

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2023

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May 14, 2023, 3pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Important Note: ISW has reindexed its map layer for reported Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 12, 2023. We removed reported Ukrainian counteroffensive coded before May 1, 2023, in order to delineate more clearly new Ukrainian territorial gains from gains secured in previous Ukrainian counteroffensives. ISW retained a few reported Ukrainian counteroffensives polygons from before May 1, 2023, specifically on the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson Oblast, to preserve context in that complex area of operations. May 1, 2023, is an arbitrary date and does not mark the beginning or end of any assessed Ukrainian or Russian effort. ISW has reindexed its map layers before and similarly removed old reported Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts following the conclusion of the Battle of Kyiv in April 2022.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of drones of varying models at Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 25, including 18 Shahed 131/136s.¹ The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-136/131 drones in total.² The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea as well as an unspecified number of Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down three Kh-101/555/55 missiles.³ Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Ternopil and Mykolaiv cities as well as Kharkiv City and Zolochiv in Kharkiv Oblast with S-300 missiles.⁴ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi City and Ukrainian military facilities and deployment areas near Ternopil and Petropavlivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.⁵

Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term. Russian forces have conducted at least 10 series of strikes throughout Ukraine, particularly in rear areas, since April 19.⁶ Russian forces have used significantly fewer high precision missiles in these latest series of strikes in comparison to their failed campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure from the fall of 2022 through the winter of 2023. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely expended a significant proportion of their precision missiles in the previous air campaign, and the current Russian air campaign may be using far

fewer of these missiles in an effort to conserve the limited remaining stocks.⁷ Russian forces have instead relied heavily on launching large numbers of Iranian-made Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, although Ukrainian forces have been more effective in shooting down Russian precision systems than during the previous Russian air campaign.⁸ The new Russian air campaign appears to be focused on Kyiv and alleged Ukrainian military industrial and logistics facilities in deep rear areas. The more limited air campaign has so far been more regular than the previous wider Russian campaign against critical infrastructure, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be attempting to conduct almost daily series of strikes to portray themselves as successfully constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.⁹ The alleged targets and limited nature of this campaign indicates that Russian forces are immediately concerned with current Ukrainian capabilities to launch counteroffensive operations, although the diminished effectiveness of these strikes are likely not significantly constraining Ukrainian capabilities writ large.

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 Russian positions on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut over the course of the day on May 14.¹⁰ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked towards Berkhivka, Klishchiivka, and Kurdiuvivka and took up new unspecified positions near the settlements and additionally advanced towards Yahidne from the direction of Bohdanivka.¹¹ Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any attacks on the night of May 13 to 14, however.¹² ISW has not observed visual confirmation of new Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty emphasized on May 14 that Ukraine's main goal in Bakhmut is to destroy Russian concentration areas and encircle the city, not to conduct frontal assaults.¹³ Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced up to 300m in some areas, and Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in two directions in the suburbs of Bakhmut.¹⁴

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian MoD praised the defensive efforts of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) south of Ivanivske, 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) east of Bohdanivka, and the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) in an unspecified area on the Soledar-Bakhmut line.¹⁵ The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian counterattacks and that the 4th Brigade Commander Colonel Vyacheslav Makarov and Deputy Commander for the likely 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps of Political-Military Work Colonel Yevgeny Brovko died while leading their respective defense efforts.¹⁶ The Russian MoD noted that it presented combat medals and state awards to defending Russian personnel at their combat positions, and later posted footage of Russian military leadership presenting over 120 personnel with various awards, including "For Courage," "For Military Distinction," and "For Military Valor."¹⁷ The Russian MoD likely seeks to assuage information space criticism of the MoD's failure to acknowledge Ukrainian battlefield successes in a timely manner without actually acknowledging the degree of these successes, which is consistent with recent Kremlin guidance to not downplay Ukrainian military successes.¹⁸ The MoD also notably highlighted the efforts of its regular forces over those of irregular forces, including Wagner Group forces operating in Bakhmut. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized reports on May 14 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are helping Wagner forces, instead claiming that VDV forces are failing to support Wagner's offensive operations, defending captured positions, or recapturing positions recently lost to Ukrainian forces.¹⁹

Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse. The Club of Angry Patriots announced on May 14 that it is forming regional branches and called on experienced politicians, public opinion leaders, and heads of Russian organizations to participate.²⁰ The Club of Angry Patriots also stated that it will hold a news conference in Moscow on an unspecified date in June, during which it will address how Russia can win the war in Ukraine.²¹

Key Takeaways

- **Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14.**
- **Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive operations in the near term.**
- **Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14.**
- **The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks.**
- **Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse.**
- **Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.**
- **Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners.**
- **Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for the September 2023 elections in occupied territories.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk), Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and on the eastern outskirts of Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).²² A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continue “sluggish” fighting between Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove), and that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) have established first lines of defense along the eastern side of the rail line near Novoselivske.²³ The milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Novoselivske on an unspecified date because the settlement is destroyed and not worth defending, and emphasized that Russian forces still control Kuzemivka.

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks near Kreminna on May 14. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, citing a Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander, denied reports that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defensive lines near Kreminna but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces may be conducting sabotage and reconnaissance in the area.²⁴ ISW has not observed claims or confirmation of significant Ukrainian offensive activity near Kreminna.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut as of May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations within Bakhmut itself; within 9km northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka, Bohdanivka, and Khromove; and within 14km southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora and Predtechyne.²⁵ Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 13 that Wagner fighters advanced up to 500m in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 1.78 square kilometers of the city.²⁶ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).²⁷

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled numerous Russian assaults near Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).²⁸ Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (Southern Military District) Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations near Marinka.²⁹ A Russian milblogger claimed that there are ongoing battles near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) and Kruta Balka (4km northeast of Avdiivka) but that the frontline remains unchanged along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.³⁰

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 14.³¹ The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (Eastern Military District) Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces thwarted an attempted Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast.³²

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ⊕ Major Railroads
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ⊕ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine on May 14.³³ Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are trying to use sea missile carriers, kamikaze drones, and reconnaissance drones to distract Ukrainian air defenses.³⁴ Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Kizomys and Stanislav, Kherson Oblast with four guided aerial bombs and targeted the Chornobaivka and Tokarivka areas with four loitering munitions.³⁵ The Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian shelling damaged critical infrastructure in Ochakiv Hromada.³⁶ Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov posted footage on May 13 of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) firing incendiary munitions at the Hulyaipole area.³⁷ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Mykolaiv City.³⁸


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of May 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 14 that 200 prisoners arrived at a training camp in Rohove, occupied Luhansk Oblast for a four-week military training course and that an additional 50 recruits will likely arrive by the end of May.³⁹ The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that 800 prisoners are training in Mozhnyakivka, Luhansk Oblast, and that 400 convicts are training with the Wagner Group in Novopetrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.⁴⁰ Ongoing prison recruitment efforts are part of a wider campaign of crypto mobilization that avoids the need to conduct general mobilization, as ISW has previously assessed.⁴¹

Several Russian sources continue to claim that the Wagner Group is successfully continuing recruitment and maintaining a positive reputation despite its challenges in Bakhmut. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 14 that the number of those wishing to join Wagner is increasing because Wagner ensures that all of its soldiers are protected and cared for.⁴² A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner has already successfully trained nearly 10,000 volunteers for "people's militias" in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.⁴³ A Russian opposition source additionally amplified a video appeal posted by mobilized personnel from Ulyanovsk Oblast where they ask to be transferred from the Russian army to Wagner because they want to fight and not be "abandoned like kittens" by their leadership.⁴⁴ Wagner's information campaign to portray itself as an effective and empathetic force is at odds with ubiquitous reports of Wagner's brutality towards its own.⁴⁵

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues measures to integrate the forces of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) into the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on MAY 14 that the Russian MoD issued an order to an unspecified DNR brigade to replace its DNR military tickets with formal Russian tickets and to re-sign service contracts with the Russian armed forces for a two-year minimum.⁴⁶ The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian MoD is threatening to send DNR forces who refuse to receive Russia military tickets or re-sign contracts with deployment to the most dangerous sectors of the front.⁴⁷

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for regional elections in occupied territories, which are set for September 2023. Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission Ella Pamfilova met with Russian occupation authorities on May 14 to discuss preparations for the upcoming elections, including creating conditions for fair and safe voting for all residents of occupied territories.⁴⁸ Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on May 14 that the Russian Central Election Commission has started preparing the electoral systems and that recruitment to form 615 precinct commissions is ongoing in occupied Donetsk Oblast.⁴⁹

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in

Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on May 14 that Belarusian forces are continuing combat readiness checks and combat training.⁵⁰

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

1

<https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid0UrayivS8LqhUFdf16ggKP754fjgKhszNaFCh6NcyCaVRPZwUkYBrJ6rrUuwHPRxI>; <https://t.me/kpszsuz/2515>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uoWcW4vAjQe1h6ZNGVDL8VdxenNicJzFMkvaS246JLkdKL5N3DsCAdLidZVzunXI> ;

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https://www.facebook.com/UA.National.Police/posts/pfbid037K7S7kiHzuabxNJNzrPnranjvgFmGCkeoAmJ2smHC1ibe5qTb8uLXNmRPSzLFNDI?locale=uk_UA

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/26560 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/26561;

⁶ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050823> ;

<https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123>

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⁷ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223>

⁸ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050823> ;

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⁹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/annamaliar/737>

¹¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12517>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/58836>

¹² https://t.me/concordgroup_official/963

¹³ https://suspilne_dot_media/475489-445-den-povnomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-tekstovij-onlajn/?

¹⁴ <https://t.me/annamaliar/732>

¹⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/26560

¹⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/26560

¹⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/26565; https://t.me/mod_russia/26560

¹⁸ <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2023>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%20%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf>

¹⁹ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/963

²⁰ <https://t.me/KRPRus/43>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4832>

²¹ <https://t.me/KRPRus/43>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4832>

²²
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²³ <https://t.me/rybar/47053>; <https://t.me/rybar/47054>

²⁴ https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3630

²⁵
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²⁶ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/962

²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12517>

²⁸
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl> ;
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²⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/26558

³⁰ <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47557>

³¹
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhp88ezjl> ;
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³² https://t.me/mod_russia/26561

³³
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhp88ezjl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl>

³⁴ https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/05/14/okupanty-vykorystovuyut-taktyku-rozsiyvannya-uvagy-nashoyi-protypovitryanoyi-oborony-nataliya-gumenyuk/

³⁵
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0zifB1EXiHEfhhWDZ7KYmh1ufWXzrBJDXwAPy7gyy9uKDpB2osyRBrZ3LzvRNRNyl>

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<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0zifB1EXiHEfhhWDZ7KYmh1ufWXzrBJDXwAPy7gyy9uKDpB2osyRBrZ3LzvRNRNygI>

³⁷ <https://t.me/vrogov/9456>

³⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/26561

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhp88ezjl>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhp88ezjl>

⁴¹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051223>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623>;

<https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623>

⁴² https://t.me/concordgroup_official/965

⁴³ https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85664

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/idelrealii/27338>

⁴⁵ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271DvI>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271DvI>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/pushilindenis/3423>; <https://t.me/cikrossii/2723>; <https://t.me/cikrossii/2735>; <https://t.me/cikrossii/2733>;

<https://t.me/cikrossii/2731>; <https://t.me/cikrossii/2725>; <https://t.me/cikrossii/2724>

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/pushilindenis/3423>

⁵⁰ <https://t.me/modmilby/27490>