

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00 pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days. *The Moscow Times* identified the tanker as the chemical tanker *SIG*, which is currently under US sanctions for supplying jet fuel to Russian forces in Syria.¹ Sources within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) confirmed to the Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy struck the ship near the Kerch Strait Bridge using a naval drone.² The Russian Federal Agency for Sea and Inland Water Transport (Rosmorrechflot) reported that the strike on the *SIG* occurred 27 kilometers south of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers claimed that the attack caused Russian authorities to suspend traffic on the bridge.³ Russian news aggregator *Baza* reported that the naval drone punched a two-by-one meter hole in the *SIG*'s engine room, and state Russian outlets claimed that the incident did not result in an oil spill.⁴ A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian naval drone intentionally targeted the *SIG*'s engine room because targeting the stern creates the least likelihood of an oil spill and is where the most expensive and difficult-to-repair equipment is located.⁵ The nature and location on the ship of the attack suggest that Ukrainian forces intended to disable the ship without generating significant ecological consequences. Ukrainian forces have long targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge in order to degrade Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine, and the attack on the *SIG* is likely part of a wider effort to disable ships involved in supplying Russian military forces and the location of the attack near the bridge suggests that it was part of a larger effort to disrupt Russian logistics along a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).⁶

Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia's Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17.⁷ The Ukrainian State Hydrographic Service at the State Service of Maritime and River Transport posted a notice to mariners on August 4 announcing a “military threat” in the vicinity of the internal and external roadsteads at the ports of Taman, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, Tuapse, and Sochi, until further notice.⁸ The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense also cryptically tweeted “Two can play that game,” without further context on August 5 - likely a reference to the Russian military's continued strikes against Odesa's port infrastructure since July 17.⁹ This Ukrainian warning may deter merchant activity and international commercial shipping to and from Russia in the Black Sea.

Russian Ports Affected by Ukraine's Notice to Mariners as of August 4, 2023



Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations. A Ukrainian naval drone struck the Russian *Olenegorsky Gornyak* Ropucha-class landing ship on the night of August 3 to 4.¹⁰ Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on August 5 that the damage to the *Olenegorsky Gornyak* is very significant and suggested that the ship will not be operational for some time.¹¹ The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that images of the ship show it listing at 30 to 40 degrees, which suggests either that several watertight compartments were breached by the drone strike or that the crew's efforts to control the damage were ineffective.¹² UK MoD reported that the *Olenegorsky Gornyak* is typically assigned to Russia's Northern Fleet but has lately been ferrying military and civilian traffic between Russia and occupied Crimea following traffic disruptions to the Kerch Strait Bridge caused by previous Ukrainian strikes.¹³ Previous Ukrainian interdiction efforts have mainly focused on Russian military targets on land, but it seems that Ukrainian forces are now expanding their efforts to include naval targets as part of these efforts. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated their commitment to a deliberate interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in order to degrade Russian logistics and defensive capabilities to set favorable conditions for future Ukrainian counteroffensive activity.¹⁴ **Ukrainian forces are thus continuing to set conditions for future decisive operations via an interdiction campaign as they did before and during counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in 2022, now striking much deeper into Russian rear areas and incorporating maritime targets.**

Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there. Ukrainian offensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern and northern flanks have slowed in recent days, and Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Ukrainian ground attacks in the area on August 5.¹⁵ The rate of Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area has also slowed in recent weeks. Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut have drawn additional Russian units and formations to the Bakhmut area and have kept Russian forces in the area, which was likely one of their primary objectives. Russian forces have deployed elite formations and units to support defensive operations around Bakhmut, including elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, the 11th VDV Brigade, the 106th VDV Division, and the 364th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate).¹⁶ ISW has also observed speculation that elements of the 31st VDV Brigade are now defending Bakhmut’s southern flank and inconclusive footage suggesting that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) recently arrived in the Bakhmut direction.¹⁷ The arrival of these units and formations in the Bakhmut area represents the commitment of a sizable amount of combat power that Russian forces could otherwise have used to support offensive operations in Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts or to reinforce Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian counteroffensive operations also appear to be successfully fixing Russian forces in this area, as ISW has yet to observe elements of these forces deploying to other parts of Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 4 that Russian forces are continuing to commit a large number of forces in the Bakhmut direction in hopes of recapturing recently lost dominant heights north of Bakhmut City.¹⁸

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia) directions. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in both areas and are advancing near Orikhiv.¹⁹ Russian sources have routinely characterized Ukrainian attacks in southern Ukraine as up to a company in size with minimal armored vehicle or tank support.²⁰ These small Ukrainian ground attacks indicate that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conserve uncommitted reserves for larger mechanized attacks. Limited Ukrainian ground attacks can set conditions for larger mechanized attacks when the Ukrainian deep interdiction campaign has generated effects on the battlefield and can also support Ukrainian efforts to achieve an asymmetrical attrition gradient. Larger Ukrainian mechanized offensive operations have been sporadic since the start of the counteroffensive in early June, and ISW did not observe visual evidence or other observable signatures indicating a large assault near Orikhiv that Russian sources claimed occurred on July 26.²¹ Russian sources may have exaggerated the Ukrainian attack in order to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as a failure. The *New York Times* reported that two anonymous Pentagon officials said on July 26 the “main thrust” of the counteroffensive had begun, although it was not clear if those officials were referring to the July 26 attack, and other unnamed US officials subsequently walked those comments back.²² Ukrainian forces are clearly not committing to large, massed mechanized counteroffensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction as their interdiction campaign proceeds, although they continue to conduct a series of variously-sized but relatively small attacks across the front line that are having the effects of fixing Russian forces in place, tiring them, and attriting them, as ISW has previously observed.²³

Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on August 3 that the White House does not expect any “tangible deliverables” from the talks in Saudi Arabia and that the talks are

a continuation of the process to promote a peace formula proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.²⁴

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days.**
- **Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia's Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17.**
- **Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations.**
- **Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas.**
- **Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kremmina line.**
- **Pardoned Wagner Group convict fighters continue to increase recidivism rates in Russia.**
- **Russian officials continue to transport Ukrainian children from occupied regions to Russia under the guise of summer vacations.**

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk on August 5 but made no confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).²⁵ Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov claimed on August 4 that Russian forces advanced 3-5km along the front line and 2km into Ukrainian defenses in the Kupyansk direction.²⁶ ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Kiselyov's claims, which are likely a part of a pattern of continued unverified Russian claims of extensive Russian gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.²⁷ Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces have concentrated the largest number of their forces in the Kupyansk direction.²⁸

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremmina line and advanced as of August 5. Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Verkhokamianske (18km south of Kreminna).²⁹ The Russian MoD and Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk claimed on August 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near the Serebryanske forest area in Luhansk Oblast and Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (34km south of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.³⁰ A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nadiya (15km east of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), and Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove).³¹ A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 4 that unspecified elements of the Russian 21st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Karmazynivka.³²

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and advanced as of August 5. Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows that Russian forces advanced further on the west bank of the Zherebets River west of Karmazynivka.³³ The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 5 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.³⁴ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced into Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove) and control the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.³⁵ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations near the Serebryanske forest area.³⁶

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any continued Ukrainian ground attacks in the Bakhmut direction on August 5. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on August 5 that Ukrainian soldiers in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian defensive operations and counterattacks have slowed Ukrainian advances in recent days.³⁷ The *Wall Street Journal* also reported that Ukrainian soldiers stated that Ukrainian advances have been marginal in the Bakhmut area due to heavy Russian artillery bombardments.³⁸ A Russian milblogger noted on August 4 that the tempo of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has notably decreased in recent days.³⁹

Russian forces counterattacked in the Bakhmut area on August 5 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from advancing near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).⁴⁰ Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 4 that Russian forces are committing a large number of forces to the Bakhmut direction and where they are focused on recapturing dominant heights north of Bakhmut.⁴¹ A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and attempted to move towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) from Bakhmut, but did not specify the results of these actions.⁴²

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on August 5. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Avdiivka and Staromykhailivka (19km southwest of Avdiivka).⁴³

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on August 5 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains south of Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka).⁴⁴ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka, Staromykhailivka, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).⁴⁵ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured three unspecified lines of Ukrainian fortifications northeast of Avdiivka and conducted assaults near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).⁴⁶ Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Deputy Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov claimed on August 4 that Russian forces advanced up to 2km into Ukrainian defenses along a 1.5km front in the Marinka area, although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of this claim.⁴⁷

Elements of the pro-Ukrainian, all-Russian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) claimed on August 5 that they destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Zaitseve, Donetsk Oblast (21km south of Bakhmut).⁴⁸ Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows an explosion at a Russian ammunition warehouse northwest of Zaitseve.⁴⁹

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on August 5 and made limited advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks in the Vuhledar area, advanced into contested territory, and reached unspecified Russian defense lines.⁵⁰

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 5 but did not make confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area).⁵¹ Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Urozhaine and two Ukrainian infantry groups northeast of Staromayorske and south of Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).⁵²

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 5 but did not make confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to recapture lost positions near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the direction of Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).⁵³ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).⁵⁴ Footage amplified on August 5 purportedly shows reconnaissance elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff [GRU]) operating in the Vuhledar direction.⁵⁵ Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) in the Velyka Novosilka area.⁵⁶

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast area).⁵⁷ A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing near Orikhiv and that Ukrainian infantry groups continue to attack Russian positions along the Kopani-Robotyne-Verbove line (10km southwest to 17km southeast of Orikhiv).⁵⁸ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully conducted up to a company-sized attack near Robotyne.⁵⁹

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 5 but did not make confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (13km southeast of Orikhiv).⁶⁰ Footage published on August 5 purportedly shows elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Sea Flotilla) operating near Robotyne.⁶¹

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are intensifying operations on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have increased activity in the Dnipro River Delta, intensified shelling on Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City), and that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions near Antonivsky Bridge and the adjacent dacha area.⁶² Footage published on August 5 purportedly show Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge with precision-guided munitions.⁶³

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Pardoned Wagner Group convict fighters continue to increase recidivism rates in Russia. *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty* reported on August 5 that Russian police arrested two former convicts who served in Wagner for the murder of six people in a village in the Republic of Karelia on August 3.⁶⁴

An Ossetian military source reported on August 5 that over 12,000 Ossetian men have left the North Ossetia–Alania Republic to fight in Ukraine.⁶⁵ The Russian Federal State Statistics Service assesses that about 680,748 residents live in the North Ossetia–Alania Republic as of 2023.⁶⁶ The Ossetian source’s claim, if true, means that almost two percent of the entire population of the North Ossetia–Alania Republic has deployed to Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to accumulate large losses from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Dutch open-source group *Oryx* assessed that Russian forces are visually confirmed to have lost at least 2,203 tanks between February 24, 2022, and August 5, 2023.⁶⁷ The *BBC* reported on August 4 that it was able to confirm the names of 29,217 Russian servicemen killed in action in Ukraine and that the full number of Russian war dead is twice as large.⁶⁸

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to transport Ukrainian children from occupied regions to Russia under the guise of summer vacations. Head of the Republic of Mordovia Artyom Zdunov visited 76 Ukrainian children and teenagers from occupied Kalanchak Raion (Kherson Oblast) and 18 chaperones at the “Lesnaya Skazka” sanatorium in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia on August 5.⁶⁹ The Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration claimed that Zdunov personally offered these children a vacation at “Lesnaya Skazka” which would last between July 17 and August 11.⁷⁰

Secretary of the United Russia Party General Council Andrey Turchak announced on August 4 that acting heads of the Russian occupation administrations – Denis Pushilin, Leonid Pasechnik, Yevgeny Balitsky, and Vladimir Saldo – will be the official United Russia Party candidates in regional elections in occupied Ukrainian regions scheduled for September.⁷¹

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

¹ <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/05/russian-tanker-hit-by-ukrainian-drones-russian-media-a82064>

² <https://suspilne.com/media/544475-u-kercenskij-protoci-morski-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-rosijskij-tanker-himovoz/>

³ https://t.me/boris_rozhin/94015; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50621>; <https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28545>; <https://t.me/rusbrief/142875>; https://t.me/morflot_gov/1484

⁴ <https://t.me/bazabazon/20202>; <https://suspilne.com/media/544475-u-kercenskij-protoci-morski-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-rosijskij-tanker-himovoz/>; https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1687589428947042307?s=20; https://t.me/morflot_gov/1484; https://t.me/tass_agency/204045; <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=27148>; https://t.me/grey_zone/19868; https://t.me/grey_zone/19863; https://t.me/tass_agency/204045

⁵ <https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28565>

⁶ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023>;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2023>

⁷ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2023>

⁸ <https://suspilne.com/media/544661-ukraina-ogolosila-pro-vijskovu-zagrozu-v-akvatorii-sesti-portiv-rf-u-cornomuri/>; <https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fhydro.gov.ua%2Fpoperedjennya%2FCoastal%2520Warning%2520118%2520War%2520risk%2520area%2520until%2520further%2520notice.doc&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK>;

<https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-issues-coastal-warning-threat-121200692.html>;

https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1687830626282385408/photo/1; <https://t.me/rusbrief/142965>

⁹ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2023>;

<https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1687873600655851520>

¹⁰ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2023>

¹¹ <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/08/05/vidnovyty-vdk-olyenyegorskij-gornyak-rosiyanam-bude-problematychno-andrij-yusov/>

¹² <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1687697529918373889?s=20>

¹³ <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1687697529918373889?s=20>

¹⁴ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2023>

¹⁵ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar080423> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar080323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar080223> ;

<https://isw.pub/UkrWar080123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar073123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar073023>

¹⁶ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2023>

¹⁷ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2023>

¹⁸ <https://armyinform.com> dot ua/2023/08/04/najbilsha-kilkist-syl-voroga-skonczentrovana-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-ganna-malyar/

¹⁹ <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50646>; https://t.me/mod_russia/28958; <https://t.me/wargonzo/14201>; <https://t.me/kommunist/18027>; <https://t.me/infantmilitario/104476>; <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1463>; https://t.me/rusich_army/10252; https://t.me/rusich_army/10253; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2511>

²⁰ <https://t.me/infantmilitario/104476>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2023>

²¹ <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2023>

²² <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/26/world/russia-ukraine-news>; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/26/boris-kagarlitsky-arrest-war-ukraine/>;

²³ <https://time.com/6300772/ukraine-counteroffensive-can-still-succeed/>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2023>

²⁴ <https://www.voanews.com/a/washington-upcoming-ukraine-talks-in-saudi-arabia-won-t-result-in-peace-deal-7211211.html>

²⁵

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0i7N4ac1uKn4JCmobnAQibLkvszynbt5oCf7FoS1ZrA1R9Z5NjVG2nDUSYijswAZ1>

²⁶ <https://t.me/kommunist/18022>

²⁷ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2023>

²⁸ <https://armyinform.com> dot ua/2023/08/04/najbilsha-kilkist-syl-voroga-skonczentrovana-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-ganna-malyar/

²⁹ https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10824; <https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1687734944053755904?s=20>

³⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/28972; https://t.me/mod_russia/28968

³¹ https://t.me/multi_XAM/635

³² <https://t.me/rybar/50434>

³³ https://t.me/veles_v_okope/730; <https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1687584484110057472?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1687584487226351618?s=20>

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⁴² <https://t.me/wargonzo/14201>

⁴³ https://t.me/mod_russia/28972

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/MishaDonbass/1082> ;

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⁴⁷ <https://t.me/kommunist/18022>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/astrapress/34491> ; <https://t.me/legionoffreedom/921>

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<https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1463>; https://t.me/rusich_army/10252; https://t.me/rusich_army/10253;

<https://t.me/batalyon15/2511>

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