

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2023

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November 5, 2023, 5pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. The Ukrainian Amed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes on Russian marine and port infrastructure at the Zalyv Shipyard in Kerch on the evening of November 4.[1] Satellite imagery from November 4 shows that the strike damaged a Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette at the shipyard, although the extent of the damage to the ship is currently unclear.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 13 of 15 Ukrainian missiles targeting the shipyard and acknowledged that two missiles damaged an unspecified ship.[3] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian cruise missiles damaged the *Askold* missile carrier, a Karakurt-class corvette that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) launched in 2021.[4] The Zalyv shipyard reportedly planned to construct 14 warships intended for the BSF between 2016 and 2021, including eight Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvettes.[5] ISW has only confirmed that three Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvettes have launched from the Zalyv shipyard as of 2023, however.[6] The Zalyv shipyard is the largest shipyard in Eastern Europe and is likely the main repair facility for the BSF in Crimea following a successful Ukraine strike on the Russian state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol on September 13, 2023.[7] The extent of damage to the repair facilities at the Zalyv Shipyard is unclear, although the available satellite imagery suggests that the Ukrainian strike has likely not caused damage that will disrupt its operations in the medium-to-long term, unlike the previous strike on the Sevmorzavod facility.[8] *Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL)* has reported that Russian forces have three active shipyards, including the Zalyv facility, in occupied Crimea.[9] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[10]

Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of November 4-5.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also disabled Ukrainian drones targeting a railway at an oil refinery in Dzhankoi,

occupied Crimea on November 5.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow missile strike on Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5.[13] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoria Halitsyna stated that locals reported two explosions in the city but that the Ukrainian General Staff was clarifying information.[14] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of the Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov notably stated in an interview with the *Independent* published on November 4 that Ukrainian forces intend to “capitalize” on their learned experiences and conduct large-scale drone strikes on Russian targets when fighting slows in the winter.[15] The *Independent* reported that Baranov stated that Ukraine intends to build on its “significant successes” with recent drone strikes that targeted critical Russian military assets and naval sites.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate. Zelensky emphasized that the situation on the battlefield remains very challenging but noted that he does not believe that the war is at a “stalemate.” He described it instead as a “check on the part of the Russian army,” suggesting that Ukraine can resume making significant advances when it resolves the military parity with Russian forces described by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to destroy Russian Black Sea Fleet assets and continued to reiterate Ukraine’s urgent need to receive air defense systems from Western partners. Zelensky further noted that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia until or unless Russia entirely withdraws from Ukrainian territories, concluding that Ukraine is not ready to concede its freedom to the “f###ig terrorist Putin.”[18] ISW continues to assess that external pressure to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia is harmful and counterproductive as long as Putin maintains his maximalist objectives and believes that he can attain them on the battlefield.[19]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast), as well as on the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Pidstepne (12km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[21]

Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov’s exact position. Chechen Duma Chairperson Magomed Daudov, Chechen Republic Press Head Akhmed Dudaev, and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov stated that Adam holds an unspecified “important position” in the security service of the Head of the Chechen Republic.[22] Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs special regiment commander Zamid Chalaev and Health Minister Adam Alkhanov claimed that Adam Kadyrov was appointed as the head of this security service.[23] Ramzan Kadyrov has not yet commented on his son’s appointment. Ramzan Kadyrov notably headed the security service of his father, former Chechen Republic President Akhmat Kadyrov, in the early 2000s until Akhmat Kadyrov’s death in 2004.[24] Adam Kadyrov will turn 16-years-old on November 24, 2023.[25]

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments. Russian authorities reportedly charged many of the antisemitic riot participants with using obscene language, disobedience of police orders, petty hooliganism, and violations of procedures for holding a rally.[26]

Dagestani courts sentenced rioters to six to 10 days of administrative arrest or compulsory labor. ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding wider punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.^[27]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to *NBC* and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate.**
- **Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5.**
- **Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov's exact position.**
- **Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.**
- **A Russian milblogger called on Russian “propagandists” to increase the use of Russian propaganda against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russia in an effort to increase the number of “volunteers” in the Russian military.**
- **Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued to promote the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacations.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northeast of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted offensive operations near Stepova Novosilka (18km southeast of Kupyansk), near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), and from Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna) towards the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[29] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and attacked near Makiivka on November 4.[30]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 5.[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Meale, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Megan Wilson, and Shaylei Dauphinais
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	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours		Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
	Russian Ground Lines of Communication		Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut on November 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have recently made gains east of the railway line near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[33]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Bakhmut on November 5 and recently made confirmed gains southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of a section of the railway line near Klishchiivka.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 10 Russian assaults near Bohdanivka (7km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[35]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Megan Wilson, and Shaylei Dauphinais
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- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on November 5 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 20 Russian assaults near Stepove (3km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established a foothold near Stepove and advanced west of a section of the railway line near the settlement.[37] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made unspecified gains southeast of Avdiivka and continued assaults in the direction of Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka) after conducting heavy MLRS fire.[38] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian artillery and aviation units continue to heavily strike Ukrainian positions in and near Avdiivka and that Russian forces regularly conduct four to 10 heavy aerial bombardments in a day.[39]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses near Avdiivka as of November 5. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 5 that Russian forces lost 212 personnel near Avdiivka over the past day.[40] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of the Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov stated on November 4 that Russian forces lost 250 personnel killed and wounded and 20 armored vehicles near Avdiivka in the past 24 hours.[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka) on November 5 but did not specify the outcome of the assaults.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Donetsk City as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Donetsk City Limits
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 20 Russian assaults near Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (11km southwest of Donetsk City).[43] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that there were 42 combat engagements in the Tavriisk direction (from Avdiivka to western Zaporizhia Oblast) over the past day and that the majority of fighting took place near Marinka.[44]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Novomykhailivka and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar) in western Donetsk Oblast on November 5.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours		Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Major Railroads
	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
	Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives		

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on November 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), advanced near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these purported advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske.[47]



Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 5.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around the Vremivka Salient as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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
Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Russian Field Fortifications
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast area on November 5 and made a marginal confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on November 4 indicates that Russian forces made a limited advance towards a trench line west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne).[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful attacks northwest of Verbove, near Robotyne, north of Nesteryanka (10km northwest of Robotyne), and near Pyatykhatky (25km northwest of Robotyne).[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on November 5 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division clearing Ukrainian positions during active defensive measures near Verbove and Robotyne.[50]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5 and made marginal confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Verbove.[51] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack near Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne).[53] Several Russian sources remarked that the situation along the Robotyne-Verbove line remains relatively unchanged and claimed that the fighting is mostly of a positional nature.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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
- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Russian Field Fortifications |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Ukrainian forces continued activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage posted on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced on the southwestern corner of a solar panel farm near Pidstepne (12km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[55] Additional geolocated footage posted on November 4 confirms that Ukrainian forces hold positions in houses in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles continue in Krynky and along the Pishchanivka-Poyma line (10km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[57]

Russian forces continued glide bomb strikes against west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces conducted nine airstrikes with 50 glide bombs against populated areas of west bank Kherson Oblast in the past day.[58] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing a Russian glide bomb strike on Odradokamyanka (50km east of Kherson City).[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have launched over 40 FAB-500 glide bombs at Ukrainian targets in Kherson Oblast over the past 24 hours.[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of November 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger called on Russian “propagandists” to increase the use of Russian propaganda against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) currently detained in Russia in an effort to increase the number of “volunteers” in the Russian military.[61] The milblogger suggested that Russian prisons housing Ukrainian POWs stream almost constant broadcasts of state television and radio programs, such as “Rossiya-24,” “Radio Mayak,” and “Radio Rossiya.” The milblogger also proposed that prisons show specially produced “propaganda lectures” about the Russian way of life and bring in Russian political scientists and economists to give talks in the prisons. Russian state media previously reported that the Russian “Bogdan Khmelnytsky” volunteer battalion “recruited” Ukrainian POWs from various Russian penal colonies.[62] Coercing POWs into combat, however, is a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.[63]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage purportedly of a successful test of the RSM-56 “Bulava” submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the *Emperor Alexander III* nuclear-powered strategic Borei-A class submarine cruiser in the White Sea near the Kamchatka peninsula on November 5.[64] The Russian MoD claimed that the firing of the ballistic missile was the final step before the Russian Navy decides whether to accept the missile into service. The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Navy has three Borei-A class submarines in service, one more completing tests, and three under construction. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on November 4 that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful test of the “Bulava” missile on October 25 and that Russia was struggling to improve its strategic nuclear force.[65] ISW has consistently assessed that Russia often references Russian nuclear capabilities in an attempt to dissuade the West from providing Ukraine with materiel.[66]

Russian defense manufacturer Kalashnikov Concern is reportedly modernizing the “Kub” drone based on Russian forces’ experience in the war in Ukraine.[67] Kalashnikov Concern President Alan Lushnikov stated that the company has successfully completed tests and that the updated Kub drone will have increased power and a larger warhead. Lushnikov also stated that the company is working on increasing the drone’s range and navigation systems.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continues to promote the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacations. Lvova-Belova stated on November 5 that she met with children from occupied Ukraine at the “Artek” children’s camp in occupied Crimea.[68]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian information space continues to discuss the official Russian response to domestic interethnic tensions. A prominent Russian milblogger complained that some Azerbaijani and Turkish migrants in Putilkovo, Moscow Oblast are affiliated with various nationalist groups and are “terrorizing” ethnic Russians in the town.[69] The milblogger complained that there is “not a day

without incidents” in ethnic diasporas and migrants in Russia and that the government repeatedly fails to respond adequately. Jewish Autonomous Okrug Head Rostislav Goldstein stated that the okrug is ready to accept refugees from the Israel-Hamas war under the Russian resettlement program to the Far East, and a Kremlin insider source amplified comments from local Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faith leaders in support of Goldstein’s proposal.[70]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://t.me/AFUStratCom/20918>

[2] <https://www.facebook.com/corruption.schemes/posts/pfbido2HwGMVsh9WTEsjCj...> ; <https://t.me/suspilnecrimea/9229> ; <https://meduza.io/news/2023/11/05/opublikovany-sputnikovye-snimki-sudostroitel'nogo-zavoda-v-kerchi-po-kotoromu-vsu-nanesli-raketnyy-udar>

[3] https://ria.ru/20231105/kerch-1907514377.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop

[4] <https://tass.com/defense/1340759> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/11/05/syly-oborony-provely-potuzhnu-robotu-shhodo-vyavleniya-j-urazhennya-rosijskogo-raketonosiyaskolda-nataliya-gumenyuk/> ; <https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/144>

[5] <https://jamestown.org/program/an-arsenal-of-empire-russian-naval-construction-in-crimea-and-implications-for-black-sea-security/> ; <https://oborona.ru/includes/periodics/navy/2015/0730/153716373/detail.shtml> ; <https://topwar.ru/91585-korvety-pr-22160-malozametnye-patruľnye-korabli-s-vozmozhnostyami-esminca-vsled-zasoobrazitelny.html> ; <https://topwar.ru/173342-korabli-proekta-23900-universalnye-desantnye-svoi.html>

[6] <https://tass.com/defense/1645805> ; <https://tass.com/defense/1340759> ; http://forums.airbase.ru/2023/06/t91586_267--malyj-raketnyj-korabl-korvet-proekta-22800-karakurt.491.html

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar091323> ; <https://kerchbutoma.ru/o-nas.html> ; <https://rg.ru/2022/05/14/reg-ufo/sudostroitelnyj-zavod-zaliv-v-kerchi-zagruzili-zakazami-na-100.html> ; <https://t.me/crimeainform/39425>

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar091323> ; <https://www.facebook.com/corruption.schemes/posts/pfbido2HwGMVsh9WTEsjCj...> ;

<https://t.me/suspilnecrimea/9229> ; <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/05/opublikovany-sputnikovye-snimki-sudostroitelnogo-zavoda-v-kerchi-po-kotoromu-vsu-nanesli-raketnyy-udar>

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