

## **Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2023**

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**May 8, 2023, 4:30pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched 16 missiles at Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 35 launched Shahed drones.[1] Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 Russian drones targeting Kyiv out of a 60 total launched against Ukraine, however.[2] Klitschko did not specify how many total drones Ukrainian forces shot down elsewhere in Ukraine. Klitschko's report is more likely accurate as it was posted nearly four hours after the initial round of Ukrainian reporting on the Shahed strike. The Ukrainian Red Cross stated that one Russian missile destroyed an entire Red Cross warehouse in Odesa Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers celebrated claims that Russian forces intensified strikes against Kyiv, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces conducted the largest strike campaign against Kyiv since the start of the war.[4] Russian sources are likely overcompensating for ineffectiveness of the drone strikes by playing up the size and scale of the effort.

**Senior Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counteroffensive operations in May or June.** Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 7 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for "new events" in May or June 2023.[5] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov stated in a May 8 interview that the timing and location of a Ukrainian counteroffensive is not significant because Russian forces and leadership will panic regardless, but that he would not be surprised if "something," possibly alluding to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, occurred in May or June.[6] The Ukrainian Defense Forces Military Media Center stated that Russian forces continue to transfer military equipment, ammunition, and supplies to Ukraine to prepare for a defensive operation against a Ukrainian counteroffensive push.[7]

**Russian-occupied Transnistria asked Russia to increase its peacekeeping contingent in the region, likely to support the Kremlin's efforts to destabilize Moldova.** A Transnistrian occupation representative to Moscow, Leonid Manakov, asked Russia to increase the number of peacekeepers in Transnistria due to claims of increasing security and terrorist risks.[8] Manakov proposed that Transnistria increase the number of peacekeepers by involving the Russians living in Transnistria in the peacekeeping operations. Manakov's statement follows reports of Moldovan prosecutors detaining and cracking down on the members of the pro-Russian "Shor" party in mid-


April and May.[9] Chisinau detained 27 protestors from the "Shor" party on May 7.[10] Kremlin's Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not comment on Manakov's proposals.[11] White House officials warned in March that individuals linked with Russian intelligence were planning to stage protests against the Moldovan government in order to install a pro-Russian administration. Manakov's statements are likely a continuation of the Kremlin's effort to destabilize Moldova.[12] Russia remains unlikely to deploy additional forces to Transnistria given its ongoing need for forces in Ukraine.

**Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use the Moscow Victory Day parade to show Russia's continued influence in Central Asia.** Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon are reportedly attending the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9.[13] Kremlin-affiliated news outlet *Vedemosti* reported Japarov's visit to Moscow for Victory Day on April 23, while Russian media reported Tokayev's, Mirziyoyev's, and Rakhmon's visits on May 8, only one day before the Victory Day parade in Moscow.[14] Russian independent news outlet *SOTA* reported that Rakhmon's press service initially announced that Rakhmon would celebrate in Dushanbe, but later stated that Rakhmon had arrived in Moscow for Victory Day.[15] Kremlin newswire *TASS* reported that Putin also invited Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov but he did not confirm his attendance.[16] No foreign leader attended Moscow Victory Day in 2022, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan did not hold Victory Day parades in 2022 with some citing health risks from the coronavirus pandemic.[17] The late announcement of Central Asian leaders' attendance likely indicates their reticence to show direct and public support of the war despite Kremlin efforts to project power. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan reportedly also flew to Moscow to attend the Victory Day parade.[18]

### Key Takeaways

- **Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8.**
- **Senior Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counteroffensive operations in May or June.**
- **Russian-occupied Transnistria called on Russia to increase its peacekeepers in the region likely to support the Kremlin's efforts to destabilize Moldova.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use the Victory Day parade to show Russia's continued influence in Central Asia.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremenna line.**
- **Russian forces have made marginal advances within Bakhmut as of May 8 amid reports of intensified Wagner Group forces offensive operations and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine.**
- **Russian authorities have reportedly escalated their campaign targeting ethnic minorities for contract service in the Russian military.**
- **Russian occupation authorities continued to forcibly evacuate civilians in rear areas in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian***

***violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (26km south of Kreminna).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[20] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows an unspecified element of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division conducting a drone strike against Ukrainian positions south of Torske (16km west of Kreminna).[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Synkivka, Novomlynsk (19km northeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (22km southeast of Kupyansk).[22]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.


## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces have made marginal advances within Bakhmut as of May 8 amid reports of intensified Wagner Group forces offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces likely made gains in western Bakhmut.[23] Russian sources claimed on May 7 and 8 that Wagner fighters intensified assaults on Ukrainian positions in western Bakhmut and shelling of the area.[24] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 7 that Wagner advanced 280m in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 2.37 square km of the city.[25] A Russian milblogger refuted Russian claims that some Chechen Akhmat units have deployed to Bakhmut as of May 7. ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of Akhmat units operating in the area.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces also increased assaults on Ukrainian positions near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Chasiv Yar (13km west of Bakhmut), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (14km northwest of Bakhmut) and conducted assaults near Bohdanivka, Predtechyne (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on May 8.[27] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted 29 assaults in the Bakhmut direction, and that increased artillery activity indicates that Russian forces in the area do not suffer from significant ammunition shortages despite Prigozhin’s recent claims.[28] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces continue to conduct attritional ground attacks as their main tactic in the Bakhmut area.[29] Ukrainian Commander of the 127th Territorial Defense Brigade Roman Hryshchenko reported on May 7 that additional Wagner personnel arrived and are operating in the city, leading to an increased intensity of assaults.[30] Hryshchenko stated that Ukrainians have not observed any indications that Wagner intends to leave the city and that intensified shelling likely indicates that Wagner has received more ammunition.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, and Stupochky (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[32]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[33] Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in the Avdiivka area.[34]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 8.[35] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified location in western Donetsk Oblast.[36]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Major Railroads
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



## **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

Russian forces targeted Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction. Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky in Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Russian milbloggers published footage on May 7 and 8 that purportedly showing elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) striking




Ukrainian forces near Charivne and elements of the 503rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[38]

Russian forces continue defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces are “massively mining” the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[39] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo published footage on May 8 purportedly showing him visiting fortifications in occupied Kherson Oblast.[40] Saldo claimed that the fortifications are well-equipped and that the Russian forces stationed there will receive an additional supply of anti-drone guns.

Russian forces conducted routine fire west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[41]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian claims, or Russian advances, where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 8, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russian authorities have reportedly escalated their campaign targeting ethnic minorities for contract

service in the Russian military. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* reported on April 18 that Russian military recruiters are targeting Central Asian migrant workers for contract service by visiting mosques and immigration centers.[42] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on May 8 that this recruitment campaign is likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to "voluntarily" recruit 400,000 military personnel and avoid another round of mobilization. The UK MoD also assessed that Russia likely sends these migrant recruits to the front lines in Ukraine, indicating that Russian authorities remain content with forcing ethnic minorities to disproportionately bear the burden of combat losses in Ukraine.[43]

Russian authorities continue to incentivize and coerce Russians into contract military service. A Russian milblogger advertised contract service through Moscow Oblast and claimed that authorities pay contract recruits 18,770 rubles (\$241) for each child, 500,000 (\$6,435) rubles for suffering minor injuries, and 1,000,000 rubles (\$12,870) for suffering severe injuries in addition to regular monthly salaries of 50,000 rubles (\$643).[44] Russian opposition media outlet *Mobilization News* claimed that the Sochi military registration and enlistment office sent paper summons to Russian students who just turned 18 and became eligible for service.[45]

Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec announced plans to modify the Su-25 attack aircraft based on its use in Ukraine. Rostec First Deputy General Director Vladimir Artyakov announced that Rostec plans to modify the Su-25SM3 for high-precision weapon use.[46] A Russian milblogger previously criticized the decision not to develop Su-25 aircraft on May 2 and claimed that Russian forces should develop the Su-25 and Su-23CM3 variants closer to unspecified American models that are capable of carrying a variety of munitions.[47]

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian occupation authorities are evacuating from some settlements in Kherson Oblast to areas deep in the rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian occupation authorities suspended the Skadovsk raion and Skadovsk City administrations and loaded documents, office equipment, and other state property for transport out of the area.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian occupation authorities are conducting similar activities in other settlements in occupied Kherson Oblast and are evacuating the areas with their families.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities plan to transport documents and looted property by sea to Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast in an effort to avoid multi-kilometer traffic jams on the Kerch Strait, which are a direct result of the partial evacuation order.[50]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage-like partnerships with Russian regions. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik stated on May 8 that he and Republic of Bashkortostan head Radiy Khabirov met to discuss ways that Bashkortostan can support the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration. Pasechnik announced that Khabirov had committed to sending a team of builders to help repair residential buildings and social facilities in Khrustalniy, Luhansk Oblast, by May 10.[51] Pasechnik also stated that he and Khabirov discussed opening an official representative office of Bashkortostan in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[52] Pasechnik thanked Khabirov for continuing to invite children from the occupied Luhansk Oblast to recreation camps in

Bashkortostan, noting that 1,500 Ukrainian children attended recreation camps in Bashkortostan in 2022.[53][54]

**Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)**

**ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotpVzddU6pp7zGZ5Qeb158xpMMfUHvQuA5sc23LEfHXKRkxwEqBu28pJ19EoJ9vXl>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/08/rossiyskie-voyska-atakovali-territoriyu-ukrainy-bespilotnikami-vsu-zayavili-chto-vse-drony-udalos-sbit-vlasti-kieva-soobschili-o-pyati-postradavshih-zhitelyah>

[2] [https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/1935](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/1935)

[3] <https://od.redcross.org.ua/posts/2023-05-08-%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F-%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D1%85%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0/>

[4] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11504>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11507>; [https://t.me/Sladkov\\_plus/7638](https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7638); [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85077](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85077); [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85088](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85088); [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85115](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85115); <https://t.me/vrogov/9306>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25119>; [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/8730](https://t.me/rusich_army/8730)

[5] <https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/usi-hto-dopomagaye-ukrayini-povertati-bezpeku-htotisne-na-r-82757>

[6] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-counteroffensive-russian-losses-putin-b2334687.html>

[7] <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/1886>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/08/rf-pragne-vysnazhyty-oboronnyj-potenczial-zsu-ta-zashkodyty-pidgotovczy-do-kontrnastupu/>

[8] [https://t.me/rian\\_ru/202053](https://t.me/rian_ru/202053) ; <https://suspilne dot media/468791-na-zaes-situacia-stae-neperedbacuvanou-do-bahmuta-zvozat-novi-pidrozdili-vagnerivciv-439-den-vijni-onlajn/> ; [https://t.me/riz\\_the\\_kraken/58282](https://t.me/riz_the_kraken/58282)

[9] <https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-tauber-shor-official-arrested-airport/32386939.html>; <https://sports.yahoo.com/police-chisinau-detains-27-protesters-142900991.html>; <https://balkaninsight dot com/2023/05/08/moldovan-prosecutors-raid-pro-russian-shor-party-in-gagauzia/>; <https://apnews.com/article/moldova-oligarch-ilan-shor-bank-fraud-chisinau-israel-maia-sandu-e7c9639f354f27c4975030f7b40629be>; <https://babel dot ua/en/news/92747-in-moldova-the-leader-of-the-pro-russian-party-sor-was-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison>

[10] <https://sports.yahoo.com/police-chisinau-detains-27-protesters-142900991.html>

[11] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/breakaway-moldovan-region-suggests-russia-deploy-more-peacekeepers-ria-2023-05-08/>

[12] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2023>

[13] <https://t.me/bbcruussian/45890> ; <https://t.me/bbcruussian/45892> ; <https://t.me/bbcruussian/45903> ; <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-president-russia-visit-japarov-putin-victory-day/32400550.html>

[14] <https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/04/24/972166-na-meropriyatiyah-v-chest-dnya-pobedi-zhdut-prezidenta-kirgizii>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/08/nikol-pashinyan-priedet-v-moskvu-na-den-pobedy>

[15] <https://t.me/sotaproject/58534>; <https://t.me/sotaproject/58529>; <http://www.president dot tj/ru/node/30628>

[16] <https://tass dot ru/politika/17699029>

[17] <https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/04/24/972166-na-meropriyatiyah-v-chest-dnya-pobedi-zhdut-prezidenta-kirgizii>; <https://regnum dot ru/news/3564808.html>; [https://central.asia-news.com/ru/articles/cnmi\\_ca/features/2022/05/09/feature-01](https://central.asia-news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2022/05/09/feature-01); <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31840960.html>; <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-cancels-victory-day-parade/31801848.html>;

[18] <https://sputnik dot by/20230508/lukashenko-priletel-v-moskvu-s-rabochim-vizitom-1075296827.html>; <https://armenpress dot am/eng/news/1110491.html>

[19] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotpVzddU6pp7zGZ5Qeb158xpMMfUHvQuA5sc23LEfHXKRkxwEqbBu28pJ19EoJ9vXl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aRdL1mTmajk7HV4qtxTrP5dR4SVE4bgPeYf7zne35UimnXwHGyAnozJNtnBsJFs7l>

[20] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12373>

[21] <https://t.me/vdd08/177>; <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1655478746009202688?s=20>

[22] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26296](https://t.me/mod_russia/26296); [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26284](https://t.me/mod_russia/26284)

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