

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2023

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May 1, 2023, 5pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1.

Ukrainian sources reported that nine Tu-95 and two Tu-160 strategic bombers took off from Murmansk Oblast and near the Caspian Sea and launched 18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles at Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 15 of the missiles.[2] Geolocated footage from Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, shows that one of the missiles struck the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant and caused a massive explosion on impact.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 1 that the strikes targeted Ukrainian military-industrial objects and successfully disrupted the production of military resources.[4] The Russian MoD has recently shifted its rhetoric and is actively describing strike campaigns, likely in an effort to portray a proactive approach to growing concerns in the Russian information space regarding a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers claimed that the missiles struck Ukrainian air defense systems and a transportation hub in Pavlohrad.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that the fact that both the Tu-95 and Tu-160s carried far fewer missiles than their maximum load suggests that Russia continues to struggle with adequate production of such munitions.[6]

The White House assessed on May 1 that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 casualties—80,000 wounded and 20,000 killed—in fighting for Bakhmut since January 2023.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby announced that half of the 20,000 killed in action were Wagner Group fighters. Kirby also assessed that Russia's offensive on Bakhmut has failed.[8]

Ukrainian officials continue to signal Ukraine's readiness for potential counteroffensive operations.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on May 1 that Ukraine is "reaching the finish line" in terms of when it will be ready to launch counteroffensive actions.[9] Reznikov noted that the ratio of available ammunition still does not favor Ukraine but stated that Russian capabilities continue to be limited.[10] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov emphasized on April 30 that the main goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive remains the liberation of all Ukrainian territory and stated that he hopes Ukraine will be able to improve its positions along the entire frontline in order to effectively threaten Russian logistics in occupied Crimea and Donbas.[11]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely using his rehabilitated standing with Russian leadership to amplify his self-promotion efforts and his longstanding issues with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian sources began circulating an alleged letter from the MoD to Prigozhin on April 30 responding to Prigozhin's April 29 interview wherein he threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut if the Russian military fails to provide more ammunition to Wagner.[12] The letter, dated April 23, lists all the artillery ammunition and equipment that the Russian MoD provides to Wagner.[13] A Russian official may have released the letter to stop Prigozhin from using the issue of artillery shortages to criticize the MoD as he has done in the past.[14] Prigozhin responded by stating that the figures provided by the unverified document are still not sufficient for what Wagner needs to complete its assigned tasks.[15] Prigozhin then claimed on May 1 that Wagner is in possession of large stocks of weapons it captured from Ukrainian forces during the seizure of Soledar in January 2023, and Prigozhin rhetorically boasted that he has enough arms to support a million-strong army.[16] Prigozhin suggested that he would offer to exchange these stocks of weapons for the resources that Wagner requires.[17] Prigozhin will likely continue to rely on his existing informational lines of attack to promote himself and seek further privileges from the Russian military as he retains a rehabilitated standing with Russian leadership.[18]

The Russian MoD confirmed on April 30 the replacement of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev with Colonel General Aleksey Kuzmenkov.

The MoD provided no justification for the replacement nor did it specify whether Mizintsev has a new role. Russian milbloggers began speculating about the replacement of Mizintsev with Kuzmenkov, who was then Deputy Head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), on April 27.[19] Regular changes to the Russian military command have resulted in increasingly factionalized Russian military and disorganized command structures that degrade Russia's military capability, as ISW has recently assessed.[20]

The Russian MoD opposition faction is likely attempting to remove select MoD officials by publicly criticizing their war efforts. Russian milbloggers complained that Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov visited the Kherson direction months ago and did not fulfill his promise to allocate 140 to 150 boats to Russian forces to defend the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[21] One milblogger claimed that the lack of watercraft prompted Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo to order his administration in mid-April to start commandeering civilian boats for Russian military use.[22] Milbloggers' criticism of Yevkurov follows the dismissal of the Russian Deputy Defense Minister for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev on April 27.[23] Mizintsev was reportedly dismissed after Commander of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces and Wagner affiliate Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky's inspection of the Northern Fleet troops revealed significant issues with supply provisions.[24] Teplinsky reportedly assumed command of Russian forces in southern Ukraine in mid-April and may be using his new appointment to remove Russian MoD officials with the justification that they are failing to adequately supply troops. ISW assessed on April 30 that Teplinsky likely gained Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor in late March, and the milbloggers' criticisms against Yevkurov is likely an ongoing effort to weaken or remove a group of Russian military commanders and officials who are loyal to Russian Chief of General Staff **Army General Valery Gerasimov**. [25]

Key Takeaways

- **Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1.**
- **The White House assessed on May 1 that the Russian offensive against Bakhmut has failed.**
- **Ukrainian officials continue to signal Ukraine's readiness for potential counteroffensive operations.**
- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely using his rehabilitated standing with Russian leadership to amplify his self-promotion efforts and his longstanding issues with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).**
- **The Russian MoD confirmed the replacement of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev with Colonel General Aleksey Kuzmenkov.**
- **The Russian MoD opposition faction is likely attempting to remove select MoD officials by publicly criticizing their war efforts.**
- **Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kremmina line.**
- **Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Ukrainian officials indicated that Wagner Group and other Russian forces are struggling to maintain their pace of offensive operations in Bakhmut.**
- **Russian sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting raids across the Dnipro River.**
- **The recent increased prevalence of Russian private military companies (PMCs) operating in Ukraine may be necessitating certain changes in the overall command structure.**
- **Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian socio-economic system.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued routine fire and defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 30 and May 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 30 that elements of the Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) struck Ukrainian forces that were conducting troop rotations northeast of Kupyansk.[26] Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on April 30 that Russian forces are conducting fewer assaults in the Kupyansk direction but are still heavily using artillery.[27]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 30 and May 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[28] The Ukrainian commander of a UAV company, Yuriy Fedorenko, noted on April 30 that Russian forces have built three to four defensive lines within the city of Svatove itself.[29] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Military Administration Head Roman Vlasenko noted on April 25 that Chechen units have returned to Luhansk Oblast and that the heaviest fighting on this sector of the front is ongoing near Bilohorivka.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and the Serebrianske forest area (both about 10km south of Kreminna) and west of Kreminna near Torske (15km west) and Nevske (18km northwest).[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| | Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | | Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |
| | Key Ukrainian Roads | | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| | Russian Ground Lines of Communication | | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces have continued to make gains in Bakhmut as of May 1. Geolocated footage posted on April 29 and 30 shows that Russian forces made marginal gains on the T0513 Bakhmut-Siversk highway just south of Sakko i Vanzetti (14km north of Bakhmut) and within western Bakhmut.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Wagner Group forces advanced in western and southwestern Bakhmut at a maximum pace of one or two blocks a day.[33] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner fighters advanced 230m in Bakhmut on April 30.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in heavy fighting near Khromove.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces continued attacking in Bakhmut and conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), Predtechyne (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and Oleksandro-Shulytne (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[36]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Wagner Group fighters and other Russian forces are struggling to maintain their pace of offensive operations in Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces in Bakhmut conducted numerous attacks but failed to advance, whereas Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks and recaptured some Russian positions.[37] A local Ukrainian commander stated that Ukrainian forces have regained the battlefield initiative in some areas of Bakhmut, and Russian forces have failed to cut Ukrainian logistics lines into Bakhmut.[38] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian snipers from an unspecified special counterterror service are operating in Bakhmut, suggesting that the Russian military command may be reallocating additional irregular military units to the Bakhmut front to compensate for overtired Wagner forces and ineffective Russian force organization in the area.[39]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 30 and May 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 30 and May 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces attacked Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and southwest of Avdiivka.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and broke through Ukrainian defensive lines in western Marinka and that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks against Russian positions near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[42]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 30 and May 1.[43] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance on the eastern outskirts of Vuhledar as of April 29.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET





Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

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|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Major Railroads |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Bakhmut City Limits
- ▭ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▭ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian sources are continuing to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting raids across the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to cross the Dnipro River to reach the left bank Kherson Oblast and claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian crossing attempts.[45] A Russian commander of an unspecified unit operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast claimed that Russian forces constructed a deeply echeloned defensive line on this bank and are regularly identifying and defeating Ukrainian forces.[46] Geolocated Russian footage published on April 30 showed Russian 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade of the 22nd Army Corps (Russian Black Sea Fleet) shelling Ukrainian forces on the Velykyi Potemkin island.[47]

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to engage Russian forces in a counter-battery fights in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Forces Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated on April 30 that Ukrainian counter-battery operations are forcing Russian forces to constantly maneuver on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[48] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on May 1 that Russian forces decreased the rate of artillery fire against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast over the past three days.[49]

Russian sources said that the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast did not change as of May 1, denying unspecified Ukrainian claims about Ukrainian advances.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published video of himself claiming that he is located near the Hulyaipole area and stating that Ukrainian forces did not break through Russian defensive lines southeast of Hulyaipole.[51] The milblogger claimed that he observed Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces almost liberated Marfopil, Stepanivka, and Novoselivka – all within 15km southeast of Hulyaipole - which he claimed were not true. ISW has been unable to find such Ukrainian claims, however, and has observed nothing to confirm the milblogger's observations about Ukrainian activities in this area. The milblogger amplified an interview with a commander of the grenade launcher squad of the 503rd Guards Motorized Regiment of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) claiming that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force and artillery fire in Zaporizhia Oblast.[52] Geolocated Russian footage also showed that unspecified elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army shelled Ukrainian positions with Polish-language leaflets which called on Ukrainian forces to surrender southwest of Orikhiv.[53] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Tokmak, damaging a railway depot and a service station.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two drones in Enerhodar.[55] None of these reports suggest unusual activity in this area.

Geolocated footage posted on May 1 showed smoke over Sevastopol Bay reportedly caused by a drone.[56] Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian air defense shot down a drone in Sevastopol Bay.[57]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 1, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The recent increased prevalence of Russian private military companies (PMCs) operating in Ukraine may be necessitating certain changes in the overall command structure. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on April 30 that Russian forces are attempting to create a unified command structure for Russian paramilitary companies (PMCs) operating in Ukraine under the control of the Russian General Staff.[58] A reliable Ukrainian reserve officer reported on April 30 that the emergence of additional PMCs such as Potok, Veterany, Yenisey, Skif, Tigr, Ibris, Rys, and Wolves has exacerbated challenges with logistics, command and control, intelligence, and operational coordination.[59] ISW has not seen any claims that the Russian military intends to include the Wagner Group alongside these other PMCs in this reported single command structure, although efforts to do so would likely intensify Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), as Wagner has recently challenged other PMCs in the Bakhmut area[60]

The Russian MoD has reportedly intensified its prison recruitment campaign, although Wagner may still be benefiting from the effort. Head of the independent Russian human rights organization "Rus Sidyashchaya" (Russian Behind Bars) Olga Romanova stated on April 30 that the Russian MoD began increasing convict recruitment dramatically in April after barring Wagner from recruiting from prisons in February.[61] Romanova stated that the MoD is currently recruiting at a rate of roughly 10,000 convict recruits a month.[62] Romanova also stated that the MoD transfers "surplus" convict recruits to Wagner because many Russian commanders do not know how to command a contingent of convict recruits.[63] An alleged Russian convict recruit serving with the Russian military claimed that convicts sign six-month contracts with the MoD, the same contract periods that convict recruits served with Wagner.[64] The Russian convict recruit claimed that convict recruits form "Storm-Z" assault groups, further indicating that these irregular formations are likely meant to conduct attritional ground assaults.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 1 that roughly 400 newly deployed Wagner convict recruits are training in Berdyansk Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast with another 200 training near Luhansk City.[66]

Cadets at command academies throughout Russia graduated several months ahead of schedule, and some Russian sources claimed that these graduates may be deploying to Ukraine. Russian sources reported that command cadets from the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School, the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, the Far Eastern Higher Combined Arms Command School, the Military University of the Russian MoD, the Military Medical Academy, and the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School graduated on April 29, either two or three months ahead of schedule.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that graduates from the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School immediately deployed to Ukraine and will likely participate in the Russian military's effort to form new Airborne Forces (VDV) brigades.[68] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that recent graduates from Russian command schools are deploying to Ukraine. The Russian military is likely attempting to quickly generate a new pool of lower and mid-level commanders to address the degradation of the Russian command cadre in Ukraine.

Russian commanders are reportedly increasingly punishing Russian servicemen for insubordination in an effort to strengthen discipline. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 30 that Russian commanders have started punishing breaches in discipline by detaining Russian servicemen in improvised cells made of holes in the ground covered with a metal grill.[69] The UK MoD reported that Russian commanders have been instituting increasingly draconian initiatives to improve discipline among Russian forces in Ukraine since Autumn 2022.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian socio-economic system. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on May 1 that he and Russian Labor Union Association Sergey Vostretsov discussed ways to develop labor unions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Representatives of occupied Kherson Oblast Ministry of Industry met with Vostretsov and Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Semyon Mashkautsan on April 27 to identify opportunities to develop labor unions and workers satisfaction in occupied Kherson Oblast.[73]

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian children in an effort to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Occupied Kherson Oblast Vice Governor Tatiana Kuzmich stated on April 29 that Russian occupation authorities plan to bring high school students from Kherson Oblast to Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, by Russia's May 9th Victory Day holiday to promote Russian patriotism and historic education.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus.[75] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 1 that the final stage of the brigade tactical exercise is underway.[76]

Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich stated on April 29 that Belarusian brigades are training for offensive, defensive, and special operations and that a set of measures to transfer the brigades from peacetime to wartime has been underway for the last few weeks.[77] Volfovich claimed that it is necessary for all Belarusian forces to maintain combat readiness due to the current military-political situation on Belarus' borders.[78]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eZ1ajgBgaVuwMEjvaSghsSqQRdgtHKxvdcggy5PVUzdiweAZkbD5s2nH6ZQUuaHSL>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eZ1ajgBgaVuwMEjvaSghsSqQRdgtHKxvdcggy5PVUzdiweAZkbD5s2nH6ZQUuaHSL>; <https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid02eGQm7dpqdJBHXTbfvg1oML6xt91XC1xQZEwKGh9j4s6uJTNBV79bZrmUELQbooQfl>; <https://t.me/CinCAFU/489>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/01/yakby-rosiyany-mogly-dozvolity-sobi-vytratyty-bilshe-raket-vony-b-vdaryly-bilshoyu-kilkisty-yurij-ignat/>; https://twitter.com/olga_pp98/status/1652898629420568576?s=20; https://twitter.com/olga_pp98/status/1652876266800914432?s=20; https://twitter.com/olga_pp98/status/1652746975735840769?s=20; https://twitter.com/olga_pp98/status/1652874791324463104?s=20

[2] <https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid02eGQm7dpqdJBHXTbfvg1oML6xt91XC1xQZEwKGh9j4s6uJTNBV79bZrmUELQbooQfl>; <https://t.me/CinCAFU/489>

[3] <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1653025941935861760?s=20>

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/26091; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84390

[5] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11226; <https://t.me/rybar/46466>; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9188; <https://t.me/readovkanews/57901>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84341; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84342; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84344; <https://t.me/readovkanews/57876>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47205>

[6] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/01/yakby-rosiyany-mogly-dozvolity-sobi-vytratyty-bilshe-raket-vony-b-vdaryly-bilshoyu-kilkisty-yurij-ignat/>

[7] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-believes-russians-ukraine-have-suffered-100000-casualties-5-months-2023-05-01/>

[8] <https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1653095752455929856>

[9] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/01/kontrnastup-zsu-my-vyhodymo-na-finishnu-pryamu-oleksij-reznikov/>

[10] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/01/kontrnastup-zsu-my-vyhodymo-na-finishnu-pryamu-oleksij-reznikov/>

[11] <https://gur.gov dot ua/content/kyrylo-budanov-zvilnennia-tymchasovo-okupovanykh-terytorii-pershocherhove-zavdannia-ukrainy.html>

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042923>; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/8874; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84271

- [13] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/8874 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84271 ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021623>
- [14] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/8874 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84271 ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021623>
- [15] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/868
- [16] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/872
- [17] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/872
- [18] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2023>
- [19] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2023>
- [20] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023>
- [21] <https://t.me/rybar/46439> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/13977 ; <https://t.me/rybar/46444> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/13979
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