration to support combat operations in Ukraine. Russian state-owned space organization Roscosmos announced on March 5 that its subsidiary Gonets

Satellite System Enterprise developed a modem for transmitting data from satellites directly to an aerial drone.[103] Gonets Satellite System Enterprise Head Andrey Manoylo stated that the enterprise will soon begin serial production of this modem.[104] The Gonets Satellite System Enterprise previously stated that drones can use satellite signals to backup transmitted information or as the main channel of communication when outside the coverage area of ground-based communications facilities.[105]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia proposed building a drone production factory in Belarus, likely to support combat operations in Ukraine and long-term efforts to expand Russia's military production capability. Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Maxim Oreshkin visited Minsk on March 6 and announced a proposal to construct a drone factory in Belarus with an annual production capacity of 100,000 drones.[106] Oreshkin claimed that the drone factory will help ensure Belarus' sovereignty and support the Belarusian technology sector. Russia has used Belarus as a tool to evade sanctions and support Russia's combat operations in Ukraine, as ISW has extensively reported.[107]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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