

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4

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Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is making verifiable progress in the south and the east. Ukrainian forces are advancing along several axes in western Kherson Oblast and have secured territory across the Siverskyi Donets River in Donetsk Oblast. The pace of the counteroffensive will likely change dramatically from day to day as Ukrainian forces work to starve the Russians of necessary supplies, disrupt their command and control, and weaken their morale even as counteroffensive ground assaults continue. The Russians will occasionally counterattack and regain some lost ground and will of course conduct likely fierce artillery and air attacks against liberated settlements and advancing Ukrainian troops. Ukrainian forces have made substantial enough progress to begin evoking more realistic commentary from the Russian milbloggers, who had been hewing very closely to the Kremlin's optimistic rhetoric until today.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukrainian forces liberated two unnamed settlements in southern Ukraine and one settlement in Donetsk Oblast on September 4.¹ Zelensky added that the Ukrainian 54th Mechanized Brigade also advanced in the direction Lysychansk-Siversk and established positions on unspecified heights. Ukrainian officials shared geolocated footage that shows Ukrainian forces raising a Ukrainian flag on a hospital building in Vysokopyllyia, south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.² Social media sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets River and liberated Ozerne, 20 km northwest of Siversk.³

Geolocated footage from September 2-3 shows Russian forces firing MLRS rounds from positions on the grounds of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) within 1km of a nuclear reactor.⁴ Russian opposition outlet *The Insider's* footage of Russian forces operating MLRS systems at the ZNPP reaffirms ISW's prior assessment that Russian forces have militarized the ZNPP.⁵ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on September 3 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the power grid for the second time in its operational history (the first instance occurred on August 25), likely due to continued Russian false flag attacks and other military activities in and around the ZNPP.⁶ Russian sources claimed the ZNPP has stopped providing energy to Ukraine.⁷

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is ready to negotiate Moscow's conditions for ending the Russian war in Ukraine on September 4, but the Kremlin is maintaining its maximalist goals to "denazify" Ukraine. Peskov said that the Kremlin would discuss with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky how Ukraine would meet Russian conditions during peace negotiations and noted that Russia will complete all stated objectives of the "special military operation."⁸ Peskov also noted that all conflicts end at the negotiations table and expressed that relations between Russia and the West will improve soon. Peskov's statement comes amidst the reports of the Ukrainian counteroffensive progress in southern Ukraine. The stated objectives of the

“special military operation” include regime change in Kyiv as well as the surrender of all of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts to the Kremlin. Russian efforts to integrate occupied areas of Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv Oblasts demonstrate that Moscow expects to keep those territories permanently as well. Peskov’s statement is thus a reiteration of Moscow’s demands for Ukrainian surrender and offers no indication that Moscow is willing to negotiate seriously and on the basis of a realistic assessment of its prospects in a war that is turning in Ukraine’s direction.

Key Takeaways

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukrainian forces liberated two unnamed settlements in southern Ukraine and one settlement in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has independently confirmed the liberation of the settlement in Donetsk Oblast and one of the settlements in Kherson Oblast.**
- **Geolocated footage shows Russian forces firing MLRS rounds from positions on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.**
- **Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), ammunition depots, and key positions to exhaust Russian forces and restrain Russian combat power.**
- **The Ukrainian liberation of Vysokopillya ignited critical discussions among some Russian milbloggers while Russian Defense Ministry maintained that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct “unsuccessful attempts” to advance.**
- **Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 127th Regiment of the 1st Army Corps personnel reportedly refused to fight due to a lack of supplies.**
- **Ukrainian forces regained territory on the left bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in Donetsk Oblast.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut and west of Donetsk City.**
- **Russian forces are reportedly moving military assets to areas situated along major ground lines of communication (GLOCS) in rear areas in Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of September 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces are continuing to make unspecified advances in Kherson Oblast and are exhausting Russian troops and logistics as part of the counteroffensive on September 4. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that “Ukrainian flags are returning to those places where they rightfully belong” and noted that Ukrainian forces liberated two unnamed villages in southern Ukraine.⁹ Ukrainian officials and social media users published footage of Ukrainian forces raising a Ukrainian flag in Vysokopillya, south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.¹⁰ Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces withdrew from Vysokopillya to avoid encirclement from the Olhyne and Potomkyne directions (west and east of Vysokopillya, respectively).¹¹ Some milbloggers noted that a lack of Russian aviation in the area (diverted, they say, to the fight around the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River) allowed for Ukrainian advances to Vysokopillya.¹²

Ukrainian officials did not name the second liberated settlement area. Kherson Oblast Administration Head Yaroslav Yanushevich reported that Russian forces shelled Olhyne, Potomkyne, Doryanka, and Novovoznesenske (southeast of Vysokopillya), while some milbloggers claimed that elements of Russian airborne forces also withdrew from Novovoznesenske, which may indicate a Ukrainian advance in the area.¹³ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched airstrikes at Lyubomyrivka (approximately 28km north of Kherson City), and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces left the settlement.¹⁴ The Ukrainian General Staff also reported Russian airstrikes on Sukhy Stavok, Bezimmenne and Kostromka, and other settlements around the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, which may indicate that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 12km southeast of the bridgehead.¹⁵ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are firing artillery at Kostromka and Sukhy Stavok, where battles continued throughout the day.¹⁶ Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Gumenyuk noted that Ukrainian forces are advancing and liberating settlements, but Russian forces are continuing to shell newly-established Ukrainian positions from afar.¹⁷

The Ukrainian General Staff noted that servicemen of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 127th Regiment of the 1st Army Corps refused to fight, citing a lack of supplies such as water.¹⁸ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian counterintelligence representatives are dealing with the 127th regiment and that its fate is unknown.¹⁹ Russian forces formed the 127th Regiment of forcefully mobilized personnel in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast in early April, alongside four other DNR regiments: the 103rd, 109th, 113th, and 125th.²⁰ ISW previously reported that the DNR redeployed the 109th, 113th, and 125th Regiments to northwestern Kherson Oblast in late July, and the 109th regiment reportedly surrendered on the first day of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.²¹ It is likely that Russian forces are reinforcing their frontline positions with inexperienced and forcefully mobilized elements that lack the will to fight.²²

Gumenyuk noted that the Ukrainian counteroffensive strategy is to exhaust Russian forces and added that Ukrainian forces have enough resources and forces to restrain Russian combat power in southern Ukraine.²³ Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), ammunition depots, and key positions to support Ukrainian ground counteroffensive efforts. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian missile and artillery units struck a Russian ferry crossing in Beryslav (north of Nova Kakhovka), and social media users published footage of Ukrainian forces striking a

segment of the Antonivsky Road Bridge on the left bank of the Dnipro River.²⁴ Ukrainian attacks on ferry crossings are likely in direct support of ongoing counteroffensive operations, as the disruptions generated by such strikes are more ephemeral than those caused by attacks on bridges. Continuing strikes on the bridges, on the other hand, are indicators of a long-term effort to prevent Russian forces from reestablishing GLOCs before the conclusion of the liberation of western Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian military officials noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Bashtanka Raion, and confirmed the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Oleshky (approximately nine kilometers south of Kherson City) that occurred on September 2.²⁵

Social media footage also showed that Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian targets across central Kherson Oblast on September 3 and 4. Ukrainian social media footage showed a large smoke plume in Kozatske (on the right bank of the Dnipro River near Nova Kakhovka), where Ukrainian officials previously reported destroying a Russian pontoon crossing on September 3.²⁶ The Russian Defense Ministry claimed to intercept Ukrainian HIMARS, HARM, and Olkha rounds in Nova Kakhovka and over the Kakhovka Hydro Power Plant, and Ukrainian social media users reported hearing explosions in Nova Kakhovka.²⁷

Russian milbloggers claimed that battles continued in five directions: east and west of Vysokopillya, near the Ukrainian bridgehead, near Snihurivka approximately 60km east of Mykolaiv City, and northwest and west of Kherson City on September 4. Milblogger accounts remain largely unverifiable as Ukrainian officials have not announced additional advances outside of those mentioned above.

Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces were unsuccessful in advancing in the Petrivka direction, southeast of Vysokopillya.²⁸ Milbloggers claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in street fights in Arhanhelske (on the eastern bank of Inhulets River and west of Vysokopillya), and that Russian forces still control the southern part of the settlement.²⁹ Milbloggers also stated that fighting continued on the southern outskirts of Olhyne, the next settlement west of Vysokopillya.³⁰ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian advances southeast of the bridgehead are contingent upon their ability to accumulate more reserves and noted that Russian forces are intensely firing at Ukrainian forces in the Andriivka area.³¹ Milbloggers noted that Ukrainian attempts to seize Blahodatne (west of Snihurivka) were unsuccessful and that artillery fire continues in the Snihurivka area.³² Milbloggers noted that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in positional battles in Posad-Pokrovske, following a Ukrainian unsuccessful attempt to conduct a counteroffensive in the area.³³ Positional battles reportedly continued in Oleksandrivka (35km west of Kherson City), and milbloggers published footage of abandoned Ukrainian military equipment in the area.³⁴ Satellite imagery showed Russian second and third lines of defenses in Kyselivka (approximately 18km northwest of Kherson City).³⁵ The satellite imagery also showed that Russian forces dug the trenches at the end of May and extended them in late August. Russian forces have extensive defenses around Kherson City International Airport in Chornobaivka. Geolocated footage showed Russian forces striking advancing Ukrainian forces south of Tavriiske (approximately 38km northwest of Kherson City).³⁶

The Ukrainian liberation of Vysokopillya ignited some critical discussions among Russian milbloggers, whereas the Russian Defense Ministry maintained that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct “unsuccessful attempts” to advance in the Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih direction.³⁷ The Russian Defense Ministry changed its day-to-day recap of the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive from declaring total Ukrainian defeat on August 29, to claiming high Ukrainian losses among personnel and military equipment.³⁸ Milbloggers largely presented Ukrainian advances in northern Kherson Oblast as a

“massacre of Kherson Oblast” due to claimed large losses among Ukrainian troops.³⁹ Some milbloggers noted that Ukrainian forces conducted a correct counteroffensive around Vysokopillya, and noted that Russian forces lost a tactically significant settlement.⁴⁰ This is the first occasion on which some milbloggers have broken with the Kremlin’s optimism about the Ukrainian counteroffensive and recognized Russian setbacks.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort 1- Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort 2- Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort- Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Southern Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: We have revised our organization of Russian lines of effort to include Russian operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast as part of the Donetsk Oblast effort due to recently observed force allocations indicating the Russian grouping east of Hulyaipole, previously grouped with the Southern Axis, will support efforts southwest of Donetsk City.

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk on September 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted ground assaults near Bohorodychne, Pasika, Krasnopillya, and Dolyna, all within 25km northwest of Slovyansk.⁴¹ It is unclear if Ukrainian forces have liberated Pasika (approximately 27km northwest of Slovyansk and on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Bohorodychne (approximately 20km northwest of Slovyansk) and Husarivka (approximately 40km northwest of Izyum) and continued routine shelling along the Izyum-Slovyansk Axis.⁴²

Ukrainian forces regained territory on the left bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in Donetsk Oblast.⁴³ Geolocated imagery and footage published on September 3-4 show that Ukrainian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets River and took control of Ozerne, approximately 20km east of Slovyansk, on an

unspecified date.⁴⁴ Ukrainian forces' ability to cross the Siverskyi Donets River without coming under Russian fire suggests degrading Russian control of the river's left bank east of Slovyansk.


Russian forces did not conduct any ground assaults near Siversk on September 4 and continued routine shelling on settlements in the area.⁴⁵ Russian forces conducted an airstrike on Verkhnokamianske, approximately 8km east of Siversk.⁴⁶

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut on September 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack near Bakhmut, Bakhmut'ske (approximately 10km northeast of Bakhmut), and Pokrovske (approximately 11km northeast of Bakhmut).⁴⁷ Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces captured most of Kodema but that fighting continues in the area as of September 4.⁴⁸

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Donetsk City on September 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground assaults near Pervomaiske (10km northwest of Donetsk City) and Pisky (5km northwest of Donetsk City).⁴⁹ Russian troops continued routine artillery strikes along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.⁵⁰

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City or in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 4 and continued routine artillery strikes in these areas.⁵¹ The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck Kurakhove and Yelyzavetivka (roughly 10km south of Kurakhove), Donetsk Oblast, and Malynivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 15km east of Hulyaipole).⁵²

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of September 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Major Railroads
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Supporting Effort #1- Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication – GLOCs – to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks north of Kharkiv City and continued routine shelling of Kharkiv City and the surrounding settlements on September 4.⁵³ A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Vovchansk (75km northeast of Kharkiv City and on the intersection of the T2104 and T2108 highways) and Balakliya (50km northwest of Izyum and at the intersection of the M03 and P78 highways).⁵⁴ Social media footage showed a powerful explosion in Balakliya.⁵⁵

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of September 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie
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| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |
| Key Ukrainian Roads | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Russian Ground Lines of Communication | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: ISW reassessed Russian-controlled territory around Pasika based on a Ukrainian General Staff report that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault in the area on September 4. ISW will adjust our maps once more information on Pasika becomes available.

Supporting Effort #2- Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia Oblast and continued routine shelling along the line of contact on September 4.⁵⁶ The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian command post in Mykilske, 23km northeast of Orikhiv.⁵⁷

Russian forces are reportedly moving military assets to areas situated along major ground lines of communication (GLOCs), likely to protect Russian GLOCs to Melitopol and Tokmak. Ukraine's Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are bringing Russian military personnel to Tokmak, on the intersection of the N30, T0408, and T0401 highways. These GLOCs connect Melitopol and Berdyansk to the front lines in Zaporizhia Oblast and the rear in western Donetsk Oblast.⁵⁸ The Resistance Center also reported that Russian forces are storing military equipment in agricultural equipment storage areas near Melitopol.⁵⁹ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 70 Russian servicemen currently live in a school that is actively holding classes in Orlyanske, 24km southwest of Vasylivka checkpoint.⁶⁰ The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces are using many active schools as cover for Russian military assets.⁶¹ Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov warned that Russian forces are planning military provocations at schools in occupied territories, supporting ISW's prior assessment.⁶²


Russian and occupation officials are increasing their claims of Ukrainian attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Russian MoD claimed that Russian electronic warfare systems prevented eight Ukrainian attack drones from striking the ZNPP on September 4, intercepting the drones 1.5km from the ZNPP grounds.⁶³ Occupation Enerhodar Head Alexander Volga claimed on September 3 that a Ukrainian artillery shell pierced the wall of one of the nuclear reactor containment units on an unspecified date but did not produce the photo of the damage he claimed to possess.⁶⁴ Russian news outlet *Komsomolskaya Pravda* published excerpts of interviews with claimed former ZNPP personnel who left Ukraine for Russia in which the former employees downplayed the risk and impact of a nuclear disaster at the ZNPP.⁶⁵ These claimed former employees stated that even direct artillery strikes are unable to penetrate the nuclear reactor containment units because the containment unit walls are too thick.⁶⁶ *Komsomolskaya Pravda* also reported claims that a disaster at the ZNPP would only cause nuclear contamination on a local level with an unspecified span, not a global level.⁶⁷

Russian forces fired on Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely from positions near Enerhodar on the opposite bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir.⁶⁸

Russian forces continued targeting rear areas in Mykolaiv Oblast on September 4. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City with S-300 anti-air missiles.⁶⁹ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are using outdated S-300 missiles to strike ground targets due to a shortage of high-precision missiles, supporting ISW's previous assessment.⁷⁰ The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have thousands of S-300 missiles in storage, but that Russian forces are unable to use most of them because the missiles are outdated.⁷¹ A Russian source claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military hospital in Mykolaiv City, which the source claimed is a legitimate military target.⁷² Russian forces also conducted airstrikes in Ochakiv (southwest of Mykolaiv City on the Black Sea coast) and Voznesensk (roughly 88km northwest of Mykolaiv City).⁷³

Russian air defenses reportedly shot down a UAV over Kazachya Bay in Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on September 3-4.⁷⁴

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of September 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Ukrainian officials announced on August 29 that Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast. An unnamed military official of an unspecified country told CNN on August 29 that Ukrainian forces liberated Pravdyne, Nova Dmytrivka, and Tomyna Balka (northwest of Kherson City) and Arkhanhelske (along the Inhulets River). ISW will readjust the maps when more open sources confirm the liberation of these settlements. ISW extended Ukrainian counteroffensives to Sukhyi Stavok based on several claims from Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces liberated the settlement on August 29. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back to Sukhyi Stavok from Kostromka and Bezimmenne on September 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched air strikes on Bezimmenne and Kostromka on September 4, which may indicate a Ukrainian advance in the area.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities are continuing to struggle to recruit military personnel within occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Wagner personnel are recruiting convicts from correctional colony No. 124 in Donetsk City.⁷⁵ Head of the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School Mikhail Tikhonov stated that the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School suffered a shortage of applicants in 2022, as only 44 people entered the course and only 40 graduated.⁷⁶

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow's choosing)

Russian occupation authorities in occupied southern Ukraine are continuing filtration and passportization measures to crack down on partisan activity in rear areas during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Occupation authorities in Tavriisk (immediately west of Nova Kakhovka and on the left bank of the Dnipro River) are reportedly gathering civilian data to intimidate locals into revealing members of the partisan movement.⁷⁷ Ukraine's Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are blocking humanitarian convoys from entering occupied Zaporizhia Oblast through the checkpoint at Vasylivka to coerce civilians into accepting Russian passports in exchange for humanitarian aid.⁷⁸ The Ukrainian Ministry for Reintegration of Occupied Territories announced on August 22 that it is restricting all passage in and out of occupied southern Ukraine through Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (the only checkpoint for such passage) to transit for humanitarian purposes only, likely because of the occupation administrations' coercion and passportization efforts.⁷⁹

Russian occupation authorities are increasing measures to force Ukrainian civilians to send their children to occupation administration-run schools. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that occupation propaganda events to mark the first day of school in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on September 1 failed to garner civilian support.⁸⁰ Ukrainian Advisor to Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Khlan reported that occupation authorities in Henichensk, Kherson Oblast are blackmailing civilians into accepting Russian passports and providing the data of civilians who left occupied territories to coerce civilians into working for occupation schools.⁸¹ Khlan stated that Ukrainian parents do not want to send their children to occupation schools after the school year started on September 1.⁸² Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that occupation-run schools are facing low attendance issues.⁸³

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

- ¹ <https://suspilne dot media/278290-na-doneccini-zsu-zvilnili-naselenij-punkt-ta-zajnali-visoti-zelenskij/>
- ² <https://t.me/ermaka2022/1227>
- ³ <https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy27bilyak/posts/pfbid02kddBhez9i6RrG3Wqu3kex9svjmR9RdEwZeLVSA23ggRhx3327yUSQF5nPWxQsuz7l>; <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566441869776932865>; <https://twitter.com/BigSmokyDude2/status/1566316192335364098>; <https://t.me/mig41/20379>; <https://t.me/mig41/20374>; <https://t.me/milinfoolive/89932>; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566399508224872449; <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39721>; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566399888346202113; <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39762>; <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566391913082667010>; <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566385997247647746>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62378
- ⁴ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jSQw35mJrA&ab_channel=TheInsider; https://twitter.com/the_ins_ru/status/1566160816298237952 <https://twitter.com/splussi/status/1566317804575506439>; <https://t.me/stranaua/61798>
- ⁵ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21>; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jSQw35mJrA&ab_channel=TheInsider; https://twitter.com/the_ins_ru/status/1566160816298237952 <https://twitter.com/splussi/status/1566317804575506439>; <https://t.me/stranaua/61798>
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- ⁸ <https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2022/09/04/939096-peskov-nazval-usloviya-dlya-peregovorov-rossii-i-ukraini>; <https://www.interfax dot ru/world/860624>; <https://www.unian dot net/politics/v-kremle-zayavili-chto-gotovy-k-peregovoram-s-zelenskim-11966622.html> https://t.me/rian_ru/176566; <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5546793>
- ⁹ <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/09/04/volodymyr-zelenskyj-proviv-cherbove-zasidannya-stavky-verhovnogo-golovnokomanduvacha/>; <https://suspilne dot media/278290-na-doneccini-zsu-zvilnili-naselenij-punkt-ta-zajnali-visoti-zelenskij/>
- ¹⁰ https://t.me/supernova_plus/10115; <https://twitter.com/NikoRadans/status/1566385002094403585>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25354> <https://t.me/stranaua/61846>; <https://t.me/zalpalyanytsya/1509>;
- ¹¹ <https://t.me/rybar/38194>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62382; <https://t.me/voenkorkotenok/39906>
- ¹² <https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1566442334811787264>; https://t.me/grey_zone/14887
- ¹³ https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1566394747849146369; <https://t.me/voenacher/28319>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/935>
- ¹⁴ <https://t.me/strelkovii/3169>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjyEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSI>
- ¹⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjyEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjyEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSI>
- ¹⁶ <https://t.me/rybar/38175>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62364; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9304>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9304>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62361
- ¹⁷ <https://suspilne dot media/278093-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-193-tekstovij-onlajn/>
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<https://www.facebook.com/ouvKakhovka/posts/pfbid0Q6acJakELqeCNxGcitVc9fXPhxQE2j2e6cuDyvtviPumQyUSdPjsgtNczJ7qYKMtl>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25346>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25348>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25349>;
<https://t.me/hueviyherson/25345>; <https://t.me/zalpalyanytsya/1510> ; <https://t.me/rybar/38170>;
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<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566332859119505409>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25346>;
<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566333915987599360>;
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<https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566363082364014592>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62358;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62362; <https://t.me/rybar/38170>; <https://t.me/milinfohive/89911>;
<https://t.me/epoddubny/12139>; <https://t.me/epoddubny/1214>; <https://t.me/senkevichonline/2363>;
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<https://www.facebook.com/ouvKakhovka/posts/pfbid0Q6acJakELqeCNxGcitVc9fXPhxQE2j2e6cuDyvtviPumQyUSdPjsgtNczJ7qYKMtl>

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<https://t.me/hueviyherson/25355>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25356>

²⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/19501; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25356>

²⁸ <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39906>

²⁹ <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39906>; <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566413645243990016>;
<https://t.me/rybar/38194>

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³¹ <https://t.me/rybar/38175>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62364; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9304>;
<https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9304>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39906>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62361;
<https://t.me/strelkovii/3169>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/3168>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/3168>; <https://t.me/rybar/38183>

³² <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39906>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39905>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62408

³³ <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39906>

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<https://twitter.com/NLwartracker/status/1566070192266006529>;
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<https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566109893777674242>

³⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/19501

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³⁹ <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9308>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9301>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39895>;
<https://t.me/milinfohive/89916>; <https://t.me/milinfohive/89913>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9305>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/3170>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjiiEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSl>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/5881; <https://t.me/rybar/38183>

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<https://twitter.com/BigSmokyDude2/status/1566316192335364098>; <https://t.me/mig41/20379>; <https://t.me/mig41/20374>;
<https://t.me/milinfoive/89932>; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566399508224872449;
<https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39721>; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566399888346202113;
<https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39762>; <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566391913082667010>;
<https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566385997247647746>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62378

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>; <https://t.me/stranaua/61777>

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⁴⁸ <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBezsonoV/17241>; <https://t.me/voenkors/196>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39899>

⁴⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjiiEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSl>

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7135; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7133 https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7129;

⁵¹ <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RzSoQU1WHKKweQF9dkNjiiEEWuiX4xtvHqtZmjEX6kHxM3wQihYt9Lvu78haVdPSl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>

⁵² https://t.me/mod_russia/19501

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZV6oVrxMm1jJxF5oZx9FZ4SonvBz6uT6JCfqWk5bxW8zWxs8A9HF6s5gFEKTGp3Wl>; https://t.me/mod_russia/19501

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⁶² https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/516; <https://t.me/spravdi/16545>;

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https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1357; <https://t.me/vilkul/1871>; <https://t.me/Yevtushenko E/714>; <https://t.me/rybar/38183>

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<https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/2440>; <https://t.me/senkevichonline/2369>; <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25335>;

<https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/2440>; <https://t.me/Bratchuk Sergey/18055>; <https://t.me/Bratchuk Sergey/18054>;

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⁷² <https://t.me/rybar/38193>

⁷³ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/25335>; <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/2440>; <https://t.me/Bratchuk Sergey/18055>;

<https://t.me/Bratchuk Sergey/18054>; <https://t.me/stranaua/61823>

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