

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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May 24, 2023, 5:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12 pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city's capture. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed during an interview with Russian political strategist Konstantin Dolgov on May 23 that Wagner lost 10,000 convict recruits and 10,000 full-time professional Wagner fighters killed in action over the course of the Battle for Bakhmut.¹ Prigozhin specifically noted that Wagner had recruited 50,000 prisoners, 20 percent of whom (10,000) died in fighting for Bakhmut.² Russian milbloggers immediately seized on the reported losses, shifting the overall Russian conversation away from discussions of the significance of the capture of Bakhmut and amplifying speculation surrounding the reported losses. The nationalist pro-war faction, exemplified by the views of former Russian officer Igor Girkin, commented on the massive scale of the reported losses and speculated that real losses may be much higher. Russian politician Viktor Alksnis simply remarked that the Soviet Army lost far fewer soldiers (15,051) in nine years in Afghanistan.³ Girkin stated that he believes that Wagner's actual losses could be more than 1.5 times higher than Prigozhin's claims and pointed out that of the 50,000 recruits Wagner received from prisons, 10,000 died in action and 26,000 reportedly received pardons and returned to Russia, leaving 14,000 prison recruits unaccounted for.⁴ Girkin suggested that a large portion of these 14,000 unaccounted-for prison recruits may have also been killed in action and claimed that Wagner has likely suffered more than 40,000 killed in action.⁵ Girkin suggested that Prigozhin "keep [his] mouth shut" and stop talking about "wild losses for a very insignificant result."⁶ Another Russian milblogger, by contrast, praised Prigozhin for being open about the scale of losses and stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have hidden such figures.⁷

The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city's capture. As ISW reported on May 22 factions within the pro-war information space immediately began arguing over whether Wagner or regular Russian units and commanders should receive medals and commendations for operations in Bakhmut.⁸ Prigozhin's claims about Wagner's losses in Bakhmut have similarly become a distinct point of tension in the information space and have come to define the predominant discourse about Russia's entire campaign in Bakhmut. In shifting the conversation towards claimed Wagner losses, Prigozhin has largely succeeded in further depriving the Russian MoD of the opportunity to claim informational victory over Bakhmut and will likely continue to define and lead conversations on Bakhmut going forward but at the cost of highlighting the huge losses his forces suffered for a negligible gain.

Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin stated in his May 23 interview with Dolgov that the Russian military leadership has so far failed to achieve the main objectives of the war in

Ukraine.⁹ Prigozhin blamed his usual targets, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, for being the main problem within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and for blocking support and supplies to Wagner.¹⁰ Prigozhin also criticized Shoigu's son-in-law and daughter for being the stereotypical children of the Russian elite whose life experience is in dramatic opposition to those fighting in Ukraine.¹¹ Prigozhin warned that the Russian elite is fostering a situation that could end up like the revolution of 1917, in which soldiers and their loved ones stood up against the Russian government.¹² Prigozhin threatened that the Russian public may become violent towards the Russian elite, referencing mobs with pitchforks and alluding to the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, a string of politically motivated mob assassinations in France in 1572.¹³ **Prigozhin's somewhat subtle and purposefully obscure threats of violence represent an inflection in his longstanding feuds with the Russian military establishment and select elite figures.**

Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Prigozhin reiterated that the Wagner Group is the best army in the world and argued that the conventional Russian army is second to Wagner.¹⁴ Prigozhin claimed that 6,000 Wagner personnel can each manage his own company worth of personnel and that Wagner could therefore command a force of 600,000 personnel, roughly twice the estimated number of Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine.¹⁵ Prigozhin suggested that he has previously asked for 200,000 personnel to command in Ukraine and argued that if he had such a force then Wagner could advance from 50 to 150km in different directions.¹⁶ Prigozhin claimed that he did not receive this force because of fears that such a force would allow him to dictate terms and theoretically "come to Moscow in tanks."¹⁷ Prigozhin also advocated for Russian Deputy-Minister-of-Defense-for-Logistics-turned-Wagner-Group-deputy-commander Colonel General Mikhail Mizinstev to replace Shoigu as Defense Minister and for former overall theater commander and alleged Wagner ally Army General Sergey Surovikin to replace Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff.¹⁸

Prigozhin is also likely doubling down on his attempts to establish himself as a Russian totalitarian figure who could achieve military victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin called for complete martial law, several subsequent waves of mobilization, and wide-scale economic mobilization of Russian industry to save Russia.¹⁹ Prigozhin also suggested that Russia should become a totalitarian regime akin to North Korea and close all borders for a certain number of years to achieve victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin has routinely crafted an image to resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia's national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and Stalinist totalitarian control.²⁰ Prigozhin is likely advocating for incredibly radical policy approaches to the war in Ukraine to contrast himself with Putin's relatively risk averse decision-making approach to the war.²¹ ISW has previously assessed that Prigozhin harbors serious political ambitions and intends to cement himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.²² The capture of Bakhmut has likely emboldened Prigozhin to pursue those ambitions in a more explicit manner regardless of the internal upheaval that it may cause or the danger it may place him in with the Kremlin.

The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to attendees of the 11th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in Moscow on May 24 to deliver boilerplate rhetoric accusing the West of generating global instability and calling on Asian, African, and Latin American states to form a multipolar world order.²³ Putin later attended the Eurasian Economic Forum in Moscow alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan.²⁴ Putin also met with Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Dodik demonstratively supported the Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine by stating that Russia was forced to launch the "special military operation" and that the war is a clash against the West.²⁵ The Kremlin has previously leveraged energy and military cooperation with

Republika Srpska to attempt to spread Russian influence in the Balkans, although Russian influence with its other notable partner in the region, Serbia, appears to be waning.²⁶ The Kremlin has used previous international forums and meetings with heads of state to portray Russia as having robust international partnerships and to advocate for the formation of a potential anti-Western coalition.²⁷ Putin most notably tried and failed to secure a no-limits bilateral partnership with Chinese President Xi Jinping in late March and align China with Russia in Putin's envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West.²⁸ The nominal support of several post-Soviet states and the explicit support of a small constituent entity is likely far less than what the Kremlin is hoping to achieve with this wider diplomatic effort.

Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting that Western Military District Border Guards expelled all pro-Ukrainian forces from Belgorod Oblast, killing 70 personnel and destroying an unspecified number of vehicles and armored vehicles.²⁹ Some milbloggers criticized the ineffectiveness of the Russian border guards and questioned why they would allow the RDK and LSR to break through to Russian territory and mine the border areas over the course of two days.³⁰ Other milbloggers criticized Russian forces for not maintaining "normal communication and interactions" with border guards, which created difficulties in repelling RDK and LSR forces.³¹ One milblogger praised Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov and claimed that he rose to the occasion during the raid by solving problems that civilian officials usually do not have to solve.³² Gladkov, however, said that he has "more questions for the MoD" and that lessons needed to be learned from the mistakes in Belgorod Oblast.³³ Another milblogger criticized Belgorod Oblast civilian authorities for allowing civilians to live one kilometer away from the "front line" and questioned why authorities chose not to relocate civilians until after the situation improved.³⁴

***The New York Times* reported on May 24 that unnamed US officials said that the US intelligence community assesses with low confidence that unknown Ukrainian elements with unknown connections to Ukraine's leadership were responsible for the May 3 drone attacks on the Kremlin.**³⁵ ISW had previously assessed that the attack was a Russian false flag operation on May 3.³⁶ ISW has no additional information about this incident.

Key Takeaways

- **Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city's capture.**
- **The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city's capture.**
- **Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships.**
- **Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.**

- Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Masyutivka (16km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).³⁷ Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that assault detachments of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) conducted a ground attack near Masyutivka.³⁸ Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces captured Yahidne (22km east of Kupyansk) prior to May 24 and that Russian forces additionally made marginal advances near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).³⁹ Video footage amplified on May 24 purportedly shows Chechen Akhmat-Vostok forces operating near Kreminna.⁴⁰

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click [here](#) to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis of the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Ivanivske (3km southwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut).⁴¹ Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian troops are continuing defensive operations on the outskirts of Bakhmut.⁴² A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces completely control Bakhmut and that forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are slowly entering the city to take over clearing

operations.⁴³ Another Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian troops may be intensifying the movement of military equipment and personnel through Kostyantynivka (17km southwest of Bakhmut).⁴⁴

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Avdiivka and Novokalynove; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.⁴⁵ Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and Nevelske.⁴⁶ Ukrainian Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaly Barbarash reported that Russian forces conducted a massive artillery strike on Avdiivka and launched two airstrikes with unguided aerial bombs at the city on the morning of May 24.⁴⁷ Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck two Ukrainian fuel depots and a command post around Avdiivka during the strikes.⁴⁸

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 24.⁴⁹

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows a Russian FAB-500 strike on Kizomys (20km southwest of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast.⁵⁰ Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on May 23 that Russian forces attacked Beryslav (60km northeast of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast with four KAB bombs (a FAB-500 variant).⁵¹ A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to use KAB bombs on Ukrainian positions near Polohy (88km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Russian forces reportedly continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 24 that Russian forces continue to militarize the ZNPP by using power units No. 1, 2 and 4 as logistics and military bases.⁵² The GUR also stated that Russian forces permanently maintain armored vehicles, trucks, and personnel at the ZNPP and rotate personnel and equipment after curfew. ISW has previously reported on Russian militarization of the ZNPP.⁵³

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing a Ukrainian attack on the “Ivan Khurs” Yury Ivanov-class intelligence vessel in the Black Sea on May 24.⁵⁴ The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed all three unmanned speedboats that attacked the “Ivan Khurs” 140km northeast of the Bosphorus Strait while the vessel was protecting the Turk Stream and Blue Stream pipelines.⁵⁵ Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁶ Shoigu added that 21,000 personnel have undergone training to form new unspecified formations.⁵⁷ Shoigu’s figure is far lower than the roughly 300,000 mobilized personnel who underwent expedited training following the start of partial mobilization in 2022, the conventional 134,000 conscripts generated during a bi-annual conscription cycle, or the number of Russian volunteers stemming from widespread recruitment efforts.⁵⁸ Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev recently claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.⁵⁹ If Shoigu’s figure refers to contract Russian servicemembers, then Russian efforts to generate contract servicemembers since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine have failed to meet Russian force requirements. It is unclear if Shoigu was referring to contract servicemembers or any other specific subset of the Russian Armed Forces, however.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on May 25 that Russian cadets from higher military academies are undergoing training near the Ukrainian border in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.⁶⁰ The Resistance Center reported that the cadets are undergoing training at the deployment points of elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and the 76th Air Assault Division in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.⁶¹ Russian graduates from higher military academies recently graduated several months ahead of schedule, and Russian forces are likely expediting the normal education path for cadets to generate new lower and medium-level commanders.⁶² ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of recent Russian graduates serving in Ukraine or current cadets training near the Ukrainian border.

The Russian State Duma adopted in the first reading a bill preventing Russian officials with access to state secrets from traveling abroad.⁶³ The bill also bans people with financial accounts and real estate abroad from accessing state secrets and prohibits lawyers working on cases involving state secrets from leaving the country. The bill does permit those with access to state secrets to travel abroad for humanitarian reasons, including the death of close relatives or the need for emergency treatments. ISW previously reported that Russian security services are allegedly confiscating the passports of senior officials and state company executives to limit flights from Russia.⁶⁴ These measures illustrate an increasing paranoia within the Russian government about informational security that may lead to further draconian security measures reminiscent of the Soviet Union.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that research by independent Russian journalists suggests that more Russian personnel have gone absent without leave (AWOL) since January 2023 than in all of 2022.⁶⁵ The UK MoD reported that 1,053 Russian personnel have gone AWOL between January and May of 2023. The UK MoD also reported that Russian court data suggests that Russian personnel found guilty of going AWOL have received suspended sentences, allowing them to redeploy to Ukraine.

Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian citizens over concerns about Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Russian sources claimed on May 24 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers detained a design engineer of an unspecified military industrial enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast for transmitting information about the location of defense enterprises, air defense systems, and Russian personnel to Ukrainian representatives.⁶⁶ ISW previously assessed that Russian authorities appear to be using the pretext of threats to Russia's DIB as one justification for potential crackdowns as well as for the FSB's ongoing overhaul of domestic security organs.⁶⁷

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on May 24. A Russian source claimed on May 24 that the Russian Federation Council approved the law after consulting with the Russian Central Election Commission and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).⁶⁸ The Russian source also stated that the Federation Council approved a law that allows Russian occupation authorities to establish specifics of holding regional elections.⁶⁹ The Russian State Duma previously adopted amendments to the martial law legislation on May 18 that require that the FSB and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to authorize holding elections in territories under martial law.⁷⁰ ISW continues to assess that these measures indicate that Russian officials and occupation authorities may be setting informational conditions for September regional elections in case Russia loses more territory as a result of Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin will chair a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council of Ministers on May 25 in Minsk.⁷¹ The meeting will discuss threats to the CSTO member states, improving the crisis response system, military-technical cooperation, and other topics.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

¹ <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>; <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>

² <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

³ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5019>

⁴ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5022>

⁵ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5022>

⁶ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5023>

⁷ <https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24508>; https://t.me/anatoly_nesmiyan/10009

⁸ <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023>

⁹ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹¹ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹² <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹³ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/superdolgov/9446>; <https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a>

²⁰ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar111422>

²¹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020523>

²² <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052123>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032823>

²³ <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71189>

²⁴ <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71198>

²⁵ <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71188>

²⁶ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030223>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russia-review-december-1-2021-%E2%80%93-january-11-2022>

²⁷ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923>;

<https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923>;

²⁸ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123>

²⁹ <https://telegra.ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-general-a-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24>

³⁰ <https://t.me/donrf22/21807>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5016>

³¹ <https://t.me/voenacher/45154>; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25691>

³² <https://t.me/rybar/47484>

³³ <https://meduza.io/news/2023/05/23/u-menya-esche-bolshe-voprosov-chem-u-vas-k-ministerstvu-oborony-belgorodskiy-gubernator-o-napadenii-vooruzhennoy-gruppirovki-na-region>; https://vk.com/gladkov_vv?w=wall639631882_891571

³⁴ https://t.me/notes_veterans/9668

³⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/24/us/politics/ukraine-kremlin-drone-attack.html>

³⁶ <https://www.understandingwar.org/background/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2023>

³⁷

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjiejMTWy7XAQHRxmWzSYyqeil>

³⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/26798

³⁹ https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1661280349723279361?s=20 ;

<https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661346034641928194?s=20> ;

<https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/166134603790092401?s=20>; https://t.me/k_2_54/107;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661346284744130562>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661346718460387330>

⁴⁰ https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86746

⁴¹

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l>

⁴² <https://t.me/osirskiy/85>

⁴³ <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47855>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/brussinf/6065>

⁴⁵

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjiejMTWy7XAQHRxmWzSYyqeil>;

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⁴⁶ <https://t.me/readovkanews/59423>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12716>

⁴⁷ <https://suspilne.media/485539-rosijski-vijska-zranku-zavdali-kilka-masovanih-udariv-po-avdiivci/>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/readovkanews/59423>; https://t.me/mod_russia/26807

⁴⁹

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjiejMTWy7XAQHRxmWzSYyqeil>;

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⁵⁰ https://t.me/dva_majors/15797; <https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1661314417156411392?s=20>

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⁵² <https://gur.gov.ua/content/okupanty-prodovzhuiut-militaryzatsiiu-terytorii-zaes.html>

⁵³ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023>;
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⁵⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/26810

⁵⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/26806; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36681; <https://meduza.io/news/2023/05/24/minoborony-rf-ukrainskie-bespiotnye-katera-atakovali-korabl-chernomorskogo-flota-ivan-hurs>

⁵⁶ <https://telegra.ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generalarmii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24>

⁵⁷ <https://telegra.ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generalarmii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24>

⁵⁸ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623> ;
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⁵⁹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923>

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⁶⁴ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040323>

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⁷¹ <https://t.me/modmilby/28112>